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ABSTRACT 
This study traces the history of the programmes to electrify white-owned commercial fanns on 
South Africa's borders and black households, schools and clinics in the period 1980-1995 by 
Eskom, South Africa's public electric utility. In particular the study investigates why Eskom 
undertook these progranunes and their macro- and micro-economic impact on the South African 
economy. 
The history of Eskom's attempt to assume responsibility for the management of Greater Soweto' s 
electricity supply in the late eighties is also documented. Greater Soweto is South Africa's 
largest and most important black township, and is situated to the south-west of Johannesburg. 
The reasons for this initiative and its connection to Eskom's black household electrification 
progranune is exposed. 
The methodological approach to the study involves analysing political, economic and institutional 
intelligence concerning Eskom's electrification programmes gathered from primary and 
secondary literature sources and interviews with senior Eskom staff, and others, in qualitative, 
and, where appropriate, quantitative tenns. 
The results of this analysis suggest that politics played a crucial role in Eskom's decision to 
undertake these electrification programmes and that Eskom was an autonomous entity and lacked 
adequate regulatory oversight. With respect to the macro- and micro-economic benefits (GDP 
growth and job creation) arising from the progranune to electrify black households between 1990 
and 1995 these are shown to be very much smaller than those claimed by Eskom. The reasons for 
this difference are explored and explained in detail. It was also found that large scale cross-
subsidisation was required to sustain both the farm and black household electrification 
progranunes. 
These findings required that matters of energy policy with respect to the sustainability of the 
programme to electrify black households be addressed. These policy issues are dealt with under 
three headings, financial issues, economic efficiency and equity. Finally suggestions are made for 
the way forward so that the electrification of black households in South Africa may be sustained. 
KEY WORDS: SOUTH AFRICA, POLITICS, ESKOM, ELECTRIFICATION, REGULATION, 
FARMS, BLACK HOUSEHOLDS, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS. 
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GLOSSARY OF COMMON POWER GENERATING AND TRANSMISSION TERMS 
REFERRED TO IN THE TEXT 
AV AILABILITY 
The capacity of electricity generating plant available for use. Availability is usually expressed as a 
percentage of maximum generating capacity. The percentage availability may refer to a particular 
time or it may be the average taken over a period. Eskom's availability is usually measured as: 
Capacity hours available x 100 
Total capacity hours in year. 
BASE LOAD STATION 
A power station whose generating costs are low and which is, therefore, given load by day and 
night for long periods. 
EFFICIENCY 
The efficiency of the combined cycle of energy conversion is the ratio between the input of heat 
from the fuel burnt and the amount of heat in the units of electricity generated. Efficiency is 
usually expressed as a percentage. 
WATT 
The basic unit of electrical power. 
KILOWATT - HOUR 
The unit of electrical energy: one thousand Watts used for one hour (kWh). 
MEGAWATT 
One million Watts (MW). 
Power stations sizes are usually denoted by the MW generated e.g., Eskom's largest station 
generates 3600 MW. 
LOAD FACTOR 
This is the ratio, usually expressed as a percentage, of the energy produced over a given period to 
the energy that could have been produced at full output over the same period. Eskom uses the 
following formula for ANNUAL STATION LOAD FACTOR: 
kWh sent out x 100 
Assigned sent out rating x hours in year 
xviii 
PEAK LOAD 
The highest demand on the system for electric power during a period. 
PEAK LOAD STATION 
A high production cost power station which is only called upon to operate to assist with meeting 
an expected peak demand on the system, e.g., Eskom's Drakensberg Pumped Storage Station. 
TRANSFORMER 
Apparatus by which the voltage of an alternating current can be raised or lowered. 
TURBO-GENERATOR 
A machine to generate electricity driven by a steam turbine. 
VOLT 
The unit of electrical pressure. 
KILO VOLT (kv) 
One thousand volts. The unit used to characterise Eskom's electricity transmission system, e.g., 
an llkv line. 
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY 
1.0 THE AIM OF THE STUDY 
This study traces the history of Eskom's programmes to electrify 1) South Africa's white-owned 
commercial farms and 2) black, mainly urban, households in the period 1980 to 19951• Emphasis 
will be placed on the changing political and economic events and institutional structures which 
nurtured and governed these programmes. The history of Eskom' s attempt to take over the 
management of Greater Soweto' s electricity supply and how this initiative is connected to the 
Corporation's black household electrification programme is also documented for the first time. 
With respect to farm electrification the project's potential contribution to national security and 
political stability was considered to be a national priority. In the case of black households, the 
social contribution that electricity makes to people's quality of life is clearly important. The 
Department of Mineral and Energy Affairs (DMEA) in their first Annual Report (1980), and the 
late Mr Richard Castle, at an Eskom Commission meeting in 1980 (see Chapter 4), have 
commented thus on the first point and Eckert, Greyling and Van Seventer (1993, p.l) and Horvei 
and Dahl (1994, p.5) have commented thus on the latter point. 
Political and economic events surrounding the farm electrification programme have not hitherto 
been documented at all. With respect to the stated knowledge surrounding the electrification of 
black households this has been described by Eckert, Greyling and Van Seventer (1993, p.2) to be 
in a state of flux. This is probably because the available historical information on black household 
electrification is largely uncoordinated, has seemingly been gathered without a central plan and 
much of it has been left without critical historical analysis and has simply been accepted as being 
correct. For example it is claimed that the programme to electrify black households promoted 
large-scale job creation and GDP growth in South Africa, (see the supplement to Eskom's 1991 
Annual Report, "Eskom in Perspective"(p.17)). The magnitude of these claims are so large, 
however, that they can be called into question. Certain essential data, such as the cross-
subsidisation involved in, not only the black household electrification programme but the farm 
electrification programme as well, have also only been superficially commented upon in the 
literature. 
Eskom is South Africa's public electric utility. 
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By co-ordinating and analysing the extant historical data available and gathering supplementary 
data from interviews with people who were intimately associated with Eskom' s programmes to 
electrify white-owned farms and black households in the period 1980-1995, this study aims to 
determine, not only the political dynamic underlying the programmes so that a casual 
interpretation of why Eskom undertook these programmes may be offered, but the impact of the 
programmes on the South African economy as well. With respect to the electrification of black 
households from 1990 this impact will be measured in terms of changes in Gross Domestic 
Product (GDP), the Balance of Payments (BOP), employment creation, micro-economic variables 
at industry level and concomitant socio-economic effects on health. 
2.0 HYPOTHESES TO BE TESTED 
From what has been said already in this introduction three hypotheses present themselves for 
testing: 
1. Politics played a crucial role in Eskom's decision to electrify white-owned commercial farms 
and black households in South Africa between 1980 and 1995,the political forces obtruding 
rather than insinuating their presence;2 
2. The job creating potential and the growth in GDP arising from Eskom's programme to 
electrify black households between 1990 and 1995 were grossly overstated by Eskom by 
orders of magnitude; and 
3. Both the farm and household electrification programmes required large-scale cross-
subsidisation in order for them to be sustainable. 
The importance of these hypotheses rests on the fact that if they are correct, particularly with 
respect to 2 and 3 above, the proof will raise crucial questions on electrification policy and the 
efficient use of scarce resources so far as the continuance of Eskom's programme to electrify 
black households in South Africa is concerned. 
The first hypothesis demands that a fourth and related hypothesis also be tested, namely that 
Eskom functioned without an effective mechanism to check its actions in the period 1980-1995 
Concerning the political imperatives that conditioned Eskom's decision making with respect to the 
electrification of black households in South Africa it is further postulated that the government's 
reaction to unrest in black townships and the growing strength of white right wing opposition 
parties and the ANC' s attitude to public utilities was of prime importance and that social justice 
and equity, as embodied in public utility regulatory theory, was not. 
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and was therefore able to make investment and other decisions which were dependent on 
changing political events rather than on the normative rules underpinning the regulation of 
public utilities. In short it is postulated that Eskom was an autonomous entity and lacked 
adequate regulatory oversight. 
3.0 THE RATIONALE FOR UNDERTAKING THE STUDY 
Whilst there may be a hoard of opinion surrounding the history of the electrification of white-
owned commercial farms and black households in South Africa no definitive and organised 
historical study of the programmes exists. It is hoped that this study helps to fill that gap. Without 
such a study decision-makers are hampered in making intelligible the economic consequences of 
these past electrification initiatives and using knowledge of these consequences to guide future 
electrification policy formulation in South Africa. Furthermore, knowledge of the past 
consequences of money expenditure on electrification initiatives can influence the establishment 
of priorities for making funds available for the continuation of the electrification of black 
households in South Africa within national spending budgets. 
Such priorities may be conditioned by statements such as "Energy is generally considered the 
basic need of the poor community. Electricity is a relatively cheap, safe and efficient form of 
energy. Moreover given the current South African socio-economic status (compared for example 
to other African countries) electricity seems to be the most appropriate energy carrier for the 
exploding urban population of South Africa. Its availability could affect small business 
development, educational development and upward mobility in the consumer market. The other 
relatively cheap alternatives of coal and fuelwood, although perhaps currently more affordable for 
the poor section of the population, would represent a serious environmental threat for the country 
in the longer term", (Spies, 1991, p.8). Such benefits are doubly attractive when it is remembered 
that the majority of black households in South Africa in 1980 relied on traditional sources of 
energy such as coal, fuelwood, paraffin and gas. According to Turvey and Anderson (1977, 
p.161) the costs involved in obtaining such fuels are high and the benefits obtained from their use 
are relatively small with electricity being far superior in quality to these alternatives. 
The costs of obtaining the benefits of electrification cited above are also high, however. Therefore 
prior to policy-makers making decisions regarding the future of an on-going programme to 
electrify black households it is crucial to attempt to quantify the historical costs and benefits 
associated with the programme. It is also important to unearth the economic relationships and the 
political dynamics associated with the electrification process; e.g., how the programme impacted 
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the main macro-economic variables of the South African economy and the ability of consumers to 
pay for electricity as reflected in electricity usage patterns over time. 
Whilst there are several entities involved in the electrification of black households in South 
Africa, this study concerns Eskom's electrification programme only. This is scarcely a limiting 
factor, however, as in the period 1990 - 1995 Eskom was the catalyst that drove the 
electrification of black households forward. An exception is the electrification of Greater Soweto, 
which was carried out under governmental direction. Eskom were, however, intimately connected 
with that programme through their attempts to take over the management of the township's 
electricity supply and through being required to provide most of the bulk electricity necessary to 
meet the townships needs. Eskom is also the largest generator of electricity in South Africa and 
generated some 98 per cent of the electricity used in the country in 1995, (various large local 
authorities generating the remaining 2 per cent). The main electricity transmission system in 
South Africa is also under the sole direction of Eskom and the Corporation is the only electricity 
supply entity able to raise the vast amounts of capital necessary for undertaking a nation-wide 
electrification programme. It is fair to say that without Eskom the electrification of the black 
households in South Africa on a national scale would be unthinkable. 
4.0 THE PERIODISATION OF THE STUDY 
The periodisation of this study occupies the 15 years from 1980 to 1995. The period was chosen 
for many important reasons which are briefly discussed below. 
Prior to 1980 the domestic electrification process in South Africa was concerned with the 
provision of electricity to white (usually urban) areas. It was only from 1980 onwards that the 
electrification of the black households of the country got really under way. Furthermore, in 1980 
the Department of Mineral and Energy Affairs (DMEA) was established forming a single 
ministry, which was responsible for energy policy in South Africa. Through the DMEA the 
government began to take a keener interest in Eskom's affairs. 
The DMEA initially paid scant attention to household electrification but was concerned with the 
electrification of white commercial farms in remote border areas of South Africa, (DMEA Annual 
Report 1980). The electrification programme undertaken by Eskom from 1980 to 1990 was 
consequently concerned with the provision of power to these farms (see Eskom Annual Reports 
for the period) and it was therefore quite different in emphasis from the electrification 
programme that came after 1990. 
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The eighties saw Eskom continue with a massive (even by world standards) power station 
construction programme which had been started in the seventies and which would eventually 
result in the Corporation accumulating large debts and having an excess of electricity generation 
capacity. This excess capacity would ironically enable their programme to electrify black 
households in South Africa to become a reality after 1990. Eskom's economic performance in the 
early eighties also lead to the government's Commission of Inquiry into Electricity Supply in the 
Republic of South Africa, the so-called de Villiers Commission. Many far reaching institutional 
changes to Eskom resulted from this Commission and these greatly influenced the way Eskom 
thereafter approached the electrification of black households. 
By the mid, to the late 1980' s the electricity supply industry (ESI) in South Africa had also 
become fragmented. This fragmentation was to cause serious organisation problems for the 
electrification of black households. The fragmentation of the ESI was as follows: 
a) Eskom became the virtual monopoly generator of electricity, had sole control of the national 
electricity transmission grid, was supplying bulk electricity to a large number of 
municipalities and to the black homelands and was also supplying most large users of 
electricity direct, i.e., industry and mining, as well as supplying approximately 50 000 
domestic consumers around the country; 
b) The Transkei, Bophuthatswana, Venda and the Ciskei (the TBVC states) and Self Governing 
Territories (SGT's) were in the main distributing electricity, bought in bulk from Eskom 
directly to a very small number of consumers in their territories; and 
c) Approximately 450 (mainly white) local authorities were distributing electricity directly 
within their areas. They too were mostly buying electricity in bulk from Eskom. 
The result of this fragmentation was that industrial, commercial and mining consumers were all 
well served with electricity, almost all white households and many Indian and coloured 
households were also receiving electricity. Black households were very poorly served with 
electricity, however. It is not difficult to see the results of Apartheid planning and social 
engineering when electricity supply in South Africa is examined in the1980s. 
Important political events also occurred throughout the period from 1980 to 1995. For example 
the Black Local Authorities Act of 1982, which created local government structures for black 
urban areas, was passed. Such attempts at reform by the government were fought on an 
ideological basis by the Conservative Party. There was also increasing attempts by the ANC to 
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disrupt the South African economy. The mid to late 80's also saw the intensification of the 
liberation struggle by black communities. One strategy of which was the boycott of payments for 
services (including electricity in Greater Soweto) in black townships. These events had the effect 
of curtailing the electrification of black households between 1980 and 1990. 
From 1989 onwards, after F.W. de Klerk had replaced P.W. Botha as President, the government 
once more introduced political reform into South Africa and the ANC was unbanned. Eskom also 
proceeded with their so-called "Electricity for All" initiative. During the period 1992 to 1995 the 
ANC also began to get actively involved in the electrification of black households. In an effort to 
speed up the process they organised a national meeting on electrification in Cape Town. The 
result of this meeting was the formation of the National Electrification Forum (NELF). During 
the latter part of 1994 the NELF reached agreement on some important recommendations 
concerning the reorganisation of the ESI which were accepted by the government. A particularly 
important development in this respect was the establishment of the National Electricity Regulator 
(NER), an institution that would have an important bearing on Eskom's progranune to electrify 
black households and the regulation of the fragmented South Mrican ESI. 
The period starting in 1980 right up to the elections of 1994 which brought the ANC to power in 
South Mrica, was then one of great political economic and institutional change, which materially 
influenced the electrification of white-owned commercial farms and black households. The 
periodisation of this study is, however extended to the end of 1995, one year into the ANC's 
administration, thus allowing the impact of the ANC's Reconstruction and Development 
Programme (RDP) on Eskom's programme to electrify black households to be gauged. 
5.0 METHODOLOGICAL APPROACH TO THE STUDY 
The methodological approach to the study involves analysing the political, economic and 
institutional intelligence gathered on Eskom's electrification programmes from 1980 to 1995 in 
qualitative, and, where appropriate, quantitative terms. There are therefore two units of study; the 
South African political economy and the South African electricity supply industry as embodied in 
the national electric utility Eskom. 
So that the most objective quantitative research results are obtained the data used for estimating 
the economic impact of Eskom's black household electrification programme between 1990-1995 
will be disaggregated into primary and secondary effects. The primary effects result from 
expenditures on the electrification programme by Eskom. The secondary effects are those induced 
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by the programme. For example in the fonn of altered household expenditure patterns, such as 
the purchase of electrical appliances. These effects are further disaggregated into the direct, 
indirect and induced impacts on the South African economy. The direct impacts may be regarded 
as the first-round impacts on budgeted expenditure by industry and households. The indirect and 
induced impacts are then the second-round impacts that are determined from multiplier analysis. 
The analyses undertaken in this study uses at all times historical data gathered for the period 
1990 to 1995. As noted earlier the following economic indicators in particular are examined: 
a) Gross Domestic Product (GDP): Estimating the effect of Eskom's black household 
electrification programme on South Africa's GDP allows the electricity usage/national 
wealth creating pathway of the country to be gauged. The assumption being that a country's 
standard of living is related to the electricity used per capitalGDP ratio. Meinel and Meinel 
(1979, p.13) have pointed out in this regard that consumers that have low per capita energy 
use show high income inequalities. This will be shown to be the case with respect to newly 
connected black electricity consumers in South Africa; 
b) The Balance Of Payments: The effect of Eskom's black household electrification programme 
on the South African Current Account of the Balance of Payments will show how leakages 
on imported goods such as electrical appliances impacted the South African economy; and 
c) Employment Creation: Employment creation is one of the prime goals of the South African 
government. It is important therefore to focus on the comparative job creating potential of 
Eskom's black household electrification programme, both directly and in terms of the 
associated indirect and induced impacts of the programme in historical tenns. This allows 
the real, rather than the presumed, job creating potential of future electrification initiatives to 
be gauged. 
Input -Output analysis is used to determine how the macro-economic variables listed above 
reacted to Eskom' s black household electrification programme. This approach was chosen as 
being the most convenient and transparent for dealing with the interdependence of the various 
sectors of the economy impacted by the programme. 
6.0 AVAILABILITY OF DATA 
Certain historical data concerning electricity supply in South Africa and Eskom's electrification 
programmes was available from primary and secondary literature sources. Primary literature 
being composed of reports and papers describing original pieces of research (some of which were 
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commissioned by Eskom itself) yielding information not found in the public domain. For 
example, consumer response surveys covering wide areas of South Africa on induced household 
expenditure patterns resulting from Eskom' s programme to electrify black households, also 
information pertaining to the industrial sectors impacted by this programme. In this regard the 
electrical appliance manufacturing sector and the construction sector of the South African 
economy are of prime importance. Primary literature also yielded data on the financial, economic 
and technical aspects of Eskom's electrification programmes. The maiden source of the primary 
literature used in this study was Eskom's Electrification Archive, the Pricing Policy Archive and 
the Heritage Archive. 3 Information supplied by secondary literature was also used in the attempt 
made to unravel the political dynamic underpinning Eskom's electrification programmes. Such 
literature also provided international data on electrification which would be used for comparative 
purposes; it also provided general economic information of use in the study. The secondary 
literature referred to in this study was, unlike the primary data used, composed of published 
works readily accessible in the public domain. Amongst the secondary literature examined were 
two previous studies of Eskom's history and a considerable body of literature on the regulation 
and management of public utilities. It will be appropriate to briefly review this literature. The 
reasons for this, and the review itself is presented in the following chapter. 
In addition to this extant data and as noted in 1.0 above, an investigative effort involving 
interviews with senior personnel (some past, some present) ofEskom, the NER and the Transvaal 
Provincial Authority (TP A) was necessary. These interviews yielded data that supplemented the 
extant data found in the primary literature on Eskom' s electrification programmes and filled in 
information gaps where these existed. The gaps were numerous because events surrounding 
Eskom's electrification programmes were not always written down but existed in the minds of 
those connected with the programmes. Cross-referencing of the facts so gathered was therefore 
essential and was carried out whenever possible hence care has been taken that the value of oral 
tradition is not over emphasised in this study. These interviews also enabled a composite picture 
of how Eskom's electrification programmes were organised and managed and how politics 
influenced these programmes to emerge; a picture that would otherwise have remained shrouded. 
The interviews were always conducted face-to-face rather than by questionnaires or via the post. 
The former method was considered superior to the others because the ensuing discussions could 
explore important questions relating to Eskom' s electrification programmes in greater depth than 
would otherwise have been the case. Furthermore, after several interviews some trust was 
developed between interviewer and respondent, which resulted sometimes in frank comment 
It should be noted that these archives are not particularly well catalogued or maintained. 
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being made about interpersonal relations within Eskom which affected the programme to electrify 
black households in particular. 
So far as exercising the Input-Output (1-0) analysis referred to above was concerned sufficient 
expenditure data was found in primary literature sources. With respect to the 1-0 tables 
themselves the 1993 South African National tables were used to calculate the required 
multipliers. 
7.0 THE SCHEMA OF THE STUDY 
In addition to this introductory chapter, Chapter 1, there are nine other chapters to this study. The 
second chapter reviews some literature of importance to the study. The third chapter provides 
background information to the study and briefly reviews the development of electricity supply in 
South Africa from its inception in 1882 to 1980, the start of the periodisation of this study. The 
establishment of Eskom will be covered and the utility's importance in the South Mrican energy 
economy will be explained. 
Chapters 4 and 5 trace the history of the electrification of white-owned commercial farms on 
South Africa's borders and Eskom's first tentative attempts at electrifying black households in the 
period 1980 to 1990. The political dynamic underlying why the farm electrification programme 
was undertaken and why the electrification of black households in South Mrica was curtailed 
during this period will be examined in detail in Chapter 4. The magnitude of both these 
programmes in terms of farms electrified, the costs involved and the extent of Eskom' s 
programme to electrify black households will be dealt with in Chapter 5. 
Chapter 6 examines the history of the electrification of Greater Soweto between 1980 and 1986 
and describes Eskom' s attempt to assume responsibility for the management of the supply of 
power to this township from 1985 onwards after the advent of the Black Local Authorities Act. 
The reasons why Eskom made this attempt and the political and economic problems involved will 
be made clear. The costs to the South African taxpayers of electrifying Greater Soweto will also 
be analysed. 
10 
Chapters 7,8and 9 examine Eskom's programme to electrify black households in South Africa in 
the period 1990 to 1995. Again the political dynamic behind this initiative and the magnitude of 
the programme will be examined. The costs associated with the venture to South African 
taxpayers, in the form of electricity users, will also be estimated. A comprehensive historical 
analysis of the macro-economic benefits of the programme is also presented and the results of this 
analysis are compared with the benefits that popular opinion thought would arise from the 
programme. The micro-economic impact of the programme on particular sectors of the South 
African economy is also analysed. 
Chapter 10 concludes the study and includes a discussion on matters of energy policy and 
regulation arising from the results of the study. A way forward for sustaining the electrification of 
black households in South Africa and regulating the South African ESI is also suggested. 
The study also contains two Appendices. The first of these briefly describes 1-0 analysis and 
gives the multipliers derived from the 1993 National 1-0 tables which were used to estimate the 
macro- and micro-economic benefits arising from the electrification of black households from 
1990. The second appendix presents some photographs of newly electrified areas and 
electrification equipment. 
Whilst the electrification of white-owned commercial farms, Eskom' s attempt to take over the 
management of Greater Soweto's electricity supply and Eskom's national programme to electrify 
black households in South Africa from 1990 may appear disparate they are in fact not so. They 
are interrelated and interconnected one to the other and present a holistic picture of the 
electrification process in the period 1980 to 1995. The connection between them is the lessons 
Eskom learnt in electrifying white-owned commercial farms and in the attempt Eskom made to 
take over the management of Greater Soweto's electricity supply which were put to good use in 
Eskom's so-called "Electricity for All" initiative after 1990. 
With respect to farm electrification Eskom had to overcome problems of manpower and capital 
shortages and the logistics of physically connecting widespread rural areas to the national grid in 
the most efficient way. Furthermore, in the late 80's rural tariffs were examined critically by 
Eskom and the true costs of electrifying rural areas began to be understood. In their attempt to 
take over the management of Greater Soweto' s electricity supply in the late 80' s Eskom, for the 
first time, had to deal with non-governmental black entities such as the Soweto Peoples 
Delegation. Problems of the politicisation of electricity supply to black townships therefore 
presented themselves. Eskom also realised that pure engineering solutions to electricity supply in 
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black townships would not work and that the social dimensions of such supply had to be taken 
into account as well. 
Overcoming these problems conditioned the approach made by Eskom's management to their 
national electrification programme from 1990 onwards and allowed the Corporation to 
successfully electrify nearly one million black households, farm dwellings and various rural 
schools and clinics in the period 1990 to 1995. 
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CHAPTER 2 
LITERATURE REVIEW: HISTORIES OF ESKOM AND THE 
REGULATION AND MANAGEMENT OF PUBLIC UTILITIES 
1.0 INTRODUCTION 
The purpose of this chapter is to very briefly review two recent histories of Eskom and literature 
on the regulation and management of public utilities. Reviewing earlier historical studies of 
Eskom will enable the following questions to be answered 1) How does the present study relate to 
these earlier studies? and 2) what does the present study add to the stated knowledge on Eskom's 
history? Reviewing the literature on regulation will expose the hypotheses underlying the 
normative theory of public utility regulation and identify the principles which should ideally have 
been used to regulate and manage Eskom. This review will therefore provide a basis for judging 
how efficient the mechanisms that were in place for regulating Eskom up to the formation of the 
NER in 1994 really were. This will allow a conclusion to be reached concerning whether the 
fourth hypothesis postulated in Chapter 1 of this study is correct or not. 
2.0 PREVIOUS HISTORIES OF ESKOM 
Two definitive studies of Eskom's history exist; one by Renfrew Christie (1984) and one by 
Nancy L. Clark (1994); these will be reviewed in turn. 
2.1 The Christie Study 
The Christie Study, Electricity and Class in South Africa (1984), was based on that author's 
doctoral thesis of 1978 entitled The Electrification of South Africa 1905 - 1975. The book 
examines the history of electricity policies of the South African government and industrialists 
during that period. Christie postulated that electricity was extensively used by the state to power 
the particular interests of apartheid and therefore served the interests of the state and the owners of 
property; his study purports to show how this came about. 
Christie's study therefore sets out to show that electricity was not used in South Africa to serve the 
common good but rather to serve the particular interests of a certain class of society, the white 
minority, as opposed to the black majority. Christie mentions in this regard that electricity was 
used by the capitalist state and by the owners of property to serve their own particular interests of 
"control and capital accumulation" (p. 359). Christie further contends that :"electrical engineers 
and their controllers" (p. 359) (presumably he means the staff and management of the Victoria 
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Falls Power Company, the first monopoly supplier of electricity in South Africa, and Eskom and 
the South African government) tried to increase profitability in South Mrican industry by adopting 
labour-saving mechanical devices to reduce the labour required in productive processes. The 
resulting created wealth accrued to the owners of property not the non-owners and particularly not 
the black 'working and peasant class of South Africa' " (p. viii). 
Christie goes on to say that the technical achievements resulting from electrification were massive 
(p. 361) but its political and economic ones were equally so. This statement seems to dilute the 
strength of Christie's original hypothesis that only capitalist and industrial (white) society 
benefited from the electrification of South Africa between 1905 and 1975. 
Christie's study differs from the present study in a mnnber of ways. Firstly the time period is 
different, the present study covers the period 1980-1995 as opposed to the 1905-1975 period 
studied by Christie. The present study follows on then from just after where Christie left off; it 
therefore adds another chapter to the history of Eskom. Secondly the present study concentrates 
on a narrower field of research than does Christie's study, being concerned with Eskom's farm 
and black-household electrification progranunes only and not with the larger socio-political 
concerns of state electrification covered by Christie 4• 
Christie's study leaned heavily on material in the archives of the Prime Minister of South Africa 
and the private papers of Bernard Price the resident general manager in South Africa for the 
Victoria Falls Power Company. 
2.2 The Clark Study 
The second history of Eskom, Nancy L. Clark's Manufacturing Apartheid: State Corporations in 
South Africa (1994), deals with the history of state enterprises and their role in protecting the 
apartheid government. The motivation for this study according to Clark was that such 
corporations had "received scant scholarly attention" (p. xi) with scholars apparently giving "little 
thought to the state corporations briefly describing them only as the cornerstone of national 
capitalist development" (p. xi). 
The state corporations studied by Clark included Eskom and covered the period 1920 - 1960 in 
detail. Some brief coverage (about 3 pages of text) is given to the period from 1960 to 1988. A 
chapter on the privatisation of state enterprises (chapter 7 pp. 164-169) gives some coverage of 
this issue and Eskom in the period 1970 - 1988 in general terms only. Like Christie's work Clark's 
4 Certain conclusions drawn by Christie from his study will be seen to parallel conclusions drawn 
from the present study. These conclusions are documented in Chapter 10, the final chapter of this 
study. 
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study also centres on archival research; Clark used the Pretoria Central Archive and the Standard 
Bank Archive in Johannesburg. The present study was likewise centred on archival material. 
Clark's research reveals that state corporations, rather than embodying narrow political interests 
operated on a complex series of political and economic planess. Clark concluded that state 
corporations were ever changing, they did not operate on predetermined objectives and were 
seriously affected by the personalities of the men who ran them6. Clark attempted to answer 
questions such as why the state institutions were established in the first place and how their 
operations changed in response to political and economic pressures 7• 
The present study attempts to complement both the earlier studies into the history of Eskom. The 
period researched here is later than covered by both Christie and Clarlc and brings the stated 
knowledge concerning Eskom's history closer to the present day. It is true that Chapter 2 of the 
present study does briefly cover the period examined by both Christie and Clark; it does however 
emphasise issues different from those covered by these two authors and is primarily concerned 
with marshalling background material for the present study. The field of research undertaken in 
this study is also much narrower (and the time span much shorter) than that covered by Christie 
and Clark. Certain questions concerning Eskom's management practices and motives run like a 
theme through the three studies, however. 
3.0 REGULATION AND THE MANAGEMENT OF PUBLIC 
UTILITIES 
The literature on the regulation and management of public utilities such as Eskom is vast; there are 
numerous specialised book-length publications and countless articles on the subjects by managers 
and public utility regulatory theorists and empiricists. This section, for the reasons already stated, 
reviews what a small selection of that literature has to say on certain topics which are considered 
of importance to the present study so far as the regulation of Eskom is concerned. The discussion 
is divided into two parts, a general discussion conducted around non-pricing issues and a more 
specialised discussion on public utility rate fixing. The general discussion is undertaken first. 
The present study tends to confmn that that was also the situation with Eskom. 
This study confmns that this was also the case with Eskom. 
This study also attempts to address this question, particularly with the changing nature of Eskom in 
the period 1980-1995. 
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3.1 General Discussion 
3.1.1 Public utilities and regulation 
The literature on regulation recognises that some industries, commonly called public utilities, in 
which competition is not fully effective, must be regulated by government to protect the public 
interest, (Phillips, 1988, p. 3); the literature also notes that "the tenn public utility is one of popular 
usage rather than precise definition", (Bonbright 1961, p. 3). Public utilities are, however, easily 
recognised and electric utilities are traditional examples of such enterprises. The question of 
whether a company is a public utility or not is, according to Crew and Kleindorfer (1980), 
essentially technical though there is a body of legal and historical precedent to support the views 
that an industry must be of some public or social significance to be considered a public utility. 
The technical features that define a public utility are, according to Crew and Kleindorfer (1980), 
those that give rise to economies of scale (this topic will be discussed again presently)8, and lead to 
these entities being tenned natural monopolies. 
The traditional approach to defining a natural monopoly is that of a single product industry. 
Natural electric monopolies are, however, multi-product industries; as pointed out by Webb and 
Ricketts (1980, p. 74) they supply high- and low-voltage electricity to a variety of different 
consumers. Baumol (1977, p. 809) has suggested that in such a case a natural monopoly has the 
following characteristic "the cost of the sum of its output vectors is less than the sum of the costs 
of producing them separately". Baumol argues then that in defining a natural monopoly this is the 
characteristic sought, since it implies that every output combination can always be more cheaply 
produced by a single finn than by several competing finns. Simply put in mathematical tenns for 
a multi-product cost function C(x) in a set of products N = (1, ... , n), if for any m output vectors 
Xl, '" , x'" of the goods in N then C(xl + ... + x"') < C(XI) + ... + C(x"'). 
The literature also makes clear that public utilities differ in several respects from other enterprises 
in the economy and tend to operate more efficiently as natural monopolies (Phillips, 1988), but as 
Kaysen and Turner (1959, pp. 48-49) point out if this monopoly power is to be controlled for the 
general welfare it must be regulated9• In its common usage then the tenn public utility refers to a 
diverse group of businesses which should ideally be subjected to regulation by the state. One of 
the tasks of this study is to show whether Eskom was adequately regulated or not. 
The point being made by Crew and Kleindorfer (1980) with respect to economies of scale is that 
there are clearly cost-savings in having, for example, in the case of electric utilities, one large 
supplier of power to a particular area as opposed to several small suppliers that duplicate power 
generation and transmission facilities. 
There are dissenters to regulation, however. Grey (1940) for example, argued that it was fanciful to 
believe that the power of monopolies can be harnessed to the public interest by the imposition of 
regulation (in the case ofEskom it will be shown that Gray's argument has some force). 
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What makes the public utility regulator's task difficult, however, is information constraints. 
Laffont and Tirole (1992, p. 1) suggest that information constraints "limit the efficiency of control 
of industries by government agencies". Two types of information constraint are usually specified 
in the literature on regulation, these are termed "moral hazard", which refers to the endogenous 
variables that are not observed by the regulator and "adverse selection", which refers to exogenous 
variables which arise when a public utility has more information than the regulator. In this respect 
Laffont and Tirole (1993, p. 2) have pointed out that the managers of electric utilities invariably 
know more about their business than do those charged with regulating the utility. Information 
constraints therefore inevitably mean a loss of control by the regulator over the public utility. This 
situation will be shown to be the case with Eskom. Whilst information constraints have always 
been important from the very beginnings of regulation, the literature emphasises that it is only in 
the last decade or so that such constraints have been analysed explicitly with regard to public 
utility regulation. The importance of information constraints is demonstrated by the prominence 
given to the subject in Laffont and Tirole's (1993) book on regulation. Armstrong, Cowan and 
Vickers (1993, p. 37) also assert that finns are in reality much better infonned about many aspects 
of running their business than is the regulator; the problem facing regulators therefore is to design 
regulatory regimes that motivate the finn to use its superior information for the public goodlO. 
3.1.2 The importance of public utilities 
One obvious important characteristic of public utilities is the services they provide to the economy 
in general and to individual consumers in particular. Eskom's black household electrification 
programme is a potent example of such a service. Phillips (1988, p. 9), commenting on the 
importance or electric public utilities, states that, between 1920 and 1970 the use of electrical 
energy doubled every ten years in the USA. The same phenomenon can be observed in South 
Africa. The contribution made by electricity to economic growth in South Africa will be discussed 
in the following chapter. The literature is clear that the economic significance of public utilities 
adds weight to the hypothesis that such enterprises should be regulated. 
3.1.3 Environmental change, public utilities and regulation 
The literature on regulation asserts that managers of public utilities have, since 1970, had to deal 
with a changing economic environment, the reasons for which are various. For example, prior to 
1970 the rate of inflation as well as interest rates were generally low and stable world-wide 
(phillips, 1988, p.ll); with the oil crises of the 1970s this economic situation changed 
10 This will be an important task facing the South African National Electricity Regulator, which was 
established in 1994, in the years ahead. 
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dramatically, however. Because the regulatory process is geared to the prevailing economic 
environment, Perry (1981, p. 5) notes that the task of regulators, to ensure that the benefits of 
progressively higher efficiencies achieved by the managers of public utilities are passed to 
consumers, became more difficult in the changing economic environment after 1970 as costs of 
production rose. 
Inevitably during this period tariffs increased because of this situation and in South Africa and 
elsewhere there was public opposition to these increases (see Chapter 4). Gormley (1983, Chapter 
2) gives a description of the situation in the USA and Joskow (1974) commented that the 1970s 
were years of change and experiment for public utility managers and regulators alike. Norgaard 
and Riley (1983) state that difficulties with public utility regulation arose in the 1970s because the 
regulatory process was geared to the past with regard to the management and pricing 
methodologies used. This, as will be shown, was the case with the regulation of Eskom. 
Phillips (1988, p. 20) points out that after 1970 the issues brought before regulators in the USA 
shifted in emphasis from a utility's total revenue requirements to its tariff design, this also became 
an issue in South Africa as will be shown. Phillips goes on to say that prior to 1970 public utility 
tariffs were developed by the utilities themselves, especially by their engineers, and that the 
theoretical basis for their tariffs was often difficult to discernll . 
3.1.4 Economic factors of regulation 
Phillips (1988, p. 43) asserts that regulation is an economic, legislative and legal concept. The 
legislature in the USA, for example, denotes which industries to regulate, the decision being based 
upon an industry's economic characteristics, prevailing social philosophies and political 
considerations. In South Africa, it will be shown that social philosophies incorporated in the 
politics of apartheid were major influences in the way Eskom operated and was regulated. 
Kaysen and Turner (1959) have suggested that regulation may be necessary when competition 
cannot exist for long and an unregulated market will not produce competitive results. Such a 
situation can arise from an economic viewpoint, due to the capacity of one firm to supply the 
demands of the market. Where such a situation arises ruinous competition may result if more than 
one firm operates in that ma.tket. This is why one electric utility (a natural monopoly) usually 
serves an entire market as is the case with Eskom in South Africa 
II As will be shown this was certainly the case with Eskom (see Chapter 3) and was one of the reasons 
for dissent by electricity conSlllllers in South Africa. 
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In the literature regulation is predicated in some instances on the idea that decreasing costs can be 
achieved by a monopolist exhibiting economies of scale, being allowed to operate in a particular 
market, (Phillips, 1988, p. 47). This was an issue in Eskom's take-over of the Victoria Falls Power 
Company in 1948. There are, however, as pointed out by Stelzer (1980), three types of decreasing 
costs, short-run, long-run and those which reflect technological progress. Stelzer asserts that long-
run decreasing costs provide a justification for the regulation of public utilities since short-run 
decreasing costs may be found in many industries and therefore they do not provide a rationale for 
detailed regulation. Eskom, like many public utilities, is probably characterised by long-run 
decreasing costs and is therefore a prime candidate for detailed regulation. This is because long-
run decreasing costs arise from the fact that at any point in time, the unit costs of adding capacity 
declines as the size of the additional production facility increases. Eskom always adhered to the 
philosophy of increasing the size of their electric power generating sets over time, as will be 
shown when the Corporation's generation expansion progranune from 1970 is discussed in 
Chapter 3. 
When economies of scale permit only one supplier in a market the public is not assured of 
obtaining the benefits accruing from decreasing costs however, the monopolist may even raise 
prices. Phillips (1988) asserts therefore that the presence of a monopolist calls for at least some 
degree of regulation. He specifically points out that significant permanent economies of scale, 
indicating large-scale monopolistic operations appear to be found especially in the generation and 
transmission of electric power, and electric utilities should therefore be regulated. 
3.1.5 Non-economic factors of regulation 
Non-economic factors are also important in shaping public policy decision making and the 
regulation of public utilities. With respect to such factors Phillips (1988 p. 53) comments on what 
is perhaps the most important of these factors, the strict control of entry into the public sector. 
Such control is used for two main purposes, namely to allow only suitably qualified firms into the 
market, and to protect the existing firms already in the market12. Anderson (1980, pp. 23-24) 
suggests that this form of regulation i.e., entry into a market, is justified on the grounds that it 
protects consumers and provides them with a platform for airing grievances and controlling the 
social and political power of monopolists where essential services such as the supply of electricity 
is concerned. With respect to Eskom, this form of regulation did not in fact protect customers 
from high rises in electricity tariffs in the early 1980s (see Chapter 4). 
12 The National Electricity Regulator of South Africa, as will be shown, is currently having difficulty 
with this aspect of regulation. 
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3.1.6 The origin of regulation 
Crew and Kleindorfer (1988, p. 93) suggest that "once the notion of overwhelming scale 
economies and therefore of a natural monopoly is accepted, a seemingly clear explanation and 
justification of monopoly regulation appears to be readily available in terms of simple neo-
classical analysis". The origins of monopoly regulation can be discerned then, as stemming from a 
simple trade-off between market power and scale economies, which suggests an ongoing concern 
with economic efficiency as the basis for public utility regulation. Glaeser (1957, p. 196) argues, 
however, that the practice of regulation did not develop along the lines of economic efficiency but 
rather that the prime concern was equity and a notion offairness. He mentions that the "regulation 
of private industry has been attempted by government from the earliest times, and all attempts at 
such regulation owed much to a very ancient ideal of social justice, which, as applied to the 
economic life of the early Church fathers, became their very famous doctrine of justum pretium or 
'just price' ". 
The literature on regulation suggests then that the underlying hypotheses which explain the origin 
of regulation can be traced to the desire for economic efficiency, fair prices, social justice and 
equity13 rather than economic efficiency per se. The pricing structure of public utility outputs in 
terms of the literature on regulation will be discussed below. 
3.1.7 The goals of public utility regulation 
According to Lewis (1966, p. 219) the task of public utilities is to provide the public with as much 
of a product and as good a service as the public want and is willing to pay for14 and that the 
principal goal of public utility regulation, within the limits set by its authority and its capacity, is 
to translate this task into operating terms and see that it is carried out. Phillips (1988, pp. 164-165) 
observes that in carrying out this goal regulators have a) sought to prevent excess monopoly 
profits and inequitable price discrimination among different groups of consumers, b) sought to 
ensure that public utilities continue to develop and expand within consumer demand, c) sought to 
provide services to the maximum number of consumers, d) sought to develop rate structures 
(tariffs) which promote growth and development such as the provision of electricity to rural areas, 
and e) concerned themselves with safety issues, such as those attached to the generation of 
electricity by nuclear means, and the efficiency of public utility managers and staff. Shepherd and 
Gies (1968) add that an important economic goal of regulation is to ensure the efficient allocation 
13 
14 
It will be shown that with respect to the provision of electricity in South Africa equity was narrowly 
defmed up to 1990 along apartheid political lines and that economic efficiency and growth 
objectives were the prime concerns of regulation so far as Eskom was concerned. 
This has always been considered by Eskom's management as one of the Corporation's prime 
functions; within of course the political constraints of apartheid politics. 
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of scarce resources. This goal would suggest the adoption of a marginal costing regime for the 
output of a public utility. This topic will be discussed in more detail below. 
Other goals of public utility regulation which are mentioned in the literature and are considered 
important by regulators are, social (as opposed to economic) objectives. Social objectives are 
sometimes difficult to define, however. Bonbright (I % 1, p. 110) commenting on these objectives 
refers to the importance of tariff structures which make the supply of utility services responsive to 
social needs, e.g., tariff structures that make the provision of electricity to black households in 
South Africa affordable. 
Averch and Johnson (1962) assert that public utilities are not isolated from the rest of the 
economy, an assertion supported by Phillips (1988, p.62) who points out that public utilities "have 
always operated within the framework of a competitive system in providing their customers with 
products and efficient service. They must therefore obtain capital, labour and materials in 
competition with unregulated industries I 5". Phillips (1988) goes on to say that the goals of 
regulation should, as a consequence of this competition also seek to encompass the encouragement 
of new methods, improved quality, increased efficiency, cost cutting and the development of new 
markets. 
3.1.8 The rationale for regulation 
This section looks briefly at four theories of the rationale of public utility regulation commonly 
cited in the literature. 
a) Public Interest Theory 
This theory is the oldest theory of regulation and Mitnick (1980) suggests that it is more often 
"implied rather than articulated". The theory holds that public utilities are regulated to protect 
consumers from abuse arising from market imperfections as a consequence of a public utility's 
monopolistic power. In this theory regulation is therefore purported to be a legal substitute for 
competition in a particular market. Posner (1974) asserts that the theory is based upon two 
assumptions, the first being that markets tend to operate in a very inefficient way if left alone, the 
second being that the transaction costs of regulation are virtually zerol6. Because regulation is not 
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It will be shown that Eskom was burdened with such competition during the decade 1980-1990 in 
particular with respect to the resources needed by the Corporation to carry out the electrification of 
white-owned commercial farms in South Afiica. Eskom's regulatory mechanism, the Electricity 
Act of 1922, as amended, was of little use to them in this endeavour. 
This second assumption is, however, wrong. Regulation is not costless either in terms of money or 
the allocation of scarce resources. 
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costless there may be an inadequate staff complement with respect to the regulation of public 
utilities; certainly with respect to Eskom the numbers of people charged with the regulation of the 
Corporation will be shown to have been few in number. The term "public interest" itself is, 
however, a rather vague term. Crew and Kleindorfer (1998, p. 105) comment on this and suggest 
that monopolistic regulation, with respect to public utilities, is a response to public outcry, or 
demands by the public to correct inequitable or inefficient practices by a utility. It will be shown 
that after 1980 there were several instances where consumers complained about Eskom's tariff 
structures rather suggesting that the regulation of the Corporation was inadequate with respect to 
the public interest. 
b) Captive Theory 
Captive theory, according to Crew and Kleindorfer (1988, p. 175) holds that regulating bodies, 
which are primarily established to protect consumers as per public interest theory, are eventually 
captured by the industry they are supposed to regulate, i.e., they become tools of public utilities 
themselves. It will be shown that because of Eskom' s dominance in the South African Electricity 
Supply Industry the Corporation to all intents and purposes effectively captured the bodies put in 
place to regulate the Corporation. Posner (1974) suggests that capture theory can be divided into 
two classes, the economic theory of regulation and the political scientists' formulation. The 
political scientists' formulation draws attention to the role of pressure groups in capturing the 
regulatory process. It will be shown that the white commercial farmers in South Africa exerted 
such pressure on Eskom via the govermnent that the Corporation's mandate to operate at neither a 
profit or a loss was put in jeopardy, i.e., one of the rules regulating Eskom between 1980 and 1990 
had no effect so far as the electrification of white-owned commercial farms was concerned, see 
Chapter 5. 
c) Interest Group Theory 
Interest group theory depends on the hypothesis that regulation, and the behaviour of regulators 
themselves, is dependent on the desires of interest groups, and the agendas of political parties. 
Interest group theory, according to Trueman (1971), focuses on the formation of mergers between 
the regulated industry and consumer groups, the former obtaining some greater profits and the 
latter obtaining lower prices than they would have done in an unregulated market, these benefits 
being obtained at the expense of unorganised consumer groups. In South Africa, and as mentioned 
already, white commercial farmer organised themselves into a powerful consumer group. Support 
for the farmers coming from a govermnent that wanted the farmer's vote in the decade 1980-1990. 
Also as previously mentioned the type of consumer behaviour exhibited in interest group theory 
penalises certain consumers on occasions and therefore regulation posited on this theory does little 
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to enhance broad social welfare policies. Regulators can be seen in the case of interest group 
regulation as mere arbitrators between various special interest groups and the public utility. 
d) Equity-Stability Theory 
This theory tries to explain the need for regulation in tenns of replacing the market with 
institutional arrangements which better promote equity, i.e., fairness and social welfare 
improvement. Regulation under this theory places great emphasis on equity to the detriment of 
economic efficiency where this impinges on equity considerations. The Equity-Stability theory is 
therefore concerned with social objectives and stability as opposed to economic efficiency 
objectives and change. Equity and fairness are, however, judgmental issues and regulation based 
upon this theory could send wrong economic signals to consumers with respect to tariff 
structuring. This theory does not seem to have had great influence with respect to the regulation of 
Eskom and its dealings with South African Society as a whole. 
From the brief descriptions given above it is clear that these theories, each of which attempt to 
explain the rationale of public utility regulation, have common areas of overlap and some of 
Eskom's actions, as will be shown in this study, can be explained with reference to them. 
3.1. 9 The A verch -J oh n son effect 17 
This section briefly comments on what Crew and Kleindorfer (1988, p. 121) describe as one of the 
major issues in the economic theory of regulation: the Averch-Johnson effect.. Crew and 
Kleindorfer (1988) assert that the Averch-Johnson effect has received "more attention in the recent 
literature on the economic theory of regulation than any other topic" . 
Averch and Johnson showed mathematically that the marginal rate of technical substitution of 
capital for labour (-dL/dK) is lower for a public utility that is regulated than for a finn operating 
under cost-minimisation. The Averch-Johnson effect is described by Crew and Kleindorfer (1988, 
p. 123) as follows: "Given the assumed convex shape of production isoquants it follows 
immediately that under regulation capital is over-utilised and labour under-utilised relative to any 
cost-minimising solution", a simple, but elegant, mathematical fonnulation of the basic Averch-
Johnson effect can be found in Crew and Kleindorfer (1988, pp. 121-123). 
This effect is extremely important since it shows that under regulation an inefficiency can be 
introduced in the capita1/labour ratios of public utilities. What results then is that in attempting to 
17 An empirical study of the Averch-Johnson effect for selected American and Canadian electric 
utilities was undertaken by Neil Wilson Mather in his doctoral dissertation entitled: "An Empirical 
Study of Public and Private Supply of Electricity". University of Wisconsin - Madison, (1975). 
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prevent monopolists exploiting consumers, and thus concerning themselves with equity 
considerations, regulation can introduce economic inefficiency into the public utility management 
process. 
The Averch-Johnson effect shows that under regulation public utilities are sometimes encouraged 
to over-build e.g., electric utilities build more power stations and increase their capital stock more 
than would be the case under the cost-minimising pressures of the market. It will be shown that 
Eskom's management policies resulted in an Averch-Johnson effect. 
3.2 Public Utility Rates 
The literature on public utility regulation and management is, as has been shown in the discussion 
so far, concerned with a wide range of issues that are designed to provide consumers with high 
standards of service, safety of operations and efficiency of management. Phillips (1988, p. 163) 
points out that one of the issues that regulatory commissions in the USA spend much of their time 
on is rate regulation. Rate regulation has two dimensions, these being 1) control of the rate level 
i.e., the earnings of public utilities and 2) control of the rate structure itself. The time spent by 
regulatory commissions on these topics indicates how important is the oversight of public utility 
tariff levels to the regulatory process. 
Armstrong, Cowan and Vickers (1994, p. 13) suggest that where a market is supplied by a single 
firm (which is essentially the case with Eskom) in the absence of regulation the monopoly could 
charge prices that would result in "a dramatically inefficient allocation of resources". They further 
maintain that one way to curb the problem of market power by a monopoly supplier is via price 
regulation. Laffont and Tirole (1992, p. 19) also emphasise the importance of the normative 
aspects of natural monopoly pricing to successful regulation. 
Phillips (1988, p. 168) also asserts that the method of establishing public utility rates constitutes 
one of the most fundamental differences between public utilities (i.e., the public sector) and the 
remainder of the private enterprise system. In the non-regulated industries rates are usually 
determined by market forces, i.e., supply and demand. Public utility rates are, however, usually 
determined by the regulator because of the absence of these market forces. It will be shown that in 
the case of Eskom rate levels, and the structure of electricity tariffs, were determined by the 
corporation itself, generally without interference from the bodies charged with regulating the 
Corporation. 
The following section briefly discusses three pricing regimes that are commonly considered in the 
literature on public utility pricing to constitute the benclunark, or ideal case, for tariff structuring. 
Here the regulator and the utility have symmetrical information. Such information would include 
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consumer demand characteristics, the utility's cost structure and importantly, the opportunities 
available to the utility for instituting cost reductions in the production process. The benchmark 
case covers three pricing possibilities, namely, marginal cost pricing, average cost pricing and 
non-linear pricing. Determining the desired ideal pricing structure is important for regulatory 
purposes and policy making since it is only by establishing a benchmark that the economic and 
social costs to consumers of a utility deviating from this benchmark can be gauged. 
3 . 2 . 1 Mar gin a I cos t p r i ci n g 18 
When a fIrm offers a price for its product to all consumers that equals marginal cost, then output is 
efficiently allocated. A price in excess of marginal cost results in a loss of welfare or allocative 
inefficiency. Mathematically the marginal costing rule can be simply explained thus: Let C(Q) 
be the firm's cost of producing a total output Q, and let C.(Q) be the firm's marginal cost. If 
aggregate demand at price P is Q(P) efficient marginal cost pricing occurs at price PI if 
PI = C. (Q(pI))19. It is sometimes argued in the literature (see Armstrong, Cowan and Vickers 
(1994), Crew and Kleindorfer (1988), Laffont and Tirole (1992), and Hotelling (1938), for 
example) that the government should make lump sum monetary transfers to public utilities to 
ensure that marginal cost pricing is observed, i.e., provide a direct subsidy to the fIrm out of public 
funds. This suggestion demonstrates how important these authors consider marginal cost pricing 
to be with respect to public utility rate fIxing. Setting the price of a public utility's output at the 
marginal cost level will also ensure that the important regulatory goal of efficient resource 
allocation is achieved, see section 3.1.7 above. 
3.2.2 Average cost pricing 
Care must be taking in applying marginal cost pricing rules, however, because for public utilities 
exhibiting increasing returns to scale setting the price of their output equal to marginal cost results 
in the utility making a loss. In such cases the literature suggests that setting price equal to average 
cost is best in terms of overall social welfare subject to the constraint that the utility breaks even, 
see Armstrong, Cowan & Vickers (1992, p. 16). Setting a public utilities price equal to average 
cost can therefore be viewed as a practical compromise between the desire for the efficient 
18 
19 
Ruggles (1971, pp. 11-12) gives a brief history of the development of marginal cost pricing 
beginning with the work of Dupuit, a French engineer in 1844, and ending by describing the 
modern treatment of the concept from Harold Hotelling in 1938 onwards. Ruggles (pp. 16-30) also 
gives a detailed assessment of the controversy surrounding marginal cost pricing in terms of its 
welfare basis. Chapter 4 of Webb and Ricketts (1980) is also a useful source of information on the 
benefits of marginal costing with respect to energy pricing. 
There are two caveats to this rule. Firstly where externalities occur in either the production or 
consumption of a public utility's output then the cost function C(Q) should be modified to include 
these costs. Secondly if there are other distortions in the economy, then it may be desirable to 
adjust the marginal cost to counterbalance these. 
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allocation of resources, i.e., pricing the utilities output at marginal cost, and the need for the ftrm 
to at least break even and not make a loss. The ftnancial health of public utilities is clearly 
important if they are to meet what Lewis (1966) (see section 3.l.7 above) describes as the task of 
public utilities. 
3.2.3 Non-linear pricing 
A solution to the problems of increasing returns to scale mentioned above, rather than a mere 
compromise via average cost pricing, is where the regulator adopts a non-linear pricing regime for 
a public utility as opposed to the situation where the price is the same for each unit of the utility's 
output, i.e., where a linear pricing regime is in force. 
A common class of non-linear price mentioned in the literature on public utility pricing (see 
Armstrong, Cowan & Vickers (1992, pp. 18-24)) is the so-called two-part tariff; this is the type of 
tariff favoured by Eskom. A two-part tariff requires consumers to pay a ftxed charge A in order to 
buy any quantity of the utility's output, e.g., electricity, and in addition a marginal price P per unit 
of output, (a kilowatt-hour, say). The total charge for electricity for example would then be A + 
Pq where q is the amount of electricity consumed. 
A two-part tariff results in a fIrst-best allocation of resources with price equal to marginal cost, 
with the addition of the ftxed charge A allowing the unit price of the utility's output to be ftxed at 
marginal cost while covering the utility's ftxed costs20. Two-part tariffs do, therefore, have the 
effect of keeping many consumers in the market in the case of a homogeneous customer base. 
Thus is was that in the case of Eskom and the electriftcation of white-owned commercial farms 
such a tariff was introduced to make it easier for such farmers to afford to have their farms 
electrifted and to ensure that none dropped out of the market for electricity on the grounds of their 
inability to pay. 
3.2.4 Criticism of marginal cost pricing 
The literature on public utility rate ftxing offers several criticisms of marginal cost pricing, three 
important ones are considered below. 
20 1bis arrangement breaks down when consumers are heterogeneous, however, because those who 
are prepared to pay very little for the product (or those who cannot afford the fixed charge) would 
drop out of the market. 1bis situation is clearly inefficient since some consumers would be quite 
prepared to pay a price at least equal to the marginal cost of the product for some units of the 
product. For example black households that would use a small amount of electricity for lighting 
purposes only. As will be shown, although Eskom favours the two-part tariff it is doubtful whether 
the variable part of the tariff was structured around a marginal price for each unit of electricity sold. 
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a) In the absence of lump sum transfers i.e., subsidies to public utilities by government to 
finance deficits arising from marginal cost pricing, as suggested in the literature, see section 
3.2.1 above, the government must resort to taxes that distort income distribution, capital 
formation and private consumption expenditure; in this situation distortions are caused 
elsewhere in the economy. This is illustrated in modem public finance theory thus: if the 
government raises Rl society pays R(l+~»Rl, ~ being the shadow cost of public funds21 . 
b) Whilst many economists have supported marginal cost pricing several of them have expressed 
reservations about it as a policy recommendation. Laffont and Tirole (1992, p. 29) mention 
Allais' view in this regard. A1lais (1974) asserts that the absence of a budget constraint in 
such a pricing structure would create inappropriate incentives for cost reductions by the 
utility. 
c) A practical criticism of marginal cost pricing, which directly applies to electricity supply and 
the building of new power stations, was raised by Wilson (1945) and was cited by Ruggles 
(1971, p. 24). Wilson raised the objection that in making investment decisions under marginal 
cost conditions there would be no test of the accuracy of the forecast22 . 
3.2.5 In Defence of marginal cost pricing 
A practical defence of marginal cost pricing for the outputs of public utilities was made by Farrell 
(1971, pp. 44-63). Farrell develops a thesis based upon the hypothesis that whilst the objections 
raised against marginal cost pricing are formidable they constitute no reason for abandoning this 
pricing rule and setting prices at some other level. Farrell considers the objections to the marginal 
pricing rule to largely exist in economic theory only and that in the practical world they rarely, if 
ever, occur. He accepts that the adoption of a simple pricing rule does not mean that deviations 
from that rule may not be necessary under certain conditions, but argues that this is quite a 
different matter to doing without the rule. 
21 
22 
Ruggles (1971, p. 31) commenting on this point says "before the system (the marginal cost system: 
author's addition) can be considered complete some consideration must be given to the method of 
fmancing these subsidies". In the literature, many supporters of marginal cost pricing have failed to 
consider this question according to Ruggles (1971 ). 
This is be a very weak criticism, however, since past experience would be a guide to the accuracy 
of the forecast. 
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3.2.6 Choices with regard to public utility rate fixing 
In spite of the theoretical criticisms of marginal cost pricing Laffont and Tirole, (1992, p. 33) 
suggest that marginal cost pricing should be the leading normative approach to models of rate 
making (tariff structuring) in regulated public utilities. Clearly the eminently practical defence of 
marginal cost pricing by Farrell (1971) provides support for this suggestion. Phillips (1988, pp. 
171-172) has also lent support to marginal cost pricing in his comments on the preferred tariff 
structures for public utilities. He asserts that in recent years increasing public utility rates have 
added a new dimension to the tariff structuring problem and that tariff design has become the 
single most important issue in public utility ratemaking. He comments further that economists 
have concluded that the traditional approach for public utility tariff design based upon average 
total costs should be replaced with a marginal cost approach to ensure the efficient allocation of 
scarce resources and promote their conservation. 
Literature on tariff structuring and the regulation of public utilities does, however, accept that the 
adoption of marginal cost pricing presents both theoretical and practical problems, an example of 
one such problem being provided in item c) of section 3.2.4 above. Phillips (1988, p. 172) even 
goes as far as to suggest that the concept is "feared by some customers". He may be referring to 
large consumers of a public utility's product, for example, mining and manufacturing enterprises 
that require large bulk electricity supplies for new investments they may make. The fear here is 
that marginal cost pricing for such power supplies may require existing electricity tariffs to suffer 
substantial increases over tariffs based on average costs. 
These fears aside, the literature on public utility pricing does suggest the adoption of tariffs based 
upon marginal cost principles as being the ideal solution for tariff structure setting for the output of 
public utilities. 
4.0 CONCLUSIONS 
This chapter has attempted to show where the present study fits into the extant literature on the 
history of Eskom. It is suggested that the present study adds a further chapter to this literature 
bringing the stated historical knowledge on Eskom closer to the present day. 
With respect to the review of the literature on the regulation of public utilities there is vast 
literature in welfare economic foundations and public policy decision making underlying the 
normative basis for natural monopoly regulation. Only a very few authors have been examined 
here, however, and the hypotheses underlying the practice of public utility regulation commented 
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upon are those that, as will be shown (when hypothesis four is analysed), had a direct bearing on 
the management of Eskom in the period occupied by this study. 
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CHAPTER 3 
HISTORICAL OVERVIEW OF THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE 
ELECTRICITY SUPPLY INDUSTRY IN SOUTH AFRICA: 
1882-1980 
1.0 INTRODUCTION 
This chapter provides a brief historical overview of the development of the electricity supply 
industry in South Africa from its inception to 1980. The purpose of the chapter is to provide 
background information to the study. This is attempted by reviewing, and bringing into 
perspective, events of an earlier period to that covered by the study itself, some of which had an 
important influence on Eskom's electrification programmes from 1980 onwards. Reviewing the 
history of Eskom prior to 1980 will also show how Eskom was regulated up to that date and help 
prove that an autonomous spirit did indeed exist amongst Eskom's managers up to that time. In 
particular the chapter addresses the following questions. 1) How important was electricity to the 
development of the South African economy? 2) What were Eskom's priorities, so far as providing 
electricity to the nation, really centred upon? and 3) Was the electrification of South Africa's 
black households neglected or not up to 1980? Prior to addressing these questions it is 
appropriate to begin the chapter by outlining how electricity benefits the industrial sector and 
households in South Africa. 
2.0 THE INDUSTRIAL AND DOMESTIC BENEFITS OF 
ELECTRICITY 
Industrial development in the twentieth century has seen the composition of energy supply move 
towards electricity and liquid fuels thus removing some of the constraints of other energy forms to 
economic growth. For example electricity removed the limitations which were imposed on factory 
processes in the manufacturing sector by mechanical energy systems involving belt driven 
machinery for transmitting power. Factory reorganisation was therefore made possible and the 
electric motor enabled increases in productivity to occur from improved factory layouts and better 
working conditions, (Schurr, 1979, p.21). The locations of different industries were likewise 
influenced. Geographical constraints on factory locations previously imposed by railways for coal 
delivery for mechanical plant fell away with the advent of the national electricity grid and stand 
alone electricity generating sets driven by liquid fuels. As Landes (1972, pp. 282-288) puts it, 
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"Electricity freed the machine and the tool from the bondage of place ... it made power ubiquitous 
and placed it within reach of everyone ... by its flexibility and convenience electricity transformed 
the factory". 
Mining enterprises also benefited with electric power enabling deeper and deeper ore bodies 
being recovered. Gold miners in particular were transported to very deep level workings by 
electric hoists, a feat which would have been quite impossible by means of steam power. The 
working conditions in mines were also made acceptable via air conditioning and electric lighting. 
It is important to note, however, that in adopting electricity as a major power source in 
manufacturing and mining it was not substituted marginally for other factors of production such 
as capital and labour. Instead electricity produced results that could not have been achieved by 
capital and labour alone. 
Electricity has then the potential to remove the constraints that steam power has traditionally 
placed on industrial development. Without an adequate supply of reliable electricity the mining 
revolution that resulted from the discovery of diamonds and gold in South Africa and the 
subsequent manufacturing revolution could not have occurred. Landes (1998, p.40) commenting 
on energy and industrial revolutions says "All industrial revolutions have at their core an 
enhancement of the supply of energy, because this feeds and changes all aspects of human 
activity". Tireless electrical energy is particularly important for encouraging such change. In 
South Africa for example the developments resulting from electricity being used in the 
manufacturing and mining sectors were necessary preconditions for economic "take-ofJ" being 
met. 
These preconditions according to de Kock (1924), cited in de Jong (1975, Vol. 2 p. 124), were 1) 
the provision of better and cheaper transport facilities to the interior of the country, 2) more 
capital being made available for railway development and communication systems such as 
telephones and the telegraph, 3) export products, in addition to wool, being developed which 
could absorb the high transportation costs from the interior to their final markets so that foreign 
exchange could be earned, 4) a market for agricultural products in the interior being established 
and 5) sources of revenue, other than import duties, being found for the treasuries of the two Boer 
republics of the Orange Free State and the Transvaal and the two British coastal colonies of the 
Cape and Natal. 
The domestic use of electricity has also brought many benefits to mankind. These include electric 
light, allowing the day to be effectively lengthened, home entertainment has been enhanced by 
radio and television, and time savings have accrued by rural black families spending less time 
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gathering fuelwood. Health benefits have also come about from electric space heating and 
refrigeration. Electricity has also the potential to raise the living standards of the previously 
disadvantaged people of South Africa by providing them with reliable, clean and safe power in 
their homes. Increased production of goods and services by the amplification of human effort 
from the use of electricity has therefore enabled marked improvements in living standards to 
occur. 
The removal of constraining influences to industrial development by the use of electricity in 
South Africa resulted then in increased local regional and national economic growth in the 
mining and manufacturing sectors of the economy. The following sections, demonstrate the type 
and magnitude of this growth, later chapters will comment on the domestic benefits brought 
about by the provision of electricity. 
3.0 ELECTRICITY SUPPLY 
3.1 The Period 1882 - 1902 
As is the case in the rest of the world the history of electricity supply in South Africa is one of 
continuous change. In this respect the introduction of electricity into the country was inextricably 
linked to the discovery of diamonds in Kimberley and gold on the Witwatersrand and the 
changing economic milieu ofthe country, i.e., from an agrarian society to an industrial society. 
Diamonds were discovered at Kimberley in the Northern Cape in 1867. The history of the 
diamond diggings in Kimberley can be divided into three distinct phases. The first of these was 
the time of the small claims digger who had very little capital. The second phase, which extended 
from about 1875 to 1888, is where small diggers lost their place as a consequence of the diggings 
becoming deeper and requiring a more capital intensive engineering approach to diamond 
extraction. During this phase small diggings were bought up by share companies. These 
companies were continually being merged to control diamond production and sales. The third 
and final phase, which started in 1888, was when Cecil John Rhodes and Barney Barnato 
founded the De Beers Consolidated Mines, leading to monopolistic power in the industry and the 
control of world diamond sales, (de Jong, 1975, Vol.3 p.16). The provision of electricity was an 
essential ingredient to this third stage development which aided de Kock's fifth precondition for 
economic take off cited above. 
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In 1886 gold was discovered on the Witswatersrand in the Transvaal and certain farms in the 
Heidelberg district were proclaimed public diggings. 23 Claims were soon bought up by various 
diamond barons from Kimberley and there was therefore considerable capital available for 
developing the goldfields from profits made at Kimberley. Because the gold found on the Rand 
was not alluvial, extracting the gold required underground mining and the South African 
economy was not able to supply all the capital needed for this, however, because of it's 
underdeveloped state. There was then an influx of foreign capital made possible by the business 
connections that the diamond barons had built up over time. As a consequence there was no room 
for the small miners who had found success at Kimberley, only heavily capitalised enterprises 
could hope to extract the available gold on the Rand. By 1890 mining shafts were getting deeper 
and deeper and electricity was necessary in the mines for the reasons stated earlier if the mining 
industry was to develop further. With the discovery of gold two important events followed 
rapidly, Johannesburg was founded and so was the South African Chamber of Mines in 1887. 
The Chamber of Mines was an institution that was to playa significant role in the development of 
the gold mining industry in South Africa. 
In addition to the more illustrious diamond and gold discoveries coal was also discovered during 
this period. Commercial coal mining first took place at Newcastle in Natal in 1885. In 1887 coal 
was also discovered at Boksburg in the Transvaal and two years later at Brakpan and Springs, 
also in the Transvaal. The major coal fields of South Africa are in the southern and south-eastern 
Transvaal, northern Natal and the northern Free State. All these coal fields were conveniently 
located for providing coal to the diamond and gold mines for use in steam generation for ore 
crushing, hoisting the ore from underground and providing power for compressed air. As deeper 
ore bodies were mined electricity replaced steam power on the gold mines. Electricity usage in 
coal mines themselves also increased, for such activities as hoisting, conveying and drilling as the 
coal mining industry developed. 
With the discovery of diamonds, gold and coal economic benefits and disbenefits came about in 
South Africa, the era of pre and early capitalism ended and the beginnings of modem capitalism 
emerged. The immediate benefit of the mineral discoveries was that preconditions for economic 
take off materialised. In 1876 a telegraph line was built from Cape Town to Kimberley and an 
undersea cable from Cape Town to Europe was laid. Kimberley was connected to the coastal 
23 Ibis proclamation was made on the 8th September 1886, see Staats Courant Zuid Afrikaansche 
Republic, p.8;, vo1.2.SJP Kruger State President, W Edward Bok, Secretary. Ibis document was 
Johannesburg's birth certificate. Prior to the proclamation one George Harrison went to Pretoria, 
the capital of the Transvaal, and filed the following affidavit with the State Commissioner: "My 
name is George Harrison and I come from the newly discovered goldfields .. .1 have long experience 
as an Australian gold digger and I think it a payable goldfield". How right he was. Harrison sold 
his claim for £ 10 and promptly disappeared, Tri~cott (1893). 
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states by telephone in 1882. Of particular importance were the substantial capital inflows for 
investment in the diamond mines, the railways and the expansion of telegraph and telephone 
lines. In 1861 there were only 3,2 kilometres of railway line in South Africa. After the discovery 
of diamonds and gold Kimberley and Johannesburg were linked to the harbours by rail. By 1891 
there was 4 048 kilometres of railway line and by 1980 South Africa was criss-crossed by 23447 
kilometres of rail, (Swart, 1983, p.100). After 1870 investment for development could be raised 
without a great deal of difficulty and the revenues of the Free State and the Cape Colony 
increased dramatically. Kimberley was the first South African industrial community and for the 
first time problems of capital formation and labour became important. Competition between black 
and white people, not for land or capital, but for a place in industry also resulted from the 
discovery of diamonds, (de Kiewiet, 1972, p.89). Economic disbenefits arising from the mineral 
discoveries included the speculative motive, which gave rise to repeated over-straining of the 
existing capital infrastructure and financial crises. Coupled to these problems there was the 
withdrawal of labour, entrepreneurship and capital away from sectors of the economy, which 
were unconnected with the mining industry. 
Perhaps the most important social consequence resulting from the diamond, gold and coal 
discoveries was the rapid urbanisation that made its appearance in the interior of South Africa. 
Urbanisation caused a sudden change in South Africa's historical development. Prior to 1870 the 
economy of the interior of South Africa was agrarian with white immigrants becoming farmers. 
People were widely spread throughout the interior of the country. In contrast diamond diggers, 
and the gold and coal miners, congregated in or near to the workings and mining camps were 
erected which grew into the cities of Kimberley and Johannesburg. As other gold fields were 
discovered a whole string of towns was established along the world's richest gold reef, viz., 
Springs, Brakpan, Benoni, Boksburg, right down to Carltonville and from there into the Free 
State where towns such as Welkom and Virginia were established. With the development of 
manufacturing industries which can be traced to the mining industry, towns such as Vereeniging, 
Vanderbijlpark and Sasolburg resulted, an area called by Van Jaarsveld (1973, p.9) the "Ruhr" 
region of South Africa, cited in Swart (1983, p.99). Because electricity was the motive power in 
the development of the gold mines of South Africa it can be asserted that without electricity this 
urban development would have been seriously curtailed. As these urban areas expanded the 
municipalities demanded ever more electricity. A new social order also gradually emerged with 
black townships being developed next to white municipalities from which labour was drawn. 
As the South African economy began to develop as a consequence of the gold and diamond finds, 
four categories of electricity supply came about, these were as follows: 
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1. Municipal undertakings which largely supplied electricity for lighting purposes, public 
transport and small industrial developments; 24 
2. Privately owned electric companies, which supplied electricity mainly in bulk to the gold 
mining industry and also to certain municipalities;25 
3. Privately owned mining companies which generated electricity for their own use26; and 
4. The railways, which generated electricity for their own use prior to 1910. 
The mining companies installed their own electricity generating plant because they believed that 
that was the most economical and efficient option available to them and, in addition, it would 
ensure a secure supply of power. The railways also decided to generate their own electricity 
simply because there were few, if any, suppliers that could meet their particular needs. They too 
were also concerned with security of supply and this influenced their decision, (Vos, Vol. 2, 
p.12). So far as the various municipalities were concerned some of them built small power 
stations for the same reason as the railways i.e., because there was no other supply of electricity 
available to them. Legislation of the time protected the right of local government to supply 
themselves with power by ensuring that no electricity supplier could operate in municipal areas 
without the permission of the local authority. 27 
The private electric companies were formed when it was realised that the gold mining industry 
would be demanding in the future, far more power than they had available from their own 
generating plant and would not necessarily want to enter the electricity supply business but 
concentrate on their gold mining activities, (Vos, Vol.2, p.9). 
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Kimberley was the fIrst town in South Africa to have street lighting from electricity in 1882. By 
1891 Johannesburg's streets were also lit by electricity, likewise by 1892 Pretoria, by 1895 Cape 
Town, by 1897 Durban, by 1899 East London, by 1900 Bloemfontein and in 1906 Port Elizabeth 
had an electricity supply system for street lighting, (Poole, 1982); see also Eskom, (1982). 
Examples of these companies are the Victoria Falls and Transvaal Company, the Rand Central 
Electric Works, the Rand Mines Power Company and the General Electric Power Company. These 
companies will be discussed later in this chapter. Details of these companies are given in Vos 
(VoU, pp.40-l9l). 
Examples of these companies are the De Beers Consolidated Company and the Robinson Mining 
Company, both of which generated their own electricity at Kimberley and on the Witwatersrand, 
(Vos, Vol. 1, p.2 and Searle, pp.6-7). Both the Vos fIles and the Searle paper are undated. 
For example the Natal Law No 20 ofl89l, the Natal Ordinance No 6 of 1911, Ordinance No 17 
of 1916 of the Cape Colony, Ordinance No 27 of 1912 of the Orange River Colony and the 
Transvaal Local General Ordinance of 1912. 
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The Gennan finn of Siemens and Halske foresaw the possibilities of using electricity in lieu of 
steam power as an energy source for the goldmines. 28 As a matter of business policy the Siemens 
and Halske concessions29 were ceded in 1895 to the Rand Central Electric Works Ltd., (RCEW) 
which they established. The RCEW then proceeded to build an electric power station at Brakpan, 
which was completed in 1897. This was the first electricity supply undertaking built in South 
Africa, (Vos, VoU, p.2). 
Another concession for electricity supply to the Witwatersrand was granted in 1897 to the 
Simmer and Jack Mines Ltd; for the supply of electricity to five gold mines owned by the 
Consolidated Goldfields Group which were part of the RhodeslBeitlRudd mining consortium, 
(Hadley, 1913). Upon receipt of this concession the Simmer and Jack Mines, in a like manner to 
Siemens and Halske, established in 1898 a subsidiary called the General Electric Power Company 
Ltd., and the concession was ceded to this company which then built the Driehoek Power Station 
which was commissioned in 18983°. 
Another interesting initiative took place in the five years from 1895-1890, which had a 
considerable influence on electricity supply in South Africa. This concerned the possibility of 
using the Victoria Falls to generate hydro-electricity for use by the mines and also for assisting 
the development of areas around the Witwatersrand which were without electricity, (Vos, Vol.l, 
p.2). 
This scheme was the brainchild of Professor George Forbes.3J He approached Cecil John Rhodes 
and explained to him the political benefits of harnessing the power of the falls so that electricity 
could be supplied to the gold mines of the Witwatersrand32. Rhodes gave Forbes pennission to 
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Siemens and Halske were already established in South Africa having obtained in 1887 the 
concession (or licence) from the government of the South African Republic to supply electricity to 
the Johannesburg and Pretoria Municipalities, (Hadley, 1913); also see Jacobs (1941). 
Since in 1894 they had in addition obtained the concession for transmitting electricity to the gold 
mines of the Witwatersrand. The conditions of the concessions may be found in Agreement No 
37611894 of the South African Republic represented by W.J. Leyds the State Secretary, cited in 
Hadley (1913). 
The Simmer and Jack grant was ceded to the General Electric Power Company Ltd; by Deed of 
Cession No 14221M11903 dated the 1 6th of March 1899 registered in the Deeds Office in Pretoria 
on the 24th of August 1903, cited in Hadley (1913). and Vos (Vo1.2, p.15). 
Forbes was the designer of the two-phase generators in place at the recently completed Niagara 
Falls hydro-electric scheme in Canada. This scheme was at the time the largest electric power 
generator in the world, Searle, (p.8) 
Rhodes had acquired the mineral rights for the area between the Limpopo and Zambezi Rivers 
from Lobengula the king of the Matebele and Moshone in 1888. Rhodes had in addition obtained 
from Queen Victoria political power over this area in 1899 under a Royal Charter granted to 
Rhodes's British South Africa Company. 
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investigate the scheme. The investigations indicated the Victoria Falls scheme was indeed a 
viable proposition. In 1901 the African Concessions Syndicate Ltd; was formed and obtained the 
lease for exploiting the entire electric power potential of the Zambezi River, (paulet, Lord Henry, 
1934). 
The period between 1899 and 1902 was the time of the Anglo-Boer war or, as it was sometimes 
called, the Second War of Independence. Hostilities broke out on the 11th October 1899 and 
lasted until the 31st of May 1902 when the Treaty ofVereeniging was signed at Pretoria. The war 
seriously disrupted the generation of electricity by the RCEW33 In particular commandos of the 
Boer forces destroyed part of the plant and buildings at the Brakpan power station; some of the 
commandos were recognised as former employees of the RCEW. The attack took place at about 1 
a.m. on the 20th of January 1901.34 
3.2 The Period 1903 - 1914 
This period encouraged entrepreneurs to concentrate on bringing electricity to the developing 
parts of South Africa and flamboyant individuals began to seize commercial opportunities 
connected with electricity supply. There was for example Lewis and Marks the owners of the 
Vereeniging Estates Ltd. These estates bordered the Vaal river and the riparian rights to this 
water was held by the estate owners. There was also coal on the estates. Thus the three prime 
requirements for erecting a power station were available to Lewis and Marks, i.e.; space, energy 
sources and a cooling medium. This opportunity was not lost on these two men and they promptly 
built a weir, called the Sammy Marks or Leslie weir, in the river and obtained wayleaves to erect 
power lines between Vereeniging and the gold fields of the Witwatersrand, (Hadley, 19l3). 
Another influential figure during this period was H.C. Behr a consulting engineer to the 
Consolidated Goldfields Group. He developed a design for an electrically driven winding gear 
that could be used underground for transporting ore to the surface from great depths. Such an 
undertaking could not be achieved using steam power and allowed even deeper mining to take 
place. 
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Report of the directors of the RCEW presented to the shareholders at the Sixth Ordinary General 
Meeting of the company held at Winchester House, Old Bond Street, London, on Tuesday the 31 st 
July 1900 at 12 o'clock noon, (Vos, Vol. 1, p.l2l). 
See the minutes of the meeting between Colonel Colin McKenzie, the Military Governor and 
managers of the RCEW held at Johannesburg on 22nd January 1901, (Vos, Vol. 1, p.132) 
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Another innovator was Robert Hammond, who in 1905, showed that large central power stations 
could produce much cheaper electricity very reliably when compared with numbers of small 
stations35. Cheap power was of vital importance for the gold mining industry and of course for 
South Africa's macro-economic development in general, (Main, 1936). Hammond also had the 
vision to see that the Victoria Falls Power Scheme proposed by Professor Forbes would be an 
ideal large electricity generating undertaking meeting his criteria as a source of cheap power. He 
did, however, have a preference for large fossil-fired power stations located at the mines, which 
supplied them with coal.36 
Although the RCEW Brakpan power station had been built in 1897 its management foresaw the 
increased demand for electric power which came about after the Anglo-Boer war. They 
accordingly got the Transvaal Colonial Government to ratify the concessions which had been 
granted to them by the former Transvaal Republican Government. This was achieved in 1906 and 
the concession was extended to 1948. Armed with this they proceeded to raise capital to expand 
the RCEW. 
The promoters of the Victoria Falls electric power scheme were equally aware of the potential 
demand for electricity by the gold mines of the Witwatersrand and they too wanted to be in the 
forefront of those supplying power to meet this demand. Accordingly they commissioned the 
consulting engineering firm of Douglas Fox and Partners of London to check the robustness of 
the feasibility report prepared by Professor Forbes concerning power provision from the Victoria 
Falls and which had been completed in 1900, (Vos, Vol. 2, pp.19-24). The full report is contained 
in Annexure 35 of the Vos Files. 
Whilst this was being done the Victoria Falls promoters, the African Concession Syndicate Ltd., 
approached Rhodes' Consolidated Goldfields Group and the Eckstein Group, another large gold 
mining syndicate, with offers to supply them with electric power from the Victoria Falls. This 
offer was, however, rejected.3? The African Concession Syndicate Ltd., were quite undeterred by 
the rejection of their offer and immediately floated the Victoria Falls and Transvaal Power 
Company Ltd., and registered it in Southern Rhodesia on the 17th of October 1906. In common 
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See a notice of appreciation for Hammond's work in the South African Institute of Electrical 
Engineers Commemorative Journal 1909-1930 on the Institutes' 21 st Anniversary. 
Eskom's large modern power stations developed since the 1960's are all located at the mouth of 
the mines supplying them with coal. 
This rejection was the direct result of AW.K Pierces' (the consulting engineer to both Rhodes's 
Group and the Eckstein Group) view that the Falls scheme would be of no value to these 
companies because the power would be both expensive and unreliable compared to electricity 
purchased from the existing power stations located on the coalfields of the Transvaal, (Vos, Vol. 
2, p.27). 
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South African parlance the company was known the Victoria Falls Power Company, or simply 
the VFP, and this appellation is used throughout this text. All rights and concessions held by the 
African Concessions Syndicate Ltd., were ceded to the VFP. The VFP now proceeded to buyout 
the RCEW38 and furthermore formed an agreement with Lewis and Marks to take over their 
wayleaves for power line construction to the Witwatersrand and buy water from the Sammy 
Marks weir and also coal from the Vereeniging Estates Ltd., (Hadley, 1913). The VFP then came 
to an agreement with Consolidated Goldfields that they would supply them with electric power 
from a new power station, which they would build in the Transvaal by 1909, (Price, 1916). 
Another important event occurred in 1909, the Rand Mines Group (which was the largest mining 
house in South Africa at the time) decided to electrify as much of its mining equipment as 
possible. They did not, however, wish to generate their own power. This event presented an 
opportunity for W.C. Harper who made an agreement with the Rand Mines Group to supply their 
electricity needs39. He likewise concluded a similar agreement with the Eckstein Group. All in all 
seventeen mines were to be supplied with power. The agreement called for the supply of 
compressed air as well. 40 
Upon concluding this agreement Harper returned immediately to London to raise finance to build 
the power station which would be necessary to supply the electricity and compressed air he had 
contracted to deliver, (Vos, Vol.2, p.112). Harper also attempted to gain technical support for the 
venture from Charles Hesterman Mertz a prominent consulting engineer to the electric power 
industry and, as will be shown, an important figure in the development of South Africa's 
electricity supply industry.41 Harper saw that it would aid his cause in raising the necessary 
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See the minutes of an extraordinary general meeting of the VFP held on Monday March 25th 1907 
at Winchester House, Old Bond St; London, EC; also the 1st prospectus of the VFP dated 15th 
December 1906, (Vos, Vol., 2 p.48); also see van der Walt (1967). 
Harper was in South Africa at this time advising the Johannesburg Municipality in a legal dispute 
concerning defective gas engines in their municipal power station, (Price, 1916). 
A letter setting out the conditions that the Rand Mines sent Harper confrrming their agreement 
with him, can be found in Vos (Vol. 1, p. 23). 
Charles Hesterman Mertz was born on the 5th October 1874 in Gateshead-upon-Tyne England. His 
father Dr John Theodore Mertz was a distinguished engineer and director of companies. Charles' 
mother come from a well connected Quaker family in the north-east of England. The north-east of 
England is a region famous for engineers. Within a few miles of Mertz's birthplace George 
Stephenson the railway pioneer was born and in the same area Charles Parsons developed the 
steam turbine used to generate electricity in power stations. Mertz studied electrical engineering 
and in 1899 established himself as a consulting engineer specialising in power generation. On the 
1 sl January 1902 William McLellan, a Scot and engineer, joined him as a partner in the practice. 
The ftrm Mertz and Mclellan gained a world-wide reputation in the fteld of power station design 
and railway electriftcation which is why Mertz was invited to visit South Africa to advise on these 
subjects. Mertz was tragically killed on the night of the 14th October 1940 when a German bomber 
scored a direct hit on his house at Melbury Road London, (Rowland, 1960, p.95). The ftrm 
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capital if he could solicit Mertz's approval for his scheme. Mertz, however, was not forthcoming 
with his approval and this caused Harper to fail to raise the capital he required. Harper 
subsequently sold his contracts to the VFP.42 
In the event the Rand Mines agreed to the sale but stipulated that the VFP had to establish a 
separate undertaking which was to be registered in the Transvaal. This was because at the time, 
and as already noted, the VFP was only registered in Rhodesia. The new company, which was 
named the Rand Mines Power Supply Company Ltd., (RMPS) was to supply electricity and 
compressed air exclusively to the Rand Mines and the Eckstein Group. The system for producing 
this energy was to be a stand-alone system not connected to the existing VFP system.43 
During this period the gold mines were facing severe labour shortages as a result of the Anglo-
Boer war which had so destroyed the infrastructure of South Africa. So far as the provision of 
labour for the gold mines was concerned, the state was required to intervene in the supply. This 
was because not only was black labour reluctant to work on the mines because of the dangerous 
conditions, but the nature of gold mining on the Rand was susceptible to rises in costs including 
labour costs. Rising labour costs added a risk factor to investments in the gold mining industry. 
The gold mines had always had an insatiable appetite for labour with eighty-eight thousand 
Africans being employed on the Rand as early as 1898, (packenham, 1979, p32). Labour was 
then drawn from South Africa itself and from countries beyond the borders of South Africa. 
Chinese workers were even brought to South Africa. The Chamber of Mines was instrumental in 
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fOllllded by Mertz, now named Mertz and McLellan, is still in existence in the UK and is one of 
the world's foremost consulting engineering fIrms in the electric power industry. 
The Harper contract was of course of vital importance to the VFP. It is interesting to speculate on 
the connection between Mertz and the VFP. What is clear is that great pressure was put on Harper 
by the VFP. The objective being that Harper would fail to raise the required capital to built his 
power station; c.f; letters between Lord Winchester (the chairman of the VFP) and H. Wilson Fox 
the legal advisor to the VFP, also extracts from notes of meetings held on the 14th July 1908 those 
present at these meetings being Lord Winchester, Isaac Lewis, Wilson Fox and W. A. Harper, also 
letters from Wilson Fox concerning the sale of the Eckstein contract, and fiuther letters from 
Wilson Fox to Dr Geheinrath Rathenue advising that Harper be "kept on a wire until Harper 
became amenable", all dated July 1908. Copies of these letters and the Memorandum of 
Agreement eventually signed between Harper and the VFP can be found in Vos (Vol. 2, pp.85 -
131). Eventually Harper was paid £30 000 for his contracts irrespective of the Rand Mines 
agreeing to the sale. If consent was obtained Harper would, in addition, receive 150000 paid up 
Ordinary Shares of £1 each of VFP stock, or 200 000 fully paid up shares of a new company to be 
formed, The Rand Mines Power Supply Company Ltd., with a capital of one million pounds 
sterling; c.f, Memorandum of Agreement dated the 2nd December 1908 between Harper and the 
VFP. Harper would in addition be appointed to design the new power station needed to generate 
the electricity and produce compressed air required by the mines on the Witwatersrand in South 
Africa. 
That the VFP fully expected these stipulations is evident in their dealings with Harper, c.f, note 
42 above. As a result the Rand Mines Power Supply Company Ltd; was established on the 1st of 
June 1908, this company was a wholly owned subsidiary of the VFP and was controlled and 
managed by them. 
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making these arrangements and its importance was thereby assured. Nattrass, (1990 p.137) points 
out that one of the most hotly debated issues in South African economic history concerns the 
impact of gold mining development on South African labour practices. 
A commission appointed by the Transvaal Colonial Government pointed out at the time that the 
gold mining industry was not taking sufficient cognisance of the advantages of electricity with 
respect to labour saving, i.e.; for driving machines and generally mechanising tasks that had 
traditionally been done by hand. The important point here is that it is clear that the industrial 
advantages of electricity were becoming known at this time. 
There was considerable power station construction during this period, the VFP built four stations, 
the first at Brakpan in 1906 and the second, in 1909 at Simmerpan. These two stations were 
interconnected soon after they were commissioned and a central control system was established at 
Simmerpan.44 The other two power stations were built to meet the requirements of the Rand 
Mines and the Eckstein Group for electricity and compressed air. The first of these stations was 
completed in 1911. It soon became evident that the Rand Mines and the Eckstein Group required 
more electricity than this station, which was located at Rosherville, could provide. Another 
station was therefore built at Vereeniging, cooling water was provided from the Sammy Marks 
weir and coal from the Vereeniging Estates Ltd., which the VFP had acquired, as noted already. 
Because of public concern over the monopolistic supply of electricity, which had arisen as a result 
of the VFP take over of the RCEW and the agreement they had made with Lewis and Marks. The 
Transvaal Colonial Government deemed it necessary to appoint a Commission of Inquiry, The 
Power Companies Commission, 1909, to examine the desirability of the establishment of large 
electric power companies. The Commission's report was tabled in the Transvaal Parliament on 
the 17th of April 1910. It stated that "the establishment of large power companies was desirable 
providing they were effectively supervised by the government. Because such large undertakings 
could produce power more cheaply than smaller ones it would follow that the gold mines and 
other industries would benefit. The coal industry and the labour market would not be affected 
whilst the railways would benefit by increases in the volume of traffic." Prior to this the 
Commission's report had been presented to the Minister of Mines, the Hon Jacob de Villiers. 
K.C., MLA at an Extraordinary Session of the Legislature Assembly of the Parliament of the 
Transvaal on the 7th April 1910 (Item 6 (1) of the notes of Proceedings of the Legislature 
Assembly: Thursday the 7th April 1910).45 As a result of this Commission the Transvaal Power 
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This is the present location of Eskom' s electricity control system for the whole of South Africa. 
Details of evidence given at this commission and the Report presented to the Transvaal Colonial 
Parliament can be found in Vos (Vol. 3, pp.1-55). 
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Act of 1910 followed, an Act for the licensing and regulation of power undertakings. 46 The idea 
of a single power authority had also been put forward for electricity generation in Great Britain in 
1910 it is probable that this influenced the Power Companies Commission. 47 
So far as railway electrification was concerned during this period at the outbreak of the Anglo-
Boer war in 1899 South Africa had four major railway systems. These were the Cape Government 
Railway (CGR), the Natal Government Railway (NGR), the Oranje-Vrystaat Goeverment 
Spoorwee (OVGS) and the Nederlandsche ZuidAfrikaansche Spoorweg Maatschappij (NZASM). 
With the fall of the two Boer Republics in 1900 the OVGS and the NZASM became the Imperial 
Military Railway (IMR) which was renamed the Central South African Railway (CSAR) after the 
Anglo-Boer war had finished. With the establishment of the Union of South Africa in 1910 the 
NGR the CGR and the CSAR were amalgamated to become the South African Railways and 
Harbours (SAR&H); this combined company had some 12 000 kIn of track. Prior to 1910, 
however, the first of the remaining railway companies to advocate rail electrification was the 
CSAR in 1904. Lord Milner, the Governor of the Transvaal Colony, was very supportive of this 
idea, but it was only from 1912 that the SAR&H administration seriously looked at the 
possibilities of electrifying their railway along the line from Durban to Volksms. To provide the 
power the SAR&H were compelled to build their own power station. The outbreak of the First 
World War in 1914, however, curtailed the programme to electrify the railways of South Africa, 
(Searle, pp.25-29). 
Although the First World War of 1914-1918 to a large extent cut South Africa off from her 
foreign suppliers of industrial goods progress on the electrification of the railways continued. 
This progress was achieved by local endeavour. During the period of the war the Manufacturing, 
Gas, Electricity and Water sectors ofthe economy accounted for some 7,4% of the GDP, in 1918 
46 
47 
The main features of the Act, which incidentally only applied to the Transvaal, were as follows: 
1. An ordinary body , styled the Power Undertaking Board was to be established; 
2. This Board was empowered to grant licences for power generation and establish the 
boWldaries of each Wldertaking so licensed; 
3. Charges for electricity were to be Wliform for all consumers; 
4. A licensed electricity Wldertaking could be expropriated by the state after 37 years had 
elapsed from the date the licence was issued. 
The Power Undertaking Board can been seen as a forefWlller to the National Electricity Regulator 
(NER) which was established in 1994. One of the requirements of the NER being the granting of 
licences to supply electricity to entities that meet certain fmancial and technical conditions, see 
Chapter 7. 
The Power Bill of 1910 was given Royal Assent by His Excellence the Deputy Governor in the 
name of and on behalf of His Majesty the King on the 28th April 1910. 
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the figure was 9,5%48 demonstrating a continued growth in these sectors of the economy. At the 
end of the First World War a report was prepared (The Mertz Report) which was to have far 
reaching consequences concerning the supply of electricity in South Africa. By this time the VFP 
had expanded rapidly and at one stage it was the largest electric utility in the British Empire. The 
economic value of the VFP was based upon the fact that centralised electricity generation allowed 
tariffs to be reduced over what they had been when there were several enterprises competing for 
the electricity market. The VFP also pioneered long distance transmission lines allowing 
consumers far from the central power stations to have a supply of power. The VFP also began to 
exploit the enormous coal resources of South Africa for generating electricity, these deposits were 
generally of low quality being ideal for domestic consumption as opposed to coal of high calorific 
value which could be used for export purposes. 
It is rather ironic, however, that a mere four years after the founding of the VFP an act was 
passed limiting its future existence, i.e. the Power Act of 1910 of the Transvaal Colonial 
Government. This Act came into force only three days before Union, and is significant in that it 
made provision for the eventual expropriation of the VFP. The importance here is that that act 
embodied two basic concepts, these being, 1) that the state viewed the provision of electricity as a 
public service, and this would be important for the future of the electrification of white-owned 
farms and black households in South Africa, and 2) that electricity supply should be placed under 
the authority of the state, i.e., that electricity supply should be regulated. 
3.3 The Period 1918 - 1922 
3.3.1 The Mertz report 
During 1918/19 Charles Hesterman Mertz, paid several visits to South Africa at the invitation of 
the government to study the question of electricity supply on a national scale and also the 
electrification of the railways. In April 1920 Mertz presented his report entitled "Electric Power 
Supply in the Union of South Africa", to the Prime Minister (General J.C. Smuts) under cover of 
a letter dated April 1920.49 The report was divided into five sections which were as follows: 
1. The Industrial Future of South Africa; 
2. The Generation, Production and Distribution of Electricity; 
3. The Demand for Electricity; 
48 
49 
Central Statistical Services bulletin October 1967. There are no separate figures available for the 
electricity sector. 
A copy of this letter can be found in Vos (Vol. 4, p.62). 
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4. The Existing Situation in South Africa with respect to Electricity Supply; and 
5. Considerations and Recommendations for the Future Regarding Electrification Policy. 50 
Mertz also put forward a scenario of transmission networks, which were to result from the 
electrification of the railways with the generation of electricity being confined to several large 
power stations. Electricity supply so far as he was concerned should be centrally controlled, a la 
the way the British electricity supply industry was being organised at that time. 
3.3.2 Implications of the Mertz Report 
Mertz's idea was that the electrification of the railways would make possible an electricity supply 
network which would supply electricity to towns along the railway lines; this would in tum 
promote the economic development of South Africa. Within a month of the Mertz report being 
presented to the government the Minister of Railways and Harbours J. W. Jagger announced in 
Parliament on the 24th of May 1920, that the Cape Town-Simonstown suburban line and the 
Durban-Pietermaritzburg line would be electrified and that work would start in 1921. The 
decision to electrify the Durban-Pietermaritzburg line was changed, however, in favour of the 
Pietermaritzburg-Glencoe line and that Colenso would be the site for the first SAR&H power 
station. 51 Construction of this power station, which was designed by Mertz & McLellan, was 
started in 1922 and the first electricity generating sets were commissioned in 1924. The 
Pietermaritzburg-Colenso line was completely electrified by April 1926, (Searle, p.29). 
Immediately after the Mertz report had been submitted to Parliament a committee, under the 
chairmanship of the Government Mining Engineer, Robert (later Sir Robert) Kotze was 
constituted to investigate the far-reaching implications of the report. The SAR&H was 
represented by Sir William Hoy, the General Manager, D.A. Hendrie, the Chief Mechanical 
Engineer, and T.A. Park, the Electrical Superintendent. The committee also included the Director 
of Irrigation and the Chief Inspector of Machinery representing the government. Dr H.J. van der 
Bijl was also appointed to the committee, (Eskom 1973, p.ll). 52 
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Mertz also put forward the idea of distilling petrol from the low-grade coal deposits in South 
Africa. This idea was of course taken up later by the Nationalist Government and resulted in the 
founding of Sa sol and the development of the town of Sa sol burg, (Eskom 1973, p.10). 
Colenso was close to coalfields and the Thukela river which would supply water to the station for 
cooling purposes. 
Hendrik Johannes van der Bijl was born on the 23rd November 1887 in Pretoria. After the British 
occupation of Pretoria, the family moved to Gordons Bay. Hendrik attended the Victoria College 
in Stellenbosch (today the University of Stellenbosch), where he read physics, mathematics and 
chemistry. He graduated in 1908. He furthered his studies in Germany at Halle and at the 
University of Leipzig. Later he was offered an appointment as a lecturer in the physics department 
at the Technische Hochschule in Dresden. Van der Bijl concentrated on research in connection 
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Van der Bijl, a very influential member of the Kotze committee, considered that there were two 
fundamental requirements for the industrialisation of South Africa. The first and foremost was 
the need for organising the country's electric power supply so that the extensive use of cheap 
electricity could be used for this industrialisation process. The second was the need to establish an 
iron and steel industry on a national scale. The report of the Kotze Committee and the Bill 
drafted by it were presented to the Minister of Mines and Industries the Hon F.S. Malan on the 
4th of March 1924 and a few weeks later the Bill was introduced to Parliament. The first of van 
der Bijl's requirements was incorporated into the Bill. On the 31st of May 1922 the Bill was 
referred to a select committee. The Johannesburg City Council and the VFP opposed the Bill and 
appeared before the committee. Other bodies such as the Chamber of Mines also seemed rather 
doubtful about the Bill's recommendations for the state's involvement in electricity supply. Most 
of the arguments against it were effectively countered by Van der Bijl who said; "I don't mind 
who provides the power, as long as it is done and we can be sure that nobody else can do it 
better". The Bill went forward including the provision that the state was to become involved with 
the provision of electricity to South Mrica via the Electricity Supply Commission. 
Van der Bijl's interest in scientific research was overwhelming and he hoped that after his 
contract for 3 years as Technical Advisor to the Department of Mines and Industries was 
completed he would return to America. However, events were to overtake this desire. He made 
the following announcement in 1923: 
"My contract to remain as Technical Advisor was for three years and as I 
was longing to get back to scientific research work, I planned to return to the 
United States at the conclusion of that period. But in February 1923 General 
with the transmission of electric current through liquids, gases and vacuums. His work progressed 
so rapidly and successfully that the American Telephone and Telegraph Company and the Western 
Electric Company, which shared a mutual research facility, offered him a position. At the age of 
26 Van der Bijl found himself in New York working on problems concerning long-distance 
telephone calls. Whilst there he married an American woman. Meanwhile, General J. C. Smuts, 
the leader of the South African government persuaded Van der Bijl to return to South Africa as a 
scientific advisor to the Department of Mines and Industries in 1920. It was in this position that 
he started working on plans for the establishment of a public electric utility to provide cheap 
electricity for the development of the South African economy. He was offered the position of 
Chairman when the Electricity Supply Commission was eventually founded. After Eskom was 
operating Van der Bijl turned his attention to the steel industry and by 1934 the South African 
Iron and Steel Corporation (lSCOR) was producing steel. During the Second World War van der 
Bijl became Director-General of War Supplies and later Director of Supplies, appointments which 
afforded him the status of Minister. By the end of the war in 1945 Van der Bijl could look back on 
being responsible for founding important South Africa enterprises and the steel making town of 
Vanderbijl Park was named after him. Van der Bijl died on the 2nd December 1948 aged 61 years. 
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Smuts prevailed on me to accept the Chairmanship of the Electricity Supply 
Commission which was duly established in March 1923." 
Van der Bijl had succumbed to Smuts' blandishments and remained in South Africa, becoming 
the first Chairman of Eskom, (Eskom, 1973, pp. 11&94-96). 
3.3.3 The Electricity Act 
The Electricity Act, Act No 42 of 1922, came into being that year. It put in place the 
fundamentals for the orderly development of the electricity supply industry in South Africa. The 
Electricity Act was in fact modelled on the Transvaal Power Act of 1910, which it superseded. 
Whilst the Transvaal Power Act applied, as the name suggests, only to the Transvaal, the new 
electricity act was to have effect over the Union of South Africa as a whole. In draughting the act 
the legislators also drew heavily on the experience of Britain's Central Power Generating 
Authority. The act dealt with two principal matters. The first part of the Act concerned the 
establishment of an Electricity Supply Commission to effect, maintain and manage electricity 
supply undertakings throughout South Africa and also provide for the co-ordination of existing 
electricity supply entities. The second part of the Act provided for an Electricity Control Board, 
which would exercise control over the supply of electricity by the Commission. The Electricity 
Supply Commission was to be known as Escom or Evkom depending on whether reference to it 
was in English or Afrikaans. 53 
Eskom established electricity supply undertakings on a regional basis e.g., the Rand and Orange 
Free State Undertaking, to supply electricity efficiently, cheaply and abundantly to the following 
class of users: 
1. Government Departments; 
2. The South African Railways and Harbours; 
3. Local Authorities; and 
4. Industry in general. 
And what was important so far as this study is concerned the Act ensured that Eskom was to be 
responsible for investigating, initiating and stimulating the supply of electricity where no such 
supply existed i.e.; to white-owned commercial farms and black townships in South Africa. 
S3 The name of the Electricity Supply Commission was changed to Eskom, in 1987 this appellation 
having no association with either the English or Afrikaans abbreviations, see The Eskom Act (Act 
No 40 Of 1987). For convenience the name Eskom will be used throughout. 
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The legal basis for Eskom' s financial activities was likewise laid down in section seven of the 
Act. The establishment of general and reserve funds, prices to be charged for electricity, details of 
audit requirements and the reporting of financial statements were also all dealt with in the Act. 
Eskom was empowered to raise loans to acquire or extend any electricity undertaking. It was also 
entitled to obtain advances from the Treasury (from moneys voted by Parliament) to enable it to 
perform its functions during the first four years of its existence. Parliament was, however, to 
retain control over Eskom's borrowings in various ways. Firstly the approval of the Governor 
General had to be obtained and he was to approve the individual loans themselves. Secondly 
Eskom could not circumvent these provisions by changing prices charged for electricity sufficient 
to yield a profit that could be used for capital development purposes. The principle that revenue 
should only cover the cost of production and redemption payments and replacement costs was to 
remain sacrosanct for fifty years until 1971 when the idea of ploughed-back profits for capital 
expansion purposes was accepted by Parliament. 
The Act also ensured that Eskom was not afforded special privileges so far as the supply of 
electricity was concerned and therefore entrepreneurs could submit tenders for supplying 
electricity whenever Eskom intended to establish a new undertaking i.e., the supply of electricity 
to a new area. In addition where an undertaking had been in operation for five years 
entrepreneurs could tender for the supply of electricity in that area. 
The Act allowed Eskom to raise money for capital expenditure by issuing securities, debentures 
and stocks on the local money market, these being secured by Eskom's fixed assets. Foreign loans 
would be underwritten by the government. A fund had to be maintained, however, from which 
interest and redemption payments were to be made. So far as Eskom's accounts were concerned 
each undertaking had to maintain its own books. 
One of the most important principles entrenched in the Act was that Eskom had to sell electricity 
at cost. Eskom could not therefore make a profit. The advantage that accrued to Eskom from this 
was that the Corporation was exempt from paying tax. Eskom does not pay tax to this day 
although, as will be shown, it is now allowed to make a profit on its operations. The price 
charged for electricity on a national basis was arrived at by taking account of capital repayment 
charges, operating and maintenance costs and a sum for strengthening Eskom' s capital reserves. 
Whilst the Act made provision for entrepreneurs to enter the electricity supply market as 
mentioned above it also allowed Eskom, with government approval, to expropriate any private 
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electricity supplier after that supplier had been in operation for a minimum of 38 years from the 
date of issue of its licence to operate. 54 
3.3.4 The Electricity Control Board 
In the Transvaal Power Act of 1910 there was a controlling body, The Power Undertakings 
Board, which oversaw the workings of electricity suppliers. As noted above the Electricity Act of 
1922 provided for the establishment of a similar institution called The Electricity Control Board. 
The powers of this board were substantially wider than those enjoyed by its predecessor, however, 
and especially so with regard to the licensing of electricity suppliers. 55 In particular the Electricity 
Act of 1922 made it clear that no electricity supply undertaking could operate without a license. 
The following institutions were, however, exempt from this ruling: 
1. Government Departments; 
2. The SAR&H; 
3. Municipalities; 56 
4. Small undertakings of less than 500kw; and 
5. Electricity institutions for the sole use of private persons. 
The licenses issued by the Electricity Control Board had to contain a schedule of standard tariffs 
and every license holder had to supply electricity to every applicant, and the license had to ensure 
continuation of supply. With respect to electricity licenses the Electricity Act of 1922 covered 
three important issues. Firstly the holder of a license to supply electricity had the right to apply to 
the Water Court for permission to extract water from a river as well as the right to build a dam on 
a river whether the license holder held riparian rights to the water or not. Secondly a licensee 
could apply to the Governor General for permission to expropriate the necessary land to build a 
power station or obtain the necessary wayleaves for purposes of transmitting electricity along 
power lines. Thirdly a licensee could, after giving notice to the local authority, break up streets 
for the purpose of reticulating electricity or for other works which were necessary for the delivery 
of power to consumers. 
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This clause was in fact similar to the expropriation clause embodied in the Transvaal Power Act 
of 1910 mentioned already. Licences to supply electricity issued under this act remained in force 
under the new act, i.e.; the Electricity Act of 1922. 
Administratively the Electricity Control Board was senior to the Electricity Supply Commission 
having been founded on the 29th of August 1922. This Control Board can also be looked at as a 
forerunner of the National Electricity Regulator founded in 1994. 
The Johannesburg Municipality still operates its own power stations and supplies electricity direct 
to consumers. 
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3.4 The Period 1923 To 1950 
3.4.1 The Electricity Supply Commission (Eskom) 
The establishment of Eskom as a public electric utility, i.e., an institution owned by the people of 
South Africa, was announced in the Government Gazette with the following notice on the 6th of 
March 1923: 
"It is notified that His Royal Highness the Governor General has been pleased, 
under the power invested in him by Section One of the Electricity Act No 42 of 1922 
to establish the Electricity Supply Commission referred to in that section as from 1 
March 1923 and to appoint Dr Hendrik Johannes van der Bijl, M.A; Ph.D; as 
Chairman and wholetime member, and James Renwick Fulton and Robert Niven as 
part-time members of the Commission" 
Van der Bijl had a very clear picture of the direction he wished Eskom to develop along. He 
recognised that the Corporation would be crucial to future industrial development in South 
Africa. 57 He also wanted to ensure that haphazard growth would not take place but rather growth 
would proceed along carefully planned lines. Van der Bijl, whilst he welcomed government 
interest in Eskom, sought to ensure that the government had limited power over the 
Corporation58. Van Der Bijl believed that giving monopoly power to a large supplier of electricity 
was the most economically sensible way of supplying power, since it avoided duplication of power 
lines and other essential plant. As noted Eskom was also able to borrow money from the 
government to finance its development during the first four years of its existence. In fact Van der 
Bijl borrowed R16 million (1999 rand) from the state to put his plans into action, within 10 years 
the loan had been paid back, (Eskom 1973, p.26). The first meeting of Eskom took place in Cape 
Town on the 20th March 1923 and it was decided that the Commission's Head Office was to be 
established in Johannesburg on the 1st of May 1923. 
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In this respect reference is made to his comments whilst he was a member of the Kotze 
Commission. 
This point is important. This philosophy of governmental non-interference became entrenched in 
Eskom and was a concern voiced in the National Electrification Forwn's Report on the South 
African Electricity Supply Industry, (NELF (a), 1994, p.26). This point will be discussed further 
in chapter 6. It was also an important consideration in the government's decision to undertake a 
Commission of Inquiry into Electricity Supply in South Africa in 1984 see Chapter 4. 
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3.4.2 Eskom's development 
One of Eskom's first priorities was the electrification of the railways in accordance with the 
recommendations made in the Mertz report. A meeting with the Railways and Harbours 
Administration (RHA) was therefore arranged only three days after the Commission's own 
inaugural meeting. Close liaison between Eskom and the RHA, as a consequence of Eskom' s 
secretary, Mr Andrew McColm being Sir William Hoy's parliamentary assistant, made the 
meeting possible at short notice. The negotiations which followed lead to the RHA offering to 
hand over to Eskom the power station they were in the process of building at Colenso in Natal. 
This offer was accepted by Eskom and the power station was taken over in 1927. Meanwhile, on 
the 21st April 1925 agreement had been realised between Eskom, the RHA and the Durban 
Corporation that Eskom would build a new large power station at Congella to meet the needs of 
the RHA. As a consequence of these negotiations the Durban Undertaking came into being, 
(Searle, pp.49-50). 
On the 22nd April 1924 agreement was also reached between Eskom, the RHA and the Cape 
Town Corporation for a new power station to be built at the mouth of the Salt River. As in Natal 
the RHA originally intended to build their own power station for the electrification of suburban 
railway lines in Cape Town, the building of Salt River power station, however, made this 
unnecessary. The RHA was then instrumental in the establishment of both Eskom's Durban and 
Cape Town Undertakings. 
In 1922 the Rand Strike and the Rand Revolt had paralysed the gold mining industry and the 
demand for electricity by the gold mines had been curtailed. In 1923, however, with these 
upheavals over the gold mines once again increased their demand for electricity as they sought to 
increase gold production. Because gold, diamonds and coal are wasting assets after 1925 the 
government of South Africa expressed their concern about the consequences of mining these 
assets, (de long, 1975(Vol.4), p.1l4). The solution to these concerns was, however, not sought in 
prolonging the life-cycle of the mines but rather by encouraging diversification of economic 
activity through the development of a manufacturing sector in South Africa. For the reasons 
already given electricity would also play an essential role in the development of this sector. The 
development of the manufacturing industry was, however, closely allied to the development of 
mining in South Africa. The foreign exchange earned from mining provided the finance 
necessary for major developments to take place in the manufacturing sector. Workshops were 
erected to repair mining machinery that had originally been imported. Factories were built for 
manufacturing goods needed by the mines, for example, hoists and trams to move ore and 
structural steelwork fabrication for buildings needed at the mines. It was a natural step therefore 
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for the mining houses to diversify their profit base by investing in the South African 
manufacturing sector. 
A factor which curtailed the early growth of the manufacturing sector was that prior to 1924 the 
dominant economic philosophy in South Africa was that of trade liberalism and the repression of 
labour, (Abedian and Standish, (eds) 1992, p.7). Government was therefore insufficiently 
involved with fostering the development of manufacturing industries in the country. In 1925, 
however, a coalition of white business and farming interests came to power, in the shape of the 
PACT government. It was this coalition that initiated governmental involvement in the 
development of the manufacturing sector in South Africa. The government became the owners of 
major industrial enterprises including the South African iron and steel manufacturing giant 
ISCOR. The Industrial Development Corporation (IDC) was also established to encourage growth 
in the manufacturing sector and the IDC eventually owned interests in a wide variety of 
manufacturing industries. Whilst the policies put forward by the PACT helped develop the South 
African manufacturing sector they failed to encourage the sector's independence from the mining 
sector, (Lumby 1976). Even by 1980 the manufacturing sector was still almost wholly dependent 
on the mining sector for its foreign exchange needs, (Nattrass, 1990, p.272). 
Manufacturing development was stimulated in the period 1923-1950 due in part to the continuing 
urbanisation of a large part of South Africa's population which had been increasing since the 
early days of the mineral discoveries and particularly from 1920 onwards. Urban facilities grew 
as a consequence which caused a demand for various goods used in an urban environment. With 
electricity being readily available to white households electrical appliances and radios were in 
demand. After 1939 industrialisation grew at a rapid pace and secondary industry began to 
dominate the South African economy. It can be argued, as does Marais (l963,p.308), that it was 
after 1939, not after the First World War, that industrialisation took off in South Africa. As a 
consequence of this growth the manufacturing sector has diversified its output from the 
manufacture of goods for internal domestic consumption only and the mining sector, to the 
production of machinery, chemicals, metal products and some electrical equipment. 
Manufacturing expanded then from the simpler requirements of the domestic markets to products 
that could be exported. As this manufacturing development took place electricity supply, because 
of its comparative advantage over other energy forms in manufacturing processes, became more 
and more important. 
Returning now to the history of electricity supply itself in South Africa the VFP was in 1923 the 
sole supplier of electricity to the gold mines and the associated manufacturing sector. In that year 
the company applied for a licence from the recently established Electricity Control Board to build 
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a new power station at Witbank. Witbank was chosen as the location for this station because of 
the large amounts of cheap coal which was available in the area. Witbank itself was at this time a 
small town but was in the centre of the Eastern Transvaal coal fields, and therefore had the 
potential for industrial development, thus expanding the manufacturing sector, (Searle, p.53).59 
Eskom was quick to see the commercial possibilities of supplying electricity to a burgeoning 
industrial area and consequently opposed the application of the VFP for an electricity supply 
licence on the grounds that Eskom would like to build a power station themselves at Witbank. 
This act of opposition was of course, under their mandate, and well within their legal rights. The 
VFP, however, saw this as an attempt by a state established electricity supply company to curtail 
free enterprise in the electricity supply industry.60 Eskom acted very wisely when they realised 
how the VFP viewed their opposition and proposed that although they would build the Witbank 
station, and thereby establish the Witbank Undertaking, the VFP should operate and manage the 
power station.61 The Witbank power station, which was commissioned in 1927, was connected to 
the VFP transmission system by South Africa's first 132kv line to Brakpan.62 With this 
connection in place the VFP started negotiations with the Rand Mines Group to take cheap power 
from the Witbank power station. With the success of their negotiations the VFP system was 
connected to the RMPS' system making it one of the world's major interconnected power 
systems. The entire system was controlled from Simmerpan, (Eskom, 1973, p.14). 
To provide water to cool the Witbank power station Eskom was obliged to build a dam in the 
Olifants River. The water so impounded secured an adequate supply of water not only for the 
power station but for the town of Witbank as well. This water, together with the cheap electricity, 
which could be purchased from the Witbank power station was the basis for the future industrial 
expansion of the Witbank area. This was one of the first instances in South Africa of a rural area 
undergoing industrial growth as a result of electricity supply. 
Another rural development area was Sabie. The Sabie gold mines had in 1920 approached the 
Department of Mines for an electricity supply scheme to be developed. When Eskom was 
established the request was transferred to them. Mr A. M. Jacobs, Eskom's Chief Engineer, was 
59 
60 
61 
62 
Iscor was eventually to establish a large steel-making facility at Witbank and it is interesting to 
speculate whether the VFP knew of these plans. 
This is clear from the objections made by the VFP to this move by Eskom, (Vos, Vol. 2, p.32). 
This station was to be the largest in South Africa at this time and would have the reputation of 
producing the cheapest electricity. 
As previously noted there were two separate power systems serving the gold mines of the 
Witwatersrand, the VFP system taking power from the Brakpan and Simmerpan power stations 
and the RMPS' system taking power from the Rosherville and Vereeniging power stations. 
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assigned the task of investigating the electricity needs of these mines. Jacob's survey found that 
without a suitable supply of cheap electricity some of the mines in the Sabie area would be forced 
to close. He recommended that hydro power be used to solve the problem.63 The Sabie river hydro 
station was commissioned in July 1927. Although small in size this station was, like the Witbank 
power station, an example of how electricity supply to rural areas enabled such areas to prosper. 
By keeping the Sabie gold mines operational the entire Sabie area began to develop 
economically. 64 
Despite the depression of 1929-1932 sales of electricity continued to increase gradually except for 
sales to the railways which fell as a result of a smaller demand for transport. Whilst the 
depression did curb the growth in the electricity supply industry the discovery of new gold fields 
west of Randfontein and the increase in the price of gold in 1933, after South Africa abandoned 
the Gold Standard, gave Eskom the stimulus it had been waiting for. 
After the depression of 1929-32 the gold mining industry expanded and there was an increased 
tempo in the demand for electricity by the mines. Van der Bijl was quick to see that a new power 
station was needed to meet this demand. There were, however, two problems to be overcome if 
this station was to be built. The first problem was that the VFP had a virtual monopoly of 
supplying electricity to the Witwatersrand gold mines. The second problem was the serious lack 
of cooling water for a new power station in the area close to these mines. The Vaal Barrage was 
already taxed to its limits in supplying existing power stations. The first problem was overcome 
by Eskom offering to build a new power station at Henley on Klip inviting the VFP to operate and 
manage it on their behalf as part of the VFP network, a la the Witbank power station. The 
second problem was solved by using cooling towers to recycle cooling water, thereby reducing the 
amount of water drawn from the source needed to cool the station. Thus it was that in 1934 the 
building of the Klip power station commenced. This was to be a very large station by the 
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This was a very interesting decision since due to the arid nature of South Africa hydro power has 
since this scheme never been taken as a serious option by Eskom. The exceptions are the Hendrik 
Verwoerd and the VanderkloofHydro Stations. The former, which has been renamed Gariep, was 
commissioned in 1971 and the latter in 1977. Eskom also became involved in the Cabora Bassa 
hydro scheme in the early 1980' s. These schemes will be referred to again later in this chapter. 
The Sabie river hydro station has a particularly distinguished history. Firstly, it was in those days 
a remote outpost of the Eskom empire, and from 1935 onwards it was managed single-handed by 
Mr Raoul Martin a German immigrant who had fought in the Anglo-Boer war. Escom issued him 
with a rifle to keep the lions of the area away from the hydro station. Mr Martin retired at the age 
of 82 when the station was finally closed down. Many of his experiences are recorded in letters he 
wrote to Eskom's managers in head office and are preserved in Eskom's Heritage Archive at 
Megawatt Park, Sandton. 
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standards of the day generating 396MW.65 Klip power station set the pattern for future Eskom 
stations i.e.; they would be large and be located directly on coalfields providing cheap electricity 
by their ability to bum poor quality coal that could be bought at a low price. Because of their size 
economies of scale were also obtained. Further developments in this, the Rand Extension 
Undertaking, followed and Eskom, in conjunction with the VFP, decided to build yet another 
power station to meet the needs of railway electrification in the Transvaal and the needs of the 
newly discovered Free State Goldfields. This power station was to be located about 9kms south of 
Vereeniging in the Orange Free State, and was to be named the Vaal power station, (Eskom, 
1973, p.20). It was connected to the Free State Gold fields by an 88kv transmission line. 
Another Eskom development during this period was the Border Undertaking which supplied 
electricity to the Eastern Cape. Its establishment was a direct result of three municipalities 
requesting Eskom to take over ownership of their power generating and transmission systems. 
The first municipality to do this was East London in 1946 and Eskom took over that 
municipality's West Bank power station in September of 1947. In 1948 Eskom purchased both 
the King Williams Town power station and Kimberly's Alice Street power station. These three 
facilities formed the nucleus of the newly created Border Undertaking, (Eskom, 1973, p.20). 
3.4.3 The expropriation of the VFP 
The year 1948 was a very important one in the history of electricity supply in South Africa. In 
March of that year the VFP's licence to supply electricity was due to expire. For several months 
prior to that date Eskom and the VFP had been negotiating a deal whereby Eskom would take 
over the VFP. This was done on the 1st of March 1948 just before Eskom's silver jubilee. This 
was the biggest business merger that had been negotiated in South Africa up to that time and 
therefore deserves some special mention. 
The VFP had never lost sight of the possibility of its electricity supply undertaking in South 
Africa being expropriated by the state, (Searle, p.64). This was because the license granted to the 
company, in terms of the Power Act of 1910, annulled all concessions granted to them by the 
government of the South African Republic and the government of the Colony of the Transvaal for 
supplying electricity in their territories. Furthermore, the VFP's expansion prospects had been 
sealed when their agreement with Eskom had been signed whereby Eskom would own the new 
65 This station was at this time the largest in the Southern Hemisphere and indeed one of the largest 
in the world; it was four times as large as Witbank power station and was to generate even 
cheaper electricity than that station. 
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Witbank power station and for the VFP to merely operate it. The question of concern to the VFP 
was then not whether the state would expropriate them, but when would they do it? 
The expropriation question was the subject of a conversation between Van der Bijl and the Prime 
Minister 1. C. Smuts on the 24th November 1944. Van der Bijl subsequently wrote Smuts a letter 
concerning this matter. In this letter Van der Bijl asked Smuts what policy the government was 
going to adopt concerning the expropriation of the VFP bearing in mind there was controversy 
over when this could be legally carried out. The time difference attached to this controversy was 
three years between the earliest and latest dates for the take over. The Prime Minister replied on 
the 18th December 1944 saying that the later date would obtain, this being considered the fairest 
course of action. 66 
There the matter stood, all that remained was for Eskom to agree a suitable price with the VFP 
for their assets in South Africa. The mining industry attempted to enter the negotiations with a 
suggestion that Eskom should offer the VFP shareholders a price slightly higher than the ruling 
market price for their shares; they were clearly very anxious to speed up the expropriation issue. 67 
In the meantime Eskom had made an analysis of the profits earned by the VFP since 1924. This 
analysis concluded that if Eskom expropriated the VFP in 1950 the annual savings from then on 
to the South African economy would amount to between £2,5 million to £3 million per annum. 
Eskom also believed that the VFP had in hand £6 million in liquid assets plus the whole of their 
undertaking in South Africa. 68 
66 
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Copies of these letters can be found in Vos (Vol. 7, p. 49) 
The gold mining industry, represented by Sir Ernest Oppenheimer, was most anxious for Eskom 
to expropriate the VFP because then they would pay less for electricity. He wrote a letter to Van 
der Bijl on the 2nd January 1947 in this regard. The letter, in Oppenheimer's own hand and 
written from his home Brenthurst in Parktown Johannesburg, was marked Personal VFP 
Expropriation and addressed to Dear Hendrik it said, "As you know I am most anxious that the ES 
Commission should expropriate the V FP Co. It will lead to 1/- (one shilling, author's addition) 
reduction in milling costs. I have referred to this matter in public speeches but avoided quoting 
figures." He urged Van der Bijl to meet him saying that he had a scheme by which the VFP could 
be taken over on a cheaper footing than dealing with Bernard Price (the General Manager of the 
VFP) and suggested that their secretaries arrange a private meeting. A copy of the original letter 
can be found in Vos, (Vol. 7, p.66). There is no record of this approach by Oppenheimer being 
pursued by Van der Bijl, not even a reply to the letter. In the event negotiations between Van der 
Bijl and Price continued to take place. 
Eskom's Commercial Manager, Mr Percy Furness, prepared a sununary of the fmancial situation 
regarding the expropriation of the VFP, Furness showed that electricity consumers would have 
considerable savings if the VFP was expropriated. He firrther pointed out that with the exception 
of Eskom the VFP was the only other licensed electricity supplier of note in the Union Of South 
Africa. (Minutes of Commission's meeting 5th December 1946). 
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Eskom thought that the VFP would value their undertaking at £15 million. It was also believed 
that the profits made by the VFP had written off their capital assets entirely. As a consequence if 
Eskom purchased the VFP's capital assets for some higher figure the state would be effectively 
paying for them twice over.69 Negotiations between the VFP and Eskom commenced in February 
1947. Eskom's stance was based upon the financial analysis referred to above. Price70 suggested 
that Eskom should consider offering a price for the company's undertaking in South Africa as it 
stood leaving out of the question any investments or cash assets held by the company in London. 
Price "casually" mentioned a figure of £25 million less £10 million liquid assets. Eskom offered 
a price of £13,5 million, which was rejected and a counter offer of £17,5 million was made by the 
VFP. On the 28th February 1948 Eskom replied rejecting this counter offer and reaffirmed their 
original offer of £13,5 million saying that this offer must be accepted or rejected within ten days 
from the 28th January 1948. If the offer was rejected the government would be advised. Price's 
keen displeasure at this ultimatum was shown in a lengthy letter, dated 6th February 1947 which, 
he sent to Van der Bijl. Price quotes in his letter the feelings of the Chairman and Board of the 
VFP which were as follows: 
"While we are ready to give the Commission's letter every attention and 
examined their proposal we must flatly refuse to be bound by the time limit ... 
The negotiations are too big to be rushed and it is unseemly for one party to 
adopt such an overbearing attitude". 
Price went on to make Eskom another offer in the sum of £15,5 million. Eskom subsequently 
offered the VFP £14,5 million, which was accepted. 71 This brought an end to the supply of 
electricity and compressed air to the gold mines and other consumers in the Transvaal and the 
Orange Free State by a private electric utility and these services were passed over to Eskom a 
public utility. The take over was a logical step in the provision of electricity to South Africa 
because, as mentioned already, electricity is vital for a country's economic growth and it is 
doubtful whether the VFP as a private utility would have been able to raise the capital required 
69 
70 
71 
The basis for Eskom's opinion can be found in Power Supply to the Witwatersrand Gold Mines, a 
document prepared by Eskom to determine the price to be paid for the VFP's capital assets upon 
expropriation dated the 31 st December 1946. The original document can be found in Vos (Vol. 7, 
pp.59-65). 
Bernard Price was born in London in 1877 and qualified as an electrical engineer there. ill 1908 
he joined the VFP as chief engineer and became General Manager in 1926 and resident director 
for the VFP in South Africa in 1936. He was a benefactor of the University of the Witwatersrand 
and with the Carnegie Corporation was to co-found the Department of Geophysics at the 
University. He served for many years on the University Council. ill recognition of his services to 
the University he received the honorary degree of Doctor of Science. He died on the 9th July 1948 
only seven days after the expropriation of the VFP and not many days before his 71 st birthday. 
Documentation concerning these negotiations can be found in Vos (Vol. 7, pp.70-90). 
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for the expansion in electricity supply that South Africa would need in the decades ahead. The 
take over was also another step in Van der Bijl's ideal of establishing in South Africa an 
electricity supply system that would meet the needs of the entire country. 
The take over was doubly important when it is recalled that the VFP, which had been founded 42 
years before, was one of the largest electric utilities in the British Commonwealth. It had grown 
in direct proportion to the growth of the gold mining and manufacturing industries of South 
Africa. It had also brought domestic electricity to areas that had been without power, via its 
supply to various white municipalities on the Witwatersrand. It was also a principle supplier of 
electricity to many industries which had grown to serve the gold mines.72 The area formally 
covered by the VFP electricity supply licence became the Rand Undertaking. 73 The VFP 
continued to exist as a legal entity separate from Eskom after the take over but the RMPS was 
taken over as a wholly owned subsidiary of Eskom. After the 1st of January 1949 all the assets of 
the VFP and RMPS were brought onto Eskom' s books. As a consequence of the take over Eskom 
staff compliment rose from 2692 to 7850.74 
3.5 The Period 1950-1980 
The years 1950-1960 were ones of intense activity for Eskom. The newly formed electric utility 
faced many urgent priorities and problems so far as the demand for power was concerned. This 
was because there was country-wide industrial development taking place in South Africa and 
also, because of the Second World War, there was a backlog in obtaining generating plant. This 
backlog being directly related to the time needed to convert the manufacturing sector of countries 
that could supply such plant to Eskom from war to peace-time production. The fifties decade can 
also be seen as a period of transition in the history of electricity supply in South Africa. The first 
half of the decade was a time of shortages. There were shortages of raw materials required for the 
building of power stations such as cement, bricks and steel, there was also a shortage of skilled 
manpower so far as Eskom was concerned and finally there was a shortage of capital. These years 
were characterised then by a concomitant shortage of electricity. During the second half of the 
decade problems of power shortages were overcome by interconnecting power stations one to 
another which introduced economies of scale into the supply of electricity in South Africa. The 
country's electricity transmission system was also expanded from 1955 onwards. 
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The VFP had also been active in the Second World War providing weaponry for the allied cause 
in its Rosherville workshops, (Searle, p.64). 
This Undertaking was eventually expanded by Eskom and became the Rand and Orange Free 
State Undertaking. 
The staff compliment included staff of the power stations, which belonged to Eskom but were 
operated by the VFP i.e., the Witbank and Klip power stations. 
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The Rand Undertaking was the worst hit by equipment shortages. This situation being partially 
attributable to the extensive industrial development taking place in this area and also to the power 
demands of the new Free State gold mines which were going into production at this time, 
(Eskom, 1973, pp.22-23) 75. 
Gold mining was during this period, as it is today, of extreme importance to the South African 
balance of payments and because of gold mining's dependence on electricity, electricity was as 
well. The establishment of the Bretton Woods system in 1944 reinforced the monetary role of 
gold and instilled continuing long-term confidence in gold. This confidence underpinned the 
investment required for opening up the Free State goldfields after the Second World War. 
Similarly the breakdown of the Bretton Woods system and the rises in the price of oil from 1972 
with consequential world-wide inflation ensured gold's attraction as a desirable store of value. 
Only electricity could keep South Africa producing this commodity in large quantities. 
The development of the Free State mines lead to an extensive industrial development area coming 
about in what was essentially an agricultural enclave. The so-called Vaal Triangle was also being 
rapidly developed with the newly built steel manufacturing facility at Vanderbijlpark being 
extended. Also in this area the production of synthetic fuels from coal at Sasolburg demanded 
great amounts of electricity. Coupled to all this industrial activity there was in addition a uranium 
industry being developed in which the demand for electricity was particularly intensive. The 
mining of phosphates and base metals was going on in the Northern Transvaal and the cities of 
Durban, Cape Town, Pretoria, East London and Port Elizabeth were also undergoing 
considerable industrial development. There was also at this time a network of border industries 
being established as well in the so-called Bantu Homelands. Bringing electricity to these border 
areas provided Eskom with a springboard for extending the supply of domestic electricity to them 
in later years. 
To keep the gold mines productive Eskom, in conjunction with the South African Chamber of 
Mines, had to devise an urgent scheme of power quotas whereby each mine received a monthly 
supply of electricity based upon the consumption that they had taken for the previous three 
months. Mines were also warned to prepare for power cuts in the event of a generator break-
down. Each mine was warned in advance and by careful planning i.e.; control ofthe running time 
75 1bis increased activity arose because in 1949 the poWld sterling was devalued and this caused 
increased export activity from South Africa (the currency of South Africa was of course at this 
time sterling) this increased activity contributing to the demand for electricity in the 
manufacturing sector. 
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of machines and load transfer, the power supply to the gold mining industry was scarcely 
impeded at all. Municipalities and other bulk buyers of electricity were however, also restricted to 
fixed maximums of power in 1950. New applications for power were held in abeyance, unless the 
application was for an essential service or of national importance until new generating capacity 
could be built. Needless to say the provision of electricity to the rural areas of South Africa 
suffered during this period and such supplies were not taken into account in Eskom' s generation 
expansion programme, (Eskom, 1973, p.23). 
Some idea of the demand for electricity during the decade 1950 to 1960 to meet the needs of the 
mining and manufacturing sectors may be obtained by examining Eskom' s power station building 
programme. In the early fifties Eskom was carrying out work on eight power stations 
simultaneously. At the existing power stations of Colenso, Congella, Vaal and Witbank 
additional equipment was being installed and four new power stations were being built, these 
being Hex River at Worcester in the Cape, Vierfontein near Klerksdorp, to meet the increasing 
needs of the Free State goldfields, Umgeni in Pinetown and Salt River No 2 in Cape Town. 
Between 1945, at the end of the Second World War, and 1955 Eskom's generating capacity more 
than doubled. 
The decade 1960 to 1970 was, like the preceding ten years, one of intense capacity building so far 
as fossil-fuel power station construction was concerned. In addition, hydro-electric power sources 
were investigated as well which resulted in the construction of South Africa's first large hydro 
station. A particular significant milestone was reached in this decade when nuclear power as an 
energy source for generating electricity was considered. Of great economic importance was the 
construction of an interconnected national transmission network, which was also started in this 
decade. 
With respect to hydro-electric power Eskom informed the government in 1961 that it was ready 
to accept responsibility for the financing, building and operation of hydro-electric stations 
wherever they would be technically feasible and also for the provision of power transmission 
systems from these stations. This initiative was sparked off by the Orange River project being 
built by the Department of Water Affairs which was announced in 1961.76 This scheme was 
76 Until it was decided to proceed with the Orange River project Eskom had only one small hydro-
electric power station, the Sabie station. There were potential schemes such as the use of the 
Kimberly Big Hole and the Paarl Mountain scheme which had been examined for their pumped 
storage capabilities, (Eskom, 1973). There are, however, few sites in South Africa which are 
suitable for building hydro-electric stations and even fewer are the sites situated near large 
electricity demand centres. The potential sites, even if developed, would require costly 
transmission lines to connect them to consumers. In spite of these drawbacks the Department of 
Water Affairs, to this day, notifies Eskom (in terms of Section 67[2] of the Water Act No 54 of 
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primarily a water conservation project but the hydrological analysis revealed that the hydro power 
potential of the dams which formed part of the scheme was considerable, particularly the main 
dam, named the Hendrik Verwoerd Dam (now the Gariep dam). It was calculated that if the wall 
of this dam was raised an additional 18,3 metres its hydro potential would be increased by a 
sufficient amount to make it suitable for use in the generation of electricity. Eskom agreed that 
they would pay a fixed tariff per unit of water to the Department of Water Affairs to defray the 
additional costs of raising the dam wall. A new undertaking was formed by Eskom to operate and 
maintain the hydro-electric power station that could, because of the raising of the dam's wall, be 
built on the Orange River Scheme. This undertaking was appropriately named the Orange River 
Undertaking. 
Because Eskom's development plans had reached such vast proportions in the 1960's the Vaal 
Triangle was replaced as the centre of electric power generation by the Eastern Transvaal. The 
choice was governed by the vast coal reserves of the Eastern Transvaal and the adequate water 
reserves required for cooling power stations which were available in the region. In 1962 Eskom 
announced plans for their first large power station to be built in the Eastern Transvaal 16km 
south of Ermelo. This station, known as Camden, was joined to Komati power station by means 
of a 275kv transmission line. Most of the power from Camden was transmitted to the industries 
of the Witwatersrand and the gold mines of the Orange Free State and also to the growing 
industrial developments of the Northern Cape. To transmit the power a 400kv line was built, this 
being the first 400kv line in Africa. This line formed the beginnings of the South African 
national grid which was approved by the government. Camden power station and the hydro 
power potential of the Orange River were important links in the national grid, which would 
eventually connect the power stations of the Transvaal with the electricity distribution system of 
the Cape Undertakings. 
With respect to the Cape Province the price of electricity in the Western Cape was dependent on 
the cost of transporting coal to that area by rail; a distance of some 1 500km from the Eastern 
Transvaal. 77 Because the hydro station scheduled to be built on the Orange River was half way 
between the Eastern Transvaal and the Cape Eskom decided to build a transmission line from the 
Transvaal to the Orange River Undertaking and on to the Cape rather than build a new power 
station in the Cape Province to meet that provinces' increasing demand for power.78 With the 
77 
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1956) if any water schemes that they are developing have hydro-electric potential. It is left to 
Eskom management to decide if they wish to exploit this potential. 
In 1971 the cost of coal in the Eastern Transvaal was R2/ton whereas in the Cape the cost was 
R7/ton. 
See Eskom's 1960-1970 power generation plan prepared by Eskom's Power Generation and 
Distribution Department, Johannesburg, 1960. 
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construction of the national grid. Eskom took immediate steps to begin a major power station 
construction programme to provide the grid with all the power South Africa would need for its 
industrial growth and to meet the needs of white municipal areas, (Eskom, 1973, p.32). 
In 1964 plans were therefore drawn up for this purpose. Electricity supply to white-owned 
commercial farms and black households did not feature in that planning. Eskom decided that four 
new power stations would be built between 1964 and 1970 all in the new centre of electricity 
generation the Eastern Transvaal. In 1964 work commenced on Arnot and Hendrina power 
stations. With the building of these stations Eskom began observing their economies of scale 
philosophy by increasing the size of the electricity generating sets on the Arnot station over those 
of Hendrina by 75 per cent. In 1965 Eskom announced the construction of the third of these four 
stations at the Grootvlei mine in Balfour. In 1967 the building of the fourth power station was 
announced, this was the Kriel power station, which was situated between Oogies and Bethal in 
the Transvaal. Kriel was the first of a so-called "new generation" of super power stations, which 
would be built in future by Eskom. At Kriel, and subsequent stations, the electricity generating set 
sizes increased by 260 per cent over those installed at Hendrina a mere three years previously. 
Each of Kriel' s generating sets had a capacity of 500MW. In 1968 Eskom also began work on the 
construction of the Hendrik Verwoerd (now named Gariep) hydro-electric power station, (Eskom, 
1973, p.33).79 So far as transmission line construction was concerned the 400kv line between 
Camden Power Station in Ermelo, also in the Eastern Transvaal, and the Western Cape was 
completed. The Western Cape claimed further attention in July of 1967 when Eskom purchased 
the farm Duinefontein, situated 25km north of Cape Town, for the erection of the Mrican 
continent's first nuclear power station, which was to be known as Koeberg.80 The construction of 
this power station commenced in 1974. 
During the period 1960 to 1970 the development of the national grid was economically 
important, not only from the domestic viewpoint but also from the international perspective. The 
development of a national grid followed similar developments in other countries, particularly 
79 
80 
As noted, the price Eskom paid for water for this power station made a significant contribution to 
the costs of building the Hendrik Verwoerd dam which was principally used to store water for 
agricultural purposes. Electricity consumers therefore helped subsidise farmers since this hydro 
station was not strictly required so far as future electricity demand was concerned. 
Dr J.T. Hattingh who was Eskom's chairman in 1955 had attended an international conference on 
the peaceful uses of nuclear power in Geneva in that year. In 1956 he also attended a conference 
in Vienna on the use of nuclear energy for electricity generation. In 1957 a Commission of Inquiry 
into the use of nuclear energy in South Africa was undertaken under the chairmanship ofMr D.D. 
Forsyth. Eskom was represented on that Commission by Mr I. de Villiers Eskom's Chief 
Electrical Engineer. As a result of what was learnt by the Commission a task team was formed by 
Eskom in the early sixties to consider how Eskom should proceed with the development of nuclear 
power. The recommendation of the task team was that Eskom should proceed with the building of 
a nuclear power station, (Eskom 1973, p.36). 
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industrially mature countries in Europe and also the USA. Such a grid could transmit electricity 
generated in South Africa to countries bordering the Republic and conversely it was capable of 
bringing power into South Africa that was generated in neighbouring countries (then under white 
control) by connecting it to the electricity networks of those countries81 • To take advantage of this 
opportunity an important change in the Electricity Act was promulgated in 1964. The Act was 
amended to allow Eskom to supply electricity to contiguous territories or conversely receive 
electricity generated in those territories at any point on the South African border. 
The first international connection was made between South Africa and Mozambique. In 1966 the 
governments of South Africa and Portugal commenced discussions on the benefits afforded by 
such a connection. The idea was that the Zambezi River could be dammed at Cabora Bassa82 and 
a hydro-electric station could be built there. It was initially planned that Eskom would purchase 
about half the power generated at this station the other half would be used for development in 
Mozambique. The economic viability of the scheme depended on Eskom's power purchases. The 
power that would be generated at Cabora Bassa would be brought to South Africa via a 
transmission line some 1 360km in length and be fed into the national grid. 83 
Also in 1966 Eskom entered into an agreement with a subsidiary of the Industrial Development 
Corporation of South Africa, namely the South West Africa Water and Electricity Corporation 
generally known as SW A WEK. Eskom was to act as their agent for the development, distribution 
and supply of electricity to South West Africa as Namibia was known at that time. The prime 
purpose of the agreement was for Eskom to build a fossil-fuelled power station at Windhoek and 
a hydro-electric power station at the Ruacana waterfall on the Kunene river on the Angola border 
and connect these stations by a transmission line.84 
In 1967 an agreement was also reached between Eskom and the Kingdom of Lesotho for the 
supply of bulk electricity to that country. For this purpose an 88kv transmission line running from 
Ladybrand in the Orange Free State to a point on the Lesotho border near the capital Maseru was 
built. In 1968 negotiations also took place between Eskom and Swaziland concerning the supply 
81 
82 
83 
84 
The states concerned being Mozambique, Rhodesia (now Zimbabwe) and South West Africa (now 
Namibia). 
The name has subsequently changed to Cahora Bassa. 
The electricity was transmitted in direct current form and converted to alternating current at the 
Apollo Converter Station outside Pretoria. 
Construction of the Ruacana hydro-electric station was only started in 1973 since it required that 
certain dams had to be built in Angola for the successful operation of the scheme, (Eskom, 
1973,p.40). 
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of bulk electricity to that country, although the delivery of power was only to be made in the next 
decade. 
There was then in the period 1960 to 1970 considerable co-operation between South Africa, the 
so-called front-line states and the land-locked independent states of Swaziland and Lesotho, so 
far as electricity supply was concerned. The front-line states schemes were, however, short lived 
as a result of the withdrawal of the Portuguese from Africa and the fall of Rhodesia. This topic 
will be discussed further in Chapter 4. Finally, and also in 1968, Eskom concluded an agreement 
with Mozambique for the supply of electricity to Ressano Garcia. This supply was made available 
on the 29th of July 1969. 
The period, 1970 to 1980 presented financial, economic and even political problems for Eskom.85 
It was a period that saw consumer and governmental concern with Eskom's tariff increases in 
particular. The effect that the increases in electricity tariffs had on the cost structure and 
competitiveness of the South African economy over a number of years in this period prompted the 
Minister of Economic Affairs, to request the Board of Trade and Industries on the 7th March 1977 
to inquire into, and report on, Eskom's tariff policy and structure. Furthermore, in December 
1970, at the very start of the period, the government published their Economic Development 
Programme in which it was reported that only "moderate" economic growth would be expected in 
South Africa for the next five years". This prognosis did not, however, deter Eskom from 
continuing with its already substantial generation expansion programme which involved the 
building of power stations and transmission lines. This programme required large tariff increases 
to sustain it during this period and undoubtedly brought upon Eskom the governmental attention 
that occurred in the years from 1980 onwards. This topic will be discussed fully in Chapter 4. 
As a result of capital shortages in the early 1970's it became increasingly difficult for Eskom to 
raise money for their development programme on foreign markets. As a consequence of this 
capital shortage interest rates also rose (see section 3.1.3 Chapter 2). Faced with this problem 
Eskom gave attention to internal capital formation. The result was that a request was made to the 
Minister of Energy Affairs for an amendment to the Electricity Act of 1922, which would 
authorise Eskom, within statutory limitations, to generate capital which could be used for 
development purposes by a charge against revenue.86 Eskom also wanted the Act amended to 
85 
86 
Facts presented here for the years 1970 to 1980 are condensed from Eskom' s Annual Reports for 
this period. 
Eskom was encouraged to make this request to govermnent because in 1969 the Franzen 
Commission had recommended, inter alia, that the share of internal fimds, as a source of fmancing 
the capital expenditure of public sector enterprises, should be increased to reduce their 
dependence on borrowed fimds. 
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make it possible for them to combine all of South Africa's power stations in a new generating 
undertaking. This undertaking would be called the Central Generating Undertaking, commonly 
called the CGU. The CGU would supply power in bulk to all of Eskom's distribution 
undertakings. This, it was thought, would allow Eskom to operate all it's power stations in a 
manner aimed at achieving the lowest overall cost of generation thereby cutting operating and 
maintenance costs. The Electricity Act was amended in 1972 in line with Eskom' s request, and a 
Capital Development Fund was established, and money was laid aside each year thereafter for 
this fund. 
The period saw an increasing trend developing in costs for power station equipment. This was a 
world wide phenomenon. In addition fuel costs began to escalate. Initially these costs, particularly 
coal costs, were masked by rising transportation costs especially rail haulage costs. These rising 
costs forced Eskom to begin to increase their tariff levels each year in the period 1970 to 1980 at 
a higher rate than had hitherto been the case. Two reasons were given by Eskom for the 
electricity tariff increases during the 1970 to 1980 period. Firstly, increases were necessary 
because of escalating operating costs, and secondly, increases were necessary to finance 
expansion. 
The period 1970 to 1980 was also one that saw fluctuations in electricity sales. Overall there was 
a growth in sales which succeeded in sending Eskom a wrong economic signal. It encouraged the 
Corporation, despite changing political and economic events such as student and township unrest 
in the mid seventies, and difficulties in raising capital and high interest rates in the early 
seventies, to forge ahead with a massive expansion programme which, this study will show was 
partly unnecessary. 
With respect to this expansion programme, in what was an act of economic faith, Eskom 
announced in 1974 that two new stations of massive proportions (3 600MW each) would be built. 
The first was named Matla (the Sotho word for power) and was to be built 4km south west of the 
Kriel power station. The second was named Duvha (the Venda word for sun) which was to be 
built 14km south east of Witbank. In addition a new pumped storage station named Drakensberg 
was announced for Natal and in the Western Cape another pumped storage station at Palmiet, just 
outside Cape Town, was also to be built. In 1975 two gas turbine stations were also ordered. The 
first, being at Acacia near Cape Town and the second being at Port Rex near East London. These 
stations were to be used to help meet the expected power requirements of the coastal areas. To 
add to this frenetic construction activity Eskom began to plan for two more giant power stations 
also of 3 600MW which would be constructed in the 1980's. The first was Tutuka power station, 
which was to be situated at Standerton. Eskom considered that this station was so urgently needed 
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that the contracts to build it were not open to public bidding procedures i.e., competition, but 
were negotiated contracts with the main suppliers of plant for Matla power station.87 The other 
station was initially called Ilanga, but this name was eventually changed to Matimba. This station 
was to be built at Ellis Ras in the North Western Transvaal. 
3.6 Growth in the Mining and Manufacturing Sectors to 1980 
Having described the development of the electricity supply industry up to 1980 and Eskom' s role 
in the development of the mining and manufacturing sectors it is appropriate now to provide 
some facts on the growth of these sectors. It is suggested that such growth was made possible by 
supplies of reliable, and by world standards, cheap electricity. This statement in itself is not 
particularly powerful, however since this can be said of many other aids to industrial growth. The 
pertinent question therefore is how much would industrial growth have been curtailed without 
electricity? Whilst it may not be possible to answer this question it is harder to deny the 
importance of electricity in industrial growth than to extol it. 
The following tables illustrate the magnitude of development in the mining and manufacturing 
sectors of the South African economy up to 1980. Firstly mineral production from 1915 to 1980 is 
shown in Table No 3.1 below. 
. ..... _ .... _--------------------------------.-- ..................................... . 
PHYSlCAr.v():t1JMEOFPR01)Ub1'1DN9F~(198It#t.)·.···:·· 
::COld: .- ... -. DiamondS.:: •• : 
. ................... 
1915 41,5 
1935 48,8 
1950 35,5 53,8 19,1 23,3 
1960 66,1 98,5 31,2 33,6 
1970 107,7 148,5 76,1 47,7 
1980 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 
TABLE NO 3.1 GROWTH IN THE PHYSICAL OUTPUT OF THE SOUTH AFRICAN 
MINING SECTOR: 1915 - 1980 
Source: South African Statistics (1986). 
From Table 3.1 the growth in the physical output of South Africa's major mineral exports tripled 
in the period 1950-1980. Such an increase is in the most part due to the development of the 
87 Interview with Mr J de Beer, 13 November 1996. 
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electricity supply industry in South Africa. Without electric power deep level mining would have 
been impossible and these increased outputs would not have been realised. 
So far as the manufacturing sector is concerned Table No 3.2 below illustrates the net output and 
the numbers employed in manufacturing for selected years. 
1919 175890 
1936 342938 
1951 1189381 
1970 3101889 
1976 4517513 
119767 
218966 
536275 
1095557 
1362079 
687 
667 
855 
1481 
1639 
TABLE NO 3.2 MANUFACTURING NET OUTPUT AND JOB CREATION: 1919 -1976 
Source: Manufacturing Census (1918-1976). 
The average yearly growth rate in net output in the period 1919 to 1976 amounted to 5,9 per cent, 
(Nattrass, 1990, p.165). It can also be seen from Table No 3.2 that the capital employed per 
employee in the manufacturing sector increased over the years indicating more sophisticated 
manufacturing processes being employed i.e., processes becoming more mechanised and 
requiring electricity. The average yearly growth rate in capital intensity between 1919 and 1976 
was, however, relatively low being 1,5 per cent, (Nattrass, 1990, p.165). The structural changes 
in the manufacturing sector are demonstrated by the data presented in Table No 3.3 below. 
:1.916 ..... 1945 1960 ··1976 
No of Establishments 3638 9316 10264 15461 
No EmployedlEstablishment 24 39 63 88 
Gross OutputlEstablishment (1970 Rand) 52900 117800 349600 753500 
Average InvestmentlEstablishment in Plant 31600 39200 77500 151800 
and Machinery (1970 Rand) 
TABLE NO 3.3 STRUCTURAL CHANGES IN THE MANUFACTURING SECTOR: 
1916 -1976 
Source: Nattrass, (1990, p.168). 
From Table No 3.3 it can be observed that the numbers of enterprises increased fourfold in the 
sixty years between 1916 and 1976. Furthermore, the capital intensity in plant and machinery 
increased nearly five times. 
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4.0 ESKOM'S VIEW OF THE SOUTH AFRICAN ECONOMY IN 
1980 
The foregoing discussion gave an oveIView of Eskom' s extraordinarily large power station 
building programme, which really commenced after the Second World War, gained momentum 
in the period 1970 to 1980, and continued into the 80s. Nowhere in the world at that time was an 
electric utility undertaking such a task, not only with respect to the number of stations under 
construction and being planned but also so far as their size, i.e., their electricity generating 
capacity, was concerned. These stations could be ranked among the largest fossil-fired power 
stations in the world. They still do to this day. Because of the implications to Eskom that would 
result from this expansion programme it is necessary to consider why Eskom considered building 
these stations in the first place. To answer this question requires an examination of Eskom' s view 
of the South African economy during this period. 
Considering Eskom' s view of the dynamics of the South African economy will also make clear 
why the Corporation continued to pin their faith in the future on their forecasting model which 
will be discussed presently. The first clue is provided in 1980 when Eskom complained that they 
were hard pressed to meet the demand for electricity. Eskom maintained that they did not have 
enough generating capacity and that they were also short of skilled manpower. Eskom' s 
expansion programme was viewed as "a continuous process and that the construction of power 
stations and their financing should be as far as practical, free from short-term economic events. 
Expansion therefore should not be slowed down or accelerated as dictated by short-term economic 
criteria". Eskom went on to maintain that their inability to meet electricity demand in 1980 was 
attributable to the "cautious economic thinking which emerged in the late 60's and which was 
further influenced by the oil crisis in the early 70's and the recession in the mid 70's". Eskom 
further claimed "that they had at this period in history complied with a request made in the 
interests of the national economy to delay certain capital projects", and this in their opinion had 
been an unwise dictate, (Eskom Annual Report 1980 pp.11-12). 
The principle explanation Eskom put forward for their inability to meet electricity demand in 
1980 was that they had lost 3-4 years of generating expansion because of their compliance with 
this request. They went on to state that what was required so far as generation planning and 
forecasting was concerned was "bold planning and foresight", and that "when projecting 
electricity requirements in the 10-20 years after 1980 economic trends formed the only basis upon 
which to proceed". This philosophy had underpinned their whole generating expansion 
programme up to 1980. Eskom was firmly convinced in 1980 that an average annual growth rate 
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of electricity demand of nearly 9 per cent would continue into the future. This implied to the 
Corporation that by the end of the 1980-1990 decade, Eskom' s installed generating capacity 
would have to increase from 17 500MW to 34 OOOMW i.e., in short it would have to be doubled. 
The generating capacity would thereafter have to further increase to 65 OOOMW by the beginning 
of the second millennium, (Eskom: Annual Report, 1980, pp.1l-12). 
kirowth in electricity demand after 1980 would, according to Eskom, come from three sources, 
these being: 
1. The increasing industrialisation of South Africa; 
2. The swing from oil-based energies to electricity, and, referring to their electrification 
programme; 
3. The increasing economically active black population and the electrification of black 
townships,88 (Eskom: Annual Report, 1980, p.12) 
This last statement is of enormous importance since it effectively says that up to 1980 electricity 
supply in South Africa had been concerned with the provision of power to the mining and 
manufacturing sectors of the economy and white municipalities. Black household electrification 
scarcely featuring at all. 
So far as the shortage of skilled manpower was concerned Eskom considered this to be critical to 
their ability to provide sufficient electricity to meet the demand that they clearly saw arising. 
Eskom was then bullish in their sentiments regarding the economic, financial and political future 
of South Africa in the period 1970 - 1980. This view was to continue in spite of indicators that 
said otherwise; for example the political unrest that had occurred in Soweto in 1976. Eskom at 
this time seemed to be politically naIve.89 Eskom seemed then to be optimistic of the future after 
1980 and the demand for electricity was forecast to grow at a high rate and growth was 
confidentially expected to continue at this high rate until the turn of the century. It was 
considered that whilst there would be fluctuations in electricity demand from year-to-year the 
expected average growth would exceed 7 per cent per annum over the next 25 years. 90 
88 
89 
90 
The electrification of Greater Soweto had just began and it is clear that this influenced Eskom's 
comment. Greater Soweto , the largest black township in South Africa, being strategically placed 
on Eskom's front door-step near their head office in Johannesburg. The electrification of Greater 
Soweto will be discussed in Chapter 6. 
The eventual appointment of a more politically orientated chairman for Eskom was an indication 
that this was also the view of the government. This issue will be discussed further in Chapter 4. 
Eskom believed that what had happened in the past would continue to happen in the future. This 
view was conditioned by the fact that over the previous 30 years Eskom had recorded an average 
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Because of the time required to plan and build power stations, Eskom felt that only a massive 
uninterrupted expansion programme such as they were undertaking during this period would 
enable them to meet South Africa's future energy needs. Eskom' s expected growth rate in 
electricity demand as predicted in their forecasting model involved building some 20 base-load 
power stations between the years 1980 and 2005. Nuclear power it was thought, would be a 
necessary part of this programme (see Eskom's Generating Expansion Plan 1980 - 2005) also 
Eskom's Annual Report, (l980,p.12). 
5.0 ESKOM'S FORECASTING METHODOLOGY FOR 
ELECTRICITY DEMAND 
This section discusses Eskom's approach to electricity demand forecasting up to 1980, an 
approach which as will be shown in the following chapters, would come back to haunt the 
Corporation in the years ahead. 
Modelling and forecasting energy requirements from the mid seventies onwards into the eighties 
had, because of the 1973-74 oil crisis taken on greater importance. Mega-models had been 
developed which were so complex that nobody really understood them, (Baumgartner and 
Midtuun, 1987, p.3). The complexities involved in building and exercising energy models, and 
the nature of the process upon which they depend, prompted Sir James Ball to pose the question 
"where do the forecasting artists get their inspirations from?,,91 Sir James suggested that up to 50 
per cent of forecasting work was art and not science. This meant that most forecasters resorted to 
post hoc adjustments of their model's variables and demand equations to achieve suitable results. 
Formal forecasting models in the period since the oil crisis fell back on approaches such as 
discounted least squares, adaptive growth curves, Kalman Filters, ARIMA (Box-Jenkins) models 
or Poisson smoothing techniques92. It is suggested that using such approaches is, however, only 
one part of energy modelling. There is also the need to consider societal influences in the process. 
91 
92 
annual growth in electricity sales of 8,8 per cent per annwn, see Eskom Annual Reports for the 
period 1951-1981. 
Sir James Ball's, opening address to the Fourth International Symposiwn on Forecasting, 
organised by the International Institute of Forecasters at the London Business School 8-11 th July 
1984. Sir James was at the time a professor at the London Business School and a major figure in 
the development of macro-economic forecasting models, cited in Bawngartner and Midtuun, 
(1987, p.9). 
See various papers presented at the symposiwn cited above. 
69 
These influences become very important as the horizon considered in the forecasting scenario is 
lengthened93. They can range from the forecasters' interests and ideology to the political 
acceptability of the models' underlying assumptions and governmental energy policy. By leaving 
important goals and political values implicit in forecasting models, forecasts tend to project short-
term growth rates into long-term forecasts without initially examining what is involved in this 
assumption. Eskom's electricity demand forecasting model was guilty of this. Eskom in effect 
assumed that societal change was projected forward in the guise of "business as usual". This 
seemingly trivial assumption of constant growth rates of electricity demand tended to mask the 
inconceivable consequences of the assumption in the long-term. 
In the case of South Africa the dramatic changes in political development in the years from 1976 
forward brought electricity supply into prominence as a political issue. This, as will be shown, 
was particularly so in the case of the electrification of white-owned commercial farms on the 
borders of the Republic, and also in the case of the electrification of Greater Soweto and Eskom' s 
national programme to electrify black households in the 90' s. 
Eskom's electricity forecasts after 1970 therefore contained a policy bias which was not explicitly 
accounted for in their methodology. This resulted in the Corporation avoiding the probability that 
the economic, political and social structures in South Africa would break down, evolve and 
possibly change in the future, and feed back into policy changes which would invalidate the basis 
on which the forecast was made in the first place. 
What seems certain, however, is that the many relationships that impacted electricity demand 
forecasting prior to 1976 could no longer be inferred after the Soweto riots in that year. From past 
events, new relations emerged and old relationships changed.94 Eskom' s electricity demand 
forecasting methodology did not take these changes into account at all. They assumed that 
because, over the preceding 30 years from 1945-1975, the demand for electricity grew at some 4 
per cent above the growth in GDP such growth would continue until the turn of the millennium. 
This was a grave error. 95 
93 
94 
95 
ill the case of Eskom forecasts of electricity demand 15-20 years in advance were regularly made. 
Considering South Africa's volatile political environment in the period up to the ANC coming to 
power in 1994 Eskom' s forecasts therefore took heroic leaps into the future. 
This will be dramatically demonstrated in the discussions undertaken in the following chapters 
concerning Eskom's changing stance on the electrification of black households in South Africa. 
For a description of the logic and mathematics underpinning Eskom's generation forecasting 
model (see Norman, 1977). 
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Eskom's generating forecasting model was then responsible for an incredibly large power station 
building programme which was the most ambitious in the world at the time and was a recipe for 
considerable controversy. It required vast capital expenditure and was eventually to lead to an 
over capacity of generating plant, which ironically was what helped the programme to electrify 
black households in South Africa get started after 1980 (see Chapter 5). This programme was of 
course non-existent when all Eskom's giant power stations were planned. The main recipients of 
all this electricity were scheduled to be the South African mining industry, the manufacturing 
sector, the SAR&H and bulk supplies to white municipalities. To carry all the potential power to 
the various parts of South Africa, the forecasting programme called for new power lines to be 
built. The Rand, Orange Free State and Natal undertakings were connected with a new 132kv 
line and a third 400kv line into the Western Cape from the Eastern Transvaal power stations was 
built during the period 1970 to 1979. An additional 400kv line from the Camden power station to 
Natal was also built as was a 400kv line to serve the output of the Drakensberg pumped storage 
scheme. There were also two 275kv lines built to strengthen electricity supply to the Sandton area 
near Johannesburg and the West Rand. 
6.0 THE REORGANISATION OF ESKOM 
In 1978 in an effort to become more efficient and to try and curtail costs Eskom reorganised their 
distribution undertakings into six regions. From the accounting point of view, however, the 
undertakings were preserved as separate statutory entities. Each region was headed by a manager, 
who had formerly managed the relevant undertaking. The regions so formed were, The Rand and 
Orange Free State, Eastern Transvaal, Natal, Northern Cape, Western Cape and Eastern Cape 
Regions. The activities of the Eastern Cape Region included those of the Border, Cape Eastern 
and Orange River Undertakings. Responsibility for the activities of the former CGU were 
transferred partly to the regions concerned and partly to the relevant departments of Eskom' s new 
head office situated at Megawatt Park in Sandton, north of Johannesburg, (Eskom; Annual 
Report 1978, p.17). 
7.0 THE DE KOCK, WIEHAHN AND RIEKERT COMMISSIONS 
In 1977 three Commissions of Inquiry were appointed by the government; these being the de 
Kock, the Wiehahn and the Riekert Commissions. The terms of reference of the de Kock 
Commission was to investigate monetary policy in South Africa. The Wiehahn Commission was 
charged with investigating labour legislation and the Department of Labour. The Riekert 
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Commission was also to investigate labour legislation but here the emphasis was on improving 
labour utilisation in South Africa. The findings of the three Commissions were presented to 
Parliament in 1978 and 1979 and suggested inter alia that the South African economy had 
reached the stage where the state should begin to play a less significant role in developing the 
economy and that the market should be free to play a larger role. This finding was of political 
importance with regard to Eskom at this time since Eskom was a public utility and had been 
founded by the state. Furthermore, Eskom had, to all intents and purposes, monopoly status in the 
South African electricity supply industry and might be better privati sed. Because of this it is 
possible that the findings of these Commissions influenced the government's attitude towards 
Eskom and this issue will be discussed further in the following chapter when the de Villiers' 
Commission of Inquiry into Electricity Supply in the Republic of South Africa is considered. 
8.0 CONCLUSIONS 
This chapter has traced in broad perspective the development of electricity supply in South Africa 
from 1882 to 1980. It has attempted to show that private entrepreneurial activity for profit was 
the initial driving force behind this supply which was required to meet the demand for electricity 
from the gold and diamond mining companies that operated in South Africa at the turn of the 
century. At the start of electricity supply in South Africa, except for some street lighting projects, 
no attempt was made to supply electricity for general domestic use. 
The principle private electric utility was the Victoria Falls Power Company Ltd., (VFP) which 
was controlled from London. This company was eventually taken over by the newly established 
Electricity Supply Commission (Eskom) in 1948. This takeover effectively brought to an end 
private electricity generation of any note in South Africa. Eskom, which operated at neither a 
profit or a loss, would, it was reasoned, be able to supply industry the railways and the mining 
sector with electricity at a cheaper rate than had been the case under the VFP thus increasing 
South Africa's competitive edge in export markets. Additionally as a public utility Eskom could 
afford to pay greater attention to the widespread supply of electricity for domestic purposes. 
With respect to the supply of domestic electricity Eskom supplied bulk power to most 
municipalities. The municipalities in tum resold this power at a profit to consumers in their area 
of supply. In other instances electricity generated by Eskom was distributed directly by the 
Corporation in municipal areas and rural localities. Domestic electricity, with very few 
exceptions, was supplied to white households only. Deep rural areas were also generally left 
unsupplied with electricity, even in the case of white-owned commercial farms. Farms and black 
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households in South Africa were therefore very poorly supplied with power and as a consequence 
there was a huge backlog of domestic electricity provision to be dealt with after 1980. A degree of 
rural electrification did, quite naturally, occur in areas adjacent to main supply grids, but serious 
attempts to electrify areas remote from established supply points had to wait for the period after 
1980. 
Eskom's main consumers up to 1980 were the mining, industrial and transportation sectors of the 
economy, and the white municipalities, essentially the same mix of consumers as the VFP 
supplied. In 1980, at the end of the period covered in this chapter the breakdown of Eskom's 
sales of electricity was as shown in Table No 3.4 below: 
:: :.:'-'::.:.::- .. : .. ::::: .:::.:.:::.::::.::::.::::::::::::::-:::: .. :.:: ....... -: .-:::::::::::::" 
CATEGORYOFCONSUMERL··. •••··•· ••• • ••• L •• · ·.PERCENTAGlliOFTOTALSALES •• ·•••· 
Municipal supply (bulk) 
Direct Sales and Street Lighting 
Industry 
Mining 
Traction 
29,9 
1,2 
34,1 
29,8 
5,0 
TABLE NO. 3.4 PERCENTAGE OF ELECTRICITY SALES TO THE DIFFERENT 
CATEGORIES OF CONSUMERS: 1979 
Source: Eskom's Annual Report, (1979, p.20). 
It will be observed from Table No 3.4 that only 1,2 per cent of Eskom's electricity sales were 
directly supplied to consumers. These sales included the rural areas mentioned above; 68,9 per 
cent of the power generated by Eskom was supplied to the mining, industrial and traction sectors 
of the South African economy and 29,9 per cent to white municipalities. This large percentage of 
electricity sales to municipalities does demonstrate the rapid urbanisation of South Africa. 
Jones (1989) has suggested that the impact of urbanisation on energy use is profound, and is the 
single most important factor impacting the growth of domestic energy consumption. It also 
facilitates a modernisation process which leads to changes in energy preferences, e.g., from 
fuelwood to electricity, and the preference for labour and time saving electrical appliances. 
Urbanisation is then an important factor in the electrification of rural areas because as people 
leave rural areas the cost per individual electrification connection increases as a result of 
diseconomies of scale. This increasing cost makes it difficult for rural electrification schemes to 
pay for themselves. According to the Urban Foundation the urban black population was estimated 
to increase to 11 million by 1990, cited in Van Gass, (1993, p.2). This was the date when 
Eskom's "Electricity for All" programme started, (see Chapter 8). Viljoen (1989, p.131) has 
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estimated that rural-urban migration reduces the average total population growth in rural areas of 
South Africa from over 3,5 per cent to less than 1 per cent per annum. These facts will certainly 
impact the sustainability of the programme to electrify rural areas. The table below presents some 
data on the urban/rural population nexus in 1980. 
URBAN 
PERCENTAGES 
RURAL 
PERCENTAGES 
. ....................... . ......... . 
.. -. ... ........ . . ....... . 
W811$S/ .CQWU:REj)$ 
88,4 76,6 
11,6 23,3 
........ .-. 
ASlAN/H YBtAt'KSL 
90,6 38,3 
9,4 61,7 
TABLE 3.5 URBAN AND RURAL POPULATIONS IN SOUTH 
AFRICA: 1980 
Source: Swart (1983, p.102). 
At the beginning of 1980 the total sent out rating in service generating capacity of the Eskom 
system amounted to 15 056MW. This electricity being generated by the power stations shown in 
table No 3.6 below. 
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.·POWERS1'A:TION········ ............. .·ASSIGNEDSEN'l'''OUTRAtINGMW.···· 
Coal fired stations, Eastern Cape 
West Bank 
Sub-total 80 
Coal fired stations, Natal 
Colenso 184 
Ingagane 465 
Umgeni 222 
Sub-total 771 
Coal fired stations, Transvaal and O.F.S 
Arnot 1980 
Camden 1520 
Grootvlei 1 140 
Hendrina 1900 
Highveld 440 
Klip 372 
Komati 925 
Kriel 2850* 
Matla 575* 
Taaibos 440 
Vaal 282 
Vierfontein 336 
Wilge 221 
Sub-total 12981 
Coal fired stations, Western Cape 
Hex River 114 
Salt River 2 228 
Sub-total 342 
Total coal fired stations 14174 
Gas turbine stations 
Acacia (Western Cape) 171 
Port Rex 171 
Total 2as turbine stations 342 
Hydro-electric stations, conventional stora2e 
Hendrik Verwoerd 320 
Vanderkloof 220 
Total hydro stations 540 
Total all Escom 15056 
Other power sources 
Cahora Bassa 1384 
TABLE NO. 3.6 ESKOM POWER STATIONS (AND THEIR SENT OUT RATINGS) IN 
SERVICE AT THE 31ST DECEMBER 1979 
Source: Eskom Annual Report, (1979, p.60). 
*Power Station still under construction in 1979. 
Eskom's massive generation expansion programme that had its beginnings after the Second 
World War, and which continued witlI increasing fervour into tlIe eighties, was responsible for 
tlIe electricity infrastructure revealed in Table No 3.6 above. Eskom's generation expansion 
programme was, however, based upon a naIve forecasting metlIodology and resulted in excess 
capital demands being made on the South African economy. 
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In the years 1970 to 1980 the first glimmerings of serious financial and economic problems for 
Eskom could be observed. These problems occurred because in spite of a slowing down in 
electricity sales and a warning from the government that only "moderate" economic growth was 
to be expected in this period, Eskom, with complete confidence in their generation planning 
forecasts, pressed ahead with a massive power station and transmission line construction 
programme. After 1980 these financial and economic problems burst into life and, together with 
changing political circumstances, caused events which seriously impacted Eskom's programme to 
electrify black households and white-owned commercial farms. These events are discussed in 
detail in the following chapters which concentrate on describing these electrification 
programmes. 
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CHAPTER 4 
THE REASONS WHY ESKOM UNDERTOOK A FARM ELECTRIFICATION 
PROGRAMME AND RESEARCH INTO BLACK HOUSEHOLD 
ELECTRIFICATION: 1980-1990 
1.0 INTRODUCTION 
Prior to describing Eskom' s programmes to electrify white-owned commercial fanns and black 
households in South Africa in the period 1980-1990 it is appropriate to determine 1) Why was the 
fann electrification programme actively encouraged by the government? and 2) Why, with the " .. 
exception of the electrification of Greater Soweto which was carried out by the government itself, was 
the electrification of black households from 1985-1990 curtailed?96 
The purpose of this chapter is to attempt to answer these questions. To do this it is necessary to 
examine certain changes in the political and economic environments of South Africa and Eskom' s 
own changing financial and economic circumstances and institutional structure in the period 
concerned. 
2.0 POLITICAL CHANGES AND ELECTRIFICATION 
The political changes that influenced the electrification of white-owned commercial fanns and black 
households in South Africa are threefold, 1) The situation on the borders between South Africa and 
the contiguous black states, 2) The electoral struggle the government was waging with right-wing 
groups, and 3) The Black Local Authorities Act which was promulgated in 1982. Each of these three ~ 
areas of change will be discussed in tum. 
96 The electrification of Greater Soweto and Eskom's association with this project, is discussed in detail 
in Chapter 6 of this study. 
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2.1 The Front-Line States 
A major political event, which would influence the electrification of white-owned commercial farms 
on the borders of South Africa from 1980 was the coup in Portugal on Thursday the 25th April 1974 
which ousted the government. As a consequence the Portuguese army was withdrawn from Portugal's 
African colonies which they had held for close to five hundred years. This coup had everything to do 
with the wars that the Portuguese were fighting in Mozambique, Angola and Portuguese Guinea, and 
which they seemed to be losing, and a dictatorship that clung to power in Portugal itself, (Sparks, 
1990, p.298). Thus the curtain of Mrican colonial history rang down on Portugal. Portugal was the 
first European nation to colonise Africa and it was the last to leave. Trouble at home has sounded the 
death knell for many colonial empires from Rome onwards, Portugal's was no exception. 
Prior to the Portuguese withdrawal from Mrica South Africa had been somewhat protected from 
incursions by Urn Khonto we Sizwe guerrillas 97 and from immediate confrontation with black states 
to the north of the Republic. This protection was achieved by a line of white controlled countries, 
which stretched from the Indian Ocean in the East to the Atlantic Ocean in the West. Specifically 
these were Mozambique, Rhodesia (as Zimbabwe was then known), Angola and South West Mrica 
(as Namibia was then known), which was administered by South Africa. These states provided the 
Republic with a measure of security. This was because prior to confronting the South Mrican police 
and defence force the ANC's military wing had to effectively breach a cordon of Portuguese or 
Rhodesian troops and then face an equally daunting task of retreating through this white held 
territory after they had struck in South Africa. With the Portuguese withdrawal from Africa all this 
changed. 
After the withdrawal of the Portuguese, Mozambique, under Samora Machel, allowed a second front 
to be opened up on a beleaguered Ian Smith in Rhodesia. In 1979 the Rhodesians were forced to 
terminate their bush war and hand over power to a black government. This event meant that in 5 \ ____ 
years South Africa had gone from having a protective ring around the country to a situation whereby 
the country was in effect surrounded by states sympathetic to the ANC and the black liberation 
movement. The independence of the two Portuguese colonies, Angola and Mozambique, and 
Zimbabwe in 1980 left South Africa vulnerable to infiltration on a wide front and it was at this time 
97 Urn Khonto we Sizwe was the military wing of the African National Congress. 
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that a policy of destabilising the front-line states was formulated, by the South African government, 
(Arnold, 1992, p.47). 
Events in Angola now claimed the attention of the South African government. Resulting from an 
approach by the United States Central Intelligence Agency South Africa was persuaded to assist Jonas 
Savimbi and UNIT A and increase pressure on the two other political groups vying for power in 
Angola. These groups being the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA), which was 
led by Agostino Neto (and had the advantage of controlling Luanda the capital of Angola), and the 
National Front for the Liberation of Angola (FNLA) which was led by Holden Roberto, (Maier, 1996, 
p.14). 
The Prime Minister of South Africa at this time was lB. Vorster, P.W. Botha was his Minister of 
Defence and General Magnus Malan was chief of the South African defence force. Without 
discussing strategy with Vorster, and in violation of South Africa's "good neighbour" policy, Botha 
seized the opportunity to launch an attack into Angola. This attack took place on Wednesday the 17th 
of September 1975, (Stockwell 1979). The attacking force quickly moved 500 miles into Angola and 
logistical support for this force was provided by troops based on the border between South West 
Africa and Angola. The force captured the port cities of Mocamedes, Benguela, Lobito and Porto 
Amboim. This attack eventually failed, however, due to a counter attack by Cuban forces and the 
South Africans were forced to retreat. 98 The fiasco was exposed; but the important point so far as the 
future programme to electrify white-owned commercial farms on South Africa's borders from 1980 
onwards was that a new regional military strategy was taking shape in South African defence circles 
with P.W. Botha and the Department of Military Intelligence as the key drivers. Botha saw South 
Africa as a regional military superpower. The strategy was simple. If South Africa could dominate the 
Southern African region with overwhelming military force then the border states could do little to 
adversely influence the continuation of the apartheid regime in the Republic, (Grundy, 1983,pp.7-8). 
Neighbouring states would, it was thought, be intimidated and dissuaded from allowing the ANC to 
use their territory for launching military strikes into South Africa, (Arnold, 1992, p.49). 
~ 
The next political event of importance that would influence border farm electrification was the so- V 
called "information scandal". This scandal saw Voster and Cornelius Mulder, Voster's heir apparent, 
98 Ibis venture was carried out under a cloak of secrecy, the press was effectively gagged by a 
govenunent ploy of telling them what was going on and then demanding their silence, (Sparks, 1990, 
p.305) also see Maier, (1996, p.l6). 
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and then Minister of Infonnation, fall from power allowing P.W. Botha to be elected as Prime 
Minister of South Africa. Malan was brought into the Cabinet as Minister of Defence and another 
Botha supporter Constant Viljoen took over from Malan as Chief of the Defence Force, (Sparks, 
1990, p.308). 
All the pieces were now in place for a massive military build-up to commence and power increasingly 
shifted from the Nationalist Party per se to the Nationalist Party's security establishment. Such a 
military build-up would require diligence on South Africa's borders; which in turn meant keeping V 
farmers there and building a buffer zone that would discourage guerrilla attacks into the Republic by 
making South Africa less vulnerable to infiltration.99 The electrification of border farms was, the 
government thought, one of the ways of achieving this goal. Only Eskom had the capability of 
undertaking a farm electrification programme. As will be shown presently the government therefore 
exerted pressure on the Corporation to proceed with this scheme. 
2.2 The Electoral Struggle 
With respect to the electrification of black households in South Africa a political factor that was to 
have an important bearing on this issue was that from the mid 80' s to the beginning of the 90's a 
struggle ensued between the government, that was beginning to introduce political refonn into South ~ 
Africa, and the Conservative Party (CP).lOO This struggle was one, which had concerned 
Afrikanerdom during most of the 20th century. It centred on the protection of Afrikaner identity and 
how state institutions could be used to protect the status of Afrikaners in South Africa. Two views of 
how this could be done emerged. These were the right wing or "verkrampte" viewpoint, which 
defined Afrikaner nationalism by emphasising it's "primordial characteristics" 101 , and a more 
moderate or "verligte" viewpoint which defined Afrikaner nationalism inclusively by emphasising 
99 During the early 80's fanners on South Africa's borders with Namibia, BotswarJa, Zimbabwe and 
Mozambique were leaving their fanns. The exact mnnber that left is tmknown but they were sufficient 
in nwnbers to cause these border areas to become depopulated, (DMEA Annual Report, 1981, p.73). 
Such depopulation making it easier for guerrilla attacks on the Republic to take place. 
100 That the electrification of black households was part of the government's reform initiative is clear 
from the electrification of Greater Soweto that was started in 1980, and which will be discussed in 
detail in Chapter 6 of this study. 
101 These characteristics are the use of the Afrikaans language, the deep rooted folk culture of the 
Afrikaner nation, the mythology surrounding this issue and the need for a white Fatherland for 
Afrikaners. 
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racial and later territorial aspects. 102 Within each faction there was, however, intra-ethnic conflict and 
thus internal disagreement, (van Rooyen, 1994, p.117). Such a situation, according to Horowitz 
(1985, p.331) provided each faction with electoral opportunities, where voters could be mobilised by 
appeals to ethnic interests, threats and hatreds. The CP demonstrated these opportunities in the 
February 1984 by-election in the Soutpansberg where the government lost its seat to them. In 
November of that year in by-elections in Primrose, George and Parow there was a marked swing (22 
per cent), from the government to the CP, (van Rooyen, 1994, p.124). This swing occurred despite 
Hernus Kriel's assurance to voters that the government's "policy is still separate development" (The V 
Argus 10th November 1994).103 
These results indicated that formally safe government seats, particularly in the Transvaal, had been 
marginalised. Despite these electoral setbacks the government continued to introduce further reform 
measures during 1985.104 The Congress of South Mrica Trades Union (COSATU) was also founded 
during the year this being the first non-racial trade union body formed in South Africa. During 1985, 
however, there was increased political unrest in the country and the government was forced to 
introduce a state of emergency in 36 magisterial districts. 
In September 1985 P.W. Botha made a speech in Durban that reverberated around the world. The 
speech became known as the "Rubicon" speech. 105 The Rubicon speech was expected to announce 
reforms that would include a change in race relations. The speech took a hard line on change, 
however, as a result of accusations by the verkrampte element in government and the population that 
the government was bowing to foreign pressure for constitutional change in the country. In the speech 
Botha therefore rejected international demands for political change in South Mrica and this resulted 
in massive disinvestment, economic sanctions and a rapid decline in the value of the Rand. The Rand V---.. 
fell by 35 per cent in thirteen days. This speech heralded a hard-line political approach by the 
government in the second half of the 1980 - 1990 decade, which would influence the electrification of 
black households. In October 1985 there were by-elections held in Sasolburg, Bethlehem, Springs, 
102 The emphasis here is on a non-racial South Africa based on common values with a central role for the 
Afrikaner in the govermnent of such a country. 
103 Hemus Kriel was the government candidate in Parow. 
104 For example they repealed the Mixed Marriage and Immorality Acts and the Prohibition of Political 
Interference Act. 
105 It has become known as the Rubicon speech because Botha said he had crossed the Rubicon of 
Reform. Ironically this speech was allegedly orchestrated by F.W. de Klerk who was later to release 
Nelson Mandela from custody, see Van Rooyen (1994, p.12S) and Arnold (1992, p.69). At this time 
de Klerk was the leader of the Transvaal National Party and a right wing member of Botha's cabinet. 
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Vryburg and Port Natal. The result of these elections was that the government's majority declined in 
three of the five constituencies by between 50-70 per cent and the Sasolburg seat was lost to the CP, 
(van Rooyen, 1994, p.125). 
Despite Botha's speech and the by-election setbacks, significant political developments did take place 
during 1986 including a visit from the Commonwealth Eminent Persons Group. This visit was, 
however, rendered useless by the South African Defence Force carrying out cross-border raids on 
ANC bases in neighbouring states during their stay, (Sparkes, 1990, p.351). The reason for these 
raids was that the government was anxious to prove that they were not yielding to outside demands 
concerning reform in South Africa and that the white electorate could depend upon them to preserve 
white dominance in the country, (van Rooyen, 1994, p.126) Those events lead to what was termed the ~ 
"end of South Africa's Prague Spring", (Sunday times 16th August 1987). The Kliprivier by-election 
followed in September 1986 and the government again found a swing away from them and towards 
the CPo 
In 1987 there was a general election and this took place against a backdrop of a countrywide state of 
emergency. The government's election platform emphasised reform and security. The election slogan 
was "Reform Yes, Surrender No". The CP focused its attention on the worsening unrest in South 
Africa, economic decline and the failure of the government's attempts at power sharing with 
coloureds and Indians via the Tricameral Constitution of 1983. 
The result of the election was an increased support for the right wing parties from about 14 per cent 
in 1981 to 30 per cent in 1987.106 The number of right wing seats in the government increased from 7 
in 1981 to 22 in 1987. This change resulted in the CP becoming the official opposition. This was also 
an election that effectively saw the demise of the HNP as a political force leaving the CP as the voice 
of the right wing faction in South Africa. Support for the CP was centred in the mining and 
agricultural towns of the Transvaal and the Orange Free State. The consensus of opinion amongst 
journalist was that the election results would force the government to reduce its reform initiatives. 107 
The election results also had a detrimental effect on the South African economy since internationally 
106 The dominant right wing parties were the Conservative party (CP) under Dr Andries Treurnicht and 
the Herstigte Nasionale Party (HNP) under the leadership ofMr Jaap Marais. 
107 For example Rapport, 10th May 1987 said "No one can ignore the swing to the right", Business Day 
8th May 1987 said "Voters crossed all cultural, religious and language barriers to enter the White 
Laager and to shut out the rest", the Southern African Report 8th May 1987 said "swing to right 
reduces pressure for reform", and The Sowetan 8th May 1987 said "Those who did not scurry back into 
the laager took another step back to the oxwagon days by voting for the CPo 
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it was seen as a blow to the refonn process initiated by Botha in the early 80' s. In this, international 
opinion was correct since after the election the government decided to slow down the refonn process, 
which would include the electrification of black townships, and greater emphasis than ever was 
placed on security. 
In March 1988 three very important by-elections were held in Standerton, Randfontein and 
Schweizer-Reneke. The CP's election strategy concentrated on the negative consequences of the 
government's attempt at refonn and the depressed state of the economy. The CP also accused the 
government of selling out the whites. The government countered the CP's strategy with an exhibition 
of military strength and the SADF attacked ANC bases in Angola and banned anti-apartheid 
organisations. In spite of this show of strength by the government the three by-elections were won by 
the CPo The bitterest pill that the government had to swallow was perhaps the loss of the Standerton 
seat that the government had won in 1948 when they defeated the then UP prime minister General 
Smuts at that venue. P.W. Botha in response to this electoral setback said that the government would 
"give priority to the security of South Africans", (Die Burger, 4th March 1988); it was also reported V 
that senior government politicians had decided "that a brake would now be placed on racial refonn". 
Following the March 1988 election came the October 1988 municipal elections. The CP's plan was to 
gain control of as many town and city councils as possible and thus halt the government's refonn 
process. In the election the CP gained control of 101 out of 150 local councils in the Transvaal i.e., 76 
per cent. Many of the town councils thus controlled by the CP re-introduced apartheid. ~ 
Early in 1989 P.W. Botha suffered a stroke. With a general election scheduled for September 1989 a 
leadership struggle between P.W. Botha and F.W. de Klerk began. The result was a victory for de 
Klerk and the NP caucus elected de Klerk the new party leader on the 2nd February of that year. The 
struggle was acrimonious and the government feared it would become an election issue and damage 
their perfonnance in the coming election. F.W. de Klerk's rise to power provided hope that refonn 
would continue if the government won the September election. The government's election manifesto 
suggested this and included promises such as group control over their own affairs being retained 
(Tricameral Constitution), voters rolls for each racial group and separate residential areas and 
schools, with public amenities being opened to all races. 
The CP concentrated their election campaign on three issues. These were the selling out of the whites 
by the government, mismanagement of the economy and the recent settlement in Namibia which the 
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CP considered had been prejudicial to the whites living there. Both the government and CP rejected 
majority rule and both refused to negotiate with the ANC. 
The September election was the government's worst showing since 1948. They lost 29 seats, 17 to the 
CP and 12 to the Democratic Party (DP). The CP increased its number of seats from 22 to 39 i.e., it 
almost doubled its number of seats. The CP also won seats in both the Orange Free State and the 
Cape Province, i.e., outside the Transvaal, traditionally the party's strongest base. A large number of 
government seats were also marginalised, but the CP was not able to capitalise its strong showing in 
urban areas during the 1988 municipal elections.108 The CP had the support of about half the 
Afrikaner nation and this left the government, which still held a slim overall majority in parliament, 
with one option for survival, that was to accelerate reform and win over English speakers from the 
DP. 109 
The impact of the electoral struggle between 1984 and 1990 on the electrification process was such 
that as the pressure increased on Botha to reverse his reform initiatives there was clearly no chance 
that he would be prepared to endorse the provision of electricity to black households within South V 
Africa. Providing electricity to such households would have given the CP another weapon with which 
to attack the government. For example, electrification would be costly and the economy was in a 
recession. The existing situation had already allowed the CP to accuse the government of 
mismanaging the economy and "impoverishing whites through it's redistributive policies" (Market 
Opinion Surveys, M.& M., July 1989) cited in Van Rooyen, (1994, p. 136). The electrification of 
black households would almost certainly require cross-subsidisation and therefore would indeed have V 
to be paid for in part by white electricity cons~. 110 This would justify the CP's claim so far as 
this measure was concerned. It seems reasonable to suggest that the government could not possibly 
risk undertaking a programme to electrify black households as a consequence. Furthermore, both the 
108 This was probably because of the economic consequences of the CP's reintroduction of petty apartheid 
in places like Boksburg and Carltonville. Blacks retaliated with conswner boycotts causing serious 
tinanciallosses in these areas. 
109 This refonn process including the release of the surviving Rivonia trialists Govan Mbeki and Walter 
Sisulu (Nelson Mandela was, however, still kept incarcerated) and the effective unbanning of the 
ANC. Beaches were opened to all races and the government announced its intention to repeal the 
Separate Amenities Act. 
110 That Eskom thought that the electrification of black townships would require cross-subsidisation is 
clear from interviews with Dr I.C. McRae, 28th August 1996, Mr John Bradbury, 13th November 1996 
and Mr Douwe van Wyk, 29th November 1996. That their asswnption was correct will be shown in 
Chapters 8 and 9 of this study when Eskom's progranune to electrifY households in black urban areas 
from 1990 onwards will be discussed . 
. / 
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government and the CP were committed to the policy of homelands for blacks hence if the 
electrification of black households was to be undertaken it should be in these homelands thus making '// 
them more attractive for blacks to~.111 Widespread provision of electricity to black households 
in South Africa would make it more comfortable for blacks and they would then wish to remain 
within white South Africa and not return to the homelands. 112 The result was that CP could use the 
electrification of black households in South Africa as a political weapon against the government. The 
government in slowing down their reform process from 1985 onwards, thereby also effectively 
cunailed the electrification of black households in South Africa. "L/ 
2.3 The Black Local Authorities Act 
A further political change which affected the electrification of black households is now considered. In 
1982 the Black Local Authorities Act, which create~ ~~~~rnment structures for black urban 
areas was passed.113 Up until the passing of this act black urban areas were administered by 
provincial and central government administrations in terms of the Black Administration Act of 1927. V 
The new Black Local Authorities Act, which would become of critical importance in the problems 
concerned with the electrification of black townships and Greater Soweto in particular, was a genuine 
attempt to introduce reform initiatives in black communities by creating improved economic and 
social conditions. Dr. P.l Riekert, the chief director of the Western Transvaal administration Board 
commenting on the act said that it 
"would serve to defuse pent -up frustrations and grievances against administration from 
Pretoria ... Defusion of this kind has become an urgent necessity which cannot be postponed 
much longer" 
(Riekert, in Van Vuuren et al [eds.], 1983, p.156). 
'I The Act would effectively allow black municipalities to run their own affairs including the 
management of their electricity supply. The onus was also passed onto black authorities for 
supervising the influx-control system by making it illegal for blacks to be granted urban status if they 
1Jl The fIrst Eskom Management Board Meeting that dealt with the electrifIcation of black households 
(23rd June 1986) duly considered this issue. This will be discussed in the following chapter. 
112 This sentiment was held by the Transvaal Provincial Administration, Interview with Dr Ian McRae, 4th 
September 1997. 
113 The need for the creation of a form of black self-government in black townships had been identifIed as 
urgent by the Riekert Commission in 1977. 
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did not have a permanent job and so-called "approved accommodation". This meant that shack-
dwellers or blacks who rented rooms had to return to their homelands. The new black councils were, 
however, only there on the whim of the government. Dr P. Koornhof the Minister for Co-operation 
and Development could remove councillors, appoint others or dismiss whole councils and nominate 
new ones as the need arose. These councils effectively then implemented apartheid policies if they 
wished to remain in power. They could hardly be said therefore to represent the black electonlt~}n the 
townships, see Riekert, in Van Vuuren et al [eds.] (1993, pp.144-166). 
Polls to elect black councillors on the 28th of August 1983 were very heavily boycotted. There was a 5 
per cent poll in Greater Soweto, 11 per cent in the townships of Port Elizabeth, 15 per cent in the 
Vaal Triangle, 19 per cent in Durban and 20 per cent on the East Rand. Few respected black leaders 
offered themselves for election as town councillors. For the most part councillors were regarded as 
puppets of the white government, (Sparks, 1990, p.332). 
, With respect to the electrification of black townships, what was to prove disastrous, was the fact that 
under the new administrntive structure, the townships were to be financially self-supporting, (Bekker V 
and Humphries, 1985, p.l13). The required revenue necessary to run their own affairs had to be 
provided by the township residents themselves. The fiscus was therefore released from the financial 
burden of the black townships of South Africa under the new dispensation. Because most townships 
had a low level of industrial and commercial development the tax base required to run the townships 
was generally insufficient to meet their existing running expenses let alone additional expenses that V 
would be incurred with respect to the supply of electricity. Because of the lack of capital developing 
an electrification infrastructure in black townships by the municipality was therefore, in almost all 
cases, out of the question. As noted Greater Soweto was the exception having been electrified by the 
government between 1980 and 1986. In the event, to increase their revenue, councils were forced to 
substantially mise rents in the townships so that enough money was available to administer the areas.V 
These events were to lead to unrest and boycotts of payments for services and this situation added 
another dimension to the problems Eskom would eventually face in the mid and late 80' s so far as the 
supply of bulk electricity to Greater Soweto was concerned. 1 14 
Economic events between 1980 and 1990, just like political events, also had an important impact on 
the electrification of white-owned commercial farms and black households in South Africa. The next 
114 This issue is discussed in detail in Chapter 6. 
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section considers these economic events beginning with a very brief overview of the decade and 
continuing with a more detailed examination of Eskom' s economic performance. Eskom' s economic 
performance is of particular significance since this was mainly responsible for the government 
undertaking the de Villiers Commission mentioned above; a commission whose recommendations 
profoundly affected the electrification of black households in South Africa. V 
3.0 ECONOMIC CHANGES AND ELECTRIFICATION 
3.1 General Overview of the Decade 
During the decade 1980 to 1990 the South African economy grew very slowly. The average rate of 
economic growth was 1,4 per cent per annum and during the years 1982, 1983 and 1985 negative 
growth in GDP was recorded. Inflation was persistently high the average for the period being of the 
order of 14,5 per cent. Per capita incomes fell and as a consequence real living standards, in 
aggregate, declined, (Dagut, [ed] 1991, p.57). The period was also characterised by rising 
unemployment levels and rising oil prices as a result of the oil crises in the previous decade.115 Of 
particular importance to Eskom, as a consequence of their capital demands to meet the needs of their 
massive generation expansion programme, was the fact that gross domestic savings and investment as 
a percentage of the GDP fell from about 35 per cent and 31 per cent respectively in 1980 to about 22 
per cent and 19 per cent in 1990. In a similar vein net domestic investment fell dramatically from 
about 20 per cent in 1980 to a mere 3 per cent in 1990. The poor performance of the South African 
economy in the decade 1980 to 1990 was the result of fundamental problems that had been evident 
from 1960 onwards. Nattrass, (1990, p.324) has listed three such problems that in her opinion were V 
significant, these being, 1) underdevelopment patterns, 2) institutional controls over the movements 
of blacks between regions and 3) racial discrimination in the market place. 
Although P.W. Botha's reform process was attempting to address these problems, and was supported 
by the findings of the Riekert, Wiehahn and de Kock Commissions, (which suggested that the free 
enterprise system practised in South Africa had reached the stage where political and social reforms 
with respect to white supremacy were a prerequisite for continued economic development) the 
political events described above were curtailing this reform process, and negatively impacting the 
115 Rising diesel oil prices would add to the political pressures being brought on Eskom to electrifY white-
owned commercial farms in South Afiica. This issue will be dealt with in the following chapter. 
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economy. For example foreign investment was withdrawn as a result of Botha's Rubicon speech and 
financial and trade sanctions resulted from the debt standstill which was put in force against South 
Africa by foreign governments. The consequences of these events were a depreciation of the Rand and 
currency shortages. To exacerbate these domestic problems there was a slow rate of growth in the v 
world economy during this period. 
The South African economy during this decade contracted then, precisely when Eskom needed an 
expansive economy with increasing electricity sales earning sufficient revenue to pay for their / 
massive expansion progranune. How the contraction of the domestic and international economy 
affected Eskom' s economic performance from 1980 to 1990 is important because it captured the 
attention of the government in the early eighties, the result being the de Villiers Commission of 
Inquiry into Electricity Supply in South Africa; Eskom's performance in this period is therefore 
discussed in the following section. For convenience the period is divided into two parts, the years 
prior to the de Villiers Commission i.e., 1980 to 1984, and the period following this Inquiry. 
3.2 Eskom's Economic Performance: 1980-84 116 
Eskom's economic performance is examined under four headings, these being, 1) Electricity sales 
and Revenue, 2) Electricity Tariffs, 3) Capital Expenditure and Borrowings and 4) Generating Plant 
Purchases. Each will be considered in tum. 
3.2.1 Electricity sales and revenue 
During 1980 total electricity sales reached record proportions, 87 539kwh were demanded. This 
figure being 8,6 per cent above the amount demanded in 1979. Eskom's total revenue from these 
sales was Rl 772 million an increase of R 243 million over the revenue for 1979. Charges against 
revenue amounted to Rl 870 million, however, and therefore a deficit of R98 million was posted. 
116 Statistical data quoted in this section and the next was gathered from Eskom's Annual Reports for the 
period. Specifically the following items in the Annual Reports were examined: Eskom's Balance 
Sheets, their Source and Application of Funds, the Electricity Supply Account (consisting of Electricity 
Sold, Operating Expenditure, Loan Charges, and Total Charges Against Revenue), Schedules of 
Borrowings (including Internal Registered Stock, Foreign Bond Issues and Direct Placings), 
Contributions to the Capital Development Fund, Reserve Fund and Redemption Fund. Investments in 
Eskom's Foreign Loan Bonds and Schedules of Principle Equipment Installed in Various Power 
Stations. 
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This figure brought Eskom's accumulated deficit to R18 million on account of Eskom having a 
surplus revenue ofR80 million in 1979. 
Growth in total electricity sales in 1981 was 7,2 per cent, indicating a decline of 1,4 per cent from 
1980. Revenue from these lower sales was R2 141 million with charges against revenue amounting to 
R2 218 million resulting in a deficit ofR77 million and deepening the accumulated deficit to date to 
R95 million. Internal finance via the Capital Development Fund (CDF) supplied R841 million this 
sum represented 30 per cent of Eskom's financing needs for the year. 117 It was Eskom's opinion that 
the recession overseas was responsible for impacting South Africa's export market and thus / 
triggering the decline in the demand for electricity, (Eskom Annual Report, 1981, p.16). OfEskom's 
three major electricity consumers, industry, mining and bulk electricity sales to municipalities, only ---~ 
the last named had a higher growth rate in demand for electricity than the growth in the preceding 
five years. 
The year 1982 was a particularly difficult year for Eskom with the growth in total electricity sales at a 
very low 2,4 per cent, the lowest growth rate recorded since 1947 when growth was 2,2 per cent. The 
effect of the downturn in the South African economy was shown by the fact that the industrial sector 
registered a negative growth rate of 0,4 per cent in electricity demand. Electricity sales to the mining 
sector grew by only 0,9 per cent as against 4,8 per cent in 1981. Electricity demand for transportation 
v--
purposes likewise showed a negative growth rate of 4,8 per cent for the year, in 1981 the electricity 
demand in this sector had been a positive 4,6 per cent. Traction sales were largely associated with the 
export of minerals, which had dropped in volume over the previous twelve months. Only the bulk 
electricity sales to municipalities grew in a reasonable fashion being 8 per cent, still down, however, , ____ 
by 3,3 from 1981. Revenue from sales in 1982 amounted to R2 695 million whilst total charges 
against revenue was R2 753 million, the resulting deficit being R58 million, with the accumulated 
deficit standing at R154 million. Charges rose primarily due to coal cost increases of 19,8 per cent 
and Operation and Maintenance costs at Eskom' s power stations and substations rising by 50 per 
cent. 
117 Eskom had three funds for internal fmancing purposes: The Redemption FWld, The Capital 
Development FWld and The Reserve FWld. The Reserve FWld was used to fmance expenditure for the 
betterment of plant, exceptional repairs and emergencies. The Capital Development FWld, was used to 
fmance part of Eskom's capital expansion and replacement of assets taken out of service. The 
Redemption FWld was used to amortise local loans, (Eskom's Annual Report, 1982, p.lO). 
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In 1983, which year marked Eskom's 60th birthday, growth in total sales of electricity continued to l..-----
tumble, falling to 2,2 per cent even lower than the previous year. This figure was the lowest electricity 
sales recorded for 36 years. The figure was flattering, however, since electricity sales growth only 
reached 2,2 per cent due to a demand surge in the last quarter of 1983 as a result of the 
commissioning of the Sasol 2 and 3 plants and the new Alusaf Aluminium producing plant in V 
Richards Bay, (Eskom, Annual Report, 1983, p.13). Sector by sector electricity demand painted a 
sorry picture in 1983, with the mining and manufacturing sectors showing lower increases in the 
demand for electricity than the previous year. Bulk sales to municipalities recorded a growth of barely 
1,2 per cent in 1983. This figure being much below the average growth between 1978 and 1983 of 8,4 
per cent and despite a steep increase in the demand for electricity from the ongoing electrification 
programme in Greater Soweto, which is discussed in Chapter 6. Overall the low growth in the 
demand for electricity was attributed by Eskom to the deepening drought in South Africa, a domestic 
recession and low growth rates in the economies of Western nations trading with the Republic, 
(Eskom Annual Report, 1983, p.7). Revenue for 1983 was R3 302 million but charges against this 
revenue amounted to R3 405 million, i.e., R652 million or 25 per cent above the charges for 1982. 
The accumulated deficit in 1983 rose to R257 million. Eskom was confident, however, that this 
deficit would be recovered after 1984 as the economy improved and predicted that electricity sales 
would grow by about 3 per cent above GDP over the following 10 years, (Eskom Annual Report, 
1983, p.14).1l8 
After the depressing sales of 1983 electricity sales in 1984 showed quite dramatic increases which 
seemed to vindicate Eskom' s optimism. Sales to municipalities were particularly encouraging. Of ~ 
particular significance was the electricity sales to Greater Soweto which increased from 31.5 million 
kWh in 1983 to 226,1 million kWh in 1984 reflecting the rate at which the electrification of Greater 
Soweto was being undertaken. Industry similarly demanded more electricity in 1984 than it had in 
1983 largely due (in Eskom's opinion) to a recovery in export related mineral beneficiation 
industries, (Eskom Annual Report, 1994, p.20). Electricity sales to the mining sector also increased 
in 1984 compared with 1983. Rural electricity sales similarly grew due to the expansion in the 
electrification of white-owned commercial farms, this electrification programme is discussed in the 
following chapter. The year 1984 was then a vast improvement over the previous year so far as the 
sale of electricity was concerned with the farm electrification project playing its part in this recovery. 
118 Eskom's forecasting model, described in Chapter 3, seemed still to have currency in 1983 in spite of 
the changing political and economic forces indicating to Eskom planners that what had happened in 
the past was not happening currently and would probably not happen in the future. 
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Revenue in 1984 increased by 16 per cent over that of 1983 and amounted to R3 832 million. Charges 
against revenue once more exceeded revenue, however, and amounted to R3 998 million resulting in 
Eskom's accumulated deficit increasing by 63,4 per cent to R419,5 million. 
3.2.2 Electricity tariffs 
Eskom's electricity tariffs varied in each of its regions. In 1980 the average increase was 7,8 per cent 
higher than the 1979 average. Electricity on average cost 2,024 cents per kWh. The costs of 
producing electricity in 1980 rose, however, by nearly twice the tariff increase to 13,9 per cent, i.e., 
from 1,876 c/kWh to 2,136 c/kWh, clearly contributing to the financial deficits mentioned above. ~ 
The tariff adjustments for 1981 were implemented in January and the effective tariff increases ranged 
from between 4,4 per cent in the Cape Northern Region to 6,5 per cent in the Orange River Region. 
The weighted mean of the increases in the different regions was 5,5 per cent. Eskom's tariff increases 
were aimed at balancing revenue with the charges against revenue. Eskom warned consumers that 
larger tariff increases could be expected in future. 
In spite of Eskom's warning the tariff increase of 1982 was still a shock to the South African 
economy which was anyway grappling with a situation of increasing inflationary trends. In 1982 the 
price of electricity rose on average by 22,9 per cent, This was made up of an average increase in 
January of 13,1 per cent and an average increase in July of 6,6 per cent. Eskom put forward many 
reasons for this massive tariff increase, citing rises in the coal price to its power stations during the 
year and the unavailability of the Cohora Bassa hydro-electric scheme in Mozambique.119 Because of 
diminishing electricity sales and in spite of this enormous tariff increase, revenue was still 
insufficient to cover Eskom's costs (which included the costs of their massive generation expansion 
plan), (Eskom Annual Report 1982, p.19). \/ 
Eskom warned consumers, that whilst they were making every effort to keep costs down, if no 
significant decrease in the escalation of these costs came about, tariff levels in 1983 would have to be 
higher than the 1982 level so that Eskom's monetary deficit could be brought under control. In the 
event the revised tariffs when they came into operation in 1983 were on average 19,9 per cent above 
those of 1982. 
119 In 1982 55,2 million tons of coal was burnt by Eskom, the average cost of coal increased to R11, 75/ton 
i.e.; a 21 per cent increase over the cost in 1981, (Eskom Annual Report, 1982, p.22). 
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The modest 6 per cent increase in the price of electricity introduced in 1984 was solely due to a direct 
request by the government to Eskom to keep their tariffs as low as possible. The assumption being 
that this would cause the inflation rate in South Africa to decline during the year. In the event it did 
not and this placed severe financial strain on Eskom in meeting increasing operating expenditure 
with declining income. The 6 per cent tariff increase was less than half the tariff increase that Eskom 
had originally scheduled for the year 1984, (Eskom Annual Report, 1984, p.ll). 
The effect of these tariff increases was reported in the Financial Mail of November 4th 1983 (p.31) 
when it was stated that "Escalating tariffs were now threatening the viability of certain major 
industries, especially those in the export sector. To make their concerns clear organised industry 
commissioned the Financial Research Unit in the University of Stellenbosch in 1983 to analyse 
Eskom's accounts". 
3.2.3 Capital expenditure and borrowings 
In 1980 Eskom raised loans on both the international and domestic financial markets. In October 
Eskom floated their first foreign bond issue (No 129) since 1975. In spite of volatile financial 
conditions on the local money markets, Eskom managed to raise two public stock issues and 
agreements for loans were concluded with the Standard Bank, Barclays Bank and Nedbank. The year 
1980 was an important one so far as Eskom' s financial policy was concerned, instead of arranging 
finance when payments for local project commitments became due Eskom ensured the availability of 
finance for their massive expansion programme at a much earlier time by careful forward planning. 
So far as providing finance for the Capital Development Fund, i.e., internal financing of their 
expansion programme, was concerned R476 million was put aside in 1980. The Capital Development 
Fund was of course of extreme importance to Eskom for supplementing the domestic financial 
market's ability to meet Eskom's capital needs. Total borrowings at the end of 1980 amounted to R 6 
424 million. 
In 1981 capital was initially freely available on domestic financial markets and 60 per cent of 
Eskom's requirements were met from this source, the remaining 40 per cent had to be obtained from 
overseas borrowings. As the year progressed, however, stringent monetary policy was put in place due 
to South Africa's worsening Balance of Payments position and interest rates doubled between the 
opening and closing of the year, see Reserve Bank Annual Report, (1981). American interest rates 
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also reached new heights in 1981. The relatively high levels of these rates taken together with the 
Reserve Bank's reduction of the 2,5 per cent discount rate on dollar forward cover had a marked 
increase in Eskom's indebtedness with total borrowings at the close of 1981 reaching R8 155,5 '/ 
million. It is evident that because of the decrease in electricity sales and the increasing cost of 
external financing in 1981 Eskom would not have been able to meet its financing requirements if it 
had not been for their Capital Development Fund. 120 / 
In 1982 the continuation of stringent monetary policy in South Africa kept interest rates at high levels 
with foreign interest rates fluctuating widely.12I During the year there was heavy demand for Eskom 
stock with sales amounting to Rl 173 million. These sales allowed Eskom to meet 70 per cent of its 
funding requirements from domestic financial markets. Eskom's total borrowings at the end of 1982 
reached RIO 625,2 million. 
In 1983 local financial markets were characterised by fluctuating interest rates and a general shortage 
of money. This situation resulted in fierce competition taking place for available money with the 
South African government being the dominant borrower on the capital market taking half the 
available funds. Eskom's main source of finance was the sale of its own stock and the Corporation's 
resulting total borrowings reached R 14 676,6 million by year end. A falling demand for electricity 
further complicated Eskom's financial position in 1983. In 1983 the Financial Rand was abolished " 
allowing a relaxation in exchange control for non-residents and terminating the spot rand/dollar 
quotation by the South African Reserve Bank. This move gave the local foreign exchange market 
more freedom to determine market related exchange rates which would be beneficial to Eskom' s 
continuing demand for money to finance its, by now extraordinary large, even by world standards, 
generation expansion planl22 . 
Because of worsening economic conditions in South Africa in 1984 Eskom revised their forecast of 
electricity generation requirements downwards by 1 per cent i.e., from 7 to 6 per cent. During the 
year Eskom obtained funding for their expansion programme from local and foreign money markets 
120 Eskom was hopeful in 1981 that half the future fmancing it required for its expansion programme 
would be obtained from internal fmancing via the Capital Development FlIDd, (Eskom Annual Report, 
1981, p.19). 
121 These high interest rates resulted from banks being confronted with debt rescheduling problems and 
the inability of some South American and Third-World cOlIDtries to meet their debt repayments. 
122 Eskom's generation expansion programme during the 70's and 80's was, as far as can be determined, 
the largest such programme to be attempted by any electric utility in the world, both historically and 
during this period. 
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and internal funding from the Capital Development Fund. These loans brought Eskom's total 
borrowings to Rl9 154,9 million by the end of 1984, a staggering 30 per cent increase over the 
previous year. 
3.2.4 Generating plant requirements 
To meet Eskom's generation expansion plans 2 400MW of new plant was brought into service in 
1980, exceeding by 800MW that commissioned in the previous year. This increase in plant brought 
Eskom's total available generating capacity to 18 349MW. Plant under construction or on order at the 
31st of December 1980 amounted to 10 644MW. This plant was required for four fossil-fired power 
stations, Duvha, Lethabo, Matla and Tutuka the Drakensberg pumped-storage station and the 
Koeberg nuclear power station in Cape Town. 
In pursuance of their expansion plan Eskom brought into service in 1981, 1 700MW of plant, and at 
the end of the year no less than eight power stations were under construction these were, in addition 
to the ones named above, Matimba and Khutala both of which were fossil-fired stations. 123 The 
addition of these two stations brought the plant on order at the end of 1981 to 15 366MW i.e., an 
addition of 4 722MW over the previous year. 
The increase of generating plant into the Eskom system continued into 1982 with another 1 700MW 
being brought into service and there was a total of 22 130MW on order. This meant that during 1983 
an additional 6 764MW of plant was placed on order by Eskom. 
The year 1983 saw 1200MW of new plant being brought into service and 22 260MW of plant on 
order, an addition in the latter case of only 130MW over 1982. This indicated that Eskom's 
generating expansion progranune was beginning to slow down, if only marginally. This trend was to 
continue, however, into 1984 when, for the first time in the 80's the plant on order year-on-year did 
not increase, but fell by 1 551MW. The plant brought into service in 1984 amounted to 1 565MW, 
which included the first generating set of 965MW at the Koeberg Nuclear Power Station situated 
outside Cape Town. 
123 This last-named station would be renamed Kendal prior to its commissioning. 
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3.2.5 Summary of Eskom's economic situation: 1980-1984 
This summary will take the fonn of two tables, Table No 4.1 will show year-by-year statistics 
concerning electricity sales, revenue, the accumulated deficit, average tariff increases and the debt 
carried by Eskom. Table No 4.2 will show the generating plant available for meeting South Africa's 
demand for electricity and the estimated growing excess generating capacity over the period . 
. " ......................... . 
. " ....................... . 
YEAR •••••••• Electricity •• . Reve:ntle ·.AccuDudated . Ave,r3ge 
1980 
1981 
1982 
1983 
1984 
Sales: ..... (RMillions) 
.• Percentage 
········fuC ... ease.····· 
8,6 
7,2 
2,4 
2,2 
8,8 
1772 
2141 
2695 
3302 
3832 
DefiCit ........ ·Pelientage 
•••• ~1\fitlii)ris) . Tariff 
18,36 
95,74 
153,65 
256,65 
419,50 
····fuCrease 
7,3 
5,5 
22,9 
19,9 
6,0 
Total 
Bofr«riViog8'at 
...... - ...... . year.md (It 
··.·.···Minif)ns··· 
6424,9 
8155,5 
10625,2 
14676,6 
19154,9 
TABLE NO. 4.1 INDICATORS OF ESKOM'S PERFORMANCE: 1980-1984 
Source: Eskom Annual Reports for the Various Years. 
It can be seen from Table No 4.1 that whilst electricity sales continued to drop from 1980 to 1983 
revenue increased, this increase was achieved by Eskom charging high tariffs particularly in the two 
years 1982 and 1983. A criticism that can be levelled against these high tariff levels, in addition to 
those levelled by industry, is that Eskom was financing an increased portion of their generation / 
expansion plan from this source offunds. This meant that electricity consumers in the early 80's were 
paying up-front the money needed for new power stations before they were being built. The irony 
being that not all stations were really required, see the notes below on Eskom's excess generating 
capacity. The accumulated deficit (costs over revenue) continued to increase in real tenns over the 
whole period. What was of greater significance, however, was the increasing year on year total 
borrowings. Servicing this enonnous debt was problematic for Eskom due to its increasing operating ./' 
\/ 
and maintenance costs and its decreasing sales of electricity, which, although yielding increases in 
revenue year on year depended on tariff increases which were beginning to prove unpopular. 
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.... .... . .... .............................. .. ... ................... 
······CA··ACITV.(MWy·· 19$fj • •• 1981 f98ZL 19$~ > 19S4. .......... p ............... ....... . ........... .... . ..... ...... ... .. ............... .... ............ . ... _---." --.---- ... . ................ 
Assigned sent out 17 339 18 989 20 523 21 673 23 168 (1) 
rating* 
Peak demand* 13 668 14 674 15 532 15 639 17 296 (2) 
25% Reserve 3 417 3 669 3 883 3 910 4 324 (3) 
(2) + (3) 17 085 18 343 19 415 19 549 21 620 (4) 
Excess capacity 254 646 1 108 2 124 1 548 (5) 
(1) - (4) 
15% Reserve 2 050 2 201 2 330 2 346 2 594 (6) 
(2) + (6) 15 718 16 875 12 862 17 985 19 890 (7) 
Excess capacity 1 621 2 114 2 661 3 688 3 278 (8) 
(1) - (7) 
TABLE NO. 4.2 ESKOM'S EXCESS GENERATING CAPACITY: 1980-1984 
Source: For item marked thus· : Eskom Annual Reports for Various Years. 
Table No 4.2 presents a particularly intriguing situation, here is shown Eskom's increasing excess 
capacity in generating plant see rows (5) and (8). The 25 per cent spinning reserve i.e., the reserve 
generating capacity held by the utility to meet emergencies (Row 3) is considerably above that 
considered normal for the power generation industry world-wide which is about 15 per cent. 124 This 
meant that a power stations' availability of around 85 per cent is considered the norm, whereas 
Eskom's availability in the period 1980-1984 was of the order of 75 per cent maximum. V 
The question of availability is of great economic importance since an improvement in availability 
would reduce the plant needed to meet the maximum system demand and reduce Eskom's capital 
expenditure. For example the capital cost of plant in 1983 was R660 per kW and the operation and 
maintenance cost, excluding fuel, was R15 per kW per annum, the annual cost of capital in 1983 was 
14 per cent. A 1 per cent improvement in availability would then be worth about R33,6 million. 
There was therefore every incentive for the Corporation to attempt to increase their plant availability v 
to curtail this increasing capital expenditure. 
124 Author's telephonic communication with Mr S McFadzean, 12th November 1997. 
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Eskom had complained that in 1980 (see Chapter 3) and again in 1981 that they were hard pressed to 
meet electricity demand (Eskom Annual Report 1981,p.1O). It seems, however, that the Corporation 
had excess generating capacity available. This plant was then unavailable for service presumably 
because ofEskom's inability to manage their stations efficiently, e.g., poor maintenance regimes etc. 
The excess capacity was also the result of Eskom's inability to correctly forecast future electricity 
demand as has been noted earlier. It is, however, necessary in this respect to point out that the .. 
planning and building of large power stations takes many years to complete (about 8 years from the ~ 
planning stage to the commissioning of the first turbine generator set) but in any event, as has already 
been shown, Eskom' s forecasting methods were wanting in macro-economic sophistication during the 
period under review. 
3.2.6 Effect on electrification 
There is little doubt that the events described in the last section had a profound effect on the 
electrification of black households between 1985-1990 in so far as they amounted to the single most 
important reason why the government initiated the de Villiers Commission of Inquiry into Electricity 
Supply in South Africa in 1984, (the findings of this Commission, which had the effect of curtailing 
the electrification of black households will be discussed in section 4.0 below). In summary the 
following issues can be seen to be of concern to the government. 1) Eskom's massive debt situation. ~ 
This was of concern to the government because the foreign portion of the debt was underwritten by 
the government. Eskom's domestic debt was secured by the Corporation's assets. 2) Eskom's massive 
generation expansion programme, which resulted in unwanted (excess) generating capacity in the 
1980's. This expansion programme had been put in place at great cost in a depressed economy. 3) 
The very high tariff increases levied by Eskom since 1980 to pay for this partly unnecessary 
expansion progranune, which had an adverse impact on the South African economy and 4) Eskom's 
seeming inability to manage their power stations efficiently. There was, in addition, as a result of the 
points made above, widespread consumer dissatisfaction with Eskom particularly in the 
manufacturing and mining sectors of the South African economy, see Farrando, Barnard and 
McDougall (1991, p.6), Eskom Annual Report (1985,p.8) and the Financial Mail (November 3rd 
1983, p.31). As a result of the de Villiers Commission Eskom was restructured, along lines that 
would inhibit the Corporation's ability to playa role in the electrification of black households V 
between 1985-1990. This institutional change will be considered presently. For completeness sake, 
and prior to discussing the de Villiers Commission findings of 1984 and Eskom' s restructuring, 
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Eskom's economic performance between 1985 and 1990 will be briefly considered next. The 
connection between the Corporation's performance in this period and the electrification of black 
households will also be commented upon. 
3.3 Eskom's Economic Performance: 1985 - 1990 125 
3.3.1 Electricity sales and revenue 
In the years 1985 to 1990 following Eskom' s reorganisation, with the exception of 1988, the growth 
rate in Eskom's sales of electricity showed a downward trend. The growth of total electricity sales 
year-on-year was as follows; 1985 5,2 per cent (down 3,7 per cent from that recorded in 1984), 1986 
4,5 per cent, 19874,4 per cent; 1988 saw an increase of 5,7 per cent (up 30 per cent on the previous 
year) and in 1989 the downward trend continued with an increase in electricity sales of only 3,7 per 
cent, the lowest growth rate for the past five year period. This downward trend reflected the economic 
situation in South Africa after P.W. Botha's "Rubicon" speech. In contrast to the general declining V 
trend electricity sales to municipalities increased because of the sales of distribution networks to them 
in some instances by Eskom. Municipalities that purchased these networks still bought electricity in 
bulk from Eskom and they distributed it to Eskom' s former customers that the Corporation had 
previously supplied direct. In this way municipalities demanded more bulk power from Eskom to 
service these consumers leaving Eskom to sell less power direct to industry and certain domestic v/ 
customers. The Johannesburg Municipality in particular also required increasing amounts of bulk 
electricity to meet the burgeoning demand from the newly electrified Greater Soweto. By 1988 
municipalities were purchasing 10,1 per cent more electricity than in the years prior to 1985 and sales 
to municipalities represented 40 per cent of Eskom's total sales. Revenue (in real terms) during the 
years 1985 to 1989 increased year-on-year mainly resulting from increased tarifIlevels but also due to 
Eskom reducing it's operating costs through such strategies as cutting back on staff levels. For 
\ 
example in 1985 Eskom employed 66000 people by 1989 the staff compliment was down to 51 544 v 
some 23 per cent, (Eskom Annual Report, 1989, p.29). Charges against revenue increased, however, 
due to rising generation costs and loan repayments which rose as a result of increases in interest rates. 
An important change in Eskom' s accounting procedures was introduced during this period. In 1985 
Eskom decided to report it's financial activities in conventional business accounting terms i.e., 
125 The same four headings will be used in examining Eskom's economic performance between 1985-
1990 as was used for the period 1980-1985 just discussed. 
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depreciation accounting (possibly because the Corporation was now being managed along more 
business orientated lines as a consequence of the findings of the de Villiers Commission which will 
be discussed presently). Under this new accounting system fixed assets were not depreciated but the // 
"debt used to finance them was amortised instead. In adopting this system Eskom had to adjust 
upwards it's accumulated deficit, which stood at R380 million in 1985, to R489 million. Revenue in 
1985, however, exceeded charges by R200 million reducing the accumulated deficit to R289 million. 
In 1987 a net income ofR702 million finally liquidated this deficit and for the remaining years of the 
period Eskom succeeded in increasing it's surplus year-on-year. 
3.3.2 Electricity tariffs 
The price of electricity continued to rise for the first two years of the period under discussion. In 1985 
there were two tariff increases, 10 per cent in January of that year and another 10 per cent in 
September. The reasons given by Eskom for the increases was that the low tariff increase of 1984 had /' 
been too low to cover the increasing costs faced by the Corporation resulting from higher interest 
rates and rising operational costs. There was an announcement, however, in 1985 that Eskom was 
committed to keeping future tariff increases below the level of inflation, (Eskom Annual Report, 
1985, p.17). Furthermore, from 1986 pooled tariffs would be introduced. These pooled tariffs would 
be of concern to farmers with respect to the electrification of white-owned commercial farms in South 
Africa as will be shown in the following chapter. 
In 1986 there was a further two tariff increases, again of 10 per cent each, one in January of that year 
and the other in July. Eskom explained that these tariff increases were necessary to "bring the price of 
electricity to the level required for a sound financial structure" (to be put in place at Eskom), (Eskom 
Annual Report, 1986, p.13). An off-peak tariff was also announced during the year for large 
electricity consumers particularly in the industrial and mining sectors of the South African economy 
and this allowed such consumers to reduce their electricity costs. The importance to Eskom of this 
was that with large consumers using off-peak electricity the Corporation's base-load power stations 
could be operated more efficiently. 
The year 1987 saw tariff increases continue but at a lower rate than in the proceeding two years. The 
increase in 1987 being 12 per cent (the inflation rate for the year was 16 per cent). The year 1988 saw 
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the price of electricity rise by 9,3 per cent (inflation for the year being 13,1 per cent).126 In 1989 
Eskom was approaching the end of it's massive generation expansion plan, and this of course eased 
the financial burden that the Corporation had long carried. Even so tariff increases of 9,5 per cent 
were announced (the inflation rate for the year was 15,2 per cent). It was therefore argued by Eskom 
that, under the management of the restructured Corporation, the real price of electricity was-/ 
declining. 
3.3.3 Capital expenditure and borrowings 
The period 1985 to 1989 embraced the debt standstill, which was a direct result of P.W. Botha's 
August 1985 so-called "Rubicon" speech. The debt standstill made it more difficult for Eskom to raise 
money for the continuation of it's existing generation expansion programme since now money had to 
be raised, exclusively on local capital and money markets. T~ ease it's financial position Eskom took 
three important steps. Firstly reductions in capital projects were instituted. These were achieved by 
delaying the completion of certain power stations, which were under construction. For example, 
Tutuka and Lethabo power stations were deferred by 18 months, four generating sets at Matimba 
were likewise delayed and the completion of Kendal power station was deferred by 9 months. Finally 
the start of construction of Majuba power station was postponed until early 1987. Secondly Eskom's 
operating expenses were cut back. This was partly achieved by Eskom's policy of reducing staff after 
the appointment of a new Chairman Dr John Maree in 1984. Thirdly Eskom adopted stringent 
adherence to its budgets which had been modified after the imposition of the debt standstill. 
Operating expenses had been reduced by Rl 000 million and another Rl 000 million had been cut 
from Eskom's capital expenditure budget. To further ease the need for capital Eskom had increased 
the cost of electricity by a higher amount than would have been the case without the debt standstill, 
(Eskom Annual Report, 1986, p.17). What also helped Eskom meet it's capital requirements was the 
reduced demand for electricity during the period of the debt standstill and the fact that the availability 
of existing power stations was increasing from the low level of between 73-75 per cent in the early 
80's to about 87 per cent in the period 1985-1989. All these factors allowed Eskom the luxury of 
deferring the completion of the stations mentioned above, with the concomitant savings in capital 
requirements, which in turn affected the Corporation's borrowing requirements. 
126 The inflation quoted here is measured by the average increases in PPI for the year. 
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Despite it's reduced capital requirements Eskom was of course still a major borrower. In 1985 Eskom 
raised R4 900 million in local loans and on foreign markets. After August 1985 no foreign loans 
could be raised, however, because of the debt standstill. In 1986 Eskom financed 32 per cent of it's 
total funding requirements from internal sources thus reducing the pressure the debt standstill was 
putting on South African financial markets. By the second quarter of 1986 this pressure lessened, as a 
result of Eskom's ability to fund it's own capital requirements and the low economic activity in South 
Africa, and Eskom successfully raised Rl 743 million from local sources. 
In 1987 local financial markets were characterised by relatively low interest rates and considerable 
liquidity existed. Eskom quite early raised loans totalling R3 518 million for their capital ~ 
requirements. This was also a year when Eskom made every effort to maintain contact with overseas 
bankers and investors despite the debt standstill. By these means existing foreign loans were 
extended. Furthermore, export credit facilities continued to be used to source finance from overseas 
for some of Eskom' s generating plant being installed in their power stations under construction. On 
the local financial markets Eskom stock proved popular and one large loan, Eskom 168, was floated. 
Eskom therefore fared very well in raising capital in 1987. 
Eskom's funding requirement for 1988 was R2 291 million and this amount was also raised with 
relative ease. Eskom's financial position was seemingly rapidly improving compared with its 
financial position between 1980 and 1985. For example accumulated borrowings in 1984 amounted to 
R19 154,9 million whilst in 1988 this figure was R24 334 million indicating lower year-on-year 
increases than those between 1980 and 1985 in real terms. In 1989 total borrowings reached R24 630 ./' 
million showing that debt accumulation was diminishing rapidly although total debt was still 
substantial. Eskom's debt/equity ratio was also rapidly showing improvement. Eskom's funding 
requirements for 1989 were obtained from South African money and capital markets and amounted to 
R2 469 million this figure being relatively low compared with previous years because of the decline in 
the Corporation's generation expansion programme. Eskom reported that their funding requirements 
would reduce even further from 1989 onwards, (Eskom Annual Report, 1989, p.38). 
3.3.4 Generating plant requirements 
During the period 1985 to 1990 no new generating plant was ordered by Eskom. There was of course 
plant on order from contracts signed in the previous period, 1980 to 1985, as a consequence of 
Eskom's generation expansion programme. Each year between 1985 and 1990, the amount of plant 
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on order, diminished as more plant from the expansion programme was brought into service. As 
already noted this made Eskom's financial situation easier to manage. 
In 1988 Eskom for the first time mentioned their increasing excess capacity of generating plant, 
(Eskom Annual Report, 1988, p.26). The amount of plant excess to peak load requirements in 1988 
was about 4 OOOMW127. With an installed capacity at that time of33 176MW this amounted to about 
12 per cent. By 1989 the excess capacity had reached 4 363MW. This situation provided Eskom with 
the opportunity to place unwanted generation plant into reserve storage in the period 1985-1989 
Eskom's so-called "mothballing" programme. 
3.3.5 Effect on electrification 
Three important issues concerning the electrification of black households in South Mrica in the 
period 1985-1990 can be identified as a consequence of the events described in the last section. 
Firstly declining trends in electricity sales and an increasing level of excess generating plant 
presented Eskom with an ideal opportunity to initiate a national electrification programme. 
Secondly, the "mothballing" of plant presented Eskom with a dilemma. This "mothballed" plant, 
together with the prevailing excess generating capacity, provides irrefutable proof that there was 
indeed sufficient plant available, without recourse to building new power stations, for carrying out a 
major programme to electrify black households. The decision to "mothball" plant came back to haunt 
Eskom in the early 90's when ANe policy makers asked why such plant had been "mothballed" and 
not used for providing electricity to the poor. 128 
Thirdly, the period 1985-1990 saw Eskom's overall financial and technical (improvements in 
availability, more modern plant being used for generation) situation improve over that in the years 
1980 to 1985. The years 1987 to 1990 were the ones in which this improvement was the greatest. 
This situation provided Eskom with the platform required to attempt a nation-wide programme to 
electrify black households in South Africa after 1990. 1 •./ 
127 This excess capacity had obviously been accumulating over the years, see, Table No. 4.2 when it was 
postulated that in 1984 with an availability of 75 per cent Eskom had an excess capacity of 1 548MW 
and 3278MW with an availability of 85 per cent. 
128 See Chapter 7. 
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It can be argued then that Eskom's economic perfonnance in the period 1985-1990 was such that it 
L.----
encouraged the Corporation to undertake a programme to electrify black households. Such a 
programme would bolster poor electricity sales, revenue from such sales would help amortise the 
costs of Eskom' s generation expansion programme and at least part of the excess generating capacity 
that Eskom had available would be taken up by an electrification programme. Two events, quite 
outside Eskom's control, mitigated against the Corporation putting an electrification programme in 
place, however. Firstly there was the political situation described in secti~ve which would 
not allow the government to lend support to such a programme, and secondly there was the 
institutional changes which will be discussed below. 
(-~---
4.0 INSTITUTIONAL CHANGES AND ELECTRIFICATION 
With respect to institutional changes and the electrification of black households these centred on the 
restructuring of Eskom which resulted as a consequence of the findings of the 1984 Commission of 
Inquiry into the Supply of Electricity in South Africa. The Commission and its findings will be 
discussed first then the restructuring of Eskom will be analysed. 
4.1 The Commission of Inquiry into the Supply of Electricity in 
the Rep u b Ii c 0 f Sou t h A f ric a: (T h e de V i II i e r s Com m iss ion) 129 
In 1984 the government initiated a Commission of Inquiry into Electricity Supply in South Africa, 
the findings of which were to have a pronounced effect on the electrification of black households in 
South Africa. In addition to the influence that Eskom's economic perfonnance between 1980-1984, 
and described above, had on the initiation of the Commission of Inquiry there were other influences 
at work as well. There was the recommendation of the Wiehahn, Riekert and de Kock Commissions 
that the state should play a less prominent role in the South African economy leaving the way open 
for the privatisation of Eskom which was also probably a reason for the Commission. Furthennore, by 
1984 Eskom had become so powerful that its position dominated the South African electricity supply 
industry with Eskom acting in the country's interests as they alone saw them. As the Financial Mail 
129 This was the second such inquiry. As noted in Chapter 3, on 7th March 1973 the Minister of Economic 
Affairs requested the Board of Trade and Industry to inquire into, and report on, the suitability of the 
tariff policy and structures applicable to the supply of electricity in South Africa. From the seventies to 
the mid-eighties the government seemed then to be targeting Eskom, this demonstrates how important 
the Corporation's decision making really was so far as the South African economy was concerned. 
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of November 4th 1984 (p.31) reported, "For many years Eskom has run its affairs as if a law llIlliL- -~ 
itself'. This "situation had a historical precedent and Eskom's autonomy was written into the 
Electricity Act of 1922 no doubt to keep Eskom out of the political arena. Eskom was beholden to no 
shareholders, it paid no taxes, it used no state funds and government had no say in its day-to-<iay 
management. The only control over Eskom was the Electricity Act itself and the State President's 
power to appoint Eskom's Chairman. Because of Eskom's importance in the South African economy 
these considerations may also have been factors in the government's decision to undertake an Inquiry 
into Eskom's affairs. J3O 
The Commissions' appointment read as follows: "It is hereby notified for general information that the 
State President has been pleased to appoint Dr Willem Johannes de Villiers a member and Chairman 
and the following members of a commission of inquiry into the supply of electricity in the Republic of 
South Africa: Dr W. J. L. de Villiers, Mr L. F. Rive, Mr D. L. Keys, Mr A. B. Dickman, Mr A. J. van 
Wyk, Mr J. Wilkens and Mr J. C. de Waal.13l 
The Commissions' terms of reference were to inquire into and report on all aspects of the supply of 
electricity in the Republic of South Africa with special reference to: 
a) the responsibility and functions in regard to the supply of electricity of government, including 
local authorities, vis-a-vis the responsibility and functions of the private sector in this regard; 
b) the principles applicable to the supply of electricity and policies in this regard; 
c) the effectiveness of existing legislation relating to the supply of electricity; 
d) the structure and functions of existing institutions involved in the supply of electricity in the 
Republic of South Africa; ./ 
130 'This was suggested to the author by Mr J. Messerschmidt, Eskom's Executive Director, Distribution, 
in a telephone conversation on the topic of the de Villiers' Commission, 18th January 1999. There is 
also a statement in the Final Report of the National Electrification Forum's deliberations on 
restructuring the South African Electricity Supply Industry (ESI), (NELF (a), 1994, p.26). (which will 
be discussed in Chapter 7), that suggests that the Electricity Control Board (see chapter 3) exercised 
little control over the ESI after 1989, 'This situation may well have also been the case prior to that date 
prompting the govermnent to investigate the ESI and Eskom in particular. \..-
13l Mr Rive and Mr Wilkens were in fact members of the Electricity Supply Commission at the time of 
their appointment to the de Villiers' Commission. Mr Rive resigned as a member of the Electricity 
Supply Commission while Mr J. Wilkens withdrew from participating in the affairs of Eskom during 
the tenure of the Commission. Because of their business connections with Eskom, Messrs Keys and 
de Waal did not participate in the parts of the inquiry relating to the procurement function. Mr A. B. 
Dickman was to become, in the early 90's, an economic advisor to Eskom's Executive Director of 
Finance Mr M. L. Davis who was an active supporter of Eskom's Chairman Dr John Maree so far as 
the business approach to the electrification of black households in South Africa was concerned. 
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e) the cost effectiveness of such institutions, including the policy followed in the acquisition of raw 
materials; 
f) the impact of capital fonnation, price detennination, methods of financing and the existing tariff 
structure on the financial policy of the country with special reference to inflation, economic 
growth, the creation of infrastructure and decentralisation; 
g) the functions and responsibilities of members of the Electricity Supply Commission and of the 
Electricity Control Board; and 
h) any other matter concerning the supply of electricity, including matters submitted for 
investigation to the Commission of Inquiry by the Electricity Supply Commission. 
The de Villiers Commission held its first meeting on Wednesday 29th of June 1984 in Pretoria. After 
analysing its tenns of reference the Commission decided to confine its inquiry to "an in-depth study 
of Eskom's strategy", Commission Report, (p.3).132 The Commission would, however, be "mindful of 
the possible effects of its findings on monetary policy as well as financial and other planning"; The 
Commission also resolved to complete its inquiry "as speedily as possible", Commission report, (p.3). 
4.1.1. Summary of the findings of the Commission of Inquiry 
The Commission's assessment of the potential effectiveness of Eskom's strategy for the future was 
particularly concerned with the Corporation's generation expansion programme and the methodology 
which underpinned its fonnulation. The Commission went so far as to instruct Eskom to recalculate 
its forecasts of electricity demand in accordance with de-facto infonnation on electricity demand for 
the years 1973-1983. The results of this exercise revealed of course a discontinuity in the energy 
demand pattern and that trends in electrification demand subsequent to 1973 had been greatly 
overstated by Eskom. 
It was the Commissions' opinion that the average annual growth rate of electricity consumption in 
South Africa would increase by 5 per cent per annum, instead of Eskom's estimate of an average of7 
per cent per annum, until 1990 and thereafter at a slightly lower growth rate. The Commission 
calculated that after 1989 the annual saving in capital at a load growth of 5 per cent instead of 7 per 
132 This decision was made because Eskom was the major supplier of electricity in South Africa. As noted 
previously Eskom generated 98 per cent of the power used in the Republic at the time. Because, the 
electricity supply business was largely fragmented in South Africa an in-depth study of the industry at 
large would have been a very time-consuming affair and quite beyond the abilities of the members of 
the Commission to do in the short time they had available to complete their work. 
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cent would exceed R2 000 million per annum and increase to R3 000 million per annum in 1993, R6 
000 million in 1997 and about RIO 000 million in the year 2000. The difference in cumulative capital 
cost in the case of 5 per cent as against 7 per cent load growth would be Rl5 625 million in 1993, 
R41 345 million in 1998 and R105 745 million in 2003. 
The Commission concluded that Eskom was a virtual monopoly acting as a supplier and forecaster of 
future electricity demand as well as the planner of future electricity requirements and, in addition, 
Eskom was the largest capital investor in any industry in South Africa. The Commission also pointed 
out that "the magnitude of Eskom's capital requirements accentuates the necessity for accurate load 
forecasts, but the responsibility for this task rests solely with Eskom. This is an unsatisfactory state of 
affairs, as Eskom will have to bear the blame for either an inadequate supply of electricity or for an 
excessive capacity", Commission's Report, (p.14). 
The Commission went on to make a very important statement, one which heralded an era of greater 
government involvement in Eskom's affairs than hitherto. It said that whilst Eskom was 
fundamentally directed towards providing an abundant supply of electricity, and should have a share, 
and playa role in the determination, application and implementation of the country's energy and 
electricity policies, the Corporation should, however, act within the framework of the priorities and l..----
limitations of the government's development strategy, Commission's Report, (p.14).2.~3-
4.1.2. The Commission's recommendations and their impact on 
electrification 
So far as the electrification of black households in South Africa was concerned the Commission made 
several key recommendations which would affect such a programme. These recommendations were as 
follows: 
a) A two tier control structure should replace the existing Eskom management structure. The first 
tier was to be a Board of Control composed of officials from various government departments and 
133 This recommendation is important since it was argued earlier that the Wiehahn, Riekert and de Kock 
Commissions may have been partly responsible for the government initiating the de Villiers 
Commission and these three Commissions recommended a reduced government role in the economy. 
As will be shown presently the government's development strategy with respect to Eskom had all to do 
with privatising the Corporation thus eventually reducing the state's role in electricity supply in South 
Africa. 
'/ 
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major electricity consumers. The Board of Control, which after a decision by the government, 
would be called the Electricity Board was essentially a stakeholder board for overseeing Eskom' s 
management policies and strategies. The Electricity Board was to be financed by means of a levy 
on the sale of electricity, (White Paper on Energy Policy, 1985, p.19). The second tier was to be 
an internal Eskom Management Board to supervise the day-to-day running of Eskom's 
business. 134 
This recommended structure was to provide a new mechanism aimed at encouraging the 
involvement of both government and major electricity consumers, the stakeholders, in Eskom' s 
affairs. The Electricity Board would take responsibility for determining policy and strategy, 
including future growth rate estimation, Eskom' s generation expansion progranune as well as the 
effect such a progranune would have on electricity tariff levels. With shareholders participating 
in expansion progranune formulation and determining the effect of this progranune on tariff .~ 
levels it would seem unlikely that programmes to electrify black households in South Africa 
would be sanctioned. This was because such a progranune would in all probability require cross-
subsidisation. Such cross-subsidisation would hardly come from the government because of the 
political milieu in the country with the government fighting an electoral rearguard action with 
the CPo Likewise, cross-subsidisation would not readily come from large electricity consumers 
such as the mining and manufacturing sectors. This was because stakeholder representatives for 
these sectors on the Electricity Board would be reluctant to sanction increases in their own 
electricity tariff levels thus making themselves less competitive in the market place. 
b) Escor should assume a leading role in the conservation of energy thus preventing prices for 
electricity rising too rapidly and Eskom making excessive capital demands on the South African 
economy. 
This recommendation also made the electrification of black households in South Africa 
problematic since such initiatives would undoubtedly require large capital inputs. Returns from 
such projects would probably be small, particularly in the early years, and as noted above a 
degree of cross-subsidisation would also be required which would drive up tariff levels in key 
134 The de Villiers' Commission also suggested that The Electricity Supply Commission be renamed 
Escor but this recommendation was not taken up by the government when they eventually 
implemented the recommendations of the Commission; instead the name Eskom was chosen. The 
name Eskom then replaced the Afrikaans Evkom and the English Escom and as noted previously is, for 
convenience, used throughout. 
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sectors of the economy i.e., mining and manufacturing. The consequences of this 
recommendation rather echoed the last recommendation so far as limiting electrification 
programmes was concerned. 
c) The concept of different undertakings in Eskom was to be discarded and tariff strnctures were to 
be modified so that 1) The unit cost of transmitting electricity to an agreed reference point was to 
be determined and the cost of distribution calculated from that point to the actual consumer 
connection, and 2) that tariffs for individual groups of consumers should be built up from mean 
pooled costs. 
This was a very important recommendation for both the electrification of white-owned 
commercial farms and black urban and rural areas. The recommendation essentially meant that 
tariffs should be nationalised and no inter-sectoral cross-subsidisation would be allowed, hence 
the electrification of farms and black households could not be subsidised by other types of 
electricity consumers and each electrification project would ideally have to be financially viable 
in its own right. Furthermore, the costs of supplying electricity to farms would be charged to the Ii 
point of power delivery and not the nearest reference point. The significance of this last point . 
will be made clear in the following chapter. The fact that the electrification of black areas could 
not be cross-subsidised by other electricity consumers effectively curtailed them in the period 
1985 to 1990. In any event for the reasons given in a) above the government was politically 
constrained from cross-subsidising the electrification of black households and industry would 
probably object if they were called upon to do so. 
d) Eskom should in future discard the principle of operating at neither a profit or a loss in favour of 
a "sound assets and income strncture"; i.e., Eskom should now be managed along "business 
lines". 
This recommendation was perhaps the most profound one so far as the electrification of black 
households was concerned and was probably made with the privatisation of Eskom in mind. It meant 
that the electrification of black households would have to be looked upon in business terms and a 
return on the investment would be required i.e., sound business principles would henceforth dominate 
Eskom's management practices. Such a requirement would undoubtedly at the very least serve to 
curtail the electrification of black households in South Africa. 
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These recommendations and the political situation in South Africa after 1985 seemed to effectively 
close the door on most schemes to bring electricity to black households in South Africa. This was 
because Eskom was, under the recommendations of the de Villiers Commission, prohibited from 
cross-subsidising electrification projects and the government could not do so as a result of their 
electoral battle with the CP, and clearly business would not wish to do so and in the process make 
themselves less competitive in the market. 
The recommendations of the de Villiers Commission were therefore profound for nascent 
electrification projects and heavily diminished what could be achieved with respect to them. The 
recommendations of the de Villiers Commission were accepted by the government and the Electricity 
Act, as amended, was further amended to make these recommendations law. 
4.2 The Restructuring of Eskom 
Following the findings of the de Villiers Commission Mr (later Dr) John Maree was appointed 
Chairman of Eskom by the Prime Minister P. W. Botha. This appointment ensured that Botha had an 
ally in charge of the country's prime energy carrier.J3$ Maree immediately set about restructuring the 
Corporation taking into account the findings of the de Villiers Commission of Inquiry. 
The underlying principle in the restructuring of Eskom was that the Corporation should be cost 
conscious, have closer contact with the needs of electricity consumers and be governed by sound 
business principles. To achieve this aim the management of Eskom was decentralised, (Eskom 
Annual Report, 1985, p.10). The government was at this time, also embarking on a decentralisation 
policy. Eskom's decentralisation plans were therefore in line with government thinking and involved 
dividing the Corporation into 52 Strategic Business Units (SBUs), each of which had typically 
between 1000 and 2000 employees. In an attempt to make them efficient they were organised as self 
contained business operations with responsibility for the cost effective management of their service 
135 Maree came to Eskom from Barlow Rand where he had retwned after being Chairman of Annscor, a 
position that Botha had also appointed him to. That Maree was politically well connected is never in 
doubt and this was forcibly demonstrated by the fact that on his appointment he immediately pointed 
out to Mr (later Dr) I.C. McRae, Eskom's Chief Executive Officer that McRae was to be sure to leave 
the interface between Eskom and the government to himself whilst McRae devoted his energies to the 
job of managing other aspects of Eskom's business, particularly the technical aspects. Eskom's 
previous Chief Executive Officer, Mr Jan H. Smith had, under the Chairmanship of Dr R.L. 
Straszacker, much more freedom of contact with government than McRae was destined to have under 
Maree, interview with Dr McRae, 4th September 1996. Maree's political contacts were confmned to 
the author in an interview with him, 13th November 1998. 
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provision. (Eskom Annual Report, 1985, p.IO). This was incidentally a reversion to the requirements 
under which each of Eskom's undertakings had to manage its own resources and maintain it's own 
books. As will be shown in the following chapter it is rather ironical that it was this aspect of the 
reorganised structure which allowed the electrification of a black township (Elandskraal) to get 
underway in spite of the political milieu of the period and the restrictions that the de Villiers 
Commission's recommendations put on such electrification projects. SBUs were located in Eskom's 
five line functions. These were the Resource Services Group which was responsible for data 
processing and education. The Generation Group which was responsible for the running of power 
stations and the procurement of fuel and water. The Operations Group which was responsible for 
expansion planning and controlling the national grid. The Engineering Group which was responsible 
for the construction of power stations, and transmission lines and the Distribution Group which was 
responsible for managing the distribution of electricity throughout the whole of South Africa. For 
distribution purposes the country was divided into 12 regions each of which operated as a separate 
SBU. 136 Each region was further divided into 26 areas, and each area was subdivided into 85 districts. 
District managers had the closest contact with electricity consumers and were considered to be a vital 
point of interaction between Eskom and it's customer base. This closeness that developed between 
Eskom's district managers and the needs of people in their districts also helped in the electrification 
of Elandskraal mentioned above. This regional restructuring was also implemented to achieve greater 
operational efficiency within Eskom. 
The whole middle level of the previous reporting structure within Eskom was disbanded with the 
advent of the new reorganisation and the Corporation was changed to a flatter structure with 
communication lines to top management being considerably shortened. Furthermore, the new 
structure had the potential to provide more efficient communication channels between Eskom' shead 
office and the regions and hence to electricity consumers themselves. 
One of the very important considerations of the new restructuring process was to improve Eskom's 
financial position and Maree gave immediate attention to this requirement. This of course, was 
obviously necessary to normalise the situation the Corporation found itself in with regard to it's 
136 These regions were: Central Transvaal controlled from Pretoria, Southern Transvaal controlled from 
Johannesburg, Eastern Transvaal controlled from Witbank, Northern Transvaal controlled from 
Ne1spruit, Western Transvaal controlled from Klerksdorp, Eastern Natal controlled from Durban, 
Western Natal controlled from Pietermaritzburg, Orange Free State controlled from Bloemfontein and 
Welkom, Southern Cape controlled from Worcester, Eastern Cape controlled from East London, 
Western Cape controlled from Bellville and fInally the Northern Cape controlled from Kimberley, 
(Eskom Annual Report, 1985,p.ll). 
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growing debt situation. There was another reason, however, why this issue was of prime importance 
and this had to do with the possible privatisation of the Corporation which the government was 
considering at the time, (Eskom Annual Report, I 987,p. 9). Clearly if Eskom was to be sold off its 
financial strength would be of critical importance to any prospective buyer. The Corporation's 
debt/equity ratio running at about 3,511 had to be reduced as a first measure.137 The possible 
privatisation of Eskom also curtailed the Corporations efforts to electrify black households since 
financing such projects may not have been seen by a prospective private utility as being profitable and 
therefore a less desirable investment than providing power to the mining and manufacturing sectors. 
As an aid to the privatisation process the restructured Corporation was also concerned with 
examining ways of divesting itself of activities which had no bearing on it's core business, e.g., 
maintaining Eskom owned townships at power stations, these could be proclaimed for example and 
houses sold to employees. 138 
, , 
• Eskom's new corporate structure came into being in January 1986 and was to remain in place for the 
I 
:,1 period 1986 to 1991 when Eskom was again restructured (see Chapter 7). During that time efforts 
were directed at improving the Corporation's financial position so that an eventual listing on the 
Johannesburg Stock Exchange could be achieved and the public utility turned into a privati sed 
supplier of electricity. Progress on the privatisation issue was reported in Eskom's Annual Reports 
from 1987 to 1990. In 1990 the government decided that it would not proceed with this initiative, 
(Eskom Annual Report, 1990, p.9).139 
To manage Eskom a la the de Villiers recommendations there was the Electricity Board, now termed 
the Electricity Council, and the Management Board. The Electricity Council, consisting of 17 
members, drawn from both the private and public sectors, was appointed in May 1985. The Council 
met at monthly intervals and was a non-executive body with members being appointed by the 
137 The privatisation issue was addressed in detail in 1989 and study groups were fonned to prepare 
reports and recommendations concerning this issue. These groups were made up of Eskom executives 
and consultants from the private sector and they analysed the legal aspects of privati sing Eskom, 
manpower issues, options regarding the structure of the privati sed Eskom and the implication 
privatisation would have on the CotpOration's fInancing and tariffmg structures, (Eskom Annual 
Report, 1989, pp.l0 and 41), also interview with Mr Kevin Morgan 15th July 1996. 
138 Historically as new power stations were built Eskom also developed townships to house workers and 
staff that would eventually manage and operate the stations. There was a strict hierarchy of house 
types in these townships depending on the status of the occupant in the stations workforce. 
139 This decision was made after de Klerk replaced P.W. Botha and reintroduced refonn initiatives in 
South Africa. It is possible that Eskom was seen as being of use as a public utility to spearhead the 
electrification of the black townships of South Africa as a high profile refonn initiative. The 
electrification of black townships having languished since the electrifIcatioll of Greater Soweto .. 
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Minister of Economic Affairs and Technology. Its purpose as noted already, was to formulate policy 
and the setting of objectives, and it was responsible for the overall control of Eskom. One of its very 
important functions was to appoint the Management Board, which was the executive body responsible 
for the day-to-day running of Eskom. The Management Board was at all times subject to the 
directives of the Electricity Council. The Council was heavily representative of the Afrikaans political 
establishment. The Management Board was made up of Eskom's senior staff, the Chairman was 
Eskom's Chief Executive (I.C. McRea) and the General Managers ofEskom's main line functions. 
5.0 CONCLUSIONS 
The following conclusions can be drawn from the discussions undertaken in this chapter and serve to 
answer the questions posed in the introduction to the chapter. 
a) In the first half of the decade, to ensure that South Africa's borders with the front line states 
were protected, and to further enhance their destabilisation policy, the government encouraged 
the electrification of white-owned commercial farms on these borders. This electrification 
programme was undertaken by Eskom. 
b) After 1985 two constraining factors to the electrification of black households in South Africa 
emerged. Firstly the electoral struggle between the government and the Conservative Party 
caused the government to officially halt its reform initiative~his decision was reported in 
Die Burger 4th March 1988. This had the effect of curtailing electrification development in South 
Africa itself. That an electrification programme had been one aspect of the government's reform 
process, and was part of their political agenda, is certain. This being confirmed by a statement 
made by Maree, Eskom's Chairman, and a confidant of P.W. Botha, when he observed that 
"Eskom had noticed the government's aim to stimulate the electrification of black urban areas 
and farming communities, (Chairman's Review, Eskom Annual Report, 1985, p.8). Secondly in 
their efforts to answer criticism of Eskom and to make the Corporation more efficient, the 
government initiated the de Villiers Commission of Inquiry into Electricity Supply in South 
Africa. The recommendations of the Commission, which were accepted by government in 1985, 
made it virtually impossible for Eskom, the only entity in South Africa with the capability of 
140 It was prior to these refonn initiatives being halted that the government tmdertook the electrification of [ i 
Greater Soweto. 
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doing so, undertaking a national programme to electrify black households which would almost 
certainly be non-viable financially and would require cross-subsidisation. Undertaking such 
projects would also impede the government's desire for Eskom to be eventually privatised. The 
reorganisation of Eskom in 1986 was such that it aided this privatisation effort and this too then 
had the effect of curtailing electrification projects. Witho~t the fiscus cross-subsidising 
electrification projects they could therefore not be undertaken and for the political reasons 
already given the government could not provide the funds to cross-subsidise such projects either. 
The outcome of the events described in this chapter was that between 1980 and 1990 the 
electrification of white-owned farms on South Africa's borders was actively encouraged by the 
government and was carried out by Eskom with alacrity. From 1985 onwards the electrification of 
black households in South Africa languished. Some small household electrification projects were, 
however, undertaken. These had financial backing from sources other than the government. Eskom 
also undertook some research into ways to make electrification cheaper. These projects will be 
discussed in the next chapter when Eskom's electrification initiatives in the decade 1980 - 1990 are 
discussed. 
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CHAPTER 5 
DESCRIPTION OF ESKOM'S PROGRAMMES TO ELECTRIFY 
WHITE-OWNED COMMERCIAL FARMS AND BLACK 
HOUSEHOLDS: 1980-1990 
1.0 INTRODUCTION 
This chapter has a twin purpose. Firstly it describes Eskom's programme to electrify white-owned 
commercial farms on South Africa's borders in the period 1980-1990. A programme which was 
encouraged by the government for the reasons discussed in the previous chapter. Secondly it describes 
Eskom's involvement in the electrification of black households in the period 1985-1990, taking into 
account the factors which constrained this initiative and which were also discussed in the previous 
chapter. The important questions that arise with regard to the farm electrification programme are, 1) 
How did Eskom manage to make the provision of electricity to border farms affordable? 2) How many 
farms were electrified? and 3) What was the cost of electrifYing these farms to the South African 
economy? With respect to the electrification of black households the important questions that have to 
be addressed are, 1) How were the findings of the de Villiers Commission accommodated by Eskom 
vis-a-vis the electrification of black households and 2) What was the extent of the programme to 
electrifY black households from 1985-1990? The farm electrification will be considered first. 
2.0 THE ELECTRIFICATION OF WHITE OWNED-COMMERCIAL 
FARMS 
2.1 Agriculture and the State 
One of the major functions of agriculture in developing economies, in addition to the production of 
food for domestic consumption, is to earn foreign exchange for the purchase of inputs for expanding a 
country's industrial base. This situation was less of a problem for South Africa after 1870 than for 
many other developing countries due to the mineral wealth of the country which was a large foreign 
exchange earner.141 The mining revolution of 1870 undoubtedly caused a structural change in white 
141 Agriculture in South Africa can be divided into two sections, the market-orientated white-owned 
commercial farms and the subsistence-orientated black-owned farms. According to Houghton (1973, 
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agriculture in South Africa and fanners, who had previously produceO for their own use, because of a 
lack of profitable markets for agricultural produce, saw the possibilities of profit from the demands 
for food from the burgeoning mining towns. Agricultural output after 1870 only increased slowly, 
however, and was lower than the demand resulting from the mining towns, (de Jong 1975 Vol.4, 
p.34). From Union in 1910 successive governments devoted much attention to agriculture. Whilst the 
production for food was clearly of major concern the important fanner's vote was as well, and with 
about 65 per cent of the working population being involved in agriculture this was a very important 
consideration. 
After about 1902 at the end of the Anglo-Boer war and prior to Union the government concerned 
itself with developing the agricultural sector and defensive policies to control the detrimental effects 
of unstable markets for agricultural produce. Their concern was prompted by drought, disease 
amongst sheep and cattle and soil conservation problems. The promotion of co-operative' s on the 
European model and the establishment of provincial agricultural credit banks, were also undertaken, 
(de Jong, 1975 Vol.4, p.37). 
From Union in 1910 two areas of governmental attention can be discerned with respect to agriculture. 
Firstly there was indirect involvement which encompassed efforts to promote productivity in 
agriculture by means of education, and secondly direct involvement by means of the provision of 
credit from the Land and Agricultural Bank which had been formed from the amalgamation of the 
provincial banks mentioned above. The Land Bank was established in terms of the Land Bank Act, 
Act No 18 of 1912. Irrigation schemes were also begun and soil conservation schemes were put in 
place. 
After the depression of 1929-1932, which resulted in a disastrous decline in agricultural prices, the 
government directly interfered with the market-mechanism in the agricultural sector. Two cereals 
were earmarked for special attention, maize and wheat. The Maize and Wheat Control Act of 1931 
resulted, (Houghton, 1973, p.52). In 1937 in order to ensure more effective and uniform agricultural 
marketing and price policies the Marketing Act, Act No 26, of 1937 was promulgated. This Act 
p.46) the difference between the two fanning sections manifests itself in cultural differences and 
"fimdamental attitudes to the exploitation of the natural enviromnent". There is also a notable 
disproportion of land in South Africa between white and black-owned farms. In 1980 black agriculture 
held about 15 million hectares whilst white agriculture held about 88 million hectares, (Nattrass, 
1990, p.lOO). The Land Act (1913) prohibited blacks from owning land in South Africa but this 
situation was also exacerbated by tribal custom which also disallowed this. 
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allowed control boards for tobacco, milk and wheat to be formed, subject to the Minister's approval, 
(de long, 1975, Vol.4, p.47).142 A very deep relationship can be discerned to have developed between 
South African farmers and the government after 1910. This relationship was characterised by 
financial help being given to farmers in times of need. This financial help was significant and biased 
in terms of the race groups receiving it, however, (Nattrass, 1990, p. 119). For example in the period 
1965 to 1970 state aid to white farmers provided nearly 20 per cent of the average farmer's income, 
(The Maraisldu Plessis Commission, 1970). 
State aid to agriculture therefore came in a number of different forms. The most important of which 
was the payments made to farmers to stabilise various farm commodity prices. In 1975 almost 75 per 
cent of government aid to agriculture was earmarked for this purpose, (Nattrass, 1990, p.120). Other 
important inputs into the agricultural production process such as fuel, fertiliser and water were also 
subsidised. 143 These subsidies had the effect of widening the gap between the white commercial 
farming enterprises and the black subsistence farms. Frankel (1933), cited in Nattrass (1990), 
estimated that between 1910 and 1936 R224 million was spent by the state on white agriculture as 
against Rl,25 million on black agriculture, a ratio of 200: 1. 
The operation of the Land Bank in favour of white agriculture is another case in point. Wilson (1971, 
p.136) has pointed out that the Land Bank not only made credit available for farmers but that farmers 
began to look increasingly to the state to solve their financial problems. State involvement in South 
African agriculture has therefore been historically more widespread than in any other economic sector 
with the possible exception of transport services. An anonymous author writing in 1960 commented 
upon this situation as follows: 
"Having been a neglected industry during the 19th Century, farming has 
become the most cared for branch of our economy. There is no other 
economic activity on whose development so much public money, has been 
spent". Our First Half Century, (1960, p.242). 
142 Farmers exercised the most influence on the control boards and their interests were protected in this 
way. For example domestic prices could be kept at a high level and surplus crops could be exported by 
means of subsidies. Furthermore, inefficient, as well as efficient farmers were fInancially protected. 
143 Water resources for irrigation is a particular case in point in the period 1980 - 1990. To illustrate how 
the price of water for irrigated agriculture was subsidised farmers in the Loskop region near Witbank 
were paying as little as 6 cents for a cubic meter of water whereas the domestic price in Witbank was 
over Rl i.e., a ratio of 17:1. 
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It is appropriate at this juncture to briefly comment on agricultural policy in South Africa in the 
decade 1980 - 1990. 
2.2 Agricultural Policy: 1980 - 1990. 
The 1980-1990 decade was a time of financial crisis in South African agriculture, whereas the 1960s 
and 1970s had been characterised by income growth and apparent prosperity, (Spio and Groenewald, 
1998, p. 176). According to these authors this financial crisis was erroneously attributed to drought 
conditions in South Africa after 1981. Drought, however, merely exacerbated a looming crisis 
whereby credit and tax policies rendered debt attractive and removed farmer's incentives to reduce 
their indebtedness. 
Agricultural policy in South Africa until the late 80s was then responsible for farmers' attitudes 
towards debt. Such policy supported the dualist public support system that favoured white 
commercial farmers over black farmers in a similar vein to that of earlier periods. Policy toward 
white commercial agriculture was clearly set out in the 1985 White Paper on Agricultural Policy. 
This White Paper was concerned with the optimal use of resources taking into account the policies of 
apartheid. Optimal resource use, a prime concern of this white paper, was to be achieved by means of 
production and marketing considerations. 
One of the principal objectives of agricultural policy in the 1980-1990 decade was self-sufficiency in 
food production via government support for white commercial farmers, (Vink, Kirsten and van Zyl, 
1988, p. 72). Government support included the protection of farmers from foreign competition by 
various subsidies and access to the latest mechanical and biological techniques. By these means 
South Africa achieved the aim of self-sufficiency in most farm products, (Vink, Kirsten and van Zyl, 
1998, P 73). This policy should be seen, however in the global context, most industrial countries 
adopting the aim of self-sufficiency in food production in the post second world war period. 
Farm subsidies were, as they had been in earlier periods, one of the methods of achieving the goals of 
the 1985 White Paper on Agricultural Policy, and subsidies again under-pinned the government's 
agricultural policy in the 1980s144. The subsidies came in the form of drought aid and other disaster 
144 The cost of electricity to fanners was at no time during the 1980-1990 decade subsidised by the 
government. As will be shown, electricity supply to fanners was subsidised, however, this subsidy 
coming from other electricity users. 
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payments. The government also subsidised fann losses in the wheat, maize and dairy industries and 
also to ensure that prices for these commodities were kept as low as possible. Between 1985 and 
1988 the government also took responsibility for export losses incurred by the Maize Board, these 
losses amounting to about R400million by April 1988 (Brand Committee Report, 1988). 
Changes in the political economy of South Africa in the 1980-1990 decade began to affect the 
government's policy towards white commercial fanners, however. Within the ongoing reform 
process a number of important policy shifts can be discerned, the main ones according to Brand et aI., 
(1992), being: 
a) The lifting of controls over the movement of labour in South Mrica; 
b) Budget allocations supporting white commercial farmers from 1980 were reduced from 1987 
onwards; 
c) There was a change in the tax treatment of white commercial fanners in the late 1980s. One of 
the most important changes was the reduction in the subsidies provided by government with 
respect to the length of time capital purchases could be written off; and 
d) There was a general reduction in the use of price controls and a shift to a market-based 
agriculture economy. 
From the mid 1980s onward then despite stated policy the agricultural sector faced increasing 
deregulation and market liberalisation. This liberalisation could be linked to the failure of the Land • r-' 
Bank to continue the high cost of borrowing by white commercial fanners and by the end of the 1980-
1990 decade, South Mrican white commercial fanners were becoming increasingly exposed to 
market forces. As will be shown presently this liberalisation process in the agricultural sector made it 
easier for Eskom to begin a campaign to increase the price fanners paid for electricity in the late 
1980s. 
In spite of the changing political economy in the decade 1980 - 1990, further money was to be spent ! 
on the agriculture sector, however, this time for electrifying white-owned commercial fanns. The 
reasons, were twofold, for security purposes, as shown in the previous chapter and because of 
economic necessity resulting from high diesel oil prices as a consequence of the oil crises of the 1970-
1980 decade. This expenditure on electrification can be looked at as no more than a continuation in 
the government's involvement with ensuring that the agriculture sector of the South Mrican economy 
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was privileged, and to some extent cosseted. This cosseting process was also motivated by the need 
for the government to secure the important farmer's vote. 
2.3 Security Issues 
This section expands on the comments made in the previous chapter and brings the security aspects of 
the electrification of white-owned commercial farms in South Africa into clearer perspective. From 
1980 onwards the Defence Department sought to encourage the defence of areas that were under 
attack or infiltration. Area defence necessitated the South African Defence Force taking advantage of 
specialist knowledge of the terrain by the people of a locality. Farmers were obvious choices for. 
providing such knowledge, (Grundy, 1983, p.8). The Defence Act was therefore amended in 1982 to 
allow such men in particular locales to use their knowledge in aiding the Defence Force as the need 
arose. 145 
In addition the National Key Points Act allowed the Minister of Defence to designate such points. A 
National Key Point was any place or area that was so important that its loss, damage or disruption or 
immobilisation prejudiced the defence of the Republic. When a Key Point had been declared people 
living there were obliged to undertake security precautions, e.g., weapons and communications 
equipment storage and training to repel terrorists. To this end a plan was formulated to establish a 
series offortified Key Points which would be linked by radio along South Africa's borders, (Grundy, 
1983, p.9). Security on the Mozambique border was particularly troublesome. Leistner (1989), cited 
in Casto (1998, p. 53), observed that "Since 1975, when Frelimo assumed power in Mozambique, 
many South Africans have regarded the Marxist-Leninist regime as a serious threat to state security". 
Casto (1998, p. 53) claims that the ANC was "allowed to operate freely against South Africa from 
Mozambique bases". 
The problem was, however, that border farms, were being abandoned and isolated rural communities 
began to be vulnerable to attack. Both the Departments of Defence and Agriculture were therefore 
anxious to stem the depopulation of those border areas. This depopulation was considerable. For 
example approximately 30 per cent of farms along the border from Mozambique to Botswana in 
1981, no longer had white resident farmers. The remaining farmers were heavily armed and erecting 
145 Mr Hendrik Barnard told the author in an interview, 9th February 1999, that the majority of the 
farmers on South Africa's borders were members of commando units. 
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security fencing. The feeling amongst border farmers was that terrorism would increase. What was of 
extreme importance was that the abandonment of border farms placed in jeopardy the concept of a 
"ring of steel" around South Mrica's borders, which was popular in Defence Force circles, (Grundy, 
1983, p.9). 
That the electrification of border farms was an important ingredient in enabling this "ring of steel" to 
be maintained is evident by remarks made by the late Mr Richard Castle, a senior member of the 
National Party in Natal and an Eskom Commissioner, in Commission Meeting No 8/1980 held on the 
3rd September 1980. 146 
The minutes of this meeting state that Mr Castle "emphasised the problems with the depopulation of 
the border areas and the need to maintain a total strategy for the defence of the country. He did not 
advocate any Eskom subsidy for an electrification infrastructure for such areas, but ways and means 
should be devised to provide and maintain such infrastructure from sources that should be earmarked 
for that purpose". This point of view was supported by the Commission. The sources of finance for 
the development of such an electrification infrastructure, as will be shown presently, eventually came ~. 
from cross-subsidisation by other electricity users. 
2.4 Economic Issues 
Farmers were also leaving border areas because the economic future for them was unsure. Drought, 
high costs, labour shortages and poor infrastructures were key reasons, (Grundy, 1983, p.9). A 
particularly onerous burden that farmers had to bear was the price of diesel oil, which had increased 
above the rate of inflation from 1976 onwards. This section expands on this issue. 
Diesel oil was a very important factor of production in agriculture as well as being used for 
generating electricity for lighting farm dwellings. If cheap electricity could be supplied to farms as a 
replacement for diesel oil this particular financial burden would be alleviated somewhat. Electricity 
would also enhance farmers security by enabling security fencing to be electrified (David Robbins in 
his book Driving South (1993, p.6) mentions these electrified security fences. He describes them as a 
"formidable obstacle ... at 220 volts it gives a nasty kick ... at 3000 volts it is lethal") and floodlights 
fitted. This would, it was hoped, encourage farmers to remain in border areas. As a consequence, and 
146 The minutes of this meeting can be found in File CA 641/5 Vol. 1, Eskom's Electricity Pricing 
Department Archive. 
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as will be presently shown, under pressure from the government, Eskom began to electrify farms from 
1980 onwards at a greater rate than ever before in the history of the Corporation. 147 
Figs No 5.1 and 5.2 below presents in graphical format trends in the differentials in the price of 
electricity and the farm price for diesel oil. Fig No 5.1 shows the relative change in Eskom tariffs as 
opposed to the farm price for diesel oil in the period 1973 to 1989. It is clear from this graph that , 
Eskom' s electricity tariff for farms increased significantly less than diesel oil prices. What was 
particularly important was the fact that Eskom' s tariff increased uniformly unlike the wildly 
oscillating swings in the price of diesel oil. Farmers supplied with grid electricity by Eskom could 
therefore plan ahead with greater certainty than those that relied on diesel oil for generating 
electricity. 
1972 1974 1976 1978 1900 1982 1984 1986 1988 1900 1992 
1- Eskom TaJffs - Farm Prices cI Diesel I 
FIG NO 5.1 TRENDS IN THE RELATIVE CHANGE IN ESKOM 
TARIFF LEVELS VIs-A-VIS THE FARM PRICE FOR 
DIESEL OIL: 1973 - 1990 (1973=100) 
Data Source: Eskom (Agrelek) 
147 The rise in liquid fuel prices was always the public reason that Eskom gave for electrifying the border 
farms at great expanse. Oil price increases are mentioned specifically in Eskom' s Annual Reports for 
the period, (1980, p.B , 1982, p.27 and 1983, p.29). Electricity supplied to farmers was on average 60 
per cent cheaper than liquid fuels, telephonic conversation between the author and Mr. N. 
Bezuidenhout, 17th February 1999. 
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Fig No 5.2 shows the situation when both Eskom's electricity tariff for fanns and the farm price for 
diesel oil are divided by the Producers Price Index for various years. What is of significance in this 
case is that from 1978 Eskom's tariffs have shown a pattern of change which is more predictable than 
the fluctuations in the price of diesel oil which increased significantly in 1979, falling from then until 
about mid 1984 whereupon the price of diesel oil again surged upwards. Such fluctuations again 
demonstrating that Eskom' s electricity tariffs were much more predictable energy price indicators 
when farmers were formulating their costs for budgeting purposes. 
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FIG NO 5.2 TRENDS IN THE RELATIVE CHANGE IN ESKOM 
TARIFF LEVELS AND FARM PRICE FOR DIESEL 
WHEN DIVIDED BY THE P.P.I.: 1973 - 1990 
(1973=100) 
Data Source: Eskom (AgTelek) 
2.5 Manpower and Tariff Issues 
1992 
In undertaking the electrification of farms in South Africa in the decade 1980 to 1990 Eskom had to 
overcome problems concerned with manpower shortages and the tariffs to be charged for electricity 
supplied to these farms. Solutions to these problems changed in scope prior to, and after, the de 
122 
Villiers Commission of Inquiry. In arriving at these solutions negotiations were undertaken with the 
South African Fanners Union and were highly politicised. Prior to 1980 the tariff charged by Eskom 
for supplying electricity to fanns was cost reflective. Fanners who applied for electricity provision ./ 
were those who could afford this tariff. This situation changed after 1980 with many fanners who 
wished to be supplied with electricity, as a consequence of the increasing oil prices, finding the costs 
of electrification prohibitive. Because of this, and the government's strategic need to electrify fanns 
on the borders of South Africa, the government became actively involved with the problems attached 
to electricity tariffs for the farming community, and the speed with which Eskom could carry out the 
fann electrification programme. 
In 1980 Eskom reported that it was hard pressed to respond to fanner's demands for an electricity 
supply. Some fanners had to wait in excess of a year to be connected to the national grid after they 
had accepted Eskom's financial tenns for providing them with electricity. The main problems that 
Eskom faced in meeting fanners demands to be supplied with electricity being the shortage of 
materials and skilled personnel, particularly for the investigation and planning of new rural 
electrification schemes, (Eskom Annual Report, 1980, p.26). Eskom's inability to meet the pressing 
demands of the farming community for electricity supplies and the Corporation's high connection 
fees caused them to come under considerable criticism from that quarter. I 48 
As a consequence of this criticism during 1980 Eskom's Power Sales Manager had various 
correspondence with certain of Eskom' s Regional Managers concerning the question of electrifying 
white-owned commercial fanns on the borders of South Africa. 149 It is evident that some 
governmental pressure promoted this correspondence. ISO The main concern of course was how to 
148 1bis criticism is cited in a letter from the Eastern Transvaal Regional Manager to Eskom's Power 
Sales Manager, Ref ETR:3/4ffPO. File CA 64115 Vol. 1. Eskom's Electricity Pricing Department 
Archive. 
149 These letters preserved in Eskom's Electricity Pricing Department Archive, File CA 64115 Vol. 1 were 
written to the managers of 1) The Rand and Orange Free State, 2) The Eastern Transvaal, 3) The 
Northern Cape and 4) The Natal Regions. It is important to note that the fIrst three of these regions all 
had bOlll1daries running along the extreme West, North and Eastern borders of the Republic, i.e.; they 
bordered Namibia, Botswana, Zimbabwe and Mozambique, whilst the Natal Region had borders with 
Swaziland and the mountain kingdom of Lesotho. 
ISO 1bis statement is supported by a letter send to Mr. F.W. de Klerk the then Minister of Mineral and 
Energy Affairs, who was the minister in charge of Eskom, by Mr. Jan H. Smith Eskom's Chairman 
stating that Eskom was looking into the plight of the famJers and providing grid electricity to them 
with all possible speed and urgency, see letter dated 11th of December 1980 ref. CS 130/21, File CA 
64115 VoU, Eskom's Electricity Pricing Department Archive. 
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increase the speed of electrifYing these farms. In this respect various suggestions were put forward by 
Eskom's Power Sales Manager for consideration by the various Regional Managers. 
These suggestions were as follows, 1) Eskom would allow municipalities to extend existing rural 
networks, 2) Eskom would allow multi-permission areas to be established/51 3) Regional Managers 
were to investigate the logistics of Eskom providing electricity to each of their areas of responsibility 
and to put forward proposals for making such electrification possible. Each of these suggestions posed 
problems for Eskom. For example Eskom's Regional Managers were anxious to avoid farming co-
operatives or municipalities building rural electrification schemes to supply farmers. This was 
because they thought that the interests of all rural consumers should be considered not just farmers, 
and Eskom should therefore retain the planning function for rural electrification schemes. 152 In this 
regard, the Regional Manager of the Eastern Transvaal noted that "whilst it was considered that 
Eskom's prime task was the provision of bulk electricity and that rural electrification was a burden 
which results in a very small proportion of our sales and which requires a large number of staff and 
equipment, it was their duty to provide the service". 153 This was a typical response from other 
Regional Managers as well. It seems clear that these managers did not want thei:r:. power diluted by 
municipalities or from co-operatives undertaking rural electrification projects. Co-operatives erecting, 
operating or maintaining their own electricity networks would require qualified and experienced 
people to undertake such work. Regional Managers were also worried that such people would be 
persuaded to leave Eskom and join these co-operatives and Eskom already had severe staff shortages. 
The issue was a delicate one and was debated at a meeting between Eskom's Financial Department 
and Regional Managers on the 20th November 1980. As a result of this meeting a directive from Mr 
I. D. van der Walt, Eskom's Senior General Manager, on this subject to all regional managers was 
issued.154 The theme of this directive was the participation by farmers in the construction of rural 
electrification networks and the problems that could arise as a consequen~e. 
151 Multi-pennission areas were areas where several holders of pennits to supply electricity to a particular 
area existed, such areas included fanus that undertook to supply electricity to themselves through co-
operative effort in a certain geographical area. 
152 This view serves to confIrm a point which was made in the previous chapter concerning Eskom's role 
in electricity supply in South Africa as the Corporation saw it, i.e., that Eskom knew what was best for 
the country so far as this was concerned. 
153 Extract from a letter from the Regional Manager of the Eastern Transvaal to the Manager (Power 
Sales), dated 15th September 1980, Ref. ETR:3/4fTPO, File CA 64115 Vol. 2, Eskom's Electricity 
Pricing Department Archive. 
154 See Document Ref CS 204 dated 28th January 1981, File No CA 64115 VoU, Eskom's Electricity 
Pricing Department Archive. 
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This directive stated that "although Eskom might prefer to retain full responsibility for planning, 
operation and maintaining all circuits supplying farmers it cannot resist the pressure from the 
farming community to be allowed to assist in some aspects of this work". It was agreed that such help 
be permitted but subject to the principal of Eskom's "present and possible future interests being 
safeguarded". The directive did not, however, define how regional managers were to deal with the 
situations that might arise if farmers were allowed to help with the construction of rural 
electrification networks. It was recognised that the work could be undertaken either by 1) farmers 
undertaking construction work as contractors to Eskom or 2) farmers being allowed to plan and 
construct complete rural electrification schemes under licence or permit from Eskom. 
Regional Managers were allowed to deal with each application for farmers participating in rural 
electrification projects as they arose, subject to certain basic guiding principles being followed. These 
were that 1) The extent of the work to be performed by farmers was to be approved by Eskom, 2) 
Eskom would supply all materials to be used on electrification projects, and 3) That the final 
acceptance of these rural electrification projects undertaken in this fashion should be approved by 
Eskom. Construction work furthermore was to be completed in accordance with Eskom' s established 
standards for such work. It would also be the farmers sole responsibility to work in terms of the 
current Factories, Works and Machinery Act. 
The financial arrangements were also laid out in the directive and the cost of the extension works 
accruing to farmers would take account of the contribution that the farmers made to such costs. 
Eskom would not make cash payments to farmers for labour and transport supplied by them, e.g.; use 
of their farm labourers to dig foundations for electricity pylons or ferrying these labourers back and 
forth from the farm to the construction site. Eskom was at pains to point out in the directive for 
farmer's undertaking such work, (p.2 of the directive), that it was to be clearly understood that the 
farmers themselves would be responsible for the operation and maintenance of electrification schemes 
which they had helped build. In an emergency, such as severe storm damage, Eskom would only 
assist after it had seen to the needs of customers supplied with electricity from its own distribution 
networks. It seems that in spite of Eskom's Regional Managers reluctance to allow farmers to become 
involved in building rural electrification schemes, because of governmental pressure to proceed with 
such electrification initiatives with all possible speed, and Eskom's manpower shortages, Eskom 
allowed this. 
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2.6 Farm Tariffs Prior to the de Villiers Commission 
In addition to the pressure being put on Eskom concerning the rate of electrifying white-owned 
commercial farms and small holdings different provincial agricultural unions and the South African 
Farmers Union itself began to demand that Eskom reduce their charges for connecting farms to the 
national grid. That Eskom bowed to this demand is evident from the fact that in 1981 Eskom made 
application to the Electricity Control Board for an amendment to the licences of all the Corporation's 
electricity distribution regions with a view to lowering tariff charges to farmers.155 In determining 
electricity tariffs for a particular category of consumer like farmers, the users were grouped according 
to similarities in electricity usage patterns, similar costs of supply and similar geographical areas. 
This was done so that a fair and equitable tariff could be designed for each consumer category. Inter 
alia Eskom's application to the Electricity Control Board concerned the introduction in all of 
Eskom's undertakings of a new electricity tariff, Tariff D, for small power user supplies in rural 
areas. 
The existing tariff for rural consumers was Eskom's TariffB. TariffB was a two-part tariff made up 
of a basic charge composed of a network capital cost charge for a portion of the power line delivenng-
electricity to a particular farm, this being the so-called monthly rental or extension charge, and a 
charge for the necessary step-down transformer. In addition there was also an energy charge for the r .. 
amount of electricity used by each consumer. This energy charge was further subdivided into a high 
energy charge for the first 500 kWh used and a lower energy charge for the amount of electricity used 
above 500 kWh. 
The new tariff, Tariff D, involved pooling the costs of providing a new electricity transmission 
network between all the farmers in a particular geographical area. This was to bring down the 
monthly rental charge to farmers newly connected to the electricity grid. 156 The amount of energy 
charged at the high energy rate was also increased from 500kWh to 800kWh. This arrangement led 
to all monthly rentals for newly connected farms being reduced by 40 per cent from what would have 
155 Details of the application can be found in the letter addressed to the secretary of the Electricity Control 
Board from Eskom's Senior General Manager dated the 22nd June 1981 and cited in the notes of the 
meeting held 3rd August 1981 between the Electricity Control Board and the Senior General Manager 
and other officials of Eskom Ref CS 204, in File No CA 64115 Vol., 2, Eskom's Electricity Pricing 
Department Archive. 
156 Monthly rental charges were amortised over 23 years, (Ferrando, Barnard and McDougall, 1991, p.8). 
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been nonnally payable. 157 Older more established farmers with small, or no monthly rentals, would, 
however, be required to pay a little more on the energy portion of their electricity bill each month and 
thereby subsidise the cost of supplying electricity to newly connected consumers, (Salvoldi, 1994, 
p.4). 
Theoretically this arrangement should have worked well. In the event many more farmers applied for 
connections than had been envisaged by Eskom and only about 47 per cent of these, and the farmers 
already connected to the grid, used more than 800 kWh of electricity.158 This meant that Eskom 
began to subsidise the farming community.159 
In accordance with Regulation No 3 of the Electricity Act Eskom had to advertise in the Government 
Gazette and certain newspapers the proposals for the new Tariff D and their application for amending 
licences for electricity supply in their various distribution undertakings. The advertisement which was 
placed in the September 1981 issue of the Gazette ran as follows: 
"The request by organised agriculture for a tariff specifically for rural 
consumers who are not large power users, is recognised by the introduction 
of the new tariff, "Tariff D". This tariff D will be applied to consumers 
defined as rural small users. Tariff B will in future not apply to the existing 
rural consumers. The monthly extension charge at present payable by these 
consumers will be reduced by 40% when Tariff D is introduced. As a 
consequence of the introduction of the new Tariff, the payment made by 
existing rural consumers may immediately or eventually increase 
marginally" . 
157 It is curious to note that the 40 per cent reduction on monthly rentals was never specifically mentioned 
in Eskom's Annual Reports. Reference to it can only to be found in the DMEA Annual Report for 
1981 where mention is made of the 40 per cent reduction in extension charges, (monthly rentals) and 
the introduction of a new rural tariff, for farmers presumably Tariff D. 
158 Interview with Mr. H. B. Barnard, 16th June 1997, also see Salvoldi, (1994, p.9). 
159 Knowledge of electricity usage patterns is of critical importance in tariff design and general electricity 
supply planning. The problem of under usage will reappear again when the electrification of black 
households in South Africa is analysed. The magnitude of the subsidies provided to farmers with 
respect to electricity in the decade 1980- 1990 will be estimated later in this chapter. 
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At a power sales meeting in Eskom on the 10th and 11 th September 1981 the implementation of Tariff 
D was discussed. l60 Examination of the minutes of this meeting clearly demonstrate how far Eskom 
was prepared to go to ensure that farmers were connected to the national grid. Eskom's concern does 
give credence to the hypothesis that the government were active in the farm electrification 
progranune in the period 1980 to 1984. For example Eskom were keen to diffuse any objection to the 
40 per cent reduction in monthly rentals to farmers from other electricity users. They therefore 
reduced the monthly rentals to consumers charged in accordance with Tariff A by 20 per cent and 
Tariff B and C consumers monthly rentals by 40 per cent. 161 
Considerable debate also surrounded an item, which dealt with up-front cash payments by farmers 
which would bring their monthly rental bill down to levels which each farmer thought he could 
afford. Farmers could in this scheme pay for monthly rental charges in full in which event their 
electricity supply would not be subject to a monthly rental charge. Alternatively farmers could make a 
part payment and subsequent lump sum payments thus reducing their monthly rental bill. By this 
means farmers could make considerable savings over the 23 year period that Eskom required monthly 
rental charges to be payable before they were amortised. Eskom was then from 1980 onwards making 
every effort to make electricity affordable for farmers. Computerised sets of tables were prepared 
which allowed the reciprocal relationships between cash contributions and monthly rentals to be 
quickly and easily calculated allowing this further financial concession to be easily implemented. 
Following this meeting Eskom's Manager (Power Sales) wrote to each Regional Manager concerning 
TariffD.162 Of importance is the following paragraph in that letter: 
"In view of the urgency of this matter a summary of the matters discussed 
and agreed, (at the meeting referred to above: Author's addition) together 
with explanations as required, is attached hereto. This summary together 
160 Notes on this meeting can be found in File CA 64115 Vol. 2, Eskom's Electricity Pricing Department 
Archive. 
161 Broadly speaking Tariff A was the tariff for larger electricity users, e.g., mines, TariffB was for small 
power consumers and Tariff C was for domestic supplies. Reductions in monthly rentals for such 
consumers in reality meant very little so far as Eskom's revenue was concerned, and this point was 
discussed in the meeting of the 10th and 11 th, since such monthly rentals were low and could not be 
compared with the costs associated with connecting farms in remote rural areas to the national grid. 
162 Letter Ref. CA 010/12/1 & CS 204 dated 23rd September 1981 File No. CA 64115, Vol. 2, Eskom's 
Electricity Pricing Department Archive. 
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with annexures, is to be regarded as a directive to work to pending the 
approval of TariffD by the Electricity Control Board." 
The Electricity Control Board approved the tariff and this allowed fann electrification to proceed at a 
high rate of connections. During the period 1980 to the end of 1984 the fann electrification on the 
borders of South Africa, and within the country was made possible by farmers helping Eskom build 
rural electrification schemes and the very attractive financial incentives that existed for fanners as a 
consequence of Tariff D. After the de Villiers Commission of Inquiry this situation changed 
somewhat. 
2.7 Farm Tariffs After the de Villiers Commission 
As noted already the de Villiers Commission of Inquiry had given much attention to the way in which 
Eskom had increased its tariff levels over the years from the start of the Corporation's generation 
expansion programme. The Commission found that a significant cause of consumer dissatisfaction 
with Eskom' s tariffs arose from the covert nature with which certain aspects of their various tariff 
structures were arrived at. 163 
As a consequence, and also as noted already, the de Villiers Commission recommended that Eskom's 
electricity tariffs be nationalised, i.e., that the concept of different tariff structures in different regions 
be discarded and a national tariff structure with annual increases be implemented. They further 
recommended that electricity costs for different groups of consumers be pooled. 164 
In 1985 Eskom introduced a "kilometre factor" into TariffD. This meant that, in addition to all the ! 
concessions that had been made to fanners concerning the supply of electricity to them up to that 
163 The coal adjustment mechanism was a case in point. Advertised tariffs were subject to a coal 
adjustment on a quarterly basis. Before Eskom's distribution regions were connected to the national 
grid the base costs to Eskom of the coal specified in the license granted to each region reflected the 
costs to Eskom of the coal burnt in power stations in each region. Even after the establishment of the 
national grid in 1972 this regional influence in the base cost of coal persisted and this was not made 
clear in the different tariff structures. This, according to Ferrando, Barnard and McDougall (1991, 
p.6), "was due to bureaucratic inertia in revising the licences granted to the regions by the Electricity 
Control Board". 
164 As will be shown presently the concept of pooling costs was totally misunderstood by the South 
African Agricultural Union. They thought that by this the de Villiers Commission meant that all 
electricity consumers costs would be pooled not just separate categories. This created the expectation 
that large businesses would subsidise the agriculture sector. This was of course not the intention of the 
de Villiers Commission. 
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date, each farm connected to the national grid would now be given 1 km of line free and the farmers 
would not have to pay for this via monthly rentals. 165 / 
This change in the tariff was introduced because the South African Agricultural Union still 
considered that the monthly rentals were inhibiting farmers, not yet connected to the national grid 
from obtaining a supply of electricity and, at their request, Eskom changed Tariff D to include this 
kilometre factor. This ensured that it would be made even easier for farmers still without electricity to 
be connected to the grid. In an effort to ensure that Tariff D was still financially viable Eskom 
increased the high energy rate in the tariff from 800 kWh to 1 000 kWh. By this means Eskom 
considered that their costs of supplying electricity to farms would still be covered even with the 
kilometre factor in place. 
Prior to the announcement of the new TariffD, "Last minute representations to Eskom by the SAAU 
and the Minister of Agriculture resulted in a 2 km factor being introduced", (Ferrando, Barnard and 
McDougall, 1992, p.8). This was another concession to the farming community and meant that new 
consumers would only pay a monthly rental, or extension charge on line lengths in excess of 2 km 
rather than on 1 km. TariffD was not checked for financial viability as a result of this change. 166 It is 
clear that considerable governmental pressure was being put on Eskom to continue electrifying white 
commercial farms and agricultural holdings in South Africa. 167 
The first announcement of these tariff changes was made by the head of Eskom' s Power Marketing 
Division, Mr Martin Opperman. The announcement read as follows: 168 
165 This concession was introduced because electricity supplied under Tariff D was particularly affected 
by costs of monthly rentals. In reality monthly rentals formed a relatively small percentage of Eskom's 
total revenue by tariff category except for TariffD contributions e.g., Tariff A contributed 1.4 per cent, 
Tariff B 4.1 per cent. Tariff C 1.0 per cent Tariff D, however, contributed 16.7 per cent, (Ferrando, 
Barnard and McDougall, 1991, p.IO). 
166 Interview with Mr. H. Barnard, 16th June 1997. 
167 In the Chairman's Review in Eskom's 1985 Annual Report Maree mentioned the government's aim to 
stimulate the electrification of farming communities, (p.8). In the 1986 Annual Report Maree said that 
despite the debt standstill Eskom was "able to keep our major projects on line", these projects 
included rural electrification programmes, (p.7). In the Chief Executives Report in the 1986 Annual 
Report it was similarly mentioned that "every effort is being made to assist farmers in remote 
agricultural areas", (p.ll). 
168 A transcript of this interview is preserved in file CA 641/5 Volume 2, in the Eskom's Electricity 
Pricing Department Archive. 
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STATEMENT BY MARTIN OPPERMAN, HEAD OF POWER 
MARKETING TO SABC. 
RE: ESCOM EXTENSIONS IN THE EASTERN CAPE DURING 1985 
Ref 5/1/5 Date 22/11/85 
1985 was a year of many happenings in Eskom especially as regards our 
service to the Platte land. Organised agriculture have been pressing for many 
years for a more uniform system of charging for rural electrification. Under 
the old system the cost of electrical energy was recovered by way of the 
standard tariff charges, while Eskom's capital expenditure to supply a 
customer was recovered from each customer individually by means of a 
monthly extension charge which he had to pay over and above the standard 
tariff charges. 
All farmers that take small supplies therefore pay the same standard tariffbut 
do not all pay the same level of monthly extension charge. A client who is 
situated very close to a suitable Escom line would pay a relatively small 
extension charge while another client who is far from a suitable line would 
pay a very high extension charge. 
Under the new system, with effect from the beginning of 1986, monthly 
extension charges for small rural supplies will be abolished altogether and 
the associated loss of revenue will be recovered by way of a small adjustment 
to the standard tariff. This uniform method will be of great value, especially 
to those clients who pay high extension charges. In order to ensure that 
extensions will not be made in an injudicious or uneconomical way those 
clients that require, on average, more than 2 km of network or who have to 
be coupled to a very expensive network, will be required to pay a monthly 
capital charge in addition to the standard tariff. 169 
169 This statement is rather confusing. Extension charges, or monthly rentals, were not really being 
abolished altogether except in the case of farmers requiring less than 2km of network. The recovery of 
associated losses (it was hoped) being made by the increased level of high energy charge (lOOOkwh 
from 800kwh). 
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This new system will obviously have the effect of making many supplies that 
were previously considered to be uneconomically expensive, acceptable to the 
farmers. The number of applications that we have received during the past 
months has been very much above the average and additional applications 
are streaming in daily. We are, however, not in a position to handle all the 
applications immediately, firstly as a result of our limited manpower and 
secondly because of the serious shortage of capital that Escom is 
experiencing at present. Our ability to furnish additional supplies is therefore 
limited and we ask the community to please bear with us. 
The next problem Eskom faced with farm tariffs was one connected with the pooling of costs. When 
the SAAU realised how pooling was to be structured they tried to get the structure changed to include 
all electricity consumers into the pool so that the agricultural sector would be cross-subsidised by 
them. Their efforts to do this continued during almost all of the period 1986 to 1990. In these years 
there was various correspondence between provincial agricultural unions, the South African 
Agricultural Union itself and Eskom. On occasions both the Minister for Agriculture and the Minister 
of Energy and Mineral Affairs were brought into the fray. Typical of this correspondence was a letter 
from the Natal Agricultural Union which had the support of farmers in the Eastern Transvaal and 
officers of the SAAU. 170 This letter inferred that there was confusion within Eskom as to the 
intentions of the de Villiers Commission with regard to pooling and that the agricultural sector 
should not be responsible by itself for the costs of electrifying rural areas especially when the 
"strategic nature of power in remoter parts of the country" was being considered hence the financial 
costs should be spread throughout the economy.l7l 
In their negotiations with the various farming unions during this period concerning pooling Eskom 
always maintained that they were merely endeavouring to implement the recommendations of the de 
Villiers Commission, which now had the force of law. Furthermore, Eskom was charged with 
providing cost effective electricity to the nation as a whole, which of course included bulk electricity 
supplies to Greater Soweto; this being a time when the provision of electricity to black local 
authorities was being mooted. 
170 Letter Ref. 14, dated JlUle 1987 in File No CA 64115, Vo1.2, Eskom's Electricity Pricing Department 
Archive. 
171 This statement again confIrming the strategic nature of supplying electricity to border farms. The 
provision of electricity to farms did of course increase their value, but this was never a point of debate 
when the issue of their electrifIcation was being discussed. 
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Powerful support for the way Eskom saw the pooling of electricity charges came from the mining 
sector. This concern is evidenced in a letter sent to the South African Agricultural Union from the 
Chamber of Mines of South Africa. l72 In this letter the Chamber made it clear that they were aware, 
through their representative on the newly formed Electricity Council, Mr. G. Y. Nisbet, that proposals 
had been made to the Electricity Council by the SAAU at the August meeting that "the government 
should accept responsibility for the new Tariff D connections." The Chamber made it clear to the 
SAAU that they opposed the proposal on the following grounds; Firstly that Eskom had repeatedly 
indicated to the Chamber that it would not favour one consumer or group of consumers, at the 
expense of others, and secondly that new connections to mines, Tariff A consumers, were pooled 
amongst those consumers only, hence the farming and mining sectors of the South African economy 
were being given equal treatment by Eskom, which was equitable. The fact that mines consumed 30 
per cent of the electricity generated by Eskom was pointedly made, and for mines to be expected to 
cross-subsidise Tariff D consumers would be unacceptable to the Chamber. 
In spite of this support and support from other sectors of the South African economy as well for 
Eskom's pooling strategy Eskom was, nevertheless, concerned with the force of the farmer's attack on 
the restructured Tariff D. Eskom's management felt that the farmers would not capitulate easily but 
would take their arguments to "higher authorities" and this "would make life very difficult for 
Eskom". Hence Eskom should prepare itself should the SAAU get themselves really organised so far 
as their attack on Tariff D was concerned173. What Eskom did as a consequence of this suggestion 
was to prepare a belated financial analysis of Tariff D in which they showed that the Corporation was 
under recovering on TariffD and that Tariff A consumers (large electricity users) were in fact already 
subsidising electricity supply to the agricultural sector in spite of the dictate of the de Villiers 
Commission. 174 Up until this financial analysis was undertaken it seems that Eskom had simply 
assumed that by increasing the level of the high energy rate component of Tariff D the Corporation's 
costs for supplying white-owned commercial farms with electricity were being covered. 
172 Letter dated 16th October 1987, unreferenced, File No 64115, Vol. 2, Eskom's Electricity Pricing 
Department Archive. 
173 Internal Eskom memorandum dated 10th March 1988 from the Power Marketing Manager to the 
Southern Cape Regional Manager. File No 641/5 Vol. 2 Eskom's Electricity Pricing Department 
Archive. 
174 See Preliminary Report on Taritf D (Rural Tarifl), dated 7th September 1988 Ref. CA 64115 & CA 
643/3, File CA 64115 Vol. 2, Eskom's Electricity Pricing Department Archive. 
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In the meantime on the 23rd March 1988, and just as Eskom had envisaged, the SAAU sent a letter to 
their minister Mr Danie Steyn in which they outlined their grievances and their official standpoint in 
the matter of Tariff D. They stated it was of national importance that the expansion of electricity 
supplies to all small users in the country be continued. A particular barb was a comment concerning 
the government's seriousness about the electrification of farms in light of Eskom being allowed to 
restructure Tariff D via pooling various categories of electricity consumers. It was pointed out that the 
SAAU's view was that all consumers should be pooled, i.e., inter-sectoral cross-subsidisation should 
be put in place. 175 
To state Eskom's case regarding TariffD Eskom's Chairman John Maree met Dr. D.S. de Villiers the 
Minister for Administration and Privatisation (de Villiers was the Minister in charge of Eskom) 
during the first week of September 1988. As a result of this meeting Maree addressed a letter to de 
Villiers dated the 12th September 1988 enclosing documentation referring to the financial analysis 
Eskom had by then carried out with respect to the amount of money they were losing by supplying 
farmers with electricity at Tariff D rates and the subsidy they extracted from Tariff A consumers to 
balance the under recovery on Tariff D. Maree also expressed the opinion that they limit the 
development of non-economic supplies of electricity to rural consumers. It was also suggested that 
during 1989 the strategy for electrifying black households from 1990 onwards, and the 
implementation of this strategy, would have to be decided upon. 176 
175 This letter was not available for examination, the synopsis given above was taken from a memorandwn 
from Eskom's Chief Distribution and Marketing Manager to Eskom's Marketing Manager dated the 
24th October 1988 Ref. CA 088/211 dealing with this issue, File No 641/5 Vol. 2, Eskom's Electricity 
Pricing Department Archive. 
176 Letter dated 12th September 1988, unreferenced, File No. CA 64115 Vol. 2, Eskom's Electricity 
Pricing Department Archive. By 1988 Eskom was beginning to address the question of the 
electrification of black households in South Africa, see Eskom Annual Reports, (1987, p.2S; 1988, p.9; 
and 1989, p.1S). It is interesting to speculate why the government did not openly subsidise the 
electrification of white border farms considering the strategic imperative that arises time and again in 
connection with the programme. A possible reason is that the budget for the South African Defence 
Force for 1960 was R44 million, by 1982 it had risen to R3 068 million, likewise the South African 
Police budget had risen from R29 million to R482 million in the same period; even accounting for 
inflation these costs represent significant growth patterns. If electricity consumers could [mance the 
electrification of the border areas then this would ease the government's defence expenditure. The year 
1984 seems to be the exception. In that year the government decided to subsidise rural consumers 
extension charges, for the last nine months of the year, (Eskom Annual Report, 1984, p.33). The 
DMEA Annual Report likewise mentions a R2 million subsidy for rural electrification in the Northern 
Transvaal border area. This subsidy may, however, have been a payment to help farmers as a 
consequence of the inclement weather during the year with flooding in the Transvaal, in this regard see 
Eskom Annual Report (1984, p.17). 
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Eskom's Management Board discussed the financial consequences of Tariff D at their meeting of the 
25th October 1988 and resolved that from the 1st January 1989, or as soon as possible thereafter, all 
new Tariff D consumers would be charged on a basis such as the combined income from energy 
charges and monthly line rentals would render these new consumers self supporting. l77 Eskom put 
this recommendation to provincial agricultural unions in a series of meetings that the Corporation 
had with them in late 1988. Eskom also mentioned the prospect of the electrification of rural black 
areas at these meetings. After these meetings the SAAU wrote to Minister de Villiers concerning 
Tariff D. In this letter the SAAU expressed the opinion that if the government was serious about 
electrifying rural developing black areas then the government should be responsible for the costs and 
that the electricity tariffs paid by farmers should not be increased to help finance such schemes. With 
regard to Tariff D itself the SAAU stated that Eskom had brought to their notice their concerns with 
the under recovery of the present Tariff D and the possibility of various new electricity tariffs for 
farmers which would take its place. The SAAU mentioned that Eskom had proposed that these new 
tariffs would be put in place at the beginning of 1990.The SAAU informed the Minister also that 
increases in the price of electricity to farmers would result in a negative impact on agriculture and 
prevent the possible development of new electricity supply schemes for farmers. The suggestion was 
also made, that, because of the economic importance of agriculture in South Mrica, the "authorities" 
should carry the possible increased costs of Tariff D consumers. The SAAU wanted to know the 
Minister's views on the matter. 178 
The Minister (who had of course been briefed by Eskom as noted above) responded on the 6th April 
1989,179 saying that it was not possible for the Ministry to subsidise electricity supplies to farmers and 
that Eskom must supply power on an economic basis. The Minister went on to say that it was only 
where security issues were important would the government pay Eskom to supply uneconomic power. 
Resources such as capital were to be used as efficiently as possible. Subsidies for services for non-
economical reasons must therefore take place on a priority basis. The Minister closed by saying that if 
the SAAU looked at the principles of this, they would understand his viewpoint. What is important 
about this letter is that by April 1989 the political milieu of South Africa was changing and P.W. 
177 Letter from the General Manager (Distribution and Marketing) to Eskom's Chief Executive dated 28th 
November 1988, ref. CA 64115, File No. 64115, Vol. 2, Eskom's Electricity Pricing Department 
Archive. 
178 See letter to Minister de Villiers from the SAAU dated 6th March 1989 Ref. S.4114 SAAU 
Elektrisiteitskomitee - Speciale Vergadering, 12 Mei 1989, File No 64115 Vol.2, Eskom's Electricity 
Pricing Department Archive. 
179 Letter from Minister D. J. de Villiers to the SAAU Ref. M31112/1I8, File No 64115 Vol.2, Eskom's 
Electricity Pricing Department Archive. 
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Botha had been replaced by F. W. de Klerk. It seemed that the strategic importance of electrifying 
border farms was waning and the electrification of black households in South Africa was waxing. 
The SAAU continued to complain about the prospects of a self-supporting farm tariff, however, they 
pointed out, probably quite rightly, that only Eskom was to blame for the under-recovery of Tariff D 
from their farm electrification programme. The SAAU suggested that incorrect assumptions 
regarding the amount of electricity farmers used had been made, and even more surprisingly and 
rather cheekily, that Eskom had allowed themselves to be swayed by the Minister of Agriculture's 
request for a free 2 km of transmission line for each farm customer. The SAAU also made the 
politically interesting statement that if Tariff D was increased then electricity would become so 
expensive that farmers would be "unable to apply it to enhance the socio-economic living standards of 
non-white labourers on their farms". 
The SAAU was, however, seen to support the idea of limiting the development of non-economic 
supplies of electricity to rural consumers. This stance must be considered in the light of Eskom' s 
growing involvement with the electrification of black households in the country as reported in their 
Annual Reports from 1987 onwards. If non-economic schemes such as these were proceeded with, 
any cross-subsidisation required may, as a special case, possibly have to be carried by all electricity 
consumers including farmers, much in the same way the SAAU had wanted the costs of electrifying 
white-owned commercial farms to be shared amongst other electricity consumers. 
The farmers stance concerning cross-subsidisation of electrification costs is perfectly understandable 
given their history of privileges. The year 1989 was, however, seemingly a turning point so far as the 
political bargaining power of white commercial farmers in South Africa was concerned. With Eskom 
pressing for full cost recovery for electricity supply to agriculture and being supported in this 
endeavour at ministerial level, and additionally by the recommendations of the de Villiers 
Commission, it was clear, that from 1990 onwards every effort would be made to ensure that farm 
electricity tariffs would be self supporting. 
2.8 Numbers of Farms Supplied with Electricity: 1980 - 1990 
Prior to giving statistics on the numbers of farms electrified in the decade 1980 to 1990 it is 
appropriate to point out that farm electrification schemes had been ongoing from the establishment of 
Eskom in 1948 onwards. These schemes were, however, only developed in areas where farmers 
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themselves could pay for them and in the early years the numbers of connections made were small 
indeed. This also being the time before the building of the national electricity grid. Electricity supply 
to farms prior to the national grid could only be provided where the farms were fairly close to a 
municipal centre that was electrified and the farmer could pay for the supply to be taken to his farm. 
What usually happened was that small groups of farmers would apply to Eskom for power and Eskom 
would investigate the viability of supplying them. The schemes were usually very small. For example 
in 1948 forty two applicants in Klipheuvel and Agter Paarl applied for electricity. The scheme to 
bring electricity to their farms consisted of 26 miles of llkv transmission line and 3 miles of low 
voltage cables, the total cost being £24 490, (Eskom Annual Report 1948). Year-on-year more 
farmers were connected. 
With respect to the period 1980 - 1990 applications for the provision of electricity to farms were 
usually made at the nearest Eskom office. The costs of supply was influenced by a variety of factors, 
e.g., 
a) The number of farmers applying for electricity in the same area; 
b) The geographical situation of the farms; and 
c) The proximity of suitable rural power grids and sub-stations. 
Such factors were built into the tariff calculations. Discussions were then held between groups of 
farmers and Eskom at public meetings to determine electricity requirements and so that the costs 
involved could be explained as well. Quotations for the supply of electricity given to each applicant 
contained full particulars about the scheme that the particular farmer was to be connected to. Despite 
Eskom's manpower shortage problems and the claim by farmers that connecting their farms to the 
national grid was generally beyond their means without cross-subsidisation the tempo of farm 
electrification increased in the decade 1980 to 1990, and more farms were provided with electricity in 
this period than in the previous fifty years, (Eskom, (Agrelek), p.5, undated). 
The number of farms which were electrified in South Africa between 1980 and the end of 1984 prior 
to the de Villiers Commission increased by a percentage year-on-year greater than the increase over 
the previous decade which was 8,6 per cent/annum. Comparative figures are given in Table No 5.1 
below. 
1980 - 1981 
1981 - 1982 
1982 - 1983 
1983 - 1984 
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TABLE NO 5.1 YEARLY PERCENTAGE INCREASE IN FARMS 
ELECTRIFIED IN SOUTH AFRICA: 1980-1984 
Source: Eskom Annual Reports for the various years. 
The number of farms electrified year-on-year between 1980 and the end of 1984 together with the 
cumulative totals is shown in Table No 5.2 below. 
NO OF FARMS 
ELECTRIFIEDIYEAR 
TOTAL NO OF FARMS 
ELECTRIFIED 
3551 
45156 
4082 
49238 
4229 5631 5920 
53467 59098 65018 
TABLE NO 5.2 NUMBER OF FARMS ELECTRIFIED IN SOUTH 
AFRICA: 1980 - 1984 
Source: Eskom Annual Reports for the various years. 
What is of more interest, however, is the percentage increase in farm electrification in Eskom's 
regions running along South Africa's Western, Northern and Eastern borders in the period 1980 to 
1984. These regions were the Northern Cape, Rand and Orange Free State and the Eastern Transvaal 
regions, they all bordered the so-called "front-line" states. The following tables provide details of the 
yearly percentage increase in the farms electrified in the Northern Cape and Eastern Transvaal 
regions compared to the average increase for all Eskom's regions which increased by 9,7 per cent 
over the period 1979 to 1984. 
. - _.- .......... . 
:e1tJUQD 
1979 -1980 
1980 -1981 
1981-1982 
1982 -1983 
1983 -1984 
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.·PERctNl'A&EmClU:ASE. 
20,7 
13,7 
3,3 
13.1 
3.7 
TABLE NO 5.3 PERCENTAGE INCREASE IN FARM 
ELECTRIFICATION NORTHERN CAPE REGION, 
BORDERING SOUTH WEST AFRICA AND 
BOT S WAN A: 1 9 8 0 - 1 9 8 4 180 
Source: Eskom Annual Reports for the various years. 
PERIOD ... 
1979 -1980 
1980 -1981 
1981-1982 
1982 -1983 
1983 -1984 
10,0 
7,8 
15,6 
15,9 
10,2 
TABLE NO 5.4 PERCENTAGE INCREASE IN FARM 
ELECTRIFICATION EASTERN TRANSVAAL 
REGION, BORDERING MOZAMBIQUE AND 
SWAZILAND: 1980-1984 
Source: Eskom Annual Reports for the various years. 
The Rand and Orange Free State region which had borders with Botswana and Zimbabwe was, 
compared with Eskom's other regions, already well supplied with electrified farms by 1980, this is 
demonstrated in table No 5.5 below. 
180 By comparing Tables No 5.3 and 5.4 it can be seen that the emphasis was to electrifY more farms in 
the Cape Northern Undertaking in the years 1980-1981 and 1982-1983 and more farms in the Eastern 
Transvaal Undertaking in the years 1981 - 1982 and 1983 - 1984 to even out farm electrification in 
both undertakings. 
NORTHERN CAPE 
EASTERN 
TRANSVAAL 
RAND AND ORANGE 
FREE STATE 
3149 
5906 
13220 
139 
3801 
6495 
14248 
4322 4487 5074 5260 
7003 8095 9382 10338 
15709 16957 18823 20824 
TABLE NO 5.5 COMPARISON OF TOTAL NUMBER OF FARMS 
ELECTRIFIED IN THE NORTHERN CAPE, 
EASTERN TRANSVAAL AND THE RAND AND 
ORANGE FREE STATE REGIONS: 1979-1984. 
Source: Eskom Annual Reports for the various years. 
Notwithstanding this fact the yearly percentage increase in the electrification of farms in the Rand 
and Orange Free State region in the period 1979 to 1984 was still higher than the national average 
taken from Table No 5.1 above. These statistics also support the hypothesis that the government's 
need to develop a buffer zone on South Africa's borders influenced the rate of farm electrification in 
areas bordering the front-line states. 
In the period 1985 to 1990 in spite of the arguments going on between the SAAU and Eskom 
concerning Tariff D and the pooling of electricity consumers a rather interesting phenomenon was 
taking place concerning the electrification of white-owned commercial farms in South Africa. 
Contrary to expectations, and the protestations of the SAAU, that farmers could not afford to be 
connected to the rural reticulation network without cross-subsidisation from all electricity users, 
applications to be connected continued to flood into Eskom in increasing numbers year-on-year. 
In 1985, 11 449kms of line had to be built to accommodate the farm electrification programme, this 
being an increase of some 11 per cent over the previous year, (Eskom Annual Report, 1985, pp.13 & 
57). Table No 5.6 below demonstrates that in the years 1986, 1987 and 1988 the year-on-year 
percentage increase in farm electrification in South Africa as a whole even exceeded the yearly 
increases in the years 1980 to 1984, see Table No 5.1, when the strategic need for such electrification 
was probably at its height. This increased rate of electrification was probably due to the 2km rebate 
offered to farmers after 1986. 
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TOTAL NUMBER OF FARMS 
ELECTRIFIED 
PERCENTAGE INCREASE 
YEAR-ON-YEAR 
70364 
8,2 
78809 
10,7 
88 709 101 749 110121 
11,2 12,8 7,6 
TABLE NO 5.6 TOTAL NUMBER OF FARMS ELECTRIFIED IN 
SOUTH AFRICA: 1985 - 1989 
Source : Eskom A nnual Reports for th e variou s ye ar s. 
The rate offarm electrification between 1960-1990 is shown in Fig No 5.3 below. The increasing rate 
in the number of farms electrified from 1980 to 1990 is dramatically illustrated by an increasing slope 
in the graph for this period. 
100,000 
80 ,000 
60,000 
40,000 
20,000 
o -lililllilliliJ2 
1955 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 
FIG NO 5.3 NUMBERS OF FARMS SUPPLIED WITH 
ELECTRICITY: 1960 - 1990 
Source : Eskom A nnual Report s for th e variou s year s. 
1990 1995 
Although the exact number of farms on, or very close to the borders of South Africa and the front -line 
states, is not recorded, this number would of course be much smaller than the actual number of farms 
electrified by Eskom between 1980 and 1990. The analysis given above therefore suggests that the 
very favourable terms on offer by Eskom for electrifying farms was responsible for attracting greater 
and greater numbers of farms faced with rising diesel oil prices. The security issue seems then to have 
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started a farm electrification programme of great financial significance to Eskom, the magnitude of 
which will be estimated in the following section. 
2.9 Economic Impact of Farm Electrification 
The economic impact that the farm electrification programme in the decade 1980 -1990 exerted upon 
the South African economy can be characterised on the cost side of a cost-benefit equation by 
estimating the subsidies that were required to enable the electrification programme to be sustained. In 
a study, undertaken by Salvoldi of Eskom' s Electricity Pricing Department in 1994, it was estimated 
that the non-recovered capital expenditure on rural reticulation lines serving the farming community 
amounted to 65 per cent, on average i.e., only 35 per cent of the capital costs were recovered via the 
monthly rentals in the period 1980 - 1990. Estimating the subsidies paid to farmers as a consequence 
of this non-recovered capital in that period is therefore a straightforward calculation since the length 
of lines built and the numbers of farmers connected to the rural electrification grid are given in 
Eskom's Annual Reports for the period. Table No 5.7 below is constructed to allow the subsidies paid 
to farmers from the farm electrification programme to be estimated. 
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··1984_ ..... - . " ..... 1985 . .. ITEM 1980 1981·· 1982 1983.. ~ 1986 ·1981 
No of Consumers (Total)l 45156 49238 53467 59098 65018 70364 78809 88709 
No of Consumers connected 4082 4229 5631 5920 5346 8445 9900 
Year-on-Yearl 
Reticulation Line total length 66604 71296 78398 87717 95835 107284 123284 138546 
(km) 2 
Reticulation Line connected 4692 7102 9319 8118 11449 16000 15262 
Year-on-Year (km) 2 
Cost of Line per Kilometre (R)2 5400 6200 7100 8200 9200 10200 11900 13600 
Total Capital Cost of Lines 29,09 50,42 76,42 74,69 116,78 190,40 207,56 
(R Millions) 
Cost of Line J!er Consumer &1 7127 11923 13571 12 616 21844 22546 20966 
Unrecovered capital (R millions) 18,91 32,78 49,67 48,55 75,91 123,76 134,91 
(65 J!er cent on aver~ 
Cumulative cost (R millions) 18,91 51,69 101,36 149,91 225,82 349,58 484,49 
Monthly Capital Rates (%)2 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,22 1,22 
Subsidy (R millions) 2,27 6,20 12,16 17,99 27,10 51,18 70,93 
TABLE NO 5.7 FARMER'S SUBSIDY FROM UNDER RECOVERY ON LINE CAPITAL CHARGES: 1980 -1990 
Data Source: Eskom's Annual Reports for various years. 
Data Source: Eskom's Electricity Pricing Department. 
1988 1989 i 
101749 110121 
13040 8372 
I 
151971 161058 
13425 9087 
17200 17700 
23091 160,84 
17708 19212 
150,09 104,55 
634,58 739,13 
1,22 1,35 
92,90 119,74 
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The subsidy shown in Table No 5.7 being the loss in monthly rentals sustained by Eskom year-
on-year since 1980. This loss, being made good by cross-subsidisation from other electricity 
users, in particular those consuming large amounts of electricity and being charged according to 
the rates set for different consumers in accordance with Tariff A. There was, in addition, another 
subsidy that applied to farmers in the 1980 to 1990 decade. This subsidy arose because of the 
unrecovered high energy component of TariffD. Statistical records of farmers using less than the 
assumed break even amount of high energy rate electricity are unfortunately incomplete, 
however. Salvoldi in her 1994 estimates of the costs of supplying white-owned commercial farms 
with electricity has suggested that a figure of about R 47 million! year would have been on 
average the subsidy paid to farmers for this unrecovered high energy component in the latter part 
of the 1980 - 1990 decade. Accepting this figure, in the period 1987 to the end of 1989 the total 
subsidies paid to white commercial farmers were approximately those shown in Table No 5.8 
below. 
...... ... . ............. . 
........................ . ...................................................... . 
1< ....1.9$1 1988/1989 
........... . ... 
SUBSIDY 
(R MILLIONS) 117,93 139,90 166,74 
TABLE NO 5.8 TOTAL FARMER'S SUBSIDY: 1987 - 1989 
In summary Eskom's financial problems with TariffD for the period 1980 to 1990 stemmed from 
three issues, these being 1) An under recovery on line capital charges, 2) An under recovery on 
the high energy component of Tariff D, brought about by the fact that only about half of all white 
commercial farmers supplied with electricity ever used more than 650 kWh of power per month 
and, 3) More farmers than Eskom estimated applied for, and were supplied with, electricity 
during the period. 
The last section has dealt with the cost side of the cost-benefit equation for white-owned 
commercial farm electrification in the decade 1980 to 1990. The benefit side is unfortunately not 
open to quantification. This is because the historical data necessary to do this is simply not 
available in any rational form with respect to the relationship between electricity usage and 
increased farm productivity during the period. Even the amount of electricity supplied to farmers 
in the years 1980 - 1987 is mere speculation. 181 Sales of farm machinery that would use 
electricity as a means of increasing output (irrigation pumps) or processing farm products (drying 
kilns) during the period is similarly subject to dispute. This is because individual farmers bought 
181 Interview with Mrs Shirley Salvoldi and Mr. Kerry Blewett, 25th March 1999. 
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such machinery from many manufactures through agents and no central register of such sales 
exists. 182 The benefit-side of the cost-benefit equation in historical terms is then a totally 
unknown quantity. Only the cost-side of the equation can be estimated and even this is subject to 
some heroic assumptions. 
Having said this some general comments can, however, be offered concerning the national 
economic benefits of electricity usage by farmers. Firstly South African agricultural products are 
not allowed to be exported in unprocessed form "but should be delivered to foreign countries only 
after processing at a higher rand value" (Eskom (Agrelek), p.l) i.e., beneficiation is practised 
with regard to exporting agricultural products. In this way South Africa's trading position with 
the rest of the world is improved. South African farmers are becoming more and more involved 
in these beneficiation processes as a consequence of the co-operative system presently in affect. 
Nearly all processing systems prescribe high standards with respect to temperature control, speed 
control and electronic measuring methods all of which require electricity. The electrification of 
white-owned commercial farms in the decade 1980 to 1990 did, therefore, in all probability, play 
an increasing role in providing agricultural products for exports and earning valuable foreign 
exchange for the South African economy. Furthermore, the demand for electrically driven 
equipment such as irrigation pumps, hammer mills and drying kilns as a direct result of the 
electrification of white-owned commercial farms would have undoubtedly stimulated economic 
activity in the manufacturing sector of the South African economy and helped this sector increase 
its contribution to GDP and create new job opportunities. 
In spite of the increasing mechanisation and electrification of white-owned commercial farms in 
South Africa the agricultural sector has continued to lose ground to both the mining and 
manufacturing sectors with respect to contributions to GNP. In the first two decades of this 
century agriculture contributed more than 20 per cent to GNP. In the decade 1980-1990, when 
the electrification of farms reached its height, that contribution fell from 6, I per cent in 1980 to 
5,0 per cent in 1990, (National Department of Agriculture 1988, p.12). 
182 Telephonic conversations with Dr J. Rankin, and Mr P. Blignaut, 14th April 1999. 
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3.0 THE ELECTRIFICATION OF BLACK HOUSEHOLDS: 1985 -
1990 
3.1 Constraints 
In addition to the fann electrification programme, between 1985-1990 Eskom investigated how 
electricity could be provided to black households in the so-called self-governing states and to the 
20 million people who did not have electricity in their homes and who mainly lived in about 60 
black townships in South Africa. This last initiative was mentioned in Eskom's 1987 Annual V 
Report, (p.3). 
Eskom was faced with the following constraints in this regard. Until the replacement of P. W. 
Botha by F. W. De Klerk, and for the political reasons already given, it is suggested that the 
government could not actively encourage the electrification of black households. Furthermore, the 
de Villiers Commission recommendations had made it clear that the electrification of black 
households in South Africa should only be carried out if the development could be shown to be 
financially self-supporting, i.e., such developments could not be cross-subsidised. These 
constraints made it difficult for Eskom to undertake such an electrification programme. This 
section describes what action Eskom took in this regard as a consequence, bearing in mind two 
major problems which the Corporation had to overcome, these being: 
a) The costs involved in bringing electricity to potential users; and 
\ \ ' 
L----
b) The shortage of manpower needed to build the required reticulation networks and v 
substations. 
These constraints were no different to the ones that Eskom had overcome in electrifying white-
owned commercial fanns. The fact that such fanns were electrified and black households, were 
not, speaks volumes for the political importance of farm electrification during this period. 
Eskom reported these constraints in their 1987 Annual Report, (p.3). It was also mentioned that 
generally local authorities had neither the money nor the manpower to help undertake 
electrification projects in their areas of supply, thus further curtailing the electrification of black 
households. 
In addition to these two constraints on electrification initiatives a dichotomy developed within 
Eskom, concerning how the Corporation should become involved with the electrification of black 
households. Two viewpoints dominated. One was held by the newly appointed Chairman Mr John 
;' 
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Maree, the other by the Chief Executive Officer Mr Ian McRae. As Landes has observed with 
respect to history, "people matter", (Landes 1998, p.102). The history of the electrification of 
black households in South Africa is no exception. Maree and McRae had the power to make 
decisions concerning electrification issues they were, however, in many respects quite different 
from each other, and it was probably inevitable that a conflict of opinion over the matter of 
electrifying black households would arise. Taking account of the personalities of these two men 
and the different pressures upon them makes the history of Eskom's black household 
electrification programme after 1985 easier to understand. It is useful therefore at this juncture to 
give a brief profile of each of these men. 
3.2 Profile of Maree and McRae l83 
Maree was born on the 13th August 1924 in Middelburg in the Karoo where his father was a 
dentist. During the depression of 1929 to 1932 the family moved to Springs in the Transvaal. 
Whilst Maree had a traditional Afrikaans upbringing, which would have normally led him into a 
career in the professions or the civil service, these options did not appeal to him. Instead he 
wanted to become a businessman. He was driven from a very young age by an ambition to "be 
somebody", (Sunday Times Magazine, 14th May 1989, p.26). Money and power derived from 
business was perhaps seen as a means to this end. 
In 1948 Maree entered the University of the Witwatersrand and read commerce, graduating with 
the degree of B. Com. He won the Alexander Aiken Medal in his final year as the most 
distinguished graduate in the Department. He was awarded an honorary D. Com degree from the 
University of Stellenbosch in 1988. Maree's first job was as a clerk at the Johannesburg Stock 
Exchange. By 1965, however, he was managing director of a group of industrial companies. In 
1970 he was appointed Executive Chairman of Rand Mines Properties and by 1974 he was on the 
Board of Barlow Rand. Five years later, at the personal request of the Prime Minister Mr. P.W. 
Botha, he was seconded to the Department of Defence as Chief Executive of Armscor. In 1982 he 
returned to Barlow Rand but was soon, again at the request of P. W. Botha, on the move to a new 
business challenge, this time as Chairman of Eskom. Maree was very well aware of the power of 
publicity and in his tenure at Eskom he undoubtedly changed the public image of the Corporation 
and the business culture within it from a staid para statal to a business orientated enterprise by v 
exposing himself and Eskom to public scrutiny. 
183 The infonnation in this section is drawn from interviews with the two men and comments made to 
the author by the people interviewed during the course of this study. Additional infonnation was 
gleaned from the sources cited. 
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McRae, who was born of Scottish parents in Germiston in the Transvaal on the 24th September 
1925, started his working life as an apprentice fitter at Eskom. He was to remain with the 
Corporation for over forty years rising to Chief Executive. McRae eventually read mechanical 
engineering, also at the University of the Witwatersrand, on an Eskom bursary, and graduated 
with a BSc (Engineering) degree. In December 1989 the honorary degree of Doctor of 
Engineering was conferred upon him by the same university. This degree was awarded, according 
to the citation, "because of his vision of South Africa as a growth centre of the continent and that 
electricity has the potential to provide the economic upliftment for all the peoples of South 
Africa", (ERI Perspective, No 56, February 1990). Electrification and the socio-economic 
upliftment process was of extreme importance to McRae and time and time again in interviews 
with the author he spoke about this issue. 
Whilst both men are ambitious, there is a spirituality about McRae that seems absent in Maree. 
What may appear to be a trifling example of this may be found in the different answers these men 
gave to a question posed to them by the Engineering News Journal in 1992 and 1995 respectively. 
The question being "Who would you most like to meet?" McRae's reply was Mother Theresa of 
Calcutta, Maree answered Reagan's TV coach. Another instance of McRae's spirituality was 
provided to the author in an interview with him on the 28th of August 1996 when he said that his 
vision of providing electricity to black households as a means of uplifting black people's social 
condition came to him in church. 
McRae and Maree's views of electricity as a motive power for social upliftment were, however, 
not dissimilar. Their belief rested, amongst other things, on the correlation between per capita 
GDP, the level of electrification and the capital expended on electrification projects in poor 
countries. 184 
How the electrification process was to be organised and financed was, however, a point of 
contention between the two men. McRae's view was that Eskom should become involved in a 
programme to electrify black households with tariffs being set at affordable levels which would, 
184 The literature is supportive of their views, see Dtmkerley (1981), Barnes (1985), Cecelski and 
Glatt (1982), Fluitman (1983), Jechautek (1985) and Munasinghe, (1987). These authors make 
the assertion that rural electrification is a tool for national socio-economic development and 
should be encouraged. Munasinghe (1987, p.263) also asserts that the national objective of rural 
electrification is the achievement of high economic growth and a more equitable distribution of 
income. With respect to the expenditure on electrification world-wide. Munasinghe (1987) points 
out that during the decade 1980 - 1990 $ 50 - 60 billion was expended, (p.8). Furthermore, 
countries like Costa Rica, Brazil and Thailand were all spending considerable sums of money on 
rural electrification during the 1980 - 1990 decade. The govermnent of Costa Rica in particular 
was deeply involved in the electrification programme in that country being convinced that this 
initiative would improve the general standard of living in poor areas, see Central American Rural 
Electrification Study, National Rural Electric Co-operative Association, Washington, DC, (1986). 
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in all probability, involve cross-subsidisati~. By this means McRae believed that poverty and 
poverty-related violence and general crime levels in South Africa's black townships would be 
reduced; this belief was always evident when he discussed the electrification of black households. 
McRae also believed that Eskom should become involved in the management of the electricity 
supply to Greater Soweto so that the payment for services could be "ll()nnalised" (McRae's term) / 
and further unrest curtailed or at least minimised. Maree's viewpoint was that the Corporation 
should not become involved in such electrification programmes except in those areas that could 
satisfactorily demonstrate, that they could afford to pay for electricity supply, and which could 
also be relied upon to do so. Advice and help in their electrification initiatives could, however, be 
given to the so-called self governing states provided that payments for this service were 
received.185 This second viewpoint found support in the recommendations of the de Villiers 
Commission of Inquiry. 
Thus it was then that two conflicting viewpoints on the electrification of black households in 
South Africa developed during this period and claimed adherents from Eskom's top managers. 
Each of these viewpoints can be readily understood. Eskom' s Chairman Maree for example was, 
prior to his appointment at Eskom, a well respected successful businessman in South Africa. He 
was used to satisfying shareholders; furthermore, he was bound by the de Villiers Commission's 
findings and finally he was obliged to follow the government's leadership with regard to the 
provision of services in developing areas of South Africa. He was well aware of the political 
difficulties of implementing reform initiatives with public money at this time. The adherents to 
his viewpoint were quite naturally drawn from the financial arm of Eskom. McRae on the other 
hand was something of a crusader with a highly developed social conscience and had a different 
business background to Maree having all his working life served a public utility without 
shareholders to satisfy. His working environment had, however, over many years enabled him to 
see, on a regular basis, the advantages that electricity provided for social upliftment. McRae drew 
adherents to his viewpoint on electrification from social scientists and human resources personnel 
within Eskom, and often also from engineers. It is probably safe to assume that up until 1990 the 
Electricity Council being government appointees, would have supported Maree' s view on 
electrification; after that date their views would have tended to favour Eskom becoming involved 
with such a programme as the government began to accelerate social reform in South Africa. 
As the decade proceeded and political events changed the desires of these two men with respect to 
the electrification of black households coincided and eventually in the early 90' s, they formed the 
formidable team that drove Eskom's massive electrification programme forward. Until that time, 
185 This viewpoint became Eskom's official policy on the electrification of developing areas between 
1985 - 1990 as will be shown in the next section. 
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however, McRae, at considerable risk to his career often acted at odds with Maree in a 
clandestine manner so far as the electrification process was concerned. 186 
3.3 Electrification in the Self-Governing States 
The formulation of Eskom' s policy and strategy for electrifying black households in the so-called 
self-governing states was given in the minutes of an important Management Board meeting that 
took place on the 23rd June 1986. The record of the meeting reads as follows. 
RECORD : 289 
HEADING 1 : ELECTRIFICATION 
HEADING 2 : DEVELOPING AREAS 
HEADING 3 : POLICY/STRATEGY 
MEETING : 040 
ITEM : 9 
DATE : 23 JUNE 1986 
ELECTRIFICATION OF DEVELOPING AREAS 
Agreement had been reached on the following, subject to approval at Ministerial 
level: 
(1) Trustlands within self-governing stateslhomelands 
(a) The SA Development Trust (SADT), as agent of the Govts of the 
National States (NS) (excluding independent States), should accept the 
responsibility to do small distribution within the Trustlands. 
(b) This will be done in consultation with Escom which would supply the 
required training and provide assistance with resources and manpower to 
enable the SADT to do small supply distribution. 
(c) The SADT will negotiate with Escom and the relevant Govt to transfer at 
an appropriate time the responsibility for small distribution to the NS. 
(d) The Dept of Development Aid will also be approached for financial 
assistance. 
(2) Urban and semi-urban areas other than Trustlands 
(a) Each NS must in time accept responsibility for small supply, distribution 
within towns in those NS' s 
(b) Until such time as the NS are in a position to execute this responsibility, 
it will remain the responsibility of the SADT, as agents of the Govts. 
(c) Escom will negotiate directly with these agents on supply points and 
associated matters and the provision of assistance i.t.o. (in terms of, 
author's addition) resources, manpower and training. 
(3) Rural areas other than Trustlands 
(a) The same arrangements as for the Trustlands will be applied. 
(b) Escom will provide assistance with resources and manpower for 
electricity reticulation. 
(c) Escom will then be responsible only for bulk supply of electricity. 
186 McRae's actions in this regard fIrst manifested themselves in the problems of non-payment for 
services in Greater Soweto and will be described in the following chapter when that topic is 
discussed. 
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Escom should play a leading role in assisting with the provision of electricity in 
developing areas and the following was proposed: 
(1) Policy 
(a) Escom would generally be a bulk supplier. 
(b) Escom would support the Undertaker (supply authority) in a developing 
area with training, technical expertise, construction work, operating and 
maint and admin for a defined period. 
(2) Strategy 
(a) Areas in which Local Authorities, Govt depts (Development Aid/SA trust 
and other Undertakers) provided electricity services had to be clearly 
defined. 
(b) Other Undertakers had to be encouraged to develop distribution networks 
wherever possible in these areas. 
(c) Escom will assist in identifying other undertakers. 
(d) The defined Undertaker (other than Escom) should admin, render 
accounts and collect revenue from the consumers concerned with any 
necessary assistance from Escom. 
(e) Escom will undertake work in developing areas to supply bulk supplies 
where necessary. 
(f) Escom will assist with suitable technological development of appropriate 
wiring and distribution standards. 
(g) Funding the development will be obtained by the Undertaker (and Escom, 
where relevant) from the Development Bank of SA or other development 
sources. 
(h) Escom will be reimbursed for any expenditure incurred. 
(i) Any work done by Escom will be i.t.o. a formal agreement to be entered 
into with the appropriate Undertaker and, where necessary, Govt. 
The aforementioned policy and strategy would be confirmed with the relevant government 
departments at a forthcoming meeting.18? 
This policy/strategy directive made it abundantly clear that, whilst Eskom would supply bulk 
electricity to developing areas, they expected to be paid for it. Furthermore, the Corporation 
would only undertake development projects, and raise money for these, where it was guaranteed 
that they would not suffer financially from doing so. Eskom would, however, be supportive of any 
undertaker that sought to bring electricity to developing areas with training etc., and some 
research on cheaper ways of electrifying such areas would be undertaken by the Corporation. 
3.4 Electrification of Black Households in South Africa 
Eskom's concern with the electrification of black households in South Africa itself in the period 
1985-1990 concentrated on research into cheaper ways of electrifying such households. In the 
1987 Annual Report, (p.31), Eskom' s Chief Executive Officer Ian McRae announced a scheme v 
187 The Management Board Note is presented here in the exact fonn shown in Eskom's records. The 
name Escom is therefore retained. 
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aimed at assisting local authorities speed up the electrification of 60 black townships that Eskom 
had earmarked for electricity services provision. These townships were those that lay adjacent to 
already electrified white towns and Eskom estimated that electricity could be broug~ an 
additional 3 million people by 1992 if an electrification programme could be initiated. 
As a result of the recommendations of the de Villiers Commission of InquiI)} Eskom could not 
directly finance the electrification of these townships nor could township tariffs be cross-
subsidised. Eskom could, however, provide technical advice to the adjacent white municipalities, 
(for which they would be paid) which would allow these townships to be cheaply provided with 
electricity. Such actions fell under the electrification policies that had already been set for Eskom 
by its Management Board. Eskom therefore became engaged in a research programme concerned 
with drafting the technical specifications governing the provision of electricity to black 
townships. These simplified specifications did not compromise electrification safety standards in 
any way but did allow the installation of electricity in simple dwellings to be made less difficult 
and at low cost. 
V 
The conventional practice in the electrification of white urban areas favoured underground 
cables, miniature substations and individual home metering. Such an approach was costly in all l.../. 
respects both in planning, construction and maintenance. Eskom was convinced that both black 
"urban and rural developing areas could be rapidly and relatively cheaply electrified by using 
appropriate technology such as bundled aerial conductors, pole mounted transformers and pre-
paid metering systems", (Sunday Times: 30th August 1987). So far as cost was concerned one 
connection box could be provided to each home allowing the use of a single light fitting and a 
plug outlet for between R150 and R300. Such technology would allow the cost of electrifying the 
60 townships mentioned above to be reduced to R348 million against an estimated R700 million 
(1987 rand) that would normally be required if conventional electrification procedures were 
._--------
adhered to, (Business Day: 26th August 1987).188 
As a consequence of the constraints the de Villiers Commission placed upon Eskom such a 
scheme would still require commitment and money from both the government, local authorities, 
Regional Service Councils, development aid agencies and possibly overseas financing. Because of 
the probable inability to pay for such services by low income black communities, such money was 
not forthcoming during this period and the plan languished. A complicating factor in making the ~ 
scheme self-sufficient was of course the direct competition faced by electricity from traditional 
forms of energy such as wood, coal, candles and paraffin, (Eskom Annual Report, 1988, p.37). 
188 These figures were confmned in an interview with Dr I.C. McRae, 4th September 1996. 
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Wood was, during this period, the dominant fuel used by blacks in rural areas. For example 12-14 
million tons of fuelwood were consumed annually (mainly in rural areas). This usage, caused 
environmental problems such as denudation of woodlands and the destruction of tree cover, 
(Business Day: 26th August 1987).189 With respect to the electricity needed to serve the 60 
townships that Eskom had earmarked the Corporation had sufficient excess generation capacity, 
(see Chapter 4), at this time to cope with the potential increase in electricity demand that would 
arise if these townships were electrified. V 
Eskom's 1989 Annual Report (p.9) carried for the first time a separate entry on "Electrification 
Projects" and stated that there were 48 electrification projects under way affecting about one 
million households and approximately ten million people countrywidel90. The Durban City 
Council's initiative mentioned in footnote 190 below was a significant departure from the policy 
of separate control and development of "homeland" infrastructures. What was of importance to 
Eskom was that it ran counter to Eskom' s development philosophy of transferring responsibility 
for electricity provision ~locaLal!!!!~rities to _ private entities as the Corporation was 
endeavouring to do with the supply of electricity to Greater Soweto (This initiative will be 
discussed in the following chapter). 
Eskom's Annual Report for 1989 (p.9) also described a joint venture project that Eskom was 
involved with and which was being undertaken in line with Eskom' s philosophy of supplying 
electricity to black households in South Africa in conjunction with entities that would provide 
189 Such denudation was also responsible for land erosion, making farming more difficult and costly. 
Costs associated with these economic externalities are not usually taken into account in the 
benefits associated with the electrification of black households in South Africa yet they play an 
important role in cost-benefit calculations for electrification schemes in developing areas; see 
Turvey and Anderson, (1977), Munasinghe, (1987) and van Horen (1996). 
190 Diligent enquiries have proved fruitless so far as obtaining detailed infonnation on these projects. 
These projects seemed to have been investigations being carried out by Eskom concerning which 
developing areas were ready for electrification. This is the explanation given to the author by Mr 
John Bradbury in an interview on 13th November 1986. This lack of detailed historical record is a 
problem so far as Eskom's electrification initiative is concerned, and the problem will appear 
again in Chapter 7 when Eskom's electrification programme of the 1990's is discussed. What is _______ 
certain is that in 1989 The Durban City Council became the first local authority to take over full l/ 
control of electricity supplY to"adjacent "homeland" townships going against national policy 
trends. The Durban Council began supplying electricity to KwaZulu's townships and served 
approximately 20000 KwaZulu consumers in the UmlQli, KwaMakutla, KwaMashu, Ntuzuma 
and KwaNdegezi townships. Prior to this the Council sold bulk electricity directly to the Kwa 
Zulu government which supplied it to these townships. The tariff to these townships was no 
longer subsidised as it had been when the K wa Zulu government was responsible for the service. 
The new tariff, which was more expensive, was brought up to a level charged elsewhere in 
Durban. It was reported that some 92-94 per cent of consumers paid their first account after the l// 
Council took charge of the billing. Demand for electricity in the area increased by 16 per cent in 
1989, (Weekly Mail, 22nd September 1989). 
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funding, such as private enterprise, see Policy item 2(g), strategy, in the Eskom's Management"L __ 
Board directive discussed above. 
Eskom's partners, in this, their first joint venture with private sector companies for bringing 
electricity to a black township, were Volkswagen S.A., the Development Bank of Southern Africa 
and members of the Midland Chamber of Industries. The location of the project was K waNobuhle 
near Uitenhage in the Eastern Cape. In a joint statement to the press Eskom and Volkswagen said 
"this privatisation action would be of immense benefit to KwaNobuhle and could serve as a model 
for the further development of the electricity supply infrastructure in South Africa", (City Press 
20th November 1988). 
The joint venture company, was called Kwanolec, and in line with Eskom's research into cheaper 
ways of electrifying townships Kwanolec abandoned expensive underground cables in favour of 
overhead wires mounted on gum poles. Because it was considered dangerous to connect 
electricity to anything but brick dwellings Kwanolec developed a Ready Board which could be 
safely mounted within any type of home from a rondavel to an informal shack. Electrical 
appliances could be plugged into the Ready Board at 3-15 amp sockets, in addition a light socket 
and a switch was provided. The Ready Board also had a meter attached which was activated by 
the insertion of a card which purchased a set amount of electricity with a gauge showing the rate 
of consumption, (The Argus, 13th February 1989). No cash was therefore involved in operating 
the meter as the meter card was purchased at dispensers. This meant of course that there was no 
need for accounts to be prepared for individual customers. By these means the non-payment for 
electricity, which was a major problem in Greater Soweto, see the following chapter, could, in 
theory, be avoided...-
Each connection cost Kwanolec R400 but consumers were charged R50 only, R30 of electricity 
coupons were also given free to each consumer when their home was electrified. Kwanolec 
supplied about 11 000 consumers in KwaNobuhle hence these consumers were subsidised to the 
tune of R3.8 million in connection fees alone. In addition R4 million was put up in the form of 
share capital to establish Kwanolec and R25 million more was obtained by way of a loan from the 
Development Bank of Southern Africa, (Dingley 1990, p.13). Eskom provided the management 
and technical personnel on a contract basis to build and run the project and the project was ~ 
considered to be a success both financially and socially by the parties concerned with it and the 
local community itself, (Interview with I. C. McRae September 4th 1997). 
One of the chief problems with this project was that if such ventures were continued the numbers 
of separate electricity suppliers would increase over time and there were at this time already over 
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400 different electricity suppliers in South Africa and the independent states. This method of 
attacking the backlog in electrification therefore compounded the problem of the fragmentation of ~ 
the electricity supply industry in South Africa and the so-called homelands.191 
3.5 The Fragmented Domain of the ESI 
Some idea of the magnitude of this fragmentation may be obtained from the following facts. From 
the seventies onward the government policy of Grand Apartheid to create ethnically based 
"independent states" and "self governing territories" was being put in place. 192 The independent 
states were legally separate from South Africa, had their own parliaments and could pass laws 
within their boundaries. A number passed legislation concerning electrification and in fact 
established their own electric utilities in the 1980' s. The result was of course that the electricity 
supply industry in the area was further fragmented as follows: 
a) Transkei: An electric utility called TESCOR was established in terms of the Transkei 
Corporation Act of 1985. TESCOR operated a small hydro-power station (Colywobbles) but 
bought most of it's electricity in bulk from Eskom; 
b) Ciskei: Electricity was supplied by the Department of Works and purchased in bulk from 
Eskom; 
c) Bophuthatswana: An electric utility called BECOR was established in terms of the 
Bophuthatswana Electricity Act of 1985 which purchased bulk electricity from Eskom and 
distributed it within the territory; 193 
d) Venda: An electricity division of the Venda National Development Corporation was 
established called VEC which purchased electricity in bulk from Eskom and distributed it 
throughout Venda; 
e) Kangwane: Initially electricity was supplied by the Department of Public Works but in 1980 
the Government of Kangwane and Eskom entered into a joint venture arrangement and 
KESCOR (Pty) Ltd., was established to distribute electricity bought in bulk from Eskom 
throughout the territory; 
f) Gazankulu: Like Kangwane electricity bought in bulk from Eskom was distributed initially 
by the Department of Works, then a government owned company named GEZCOR (Pty) 
191 The question of the fragmentation of the electricity supply industry in South Africa became a 
highly charged debate during the period 1990 to 1995. This debate will be discussed in Chapter 7. 
192 ill all, ten such homelands were created; four independent states, the Transkei, Boputhatwasna, V 
Venda, and the Ciskei and six self governing territories, Kangwane, Gazankulu, Lebowa, 
KwaNdebele, Qwa-Qwa, andKwa Zulu, (Morgan, 1994, pp.13-14). 
193 BECOR in fact built a fossil-fuelled power station, which was never operated and was eventually 
sold for scrap. illterview with Mr Kevin Morgan, 15th July 1996. 
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Ltd., was established as a vehicle for forming a joint venture with Eskom, thereafter Eskom 
took over the distribution of electricity in the territory; 
g) Lebowa: Initially electricity bought in bulk from Eskom was distributed by the Department 
of Public Works but during the late 1980's Eskom began distributing electricity to new 
consumers in the area direct; 
h) Kwandebele: Again in this case electricity bought in bulk from Eskom was distributed by the 
Department of Public Works but in the late 1980's Eskom began to distribute electricity to 
parts of the territory; 
i) Qwa-Qwa: Also in this case electricity bought in bulk from Eskom was distributed by the 
Department of Public Works; 
j) KwaZulu: Initially electricity bought in bulk from Eskom was distributed by the Department 
of Public Works but from 1990 Eskom began distributing electricity to rural areas of the 
territory in conjunction with the Durban Municipality. 
Many former Eskom employees joined these various entities to manage the distribution of 
electricity and to carry out some small-scale electrification projects. South African consulting 
engineers were also heavily involved in such projects in these independent states and Self 
Governing territories. 194 
The fragmentation of the electricity supply industry had, by the mid to late 80'_~flten became ~ 
acute. In sununary, the situation was as follows: 
a) Eskom was virtually the monopoly generator of electricity in South Africa and in sole charge 
of the national grid. The Corporation was supplying bulk electricity to a large number of 
municipalities and to the independent black states and self governing territories as outlined 
above. In addition Eskom was supplying electricity directly to about 50 000 individual 
households throughout the country; 
b) Some of the independent states and self governing territories were distributing the bulk 
electricity they purchased from Eskom directly to consumers within their territories; 
c) Approximately 451 (mainly white) local authorities in South Africa were supplying 
electricity directly within their areas and in areas adjacent to their boundaries. Only 4 of 
these municipalities generated power themselves all the others bought bulk electricity from 
Eskom. Under the Black Local Authorities Act of 1982 a small number of black local ~ 
authorities had started to distribute electricity bought in bulk from Eskom within their 
boundaries, Greater Soweto purchasing by far the greatest amount of this electricity; and 
194 Interview with Mr Douwe van Wyk, 29th November 1996. 
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d) Provincial administrations and a number of regional Service Councils were distributing 
electricity bought in bulk from Eskom to mainly disadvantaged communities in rural areas. 
The result of the fragmentation in electricity supply management was that in the period 1980-
1990 industrial mining and commercial consumers were well served with electricity generated 
almost totally by Eskom. In addition, almost all white domestic consumers and most Indian and 
coloured consumers were being supplied with power. The farming community was also being 
rapidly connected to the national grid in large numbers. Black consumers in the independent and 
self governing states were very poorly served with electricity supply, however, and in black rural 
and urban areas of South Africa itself only a small percentage of homes had an electricity 
supply. 195 
3.6 The Elandskraal Project 
During the period 1985-1989 Eskom initiated one other electrification project under its own 
aegis. This project, the so-called Elandskraal project, was the forerunner of the type of 
electrification installation the Corporation was to become involved with in its black household 
electrification initiative from 1990 onwards. 
Elandskraal is a settlement situated some 40km north of Marble Hall in the Groblersdal district of 
the Eastern Transvaal. The town is located on land between two parts of the Moutse district of 
KwaNdebele that falls within South Africa. The early residents of Elandskraal were people that 
had been relocated there from the Moutse district, which had suffered violent unrest in 1985 and 
1986. The cause of the unrest being the dispute concerning whether the Moutse district fell 
within Lebowa or KwaNdebele. 
Eskom undertook the electrification of Elandskraal from about 1987 onwards. Progress was quite 
slow initially. Indeed up until January 1992 electricity penetration in the township was only about 
36 per cent. The origin of the funding for electricity provision in Elandskraal is interesting and 
controversial. It was reported that funding was provided by the Eastern Transvaal Undertaking 
without the knowledge of Eskom's head office in Johannesburg, the money coming from the 
Region's farm electrification budget. 196 The slow progress with the electrification of Elandskraal 
195 Interview with Mr Kevin Morgan, 25th July 1996. 
196 Interview with Mr J. du Plessis, 27th January 1998. Mr du Plessis was at the time of the 
Elandskraal project the senior manager in charge of three of Eskom's regional SBUs including the 
Eastern Transvaal Region wherein Elandskraal was located. It seems that du Plessis, and certain 
other managers in the Eastern Transvaal Region, supported Eskom's CEO Ian McRae's attitude 
towards the electrification of black households in South Africa. Mr. D. van Wyk, in an interview 
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tends to support this assertion. What seems to be certain is that by 1991 Eskom had spent about 
Rl.l million on the project, (Viljoen, 1993, p.l).197 
It will be recalled that the de Villiers recommendations made each of Eskom's regional SBUs ~ 
responsible for it's own finances. The Elandskraal project derived then an impetus from the very 
measures seeking to curtail projects such as the electrification of black households. The fact that 
the Eastern Transvaal regional SBU looked after its own budget allowed senior staff in the area to 
/ 
perform some slight of hand with the farm budget from 1986 onwards. That many senior 
members of the SBUs staff were members of the McRae faction lends further credence to the fact 
that Elandskraal was a project deliberately undertaken to show how effective the newly developed 
approach to the electrification of the black households could actually be. Thus it was that this 
initial project was undertaken in a clandestine fashion. The fact that it was quite a small project 
and in a location rather remote from Eskom's head office in Johannesburg may have allowed it to 
remain undiscovered at least in its initial phases. 
Elandskraal consisted of 2050 erven (not all of which were occupied in 1987). The township was 
formally planned with a regular arrangement of gravel roads. There were churches and schools 
and there was formal and informal housing existing side by side. Elandskraal was then an ideal 
township for Eskom to test the efficiency of the low cost reticulation technology, which it had 
been developing. 
Elandskraal is also interesting from another perspective. It is one of the few electrification 
projects undertaken by Eskom that had the benefit of some data collection of a socio-economic \// 
nature both before electrification and after electrification. l98 This was probably because it was the 
first such project that Eskom was involved with. Furthermore, the planners of the project wished 
to show how effective the electrification of such a township could be both from the social and 
economic perspective. Certainly there are no such detailed records available for the majority of 
electrification projects undertaken by Eskom from 1990 onwards in what was considered their 
"Electricity for All" initiative. It is appropriate to provide here some of the most important data 
that was collected so far as this project was concerned because the changes in energy usage can be 
with the author 29th November 1996 also mentioned the Elandskraal Project and intimated that 
acquisition of the funding for it had been irregular. 
197 In an interview with Dr John Maree, 28th October 1998 he claimed that the Elandskraal 
electrification progranune was known to himself. It is certain that he made no attempt to stop the 
programme. TIris was probably because by the late 80's the govermnent's reform process under 
F.W. de Klerk was resuming and the electrification of black households was once more seen as 
being part of that process. 
198 Another such project was the Orange Farm development. TIris project will be briefly discussed in 
Chapter 8. 
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chronicled, i.e., fuelwood and paraffin, as can the views of new electricity consumers concerning 
this form of energy. 
So far as fuel usage in Elandskraal is concerned the facts are these. Prior to electrification 
paraffin, fuelwood, coal and candles were important energy sources, the dominant fuel being 
paraffin with about 73 per cent of households using it. No historical data on the quantities of 
these fuels used prior to electrification is available, however, (Viljoen, 1993, p.20). 
After the introduction of electricity Viljoen reports that the pattern of energy usage changed and ---
electricity became the main energy carrier with 98 per cent of the households provided with 
electricity using it as the dominant energy source particularly for lighting.199 The use of candles 
therefore declined dramatically. Coal usage also declined but less dramatically as this was still 
used extensively for cooking purposes. The use of fuelwood was largely unaffected by the 
electrification of Elandskraal. This was because it could be gathered fairly easily in the area or 
purchased quite cheaply, (Viljoen, 1993, p.25). 
Appliance ownership in the township in 1992 was as follows, lights, kettles, irons, radios, 
hotplates, televisions, fridges, stoves and ovens, heaters and hi-fis in descending order of 
percentages owned. The impact of electrification on household budgets due to purchase of 
appliances was R2 350 which figure was about half the expenditure on electrical appliances in 
Greater Soweto, (LHA Report, 1987). 
The average expenditure on electricity in Elandskraal households was R25,21 per month also 
about half the expenditure in Greater Soweto with a wide range from RO to R297,93 per month. 
The standard deviation being R39,33. At a cost of 21c per unit (Eskom's SI tariff) the average 
monthly household consumption of electricity was 120 kWh. About 18 per cent of those 
connected used zero electricity and relied on traditional energy forms with about 46 per cent of 
those connected using less than 95 units of electricity per month, (Viljoen, 1993, p.29). The 
distribution of electricity usage was therefore heavily skewed with a long tail into the higher 
consumption categories. 
A large shopping centre was developed in Elandskraal in 1990 by STK - The Trust Corporation 
Ltd. This centre had 40 shops of varying sizes. The centre subsequently failed and by 1993 only 
one shop was still trading. Electrification costs were not considered to be the issue so far as this 
failure was concerned, the problem was simply the lack of trade in the area. Due to the failure of 
199 The data quoted in Viljoen was obtained from surveys carried out by Social Surveys cc, and cited 
in his study. 
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the shopping centre most of the remaining businesses operated from formal and informal 
structures scattered throughout the township. The types of business was varied including a bottle 
store, garage, restaurant, baker, butcher, electrical goods sales, welder, dressmaker, disco, a 
supermarket and many general dealers which composed about 46 per cent of all businesses. 
Electricity accounted for less than 10 per cent of the businesses running c()s~~ 
Prior to electrification, petrol generators were used to produce electricity for business purposes, 
paraffin, gas and candles were also extensively used. As with households in Elandskraal paraffin 
was the most widely used fuel in business premises. Unlike household usage wood was not used 
at all by businesses. The monthly cost of fuel to business was R58,40. Nearly 60 per cent of 
businesses in Elandskraal operated prior to electrification. 
The biggest single perceived advantage that electricity brought to Elandskraal was lighting and 
v-" 
refrigeration although the ability to use a wide variety of electrical appliances was also considered 
important. The population of Elandskraal was reported to see no disadvantages to electricity. The 
impact of electricity on common life styles was recorded as being:20o 
a) Electricity made life easier, changed lifestyles; 
b) Electricity saved time e.g., so far as cooking was concerned; 
c) Electricity was perceived as a cheap form of energy; 
d) Only 2 households expressed concern that expenditure on electricity and appliances was 
beyond their means; and 
e) Generally the impact of appliance purchase on household budgets was not of concern since 
hire purchase was extensively used and anyway purchases were staggered over several 
months. 
The impact of electricity on business was that: 
a) Electricity was seen as an advantageous form of energy (candles etc., were kept, however, in 
case of interruptions in service); 
b) A wide range of appliances and machinery could be introduced into businesses making them 
more efficient; and 
c) Electricity was not an essential energy form in the businesses in Elandskraal, they could 
operate without it, but it was the preferred energy form. 
200 The views expressed in this section were gathered from surveys carried out in Elandskraal by 
Social Services cc., in mid January 1993 and early and late February 1993, cited in Viljoen (1993, 
pp.5l-54). 
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So far as economic development was concerned: 
a) In Elandskraal there was little evidence of job creation particularly in the formal and 
informal business community; 
b) The introduction of electricity did not save the shopping complex from closure; 
c) The impact of electrification on social welfare was considered to be limited; 
d) The impact of electrification was not as marked as the popular press made out; 
e) The process of electrification should not be seen in isolation and should take into account the 
rural poverty that prevails in South Africa; and 
f) In future electrification projects it was considered important that Eskom linked itself with 
development agencies such as the Development Bank of Southern Africa, (DBSA) and 
retailing experts so that the economic viability of such projects could be investigated. (It will 
be recalled that the de Villiers recommendations were concerned also about the viability of 
electrification projects.) 
An earlier post electrification study of Elandskraal by The South African Development Trust was 
undertaken in 1990, cited in Van Gass (Nov 1990). This study suggests that electrification ~/ 
contributed significantly to the economic and social upliftment of the t~s!t!P, It was claimed 
that 127 new jobs had been created as a consequence of small business development which was 
viable because of electricity and 36 new businesses were founded. Furthermore, it was reported 
that there was a significant increase in electrical appliance ownership after electrification. 
Confirmation of this economic activity can be found in another study at Elandskraal by Van 
Biljon (1990). Van Biljon asserted that small businesses were established and in some cases firms 
doubled the number of employees in a short period, and electrification considerably increased the 
turnover of a number of small businesses. The media also commented favourably on the benefits 
brought to Elandskraal by electrification. The Sunday Times, 12th January 1990 stating that 
"There is a vibrant activity in Elandskraal taking off after the slow growth of the past few years 
before electricity was provided in the area. Where doing business meant groping in the semi-
darkness with the ineffective light of a gas lamp or candle, today the shop windows and shelves 
are brightly lit... today electricity has completely transformed the life of the Elandskraal 
businessman and his clients". Comparing these claims with the later, more thorough study by 
Viljoen reported on above it seems clear that this initial development at Elandskraal was not 
sustainable. 
Whether or not the electrification of Elandskraal had been undertaken in a clandestine fashion by 
Eskom's Eastern Transvaal regional SBU without the Maree faction in Eskom's head office 
~ 
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knowing seemed of no consequence by 1990 since during this period (exact date unknown) both 
McRae and Maree visited the township. 201 It was clear to the visitors that there were positive 
social benefits arising to the residents of Elandskraal from the electrification project. What 
McRae and Maree observed was the situation reported by the South African Development Trust, 
and Van Biljon, which in hindsight has proved to be unsustainable. What was important to these 
men, however, was the magnitude of the economic benefits that could potentially arise from such 
projects. These economic benefits were important since from 2nd February 1989 F.W. de Klerk 
had replaced P. W. Botha and the process of political and social reform in South Africa was once 
more being accelerated and these changes included the provision of services (which would 
include the supply of electricity) to developing areas of the country. The ANC had also been 
unbanned and de Klerk gave every indication that the NP was serious about constitutional 
change, (Van Rooyen, 1994, p.139). How the conditions Maree found in Elandskraal and the 
changing political milieu affected Eskom's actions with regard to the electrification of black 
households is discussed in Chapter 7 when the reasons why Eskom undertook a programme to 
electrify black households in the period 1990-1995 are exposed./ 
4.0 CONCLUSIONS 
----
This chapter has shown that the costs of electrifying white-owned commercial farms in South 
Africa in the decade 1980 to 1990 had to be subsidised by other electricity users. This subsidy was 
---"---. 
necessary because of 1) Eskom' s failure to estimate correctly the number of farmers that would 
apply for electricity, especially when the favourable financial conditions of Eskom's farm Tariff, 
Tariff D, became clear to them, 2) the fact that only about half those connected used the amount 
of electricity at the high energy rate necessary to make these electricity connections financially 
viable, and 3) there was an under recovery on the capital costs of putting the farm electrification 
infrastructure in place. It was shown that the government was concerned with the security 
situation on South Africa's borders, and the electrification of white -owned commercial farms was 
an important consideration for the defence of the country against insurgents crossing the borders 
of South Africa and the front-line states for attacks on South Africa. The electrification of white-
owned commercial farms was also conditioned by the significant rise in diesel oil prices after the 
two oil crises of the 1970's. The important farmer's vote was also probably a major consideration 
in the government's pressure on Eskom to supply farms with electricity, taking into consideration 
the government's continuous electoral battle with the Conservative Party from 1985 onwards. It 
201 Interview with Mr 1. du Plessis, 27th January 1998. 
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seems doubtful, however, that the government's support for the farm electrification programme 
up until 1988 influenced the outcome of this electoral battle. 
With respect to the electrification of black households this was curtailed and was, unlike the 
electrification of white-owned commercial farms, not openly encouraged by the government as a 
consequence of the difficult political situation they faced with opposition to their reform 
initiatives. The electrification of black households therefore concentrated mainly on research 
projects which allowed Eskom to refine their approach to the problems that they would eventually 
encounter in electrifying black households, e.g., the introduction of bundled conductors, Ready 
Boards and pole mounted transformers. Eskom was, after the de Villiers Commission of Inquiry, 
only able to undertake electrification projects which were_~lf-sustaining and where the 
consumers concerned were able to pay for the electricity supplied.202 A project that did fall into 
this category was the joint venture at KwaNobuhle near Uitenhage in the Eastern Cape. This 
project did give Eskom an opportunity to test out the efficiency of their research into making 
black household electrification as cost effective as possible. The Elandskraal project also proved 
enlightening and it was this project that initially caused Eskom to realise that whilst electricity is 
an important ingredient in economic growth and social upliftment in developing areas, by itself, 
it is insufficient to make these objectives sustainable. The early economic benefits at Elandskraal 
did, however, encourage Eskom to undertake the electrification of black households after 1990 as 
will be shown in Chapter 7. 
202 The fann electrification progranune was of course an exception to this but in fairness the fact that 
this progranune was being cross-subsidised by other electricity consumers was not known to 
Eskom until the late 80's, and anyway as noted already, Eskom's minister in replying to the 
SAAU on the subject of electrification costs mentioned that the government would consider cross-
subsidising projects that were related to the security of South Africa. 
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CHAPTER 6 
ESKOM AND THE ELECTRIFICATION OF GREATER SOWETO: 
1980-1990 
1.0 INTRODUCTION 
The major black household electrification programme that took place in the decade 1980-1990 
was the electrification of Greater Soweto. The Greater Soweto Electrification Project (SEP) was a 
government initiative, Eskom was therefore not involved in the infrastructural development< ( 
connected with the SEP but was responsible for supplying nearly 90 per cent of the bulk 
electricity required by the project. From 1988 onwards Eskom did attempt to take over the 
management of Greater Soweto' s electricity supply, however. 203 The purpose of this chapter is to 
analyse this initiative. To do this certain questions present themselves, these are 1) Why did 
Eskom attempt to become involved in managing the supply of electricity to Greater Soweto? 2) 
What lessons did Eskom learn from this attempt? and 3) How could the lessons learnt help 
Eskom with their nation-wide programme to electrify black households from 1990 onwards? For 
a complete understanding of the complexities of the SEP the reason why Greater Soweto was 
electrified and the project's size and cost will also be discussed in this chapter. 
2.0 SOWETO: AN OVERVIEW 
The South Western Township, commonly known as Soweto, is located about l5kms south-west of 
Johannesburg. The township was founded in 1930 when the Johannesburg City Council (lCC) 
purchased about 1 300 hectares of land on the farm Klipspruit No 8 for housing migrant labour. 
Today Soweto covers an area of some 8 000 hectares and is made up of 29 individual townships 
in Soweto itself plus Diepmeadow (an amalgamation of the former areas of Diepkloof and 
Meadowlands) and Dobsonville, the whole forming Greater Soweto. In 1954 the JCC introduced 
the "site and service" scheme in terms of which the Council assumed responsibility for the 
203 The negotiations involved in Eskom's attempt to take over the management of Greater Soweto's 
electricity supply are for the first time made public in this chapter due to the authors access to Eskom's 
record of these negotiations and interviews with senior Eskom staff that took part in the negotiations. 
164 
provision of serviced sites for workers who were in tum expected to erect their own houses. 204 
Between 1954 and 1960 33 000 of these sites were allocated to residents by the JCC. 
During the late 1950's and early 1960's the government began to put great emphasis on the 
homeland ideology and in 1958 the government decided that no further loans would be made for 
sub-economic urban black housing in what was considered as white South Africa. In keeping 
with the policy of Grand Apartheid all blacks in so-called white urban areas were deemed to be 
sojourners. In accordance with the Housing Act, Act No 4 of 1966 Administration Boards became 
responsible for the planning of services and the development of black township land and blacks 
could not now own land or immovable property in the townships. The Administration Boards 
became therefore the de facto owner of all fixed property in black urban areas, (Bekker and 
Humphries, 1985, p.20). Through policies of curtailed development of black urban areas in South 
Africa the government hoped to create a feasible residential alternative in homelands, and 
settlement in these areas was encouraged, (Bekker and Humphries, 1985, p.73). This policy had 
serious implications for the residents of Greater Soweto since now they were unable to buy their 
own houses and the home-ownership scheme whereby about 12 000 people already held 
mortgages was cancelled. In lieu of this scheme the state introduced a monthly rental plan for 
housing in Greater Soweto. There were at this time about 50 000 houses in the township. 
Industrial and commercial premises had very restricted development, however, due to the 
extremely complicated licensing requirements for such developments which were then in force. 
The administration of Greater Soweto continued to be in the hands of the Johannesburg L.---
Municipality until 1973. After this date the West Rand Administration Board assumed control of 
the township under the Bantu Affairs Administration Act. Greater Soweto was granted full 
municipal status in accordance with the provisions of the Black Local Authorities Act of 1982 
and the first black council elections took place in 1983. Three city councils were returned to 
office, The Soweto City Council, The Diepmeadow City Council and The Dobsonville City 
Council. 
The population of Greater Soweto continued to grow from its founding in 1930 but statistics on 
the numbers of people living there were generally incomplete until the late 1980's when even 
then they varied from researcher to researcher. For example according to the South African 
Township Annual of 1988 (p.SA4) the population of Greater Soweto was close to 2 million; 
Davies & Bristow (1988, p.89) on the other hand estimated that in 1988 the population was over 
2 700 000. Mashabela (1989, p.150), however, believed that the population of Soweto itself in 
204 Serviced sites were those which were provided with water, sanitation and refuse removal and which 
were connected together by crude access roads. 
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1989 was about 1,5 million. If the populations of Diepmeadow and Dobsonville are added to that 
of Mashabela's estimate, the population of Greater Soweto was, in the late 80's, about 1,8 
million, which is close to the figure quoted in the South African Township Annual of 1988. It is 
likely then that at the end of the period covered in this chapter the population of Greater Soweto 
approached 1,8 million. 
There is also a lack of reliable information pertaining to the numbers of houses in Greater Soweto 
in the period 1980 - 1990. What is known, however, is that Greater Soweto had a critical housing 
shortage in the early 1980' s. The population density in the township at the time was estimated to 
be 100 people per hectare,205 (South African Township Annual, 1988). In 1988 there were also 8 
squatter camps in Greater Soweto and no exact estimate existed for the number of shacks in these 
camps or the number of people living in them. According to the Planact Report on the Soweto 
Rent Boycott (1989, p.33) there were 26 000 families on the waiting list for houses in Soweto 
itself at that time. 
A consolidated overview of the housing situation in Greater Soweto in 1988, excluding the 
squatter camps, is as follows: 
ITEM 
Formal Housing Units 
Occupants per Unit 
Shacks 
Occupants per Shack 
Hostels for men 
Hostels for Women 
Total No of beds in Hostels 
....... . ..... 
.................. 
NUMBER •.. 
117495 
12 
43000 
5 
8 
1 
38000 
TABLE NO 6.1 AN OVERVIEW OF THE HOUSING IN GREATER 
SOWETO: 1988 
Source: I.R. Information Services, cited in Eskom, The Soweto Report, 
(l990,p.2 ) 
The total population arising from these statistics amounts to I 662 940 which roughly agrees with 
Mashabela's estimate given above. Because of the acute housing shortage in Greater Soweto, 
however, a culture of sub-letting arose, (Mashabela, 1989, p.148). This means that if these sub 
tenants and the residents of the squatter camps are taken into account this would give rise to 
further numbers of people living in the area than are recorded in the statistics cited above. This 
would explain Brand's estimate that there was a need for a further 66 160 houses in Greater 
205 This is in contrast to a population density of about 23 people per hectare in Johannesburg. 
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Soweto in the late 80's, (Brand 1989, p.27). In addition to these confusing statistics concerning 
housing in Greater Soweto there was no reliable listing of residential names verses their 
addresses in the period 1980-1990. 
The important point of outlining the housing and population statistics of Greater Soweto is that 
the lack of reliable data made the provision and management of services, including the supply of 
electricity, to the township a very difficult task from the budgeting point of view in the 1980-1990 
decade. For example deciding on the cost of connecting individual dwellings to an electrification 
infrastructure was subject to heroic assumptions. This in tum made the management of the SEP 
difficult with respect to the collection of electricity bills and deciding on who in fact should be 
billed. It is suggested that the subsequent dissatisfaction of electricity consumers in Greater 
Soweto with the service provided was in some part related to the lack of reliable data concerning 
house ownership and the numbers of people living in the township, clearly the situation only got 
worse as the population grew in numbers. The SEP was then fraught with difficulties from its 
inception. 
3.0 THE SOWETO ELECTRIFICATION PROJECT 
Following the Cillie Report into the Soweto riots of 1976 several important development projects 
were undertaken in the black townships of South Africa, the electrification of Greater Soweto was 
one such project. 206 To set the project in motion, approval was given by the government for 
consulting engineers to commence with the planning of the SEP in June 1979. The entire project 
was planned to take 4 years to complete i.e.; until the end of 1983. 
It would be a mistake to assume, however, that the SEP was the first electricity scheme for 
Greater Soweto. Approximately 20 per cent of houses in the township had some form of electrical !, . 
power prior to the SEP. Table No 6.2 below shows the numbers of houses which were being 
supplied with electricity in Greater Soweto prior to the SEP: 
206 The fall of Rhodesia and the withdrawal of the Portuguese from Mozambique and Angola encouraged 
the black liberation movement in South Africa. Soweto students were particularly militant and rioted in 
1976. These riots were encouraged by Steve Biko's black consciousness movement and rapidly spread 
to 160 communities. Before these riots were fma11y brought under control seventeen months had 
elapsed and there were more than 700 people dead, including Biko himself; many people were 
imprisoned and many fled South Africa. 
.... ···AREA 
Soweto 
Diepmeadow 
Dobsonville 
. .................... . 
TOTAL 
167 
15 950 
1 011 
3 808 
20 769 
TABLE NO 6.2 ELECTRIFIED HOUSES IN GREATER SOWETO: 1979 
Source: LHA Report (1987, p.19) 
This total figure represented 20,6 per cent of the 101 022 houses estimated to exist in Greater 
Soweto in 1979. The bulk electricity supply to Greater Soweto for the houses in Soweto and 
I 
Diepmeadow already electrified was generated at the Orlando Power Station, which was owned I 
by the Johannesburg Municipality. Dobsonville was supplied with electricity by the Roodepoort 
Municipality. The supply of electricity for the new SEP would, however, be mainly supplied by 
Eskom. For example in July of 1986 when the SEP was completed Eskom supplied 204 MW of 
power to the project out of a total demand of 238 MW, i.e.; Eskom supplied 86 per cent of the 
electricity demanded by the project, (LHA Report, 1987, p.48).207 This demand included the 
supply of power to houses and also that required for street lighting. 
The SEP was unusual in that it had two complete sets of designs carried out for the project 
simultaneously by two different consulting engineers the Ecoplan group and the. Van..Ni~kerk 
group. The Ecoplan design was eventually preferred. Dr Piet Koornhof the Minister of Co-
operation and Development appointed the Greater Soweto Planning Council (GSPC) to supervise 
the project. The GSPC was composed of 5 members namely Mr Louise Rive (Chairman) the 
chairmen of the three Soweto councils and Mr John Knoetze the chairman of the West Rand 
Administration Board (WRAB).208 The principle contractor was the Township Electrification 
South African Consortium (TESACON) which consisted of two firms, Siemens, a German firm 
with offices in South Africa, and General Electric, an American firm also with offices in South 
Africa. This consortium was responsible for the high and low voltage reticulation system of the 
SEP. The large house wiring contract was sublet. The total number of houses in Greater Soweto 
that was included in the house wiring contract was 104000. After completion, the SEP, with the 
greater part of the electricity required being supplied by Eskom, was to be managed initially by 
the Johannesburg Municipality. 
207 This extra load on the Eskom system could easily be met due to the excess generating capacity 
available to the Corporation. 
208 The WRAB no longer exists. 
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Because 20769 houses in Greater Soweto already had an electricity supply, there was, after 1980, 
two quite separate electricity supply schemes operating in the area, namely the new SEP, which 
principally used electricity supplied in bulk by Eskom, and the older scheme, which was, as 
already noted, supplied with electricity by the Johannesburg Municipality from their Orlando 
power station. It is unclear whether any interconnection existed between the two schemes. 
Estimating the future demand for electricity in Greater Soweto was fraught with difficulties 
because the exact numbers of people to be supplied with electricity was unknown. It is not 
surprising therefore that the estimates for the demand from the SEP at its completion by both 
design consultants was wrong. The closest estimate was that by the Ecoplan group which came 
within about 20 per cent of the actual demand, (LHA Report, 1987, p.47). In determining the 
possible electricity demand from the SEP one of the design parameters over which engineers had 
limited control was the so-called After Diversity Maximum Demand (ADMD) per house. 
Generally this is specified on the level of 100 or more households, i.e.; the maximum demand 
expressed on a per-house basis experienced when 100 or more households are served. The 
ADMD depends on such parameters as income, climate and size of dwelling. 209 /' 
The total load and energy consumption estimated in the Ecoplan design was determined by 
estimating the load requirements for an average 4 roomed house. The load being demanded by 4 
lights, 4 socket outlets, 2 outdoor lights, 1 geyser and r stove,z1O An estimate was also made of 
the peak electricity demand that the SEP would be required to meet in its completed form. This 
estimate was necessary for the financial planning of income derived from and costs associated 
with the SEP, generally electricity only makes up about 20 per cent of the costs of providing 
services in black townships on average. The cost of roads is of the order of 40 per cent and the 
road layout itself materially influences the design of the township services including the supply of 
electricity, (Cameron, 1982, pp.69-74). The road layout of the different suburbs of Greater 
Soweto varied and this added a constraint on the economic (and technical) efficiency of the 
design of the SEP. 
The electrification of Greater Soweto was a major reticulation project which demanded more 
electricity than many large white municipalities. Greater Soweto was, together with the city of ->. / 
Roodepoort, the eleventh largest consumer of electricity in South Africa. In terms of peak load 
209 The need for this calculation demonstrates the difficulty engineers faced in designing the SEP because 
the essential data regarding house numbers were unavailable in Greater Soweto. The scheme was 
therefore probably overdesigned and thereby made more costly than might have been the case if 
accurate housing data had been available to the designers. 
210 These estimates took on considerable economic importance in later years since they formed the basis 
for the designs of Eskom's massive electrification programme in the 90's. 
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demand the township challenged Germiston for sixth position nation wide, (Eskom Statistical 
Yearbook, 1987). The SEP required "great technical skill and expertise to execute properly. Most 
of the technical choices made were sound and based on the realities of the situation", (LHA 
Report, 1987, p.2 Executive Summary). These realities included the economics of the SEP and 
the political climate in which it was built, conditioned, as it was, by the 1976 Soweto riots. The 
(. 
electrification of Greater Soweto was not completed within the original time frame envisaged by \ j 
the planners. It was, however, completed by 1986. Many administrative and political problems 
associated with the SEP surfaced after 1985. These will be described presently. 
4.0 THE IMPORTANCE OF SERVICES PROVISION TO 
GREATER SOWETO 
The efficient provision of services, to Greater Soweto was important because: 
,\ a) Greater Soweto was the biggest supplier of labour in the PWV area (which had a population 
in excess of 7 million people) and which produced more than 41 per cent of South Africa's 
GDP; 
b) The leadership of the most influential black political groups and trades union lived in 
Greater Soweto. This meant that the area was effectively the centre of such organisations as 
COSA TV and black political thinking in South Africa. Whatever action such people took 
regarding the acceptance or non-acceptance of essential services delivery could be expected 
to be copied in other black townships; 
c) Greater Soweto "displayed the highest level of socio-economic and political development of 
all major black urban areas of South Africa", (Brand Report, 1989, p.14). This meant that 
political unrest in this area for any reason, including poor municipal services delivery, could 
be confidently expected to be better organised than in any other black urban area of the 
Republic and would therefore be more difficult to control; and 
d) Greater Soweto was an area in which some of the most sophisticated black people in South 
Africa resided and they demanded a service comparable with that which was provided to 
their white counterparts in Johannesburg. They purchased a range of electric appliances and 
had acquired western so-called first -world tastes in this regard. In spite of the need for 
efficient services provision in Greater Soweto municipal services problems arose. 
) 
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5.0 THE DYNAMICS OF THE GREATER SOWETO MUNICIPAL 
SERVICES PROBLEM 
As already noted Greater Soweto was until 1973 controlled by the Johannesburg City Council. 
After that date control passed to the West Rand Administration Board. The forerunners of black 
local authorities, the Urban Black Councils came into effect in the late seventies and gradually 
phased out this white controlled Administration Board. Finally in 1983 Greater Soweto was 
granted full municipal status and several political, youth, community and student organisations 
became active in Soweto municipal affairs.211 
Civic bodies such as Sofasonke, Makgotla and Dikwankwetha participated in the 1983 Greater 
Soweto council elections.212 Continual bickering, however, marked the earliest initiatives 
concerning the provision of efficient municipal services including electricity supply. These 
different bodies refused to negotiate with each other on the management of services and their 
costs, (Eskom, The Soweto Report, 1990, p.9). As a consequence the quality of services provision 
in Greater Soweto deteriorated 
Following civic unrest as a consequence of deteriorating services provision in 1985 the Soweto 
Civic Association (SCA), together with several other community organisations, was banned. In 
order to continue the struggle for more efficient municipal services the SCA established a new 
organisation called the Soweto Peoples Delegation (SPD). To make it difficult for this group to be 
banned it was composed of very prominent people, these being Archbishop Desmond Tutu, Mr 
Cyril Ramaphosa, The Rev Frank Chikane, Mrs Albertina Sisulu, Sister Bernard Ncube, Mrs 
Ellen Kuwayo and the Rev Lebamang Sebidi. This group of people became one of the most 
influential groups in the negotiations for better municipal services delivery to Greater Soweto 
between 1985 and 1989. 
So far as electricity supply was concerned, in comparison with other black townships in South 
Africa, Greater Soweto was particularly well served. From about 1986 onwards over 95 per cent 
of formal dwellings in the township had an electricity supply. As a result of mismanagement, 
maladministration, poor maintenance and the lack of development capital the electricity 
2ll These were the Soweto Civic Association (SCA) the Congress of South African Student's (COSAS) the 
Soweto Student's Congress, the Soweto Youth Congress, the Azanian Student's Movement (AZASM) 
and the Azanian People's Organisation (AZAPO). These groups campaigned against the creation of 
black local authorities before and after the 1983 elections to choose black councillors, (Mashabela, 
1989, p.142) 
212 The Sofasonke party was a Zulu based political party which controlled Diepkloof. They were between '~/ 
1983 and 1995 opposed to Eskom taking over the management of electricity supply to Greater Soweto, 
Interview with Mr Paul Mare, 19th March 1998. 
171 
reticulation system was, however, from late 1987 on the brink of collapse and residents began to .. ' ii, _ 
withhold the payments of municipal rates and taxes, the Soweto Rent Boycott had begun. With 
respect to the condition of the electrification infrastructure in 1988 the accrued damage to 
substations and the electrical network was estimated to be R30 million, (Die Afrikaner 3 Sept 
1988). The lack of revenue from the non-payment of services and general vandalism further 
exacerbated this critical situation, (PLANACT Report, 1990, p.53). In addition to the problem of 
non-payment for electricity many electricity consumers in Greater Soweto were illegally 
connected, (Business Day 29th February 1988). The situation with regard to electricity supply 
management had by 1988 deteriorated to such an extent that the authorities no longer sent out 
electricity accounts and meters were never read. Furthermore, payment records were in disarray 
and haphazard, (Eskom, The Soweto Report, 1990, p.5). 
6.0 THE SOWETO RENT BOYCOTT AND ESKOM 
6.1 The Causes of the Rent Boycott 
The so-called Soweto Rent Boycott, which occurred during the period 1985 tol9.89, was in effect/( ,~ 
a misnomer for a much more complicated boycott which embraced the non-payment of house 
rents, municipal rates and taxes and all municipal service charges, amongst which were the 
charges for electricity. 
The causes and implications of the Soweto Rent Boycott were as follows: 
a) People had been paying rent for homes for up to 55 years without acquiring the ownership of 
their homes; 
b) The quality of municipal services was generally very bad; 
c) Municipal services cost more on all counts than the much better services afforded to white 
rate-payers in Johannesburg; and 
d) Residents could generally not afford the municipal charges being levied nor could they in 
many cases even understand them. 
Residents of Greater Soweto complained to the authorities about these issues and were ignored. 
As a consequence they started to default on their payments for municipal services. The authorities 
responded by evicting large numbers of residents and prosecuting others. The net result of these 
actions was increased community resistance and the continuation of the services payment boycott. 
A vicious circle of cause and effect was therefore brought into play and this grew in magnitude. 
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Finally in mid 1986 community solidarity resulted in what was to become known as the Soweto 
Rent Boycott. By this time the Greater Soweto city councils were only collecting about 20 per 
cent of the revenue they needed to run the public services. This situation prevailed into the early 
90' s. Many attempts were made to resolve the boycott. All these attempts failed, however, and the 
Greater Soweto City Councillors persistently failed to heed the complaints of the township's 
residents, (Eskom, The Soweto Report, 1990, p.6).213 
6.2 Electricity's Role in the Rent Boycott 
There is some confusion as to whether the Soweto Rent Boycott emanated from increases in 
municipal service charges or the rents for the houses214• What is certain is that the "electricity 
master plan levy" of Rl2 per month was an important item in the general discontent consumers 
showed to municipal services provision215. Electricity charges were by far the largest of the 
services charges in Greater Soweto and amounted to between 60-70 per cent of the total services 
bill for each resident. These charges were then a central issue in the Soweto Rent Boycott. 
Because of this Eskom's Chief Executive Officer Dr I.C. McRae was convinced that to 
"normalise" the situation in Greater Soweto it was essential for Eskom to address the problems 
connected with the management of the electricity supply to the area. The strategic importance of 
this move so far as McRae was concerned, was because: 
213 Also interviews with Dr I.C. McRae 4th September 1996, Mr I. Van Gass, 16th January 1997 and Mr. 
V.C. Mi1ne, 27th November 1998, 
A survey containing the views of Greater Soweto residents concerning the supply of services is 
presented in a March 1989 report entitled "The Soweto Rent Boycott". This study was commissioned 
by The Soweto Delegation and undertaken by the consulting fInn PLANACT in conjunction with 
research staff from the Centre for Policy Studies in the University of the Witwatersrand, The most 
important views cited in this report are as follows: 
a) Most of the residents of Greater Soweto could not afford the current service charges (pp.5 & 66). 
PLANACT concluded that raising service charges to recover a combined debt ofR701 million for 
unpaid services etc., would be a "recipe for political instability", Subsidisation should therefore 
be sought and an affordable service charge introduced. It is suggested that the introduction of an 
affordable tariff for services would, however, not necessarily have solved the problem of non-
payment since Sowetans in general questioned the legitimacy of the Greater Soweto City 
Councils, which fact is acknowledged on pp.23 and 74 of the PLANACT Report; 
b) The billing system for services was too complicated and very confusing for consumers (p.63); 
c) There was poor communication between the Soweto Councils and consumers; and 
d) Sowetans perceived the cost of services to be very expensive (p.24). 
214 This confusion was exacerbated by the Greater Soweto Municipalities' accounting system, which 
combined all costs into one account, which was not understood by consumers. The account was also 
complicated by the addition of a number of levies including the "Electricity Masterplan Levy", 
(Eskom, The Soweto Report, 1990, p.7). 
215 The "Electricity Masterplan Levy" was seen as a "fonn of racial taxation", (Van Gass, 1989, p.25). 
(, ' 
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a) Eskom could gain experience by becoming involved in the management of electricity supply 
in Greater Soweto and this experience could be applied to other black townships in South 
Africa, see also Botha, (1989, p.16); 
b) Failure to find a solution to Greater Soweto's electricity problems would damage Eskom's 
credibility and impair the Corporation's efforts to manage the electricity supply to other 
black townships, which may be electrified in future; 
c) The solving of electricity supply problems in Greater Soweto would also involve for the first 
time a parastatal negotiating with black extra parliamentary groups. Such negotiations would 
give Eskom national and international exposure and credibility. Eskom's international 
credibility would become important at the end of the 80's when joint ventures between 
foreign countries offering aid for social upliftment in South Africa, and Eskom, would be 
attempted; and216 
d) Furthermore, if electricity supply could not be managed well in an almost completely 
electrified area like Greater Soweto, how could it work in lesser developed black areas. 
6.3 Attempts to end the Rent Boycott 
From 1987 onwards organisations such as the SPD and the Soweto Electricity Advice Centre 
(SEAC) attempted to bring the Soweto Rent Boycott to an end by negotiations with the Soweto 
City Council,217 (Mashabela, 1989, p.145). These attempts invariably failed. 218 As a consequence 
of the objections raised to the service charges being levied in Greater Soweto and the continuation 
of the Rent Boycott, in May 1987, the Soweto City Council served eviction notices on prominent ./ 
political leaders who were taking part in the boycott. These leaders were Dr Nathan Motlana, 
who was at the time the Chairman of the Soweto Civic Association, Mrs Albertina Sisulu, the 
then co-president of the UDF and Mrs Winnie Mandela. The council failed, however, to take 
legal action against these three. In addition the council terminated the electricity supply to 
residents who had not paid their services bill. In the event the electricity was immediately 
reconnected illegally by members oflocal youth groups, (Mashabela, 1989, p.219). 
In June 1987 the President of the Sofasonke Party, Mr Ephraim Tshabdala urged residents to pay 
municipal services charges to his party for deposit with the Soweto City Council. The previous 
Greater Soweto town clerk (Mr Nico Malan) warned residents that such payment would not 
216 One such Joint Venture did of COlITse come about in the late 80's as described in the previous chapter. 
217 The Soweto City Council was the most powerful of the three councils and it was this council that 
bought electricity in bulk from Eskom and resold it to the Diepmeadow and Dobsonville City Councils. 
218 In this regard Mr Barnard Moleke the SEAC's ombudsman declared that the city councillors were not 
prepared to debate the matter and thought that there was nothing wrong with the high service charges 
in Greater Soweto, (Mashabela, 1989, p.145) 
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prevent them being evicted for non-payment, (Mashabela, 1989, p.219). Following this, in July 
1987 Mr Steve Kgame the President of the Urban Councils Association of South Africa called for 
the eviction of all rent boycotters. In a reply to this Mr Tom Boya the President of the United 
Municipalities of South Africa, and a rival organisation to the Urban Councils Association of 
South Africa, came out against the evictions of rent boycotters and suggested that Soweto City 
Councillors should meet members of the community to discuss grievances and that tenants should 
be required to only pay service charges until such grievances had been resolved. 
The second municipal elections in Greater Soweto under the Black Local Authorities Act took 
place in October 1988. At these elections the Sofasonke Party won control of the Soweto City 
Council. It's platform was based on the non-eviction of rent boycotters and that no charges for 
services would be required until the services had been improved. This put Eskom in an invidious 
position vis-a-vis payment for the bulk electricity supplied to Greater Soweto since it appeared 
that the new city councillors were not supporting the government's requirement that services be 
paid for and this could perhaps cause the TP A to discontinue payment to Eskom for bulk 
electricity supply to the township.219 
Shortly after the inauguration of the Sofasonke Party as the newly elected Soweto City Council 
(SCC) in 1988 the mayor, Mr Sam Mkwanazi, and the Chairman of the Executive Committee, 
Mr Payne Tshabalala suggested to the TP A that a conference should be arranged with all parties 
who had a vested interest in the Soweto Rent Boycott. The purpose of the conference was to 
attempt to find a solution to the problems of non-payment for municipal services which faced the 
new council. The conference became known as the "D'Nyala Beraad". Because of Eskom's Chief 
Executive Officer Dr I. C. McRae's standing with local politicians in Soweto as a result of 
meetings he had had with them he was invited to the conference. 220 
219 The TPA had since the start of the rent boycott, been ensuring that Eskom was paid for the bulk \/ 
electricity supplied to Greater Soweto, Interview with Mr. V.C. Milne, 27th November 1998. 
220 These meetings had been undertaken in a clandestine fashion. Eskom's Chairman Dr John Maree was 
quite unaware of them. They had taken place in Soweto between McRae and community leaders. 
McRae took considerable risks in going into the township at this time and on several occasions he was 
secreted away by the community leaders during police raids on the township. McRae's purpose in 
undertaking these meetings was connected with his belief that electricity was a catalyst for social 
reform. He believed that it was imperative to understand the problems associated with electricity 
supply to Greater Soweto ifhis vision of supplying electricity for social upliftment was to succeed. The 
meetings had been arranged for Dr McRae by the Rev Frank Chikane and the Rev (now Bishop) Peter 
Storey, lnterview with Dr McRae, 29th August 1996. 
175 
The "D'Nyala Beraad" was held between the 25th and 27th November 1988. This was one month 
after the municipal elections which had brought the Sofasonke Party to power.221 Members of the 
Beraad were drawn from the TP A, the Johannesburg City Council, the Central Witwatersrand 
Regional Services Council, the DB SA, the Department of Finance, the Rand Water Board, the 
Witwatersrand Metropolitan Chamber plus the S.A. police and Eskom. The purpose of the 
Beraad was to formulate a strategy to "normalise" municipal services and in particular the 
electricity supply to Greater Soweto. The recommendations arising from the Beraad were as 
follows: 
a) The SCC and the residents of Greater Soweto would be consulted and invited to become 
actively involved in municipal services projects to improve the quality of life in Greater 
Soweto; 
b) Some of the municipal services should be privati sed and that agents be appointed to manage 
the provision of such services; 
c) Consideration would be given for the introduction of a R50 per month flat rate for municipal 
services in Greater Soweto. This was to be an interim measure to raise more revenue for 
such services until their provision could be normalised; 222 
d) Electricity should be cut off in the event of non-payment; 
e) That arrear debt be frozen;223 
f) That an in-depth study into the privatisation and management of local authorities be 
undertaken; and 
g) That measures be undertaken to improve the image and legitimacy of the black local 
authority system in South Africa, (Eskom, The Soweto Report, 1990, pp.71-73). ./ 
6.4 The Soweto Steering Committee 
McRae took advantage of the conference to lead Escom into direct participation in proposals for 
solutions to Greater Soweto's electricity supply problems when he was asked to form a steering 
committee to study certain aspects of services provision, in particular the supply of electricity to 
Greater Soweto. To this end McRae approached a number of individuals and organisations 
inviting them to serve on the steering committee . .fhere were 43 people eventually on the 
221 Mr Tshabalala and Mr Mkwanazi approached the TPA concerning arranging the D'Nyala Beraad. No 
official notes on the approach could be found, but this fact was mentioned to the author by Dr McRae, 
Interview 4th Septemberl996. 
222 This recommendation was, within days, rejected by the SPD. The rejection was based on the premise 
that small electricity users would in effect be subsidising larger users. 
223 For the period 1985 to 1990 the debt for electricity alone amounted to about R 300 million, (Eskom, 
The Soweto Report, 1990, p.lO) 
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committee representing the following organisations; Eskom, the TP A, the Central Witwatersrand 
Regional Services Council, the Johannesburg City Council, the Soweto, Dobsonville and 
Diepmeadow City Councils, the Rand Water Board, Standard Merchant Bank, Anglo American 
Corporation, Liberty Life, The Urban Foundation, Organised Business in Greater Soweto, and 
finally members of the legal profession.-2~4 The steering committee had only a nominal black 
presence these being from the business community and not from the political centre. 225 
The constitution of the so-called Soweto Steering Committee was important, and it was necessary 
to identify the most prominent and influential interest groups in Greater Soweto and the leaders 
who represented them. It was, however, early days for Eskom to attempt to do this and it 
transpired that some parties that should have been on the committee were not invited, whilst 
others, that had been invited to participate should not really have been involved. 226 
6 . 5 Fin din g S 0 f The S tee riD g Com mitt e e 227 
The Steering Committee identified the following issues as being the most important for solving 
the electricity supply problems in Greater Soweto: 
a) Identifying the weakness of the present services provision management; 
b) Determining the reasons for the non-payment of services; 
c) Identifying possible investors who would provide capital for purposes of forming an 
electricity supply management company; 
d) Deciding on the nature of a legal entity to be established to manage electricity supply; 
e) Identifying the financial risks associated with such an electricity supply company; and 
1) Determining the staffing requirements of such a supply company and the training required to 
ensure it worked efficiently. 
Six sub-committees, answerable to the Soweto Steering Committee, were formed to investigate 
each of these issues. Each sub-committee was chaired by a member of Eskom's Management 
224 It is important to mention that the Black City Councils were represented by white officials in every 
case. 
225 McRae's involvement could not of course be kept from Maree. Maree reacted by reminding McRae 
that he should concentrate on the technical and administration aspects ofEskom leaving the political 
side of the business to himself. McRae seems to have ignored this warning and became increasingly 
active in the Soweto negotiations, interview with Dr I.C. McRae, 4th September1996. 
226 Interview with Mr I.G. Van Gass, 16th January 1997. 
227 This section is condensed from "the Interim Report on the Findings and Proposals of the Soweto 
Steering Committee" (1988). 
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Board. In the interim report prepared by the Steering Committee based upon the findings of 
these sub-committees, the following general information was presented concerning electricity 
supply in Greater Soweto at the end of 1988. 
soWEtO· ··fiiEPMEAJ)OW .. OOBSONVILLE 
Approximate number of consumers 90000 30000 5300 
Average monthly consumption per consumer 
(kWh including 25% loss factor) 228 600 500 500 
Average tariff structure: 
Charge per kWh lO,5c 9c 6,6c 
Average cost of bulk electricity to City 
Councils (per kWh) 8,5c 8,5c 8,5c 
Avera2e level of non-payment 80% 77% 49% 
TABLE NO 6.3 STATUS OF ELECTRICITY SUPPLY IN GREATER 
SOWETO: 1988. 
Source: Interim Report on the Findings and Proposals of the Soweto 
Steering Committee, December 1988. 
In addition to this information, the following items of importance were addressed with regard to 
electricity supply: 
6 . 5 . 1 Pro b Ie m s wit h non - pay men t 229 
a) 7 500 electricity meters were broken, 5 000 in Soweto and 2 500 in Diepmeadow and 
Dobsonville. These figures represented about 6 per cent of the total number of meters 
installed in Greater Soweto; 
228 During the year ending 31 December 1988 Eskom had supplied the City Council of Soweto with 
electricity in the sum ofR70,3 million. Of this the Soweto City Council had resold electricity in the 
amount ofR18,3 million to the Diepmeadow City Council and R3, 1 million to the Dobsonville City 
Council. In addition the Johannesburg Municipality also supplied electricity to the Soweto City 
Council. The ratio of energy supplied between the two suppliers was about 86 per cent from Eskom, 
and 14 per cent from Johannesburg, (LHA Report, 1987, p.48). Hence the total cost of supply 
amounted to some R80 million. The 25 per cent loss factor mentioned in Table No 6.3 above included 
both technical and non-technical losses. The non-technical losses involved illegal connections, 
interview with Mr P. Mare, 6th February 1998. 
229 The Interim Report expressed the following concerns with respect to the non-payment issue: 
"In view of the high level of non-payment by consumers to the various Councils and the relatively low 
tariffs, the Councils fmd it difficult to pay for the bulk supply of electricity they receive. This means 
that Eskom is at risk since the Transvaal Provincial Administration is under no legal obligation tu 
make good the debts of the Soweto City Council, as it has in the past". 
This observation had a prophetic ring about it, because when the Metropolitan Council took over the 
Administration of Greater Soweto' s affairs from the TP A in 1990 Eskom was not paid for the bulk 
electricity they continued to supply to Greater Soweto. 
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b) Many of the meters still in working order had not been read since 1985; 
c) Many meters had been by-passed illegally; 
d) Records did not reflect who the electricity consumers were nor whether electricity bills had 
been paid or not. Furthermore, the processing of accounts was almost non-existent;230 
e) The quality of electricity supply was very poor with frequent interruptions; and 
f) It was found that many council members had no idea of how electricity was supplied, 
distributed or paid for.231 
6.5.2 Financial issues 
a) Existing electricity tariffs, as well as being unequal between the Dobsonville, Diepmeadow 
and Soweto Councils, were set at levels which were too low to cover the total costs of 
electricity supply (which would include maintenance and administration charges etc.). If the 
tariffs were standardised, however, Dobsonville residents would be faced with increases 
since their tariff was below those of Soweto and Diepkloof (see Table No 6.3 above). 
'Increases in the tariffs would probably increase the level of non-payment for services in 
; Greater Soweto as a consequence; and 
b) A considerable amount of capital would be required to upgrade the existing electricity 
distribution network to acceptable levels. 
6.5.3 The legal position 
Electricity was supplied to Greater Soweto under the Electricity Act of 1922 as amended. This act 
provided for the supply and sale of electricity within the area of jurisdiction of the local authority, 
to be under the control of that authority, except where some other body had lawfully acquired the 
rights of supply in that area by agreement with the local authority. Because of the Soweto City 
Council's poor management of the electricity supply infrastructure and the administration of 
electricity accounts, it was recommended that in future an alternative organisation be established V 
which would legally acquire the right to manage Greater Soweto's electricity supply. The 
following structures were investigated in that regard: 
230 This meant that consumers had no faith in the accuracy of electricity accounts. In addition accounts 
usually reflected amounts for total services, i.e., rent, levies etc., as well as for electricity. 
231 In the Interim Report there is a clear indication that the report compiler(s) found proof of electricity 
being managed in an inefficient manner and that there was concern in the minds of Soweto residents 
that the City Council was an illegitimate body. 
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a) Co-operatives; 
b) Trusts; 
c) A Partnership; 
d) A specially constructed statutory body; 
e) A private entity; and 
f) A section 21 company233~ 
6.6 Proposed Interim Solution 
The Steering Committee recognised the urgency of the problem concerning electricity supply in 
Greater Soweto. It resolved therefore to try and implement an interim solution to the problem in 
the short-term whilst contriving to grapple with the problem in the long- term. As mentioned 
above the Steering Committee was of the opinion that in the long-term an alternative 
organisation to the Soweto City Council should take over the management of electricity supply in 
Greater Soweto. First, however, the situation had to be "nonnalised" to make it attractive enough 
for such an organisation's interest to be aroused. This meant that the non-payment problem had 
to be solved first. Any solution to this problem, it was realised, would involve upgrading the 
standard of services to the township. The Committee proposed the following interim solution to 
the electricity supply problems in Greater Soweto: 
a) A separate entity be established to take over the management of electricity supply in Greater 
Soweto which would be composed of a partnership between Eskom and other interested 
parties and would have separate legal status and operate independently of Eskom itself, the 
Soweto City Council and the stakeholders; and 
b) Once the entity had been established it would enter into negotiations with the TP A and the 
Soweto, Dobsonville and Diepmeadow City Councils to obtain the right to supply electricity 
to Greater Soweto in the short term utilising the existing distribution networks belonging to 
the three city councils. 
The modus operandi for the proposed take-over would be as follows: 
a) An educational and communication programme aimed at infonning residents, consumers 
and other interested parties on the efficient use of electricity would be put into practice; daily 
press, radio and television programmes would be organised and brochures and newsletters 
would be used as well; 
232 A section 21 company is a non-profit company. 
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b) The Greater Soweto electricity distribution system, including the metering system and 
maintenance depots, would be upgraded technically in order to ensure a reliable supply of 
power; and 
c) The payments of accounts would be facilitated by the provision of an adequate number of 
payment offices, the efficient handling of complaints and by responding to service calls. 
A very important decision was that the failure to pay for electricity would result in the supply 
being cut off. To put these ideas into practice it was suggested that, in addition to skilled 
personnel drawn from Eskom, the independent electricity management entity would, as far as 
possible, include the existing staff members from the electricity departments in the three city 
councils of Greater Soweto. Bridging finance to set up the entity and to run it until it was 
financially independent would be sought from the TP A. 
7.0 ESKOM'S NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE TPA 
For Eskom and its future partners to take over the management of Greater Soweto's electricity 
supply system it was first necessary for representatives of the Corporation to negotiate with the 
TPA. These negotiations took place over seven months from the 22nd May 1989 to the 15th 
December 1989. There were eleven meetings, nine with three Chief Directors of the TPA namely, 
Messrs Van der Walt, Opperman and Milne and two with the Administrator of the Transvaal 
himself; thus demonstrating the importance of the supply of electricity to the township, (Eskom, 
The Soweto Report, 1990, p.40). 
At the end of the discussions Eskom's representatives concluded that the TPA were at pains to 
confirm the autonomy and legitimacy of the Soweto City Council and that the TP A appeared 
reluctant to accept that the Steering Committee's proposals were indeed fair to the council. 
Eskom's representatives further considered that throughout the negotiations the TP A were keen 
to persuade Eskom to act as agents for the Soweto City Council. Eskom made it clear, however, 
that this was totally unacceptable. (Eskom, The Soweto Report, 1990, p.40).233 
233 The TPA's role in Eskom's electrification programme was always problematic. Even when Eskom 
began their concentrated effort to electrifY black households in South Africa from 1990 onwards there 
appeared to be reluctance on the IPA's part to accept Eskom's role in the process (see chapter 8). The 
TPA also voiced its concern about Eskom having talks with the SPD and other parties (see next 
section). At the meeting between the TPA and Eskom of the 15th June 1989 Eskom explained that such 
discussions were important since the SPD was a powerful force in the rent boycott. The TP A's concern 
rested on the fact that such talks would undermine the legitimacy of the Soweto City Council, V :' 
interview with Dr LC. McRae, 4th September 1996. ,- ..... 
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In spite of the difficulties in the negotiations between Eskom and the TP A certain agreements 
were, nevertheless, reached, these were as follows: 
a) The electricity tariff to be charged in Greater Soweto would be no higher than that charged 
by the Johannesburg City Council; 
b) The proposed entity to take over the supply of electricity to Greater Soweto would not be 
burdened with the accumulated debt or arrear payments for electricity owing to or by the 
Greater Soweto City Councils; 
c) Eskom' s participation in the management of electricity supply to Greater Soweto would be 
conditional on sufficient funding being made available for the proposed entity to be able to 
meet it's obligations. It was agreed that the TP A would be responsible for arranging such 
funding; 234 
d) The proposed entity would be autonomous, i.e., it would be politically and commercially 
independent from the Soweto City Council; and 
e) The proposed entity would negotiate with the Soweto City Council prior to announcing the 
electricity tariff for the township. If agreement on this matter could not be reached then 
arbitration would be sought, (Eskom, The Soweto Report, 1990, p.41). 
Following these agreements a meeting was arranged between Eskom, the TPA and the Central 
Witwatersrand RSC. The object of the meeting was to try and persuade the RSC to fund the 
proposed entity. Unfortunately the meeting was marred by the Chairman of the RSC attacking 
Eskom for negotiating with the SPD. Both the RSC and the TP A again made it clear that RSC 
funding would only be made available if Eskom acted as the Soweto City Council's agents. 
Eskom opposed this. There followed three months of silence between the parties. Eskom then 
tried to make contact with the TPA by mail. On the 22nd November 1989 a meeting between 
Eskom, the TP A and the RSC took place. The question of funding was not discussed at this 
meeting, (Eskom, The Soweto Report, 1990, p.41). 
On the 28th November 1989 a letter was sent by Eskom to the Director of the TP A requesting a 
meeting to discuss the financial arrangements for setting up the proposed entity to manage 
Greater Soweto's electricity supply. This resulted in a further meeting between Eskom and the 
TPA on the 15th December 1989. At this meeting it was agreed that, in view of the difficulties 
thus far encountered with regard to funding the proposed entity the DBSA would be approached 
for funding. 
234 Ibis condition was necessary as a consequence of the de Villiers Conunission requirements regarding 
the fmancial viability of any electrification project that Eskom became associated with. 
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It was McRae's impression that during the eight months Eskom was involved in negotiating with 
the TP A that organisation was strongly opposed to Eskom becoming involved with Greater 
Soweto's electricity supply problems. Further, in view of the lack of support given to Eskom by 
the TP A in their negotiations with the SCC, McRae believed that they would have progressed 
further without the TPA's involvement.235 
8.0 ESKOM'S NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE SPD 
In attempting to "normalise" the supply of electricity to Greater Soweto McRae was prepared to 
have discussions with all bona fide community leaders, which included the Soweto People's 
Delegation (SPD). Talks with the SPD commenced on the 2nd August 1989. After this meeting 
the SPD released a press statement confirming that a meeting had taken place; (Business Day 3rd 
August 1989).236 The SPD's proposals for any alternative to the existing electricity supply 
arrangements to succeed depended on the following conditions. ~ 
a) Non-racialism in electricity supply planning, i.e., separate policies and supply methods of 
electricity for Greater Soweto and Johannesburg were unacceptable; 
b) The SCC was to be excluded in the planning of the new electric entity to serve Greater 
Soweto; 
c) Electricity should be efficiently supplied to Greater Soweto; 
d) Community participation would be necessary in establishing the new entity to serve Greater 
Soweto; 
e) The entity was to operate on a non-profit basis; 
f) Grant finance was to be made available for upgrading services in Greater Soweto; 
g) Non-payment arrears should be written off; and 
h) A new electricity tariff for Greater Soweto should be structured. 
In addition to these eight fundamental principles the following requirements were to be included 
in the electricity supply planning process: 
a) A Central Electricity Fund should be established from any profits made from the sale of 
electricity to Greater Soweto; 
235 Author's interviews with Dr I.C. McRae, 4th September 1996 and Mr I Van Gass, 16th January 1996. 
236 In addition a facsimile was received by Eskom from the Reverend Frank Chikane dated 8th August 
1989, detailing the SPD's proposals for the new entity to manage the electricity supply to Soweto, 
(Eskom, The Soweto Report 1990). 
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b) Residents would elect representative committees on a block basis to deal with issues relating 
to electricity supply including problems of affordability and payment exemptions and 
problems with meter reading; and 
c) Electricity Advice Centres with full-time staffwere to be established. 
Eskom responded to the SPD proposals as follows: 
a) The proposed entity237 (Econolec) would be non-racial and also be non-political; 
b) Econolec would operate independently and not countenance any political representation in 
the company structure; 
c) Econolec would be committed to supplying electricity efficiently and adequately. However, 
the electricity tariff would dictate how efficient this supply would be; 
d) Profit was subject to negotiation; 
e) Grant finance would only be supplied to the extent that it was available; 
f) Because neither Econolec nor Eskom itself would be playing a role in the formulation of state 
policy the writing off of non-payment arrears should not be treated as a pre-condition for the 
establishment of Econolec; and 
g) Econolec would introduce electricity tariffs in Greater Soweto which would be no higher 
than those paid by consumers in Johannesburg. Cross-subsidisation was a possible means of 
making the provision of electricity more affordable to the poor, providing the more affiuent 
consumers in Greater Soweto were prepared to pay relatively more for their electricity, 
(Eskom, The Soweto Report, 1990,pp.47-48).238 
Eskom and the SPD had in all, starting with the meeting of the 2nd August 1989, ten meetings in 
which Eskom imparted to the SPD "all the facts, information, knowledge, viewpoints and 
background relevant to the proposed take-over of electricity supply to Greater Soweto"; at a final 
meeting on the 30th November 1989 it was re-confirmed that both parties were committed to 
finding a mutually acceptable solution to Greater Soweto' s electricity supply problems, (Eskom, 
The Soweto Report, 1990, p.49). No such solution was found, however, and there was no further 
contact between the parties. The principle reason for this was that with the release of ANC 
237 By this time the proposed independent electricity supply entity had been given a name, Econolec. 
Econolec was represented solely by Eskom staff. 
238 The cross-subsidisation here would meet the requirements of the de Villiers Commission 
recommendations since the tariff for the poor would be built up from mean pooled costs amongst 
electricity consumers in Greater Soweto. An interesting parallel exists here between the tariff 
structures for white commercial farmers in the early eighties when they were pooled as a group to 
make the electrification of white-owned commercial farms an easier proposition. 
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prisoners in late 1989 and the political events of February 1990 (see Chapter 7) the SPD 
leadership fell away in disarray. 239 
9.0 ESKOM'S MEETINGS WITH OTHER INTEREST GROUPS 
AND COMMUNITY LEADERS IN GREATER SOWETO 
To ensure that the community would be infonned ofit's proposals regarding the management of 
electricity supply in Greater Soweto, Eskom, represented by Econolec, approached various 
interest groups and community leaders for discussions on the subject. These discussions again 
centred around the eight fundamental issues raised by the SPD. The interest groups included the 
Urban Foundation, the South Mrican Institute of Race Relations, prominent Soweto women 
representing a broad spectrum of sectors and interest groups, and Bernard Moleke of the Soweto 
Electricity Advice Centre. 240 A meeting with prominent black business leaders also took place at 
the Carlton Centre in Johannesburg on the 9th November 1989. A meeting also took place with 
AZAPO on the 19th October 1989 again at the Carlton Centre. Finally meetings were held 
between Econolec and Eskom employees living in Greater Soweto. 
10.0 ASPECTS OF ESKOM'S NEGOTIATION APPROACH 241 
In their negotiations with the three key interest groups concerned with electricity supply in 
Greater Soweto, i.e., the TPA, the SCC and the SPD, Eskom was unable to use the round table, 
multi-party conference approach, instead shuttle diplomacy had to be used. This approach was 
time consuming and meant that each set of agreements arrived at with one party had to be agreed 
again with the other influenced parties. The underlying reason for the shuttle-diplomatic 
approach was because: 
a) The TPA refused to have discussions with the SPD indicating at all times that the SCC was 
the legitimate representatives of the people of Soweto; 
239 For example Archbishop Tutu and the Rev Frank Chikane withdrew from township debates, Cyril 
Ramaphosa became prominent in the ANC's political structure, Albertina Sisulu rejoined her husband 
Walter and became, once more, active in the UDF. 
240 The Soweto Ladies Group was vociferous in their condemnation of the SCC and praised Econolec and 
Eskom on their preparedness to talk with the SPD. Interview with Dr I.C. McRae, 4th September 1996. 
241 The information in this section is derived from an interview with Mr I Van Gass, 16th January 1997. 
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b) The SPD on the other hand indicated that they could not be publicly associated with the SCC 
who were considered to be an illegal, undemocratic and incompetent entity which did not 
represent the people of Soweto; 
c) The SCC in response to the SPD' s criticism of them were not willing to have discussions 
with the SPD; and 
d) In addition the Johannesburg City Council also refused to have talks with the SPD. 
The shuttle-diplomatic approach had several weaknesses, these were: 
a) In order to save time there was the temptation to make changes to Econolec's proposals 
without involving all the other parties; 
b) An attitude of distrust arose because each party did not know what Econolec was saying to 
the other parties, e.g., the SCC accused Econolec of colluding with the SPD to undermine the 
SCC's image in the community; and 
c) There was a high degree of political fragmentation in the negotiations, which slowed down 
the process and made consensus impossible. 
It was Econolec's contention that the solution to the problems of non-payment for services, could 
only be found if all the major parties concerned were prepared to look beyond their political 
agendas and self-interests. This situation was not forthcoming up to the end of 1989 and 
Econolec's attempt to take over the management of Greater Soweto' s electricity supply by the end 
of the 1980' s failed as a consequence of this. 
11.0 THE FINANCIAL IMPACT OF THE SEP 
With respect to the capital costs of service provision in black townships in South Africa the 
breakdown of costs has been estimated to be as shown in Table No 6.4 below. 
•• ··>·· •••.•••••••• ITEM 
Roads 
Storm Water Drainage 
Electricity Supply 
Water Supply 
Sewera2e Senices 
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40 
20 
20 
10 
10 
TABLE NO 6.4 BREAKDOWN OF THE COSTS OF SERVICES TO 
VARIOUS BLACK TOWNSHIPS 
Source: Cameron, (1982, pp.69-74). 
According to Cameron (1982) the road layout of townships materially influences the costs of 
services and because different townships have different road layouts it is difficult to generalise 
about the costs of service provision. The cost of providing an electrification infrastructure was 
estimated to be 20 per cent of the total capital costs of services provision, see Table No 6.4 
above .. 
As already noted the planning of the SEP took place in 1979 and the project was initially 
expected to be complete by December 1983. The estimated costs of the project in 1979 are shown 
in Table No 6.5 and Table No 6.6 below. 
E H V SYSTEM242 
11 KV & LV RETICULATION SYSTEM 
LIGHTING 
METERING 
BUILDINGS, COMPUTERS & VEIDCLES 
MISCELLANEOUS ITEMS 
SUBTOTAL 
PROFESSIONAL FEES INCLUDING SITE 
INSPECTIONS 
GRAND TOTAL 
Sowdil&. 
m!!~QWot .. .l>t)JJSi)m-me 
19,920 1,012 
57,900 2,340 
6,490 0,650 
7,570 0,355 
2,482 0,118 
0,156 0,007 
94,518 4,482 
7,638 0,362 
102,156 4,844 
20,932 
60,240 
7,140 
7,925 
2,600 
0,163 
99,000 
8,000 
107,000 
TABLE NO 6.5 CAPITAL COSTS FOR GREATER SOWETO'S 
ELECTRICITY DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM (1979 Rand) 
Source: Condensed from the Ecoplan estimate May 1979. 
242 Cost of substations, supply lines and feeder cables. 
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...$#W~t9... .Ili~~~ .D6b~'f(j'fJ\.J., ... . 
••• (RMOlli)llS) ·(RMiIIfuIiS) .....(1:t~) ··(RMllltOtts) ... . 
WIRING UPGRADED HOUSES 
WIRING NEW HOUSES 
SUBTOTAL 
PROFESSIONAL FEES 
INSPECTIONS 
CONTINGENCY SUM 
GRAND TOTAL 
3,734 
12,430 
16,164 
0,101 0,724 
6,467 0,041 
6,568 0,765 
TABLE NO 6.6 COSTS FOR HOUSE WIRING: NEW AND UPGRADED 
HOUSES GREATER SOWETO (1979 Rand) 
Source: Ecoplan Estimate May 1979. 
4,559 
18,938 
23,497 
1,200 
1,400 
0,104 
26,201 
The numbers of new and upgraded houses that were estimated to be connected to the SEP are 
given in Table No 6.7 below. 
::: .... - ::: .. ::::::::::::::::::::::::::::_-. . - - .::. 
TYPE OFH()II~~ .............. ·Sowetcf .•••••• j)iePtn.:adow J)ob!l()IlVille. • Total 
NEW HOUSES 
UPGRADED HOUSES 
TOTAL 
49324 
21966 
71290 
................... 
25663 
1011 
26674 
162 
3808 
3970 
75149 
26785 
101934 
TABLE NO 6.7 NUMBER OF HOUSES TO BE CONNECTED TO THE SEP 
Source: Ecoplan Estimate May 1979. 
Known financing for the SEP in 1979, composed of government backed loans, is shown in Table 
No 6.8 below. 
••••••••• 
.......... ::.. 
1 
2 
3 
4 
... .... . .. 
·.FUNIUNG 
................ _- - ...... . 
. ·.AGENCY 
Bank Barclays 
Volkskas 
Merchant Bank 
UAL & Standard 
Merchant Bank 
(Public Issue) 
S A Post Office 
As per loan No 1 
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. - -- .......................... . 
TERM .... ··j;'Pl(FOR·· 
(YJ(8,) ···RETICULATIQNBOUSEWIRIlNG 
··(~l\{ilJ~~~sj ·····(R~lim~~~) 
20 
20 
20 
20 
80 
50 
20 
West Rand Unknown 25 
Administration 
Board 
TOTAL 150 45 
TABLE NO 6.8 KNOWN FINANCING FOR THE SEP (1979 Rand) 
Source: LHA Management Consultants Report, (1987, p.82). 
Due to various problems the SEP was not completed until December 1985. Ecoplan made an 
effort to estimate how the capital requirements would be affected as a consequence of the delays 
in the project. They did this by escalating their original estimates for the work involved by 10 per 
cent per annum from May 1979. The total escalated amount for the capital required for the 
electricity distribution system amounted to R 153 million (from R107 million, Table No 6.5) and 
to R 35 million (from R 26,201 million, Table No 6.6) for the capital required for the house 
wiring contract. The total escalated amount then for distribution and house wiring for the SEP 
was RI88 million which was less than the amount raised from the government backed loans of 
RI95 million (see Table No 6.8). The financial situation seemed then to be under control. 
In attempting to reconcile the estimated and actual costs of the SEP and the known financing at 
the completion of the project in December 1985, the 1985 costs of reticulating and wiring a 
household in the SEP are examined, see Table No 6.9 below. 
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132 KV &11 KV SUBSTATIONS & 11 KV LINES 
11 KV & LV RETICULATION 
CONTROL & SUPERVISORY EQUIPMENT 
SUBTOTAL 
HOUSEWIRING 
TOTAL 
••..•••• ¢QSTlHQUSE.(R} ... 
220 
1380 
20 
414 
1620 
2034 
TABLE NO 6.9 RETICULATION AND WIRING COSTS PER HOUSE: 
GREATER SOWETO (1985 Rand) 
Source: Seymore (1986) . 
. The total number of houses that were reticulated and wired under the SEP in Greater Soweto was 
101 000. Using this figure and the costs given in Table No 6.9 for reticulating and wiring a house 
the total capital spent was R164 million for the reticulation contracts and R42 million for the 
house wiring contracts i.e., a total of R206 million in 1985 Rand. Consequently the estimated 
costs were exceeded as was the funds available of Rl95 million, Table No 6.8. This figure of 
R206 million is interesting, however, since as far back as August 1981 Minister Koomhof, 
speaking in the South African Parliament, said that the total estimated cost of the Soweto 
Electrification Project was estimated to be R204 million plus R24 million capitalised interest, 
(Financial Mail 21 st August 1981). In the event with the delays to the SEP the cost of the project 
at its completion in 1985 was put at R280 million i.e., R206 million as a capital cost and 
capitalised interest of R74 million, (The Financial Mail 25 th March 1985). The capital cost of 
R206 million therefore appears to have been an accurate estimate of the final capital costs of the 
SEP in 1985 Rand. 
With respect to repaying the loans made for the electrification of Greater Soweto the adverse 
political situation extant in the area caused the Greater Soweto City Councils to lower the 
proposed electrification master plan levy (see footnote No 214 above) of R17 to R12 per 
household. This move of course made the Councils financial position even more perilous and 
lessened their ability to pay the loans raised to electrify Greater Soweto. Because of this adverse 
financial position it became incumbent on the Greater Soweto City Councils to request the 
government to help repay these loans, (as already pointed out the loans were in any event 
underwritten by the government). The result was then that the South African taxpayer helped pay 
for the SEP. 
According to the LHA Report, (1990, p.83) the loans for the electrification of Greater Soweto 
probably attracted interest from the day they were taken out or shortly thereafter and therefore 
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interest was accumulating on the unpaid capital from 1979. Furthermore, construction and 
equipment costs were escalating on a yearly basis (for all of which cost data is not available) 
which means that any attempt to do a definitive financial analysis on the project would be rather 
meaningless. What does seem certain, however, is that the figure of R206 million (1985 Rand) 
for the capital cost to electrifY Greater Soweto as completed in December 1985 is accurate. This 
amount, together with the accumulated interest thereon, was the South African taxpayers 
contribution to the project. The figure of R280 million quoted in the Financial Mail of the 25th 
May 1985 for this contribution is therefore probably an accurate estimate. This figure excluded of 
course cross-subsidising the non-payment for bulk electricity supplied to the township by Eskom. 
The last section has dealt with the cost side of the cost-benefit equation for electrifying Greater 
Soweto in its construction period from 1979 to 1986. Just as in the case of the electrification of 
white-owned commercial farms considered in the preceding chapter the benefit side of the SEP 
equation cannot readily be quantified with any degree of certainty. This, once again, is because 
sufficient historical data is simply not available. For example there is no time-series data of 
electrical appliance purchases available. Likewise there is no record of the increasing amounts of 
electricity used by individual households over time as the advantages attached to electricity usage 
became accepted. Clearly there are benefits attached to the electrification of Greater Soweto. 243 
With respect to the SEP, however, such benefits can only be expressed qualitatively and are as 
follows: 
Firstly there would be an increase in GDP. This would arise from the exogenous shock to the 
South African economy from black investment levels in the purchase of electrical appliances and 
to economic activity resulting from the infrastructural and household reticulation programme 
i 
attached to the SEP. Increase usage of electricity would further boost this increase in GDP. As a i 
-// 
I 
consequence of this economic activity there would be job creation both as a direct consequence Of\ 
the SEP and indirectly as a consequence of the SEP's impact on the South African economy in) 
total. With respect to employment the initial number of new jobs created in the construction 
phase of the SEP would be a once-off occurrence. Likewise the number of jobs created to meet the 
increased demand for electrical appliances. Thereafter job creation from the SEP would depend 
on further expenditure on replacing or maintaining such appliances and the physical 
electrification reticulation network. 
Other benefits attached to the SEP would involve the possible establishment of new small ! 
businesses both within the formal and the informal sectors of the economy. There would ' 
243 How such benefits can be calculated will be demonstrated in Chapter 8 when Eskom progranune to 
electrifY black households from 1990 onwards is considered. 
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additionally be health benefits attached to electricity replacing coal and wood burning stoves with 
respect to chest ailments, burns and poisoning, (see Terblanche 1993). Unfortunately so far as the 
SEP is concerned there appears to be no data available that could be used to quantify these 
benefits in the 1980-1990 period. Nevertheless it must be noted that as well as the SEP costing 
the taxpayer money it must have given rise to the economic benefits mentioned above in various 
degrees. 
An additional cost, over and above the ones quantified above, connected to the increased 
purchase of electrical appliances is that such appliances in South Africa have a large imported 
content, There would then have been a negative impact on the South African balance of payments 
as a result of such purchases. There would, in addition, be the negative externalities (air pollution 
etc.,) attached to generating the power for the SEP so that the benefits outlined above may be 
realised. Once more, however, so far as can be ascertained, the historical data necessary to enable 
a quantification of such externalities to be made is unavailable. This subject is discussed further 
in Chapter 9. 
12.0 CONCLUSIONS 
The SEP was an important learning experience for Eskom. Eskom' s negotiations in Greater 
Soweto represented the Corporation's first major negotiation in the world of urban black politics. 
This experience helped shape Eskom' s approach to future electrification projects in the 90' s. The 
main lessons Eskom learnt from their experience in Greater Soweto were as follows: 
a) The proceedings and resolutions of the D'Nyala Beraad were poorly documented and 
defined. This provided the TP A with an opportunity to work independently of the Beraad and 
continue their support of the SCC to the detriment of Eskom' s efforts to take over the 
management of the electricity supply to Greater Soweto; 
b) The Beraad probably evoked negative responses among black community leaders. It may 
have been seen as a paternalistic exercise managed by white officials formulating plans for 
the solution of black problems. Eskom realised in hindsight that if electrification projects 
were to be successful black leaders who were viewed as being legitimate by the community 
concerned would have to be involved in these projects; 244 \ ./ 
c) The McRae Steering Committee, which was established as a result of the D'Nyala Beraad, 
was similarly bereft of legitimate community leaders. As a consequence of this omission the 
244 Interviews with Dr I.C. McRae, 4th September 1996 and Mr I Van Gass, 16th January 1997. 
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report prepared by the committee could be viewed with a degree of scepticism. It is true that 
deciding on who should constitute the committee was difficult at the time of its formation 
and it was only during the course of the negotiations undertaken by Eskom in their efforts to 
take over the management of Greater Soweto' s electricity supply that the most influential 
community members were identified. Eskom realised that for future electrification projects 
identifying key community leaders was absolutely essential for their success and this policy 
was applied in the Corporation's national electrification programme from 1990 onwards, see 
Chapter 8. A potential problem was of course the fragmented political thinking in Greater 
Soweto. This led to groups like the SPD declining to serve on the same committee as the 
SCC, and as noted, resulted in shuttle, rather than round table diplomacy. Eskom realised 
also that such shuttle diplomacy was a recipe for disaster in getting an efficient management 
system in place for electricity supply to Greater Soweto. It is suggested that the McRae 
Steering Committee report was therefore not an adequate base on which to formulate a 
proposal for the management of electricity supply in the township; 
d) After the completion of the McRae (steering committee) report Eskom conducted meetings 
with the various municipal councils in Greater Soweto to try and gauge their responses to 
Eskom's proposals. In each instance the meetings were informal and only involved certain 
selected councillors. Upon being formed, Econolec mistakenly assumed that the positive 
responses of these councillors meant that the municipal councils themselves had accepted the 
proposals put forward in the report; this was found to be incorrect. An inappropriate 
negotiation strategy was therefore followed concerning the city councils of Greater Soweto 
and resulted from a lack of understanding of how they operated.245 This situation was not 
repeated in Eskom' s national electrification programme from 1990 onwards; 
e) Eskom's approach to the SPD was heroic and showed open-mindedness, but by not 
publishing the points of agreement to the residents of Greater Soweto, a valuable support 
base was lost; 
f) Eskom's negotiations with the TPA were perhaps the critical cause of Econolec's failure to 
take over the management of electricity supply to Greater Soweto. From the documentary 
evidence presented in this chapter it is suggested that throughout the negotiations the TP A 
vacillated between wishing to solve the problem of electricity supply in Greater Soweto and 
resisting the inclusion of SPD representatives in the entity for so doing. The TP A recognised 
the necessity for Eskom to have talks with the SPD and other anti-establishment groups, but 
were concerned that in so doing Eskom was conniving with the "enemies" of the State. The 
TP A was always concerned with establishing the political independence of the SCC, since 
the council was approved by the government, as part of its reform process.- As such they 
245 Interview with Dr I C McRae, 4th September 1 996. 
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constantly wished Eskom to act as agents for the council. Furthermore, whilst the TP A was 
having meetings with Eskom, they were also having meetings with the SCC concerning 
electricity supply. It was a point of concern to Eskom whether the TP A was undermining 
Eskom at these meetings;246 
g) It is possible that the lack of support provided to Eskom by the TP A allowed the SCC to 
reject Eskom' s offer to undertake the management of the electricity supply of Greater Soweto 
via the independent entity Econolec. It was Eskom's contention that to counter the TPA's 
actions, which certainly did not support Eskom's efforts to take over and manage Greater 
Soweto's electricity supply, the Corporation in future electrification initiatives would have to 
obtain sanctioning from high levels of government, ideally of course the Minister in charge 
of Eskom. 247 
It also became clear that solutions to problems of supplying electricity to black households in 
South Africa demanded socio-political solutions alongside the solution of the technical and 
economic problems involved. Eskom's planning for future electrification projects required then 
an in-depth knowledge of urban planning and community development. In Greater Soweto the 
community did not take ownership of the project, and the SEP was managed by engineers and 
financial mangers. In future Eskom electrification project teams would include other disciplines 
such as social scientists and public relations practitioners as well, see Chapter 8. 
Eskom's Chairman Dr John Maree seemed to have very little involvement with the Corporation's 
efforts to take over the management of the electricity supply to Greater Soweto via Econolec. 
When questioned on this in an interview with the author48 he said that he had never believed 
that Eskom would succeed in the negotiations. He had not interfered, however, in them because 
of McRae's belief that it was of vital importance to take the management of the electricity supply 
to Greater Soweto away from the SCC if political stability was to be achieved in the township. It 
is possible of course that he did not wish to lend his weight to McRae's efforts because the 
establishment of Black Local Authorities was part of the government's reform process and was 
seen as a means of diffusing political unrest and frustration with white dominated Administration 
Boards that impinged on township dwellers way of life. 249 
246 Interview with Dr I C McRae, 4th September1996. 
247 Interview with Dr I C McRae, 4th September 1996. 
248 28th October 1998. 
249 In an interview 4th September 1996 Dr McRae mentioned to the author that Dr Maree had once 
instructed him to cut off electricity supply to Greater Soweto (date uncertain) because of non-payment. 
He refused on the grounds that such an action would have raised unfavourable publicity abroad. It 
seems that Eskom itself was never involved in cutting-off electricity to Greater Soweto between 1985 
and 1990. It was reported in the Planact Report (1989, p.53), however, that twelve households had 
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Eskom failed then in their attempt to take over the management of electricity supply to Greater 
Soweto in the late 1980's. However, up until 1990 the TPA ensured that Eskom was paid for the 
bulk electricity supplied to the township.250 After this date, when the Metropolitan Council took 
over responsibility for the administration of Greater Soweto from the TP A, Eskom was not paid 
for the bulk electricity they supplied to the township. As a consequence Greater Soweto's debt for 
electricity accumulated. Eskom continued, however, to supply the township with electricity in 
spite of the non-payment; the costs being carried by other electricity users who effectively cross- (? 
,--
subsidised electricity consumers in Greater Soweto thus contravening the requirements of the de 
Villiers Commission\ From 1990, however, the political milieu in South Africa was changing and 
./ 
the provision of electricity to black households using cross-subsidisation became the norm, see 
Chapters 8 and 9. Eventually, in 1992, Eskom did succeed in taking over the management of 
Greater Soweto' s electricity supply and immediately set about upgrading the service being offered 
to the township. Although the non-payment for electricity continued, little by little, working 
together with provincial and local governments, the Soweto Civic Association and Community 
Leaders and applying the experience they had gained in their abortive negotiations of the late 
80's, the non-payment for electricity supply to Greater Soweto began to diminish, (Eskom 
Annual Report, 1994, p.16). By 1995 then the situation with respect to electricity supply in 
Greater Soweto seemed to have greatly improved to that which obtained between 1980 and 1990. 
The last two chapters have discussed the major electrification initiatives which took place in 
South Africa in the decade 1980 to 1990, and Eskom's involvement with them. The remaining 
part of this study deals with the nation-wide electrification project undertaken by Eskom between 
1990 and 1995, their so-called "Electricity for All" initiative. 251 
their electricity disconnected at some time dwing 1988. It does seem there were power cuts then but 
no pattern in frequency or duration was evident. These cuts could well have been as a result of the 
SCC's inefficiency in managing the electricity supply to Greater Soweto. Residents, however, were of 
the opinion that these power cuts were part of a deliberate policy to break the boycott on rents and 
service charges in the township, (Planact Report, 1989, p.53). 
250 Interview with Mr V.C. Milne, 27th October 1998. 
251 The term "Electricity for All' was fIrst coined by Mr P. Doepel, a strategic planning specialist in 
Eskom who was a confIdant of Dr I.C. McRae, and who accompanied him on occasions in his 
clandestine visits to Greater Soweto Interview with Mr J. de Plessis, 27th January 1998. 
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CHAPTER 7 
THE REASONS WHY ESKOM UNDERTOOK A BLACK 
HOUSEHOLD ELECTRIFICATION PROGRAMME: 1990-1995 
1.0 INTRODUCTION 
Prior to recording the main events associated with the history of Eskom's programme to electrify 
black households in South Africa in the period 1990-1995 it is appropriate to determine why 
Eskom decided to undertake this programme in the first instance. The purpose of this chapter is 
to answer this fundamental question. Just as in deciding why Eskom undertook their 
electrification programmes in the preceding period (see Chapter 4), certain changes in the 
political environment of South Africa, changes in Eskom's own financial and economic 
circumstances and institutional changes in both the South African electricity supply industry and 
Eskom itself have to be examined in deciding on this particular case as well. 
2.0 POLITICAL CHANGES AND ELECTRIFICATION 
The political changes that are discussed in this section embrace the reforms undertaken by the 
government between 1990 and 1994, when the ANC came to power, and the ANC's National 
Meeting on Electrification which allowed them to be seen as a legitimate political party dealing 
with a national development problem (electrification). 
2.1 Government Reforms 
In the period 1990 to 1995 the process of political change and reform in South Africa gained 
momentum. In early 1990 Nelson Mandela was released from prison. On 2nd February 1990, 
exactly a year to the day that de Klerk had replaced P.W. Botha, the ANC, the South African 
Communist Party (SACP) and the PAC were unbanned and the existing state of emergency in the 
country was lifted. In June, to demonstrate his commitment to reform, de Klerk stated that 
"whites could not turn back the clock and take refuge in the past", (The Argus 8th June 1990). 
In 1990 the government, the ANC and the SACP met and it was announced that the Group Areas 
Act and the Population Registration Act would be repealed, furthermore, white schools would be 
opened to all races, military service was to be shortened and there was to be a moratorium on the 
death penalty, (van Rooyen, 1993, p.139). In spite of, or perhaps because of, this reform process, 
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Schlemmer, Stack & Berklow (1991, p.163) pointed out that it was hazardous to assume 
continuing liberal attitudes amongst whites in the context of fundamental political changes. This 
viewpoint was underlined by the results of the continuing electoral struggle being fought between 
the CP and the government when the government lost five by-elections in 1991 and 1992. 
f, , 
There were four losses in 1991, these being at Randburg, M~t!1l!ld, Ladybrand, and Virginia and i ' , 
in February 1992 the Potchestroom seat was won by the CPo This particular by-election victory 
-------------was significant because the CP believed it signified that they had the support of the majority of 
the whites. The loss at Potchestroom forced de Klerk to call a referendum. 252 This referendum 
was not only necessary to renew de Klerk's mandate to continue his negotiations with the ANC at 
the Convention for a Democratic South Africa (CODESA), which was underway at the time, but 
also to counter the discontent among members of parliament who thought that the speed of the 
reform process was too fast and their "perceptions that the NP had lost control over the process of 
reform", (van Rooyen, 1994, p.150). 
The wording of the referendum called for a simple choice between approval (a yes vote) and 
disapproval (a no vote) for the reform process, rather like the Fourth Republic's referendum with 
respect to France's African possessions on the 28th September 1958, when French citizens were 
given the choice of voting "Yes" for interdependence or "No" for separation. The government 
applied considerable funds to the build-up to the referendum, which included greater media 
coverage than had been hitherto seen in South Africa for a political event. It has been estimated 
that the government spent 20 times the amount of money on advertising the referendum and 
informing the population of South Africa why they were calling for "a "yes" vote than the CP did 
in calling for a "no" vote, (Cape Times 19th March 1992). According to the government and 
reported in the Sunday Times on the 8th March 1992, "a "yes" vote means that we will sit around 
a table as South Africans and work out the best method of installing a democratic system in 
which all the country's inhabitants feel secure. A "no" vote will be a declaration of war against 
the majority of the country". 
The CP's "no" campaign was then very much under-funded compared to the government's 
campaign and their media coverage was by and large restricted to their own publications The 
Patriot and Die Afrikaner. The "yes" vote on the other hand was handsomely supported by nearly 
all of South Africa's independent newspapers. In the event the government won the referendum, 
the voting being 1 924 186 "yes" votes to 875 619 "no" votes. Only one referendum region 
returned a "no" majority, Pietersburg in the Northern Transvaal, a principally agricultural and 
252 Ibat the referendum was to take place was announced in parliament the day following the 
government's defeat at Potchefstroom. 
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mining area, the majority here being 12 208, (van Rooyen 1994, p.52)?53 After the 1992 
referendum all further general elections and by-elections were suspended and the role of the CP 
in South African politics was effectively ended. In their last two years in office, i.e., up to the 
General Election of April 1994, which brought the ANC to power, the de Klerk administration 
pressed on resolutely with reform in accordance with the mandate given to the government as a 
result of the referendum. 
A programme to electrify black households in South Africa fitted nicely into the government's 
reform initiatives. Such a programme could be an important and obvious force aiding social 
upliftment and therefore, in contrast to the last years of the Botha era, it could be encouraged. 
Eskom could once again be used as an instrument to aid governmental policies and, as will be 
shown in the following chapter, the Corporation avidly sought to put an electrification 
programme into force. 
In addition to the political events described above, in 1990, at their Economic Debate in Harare, 
the ANC made the following important statement concerning parastatals in South Africa. 
"Public corporations operating in such areas as electricity 
supply all provide major inputs to development through an 
infrastructural base a future government will need to 
transform the public sector into a vehicle for development," 
This statement could be considered as a threat of nationalisation if Eskom did not address 
development issues. As if this statement was not enough in The ANC/COSA TU Proposals for an 
Economy Beyond Apartheid, (Section 5, p.3), the following announcement was made "The 
transformation of the economy will require a viable state sector. Nationalisation would be an 
essential part of the reconstruction programme of such a state". It was also evident that de Klerk 
was preparing South Africa for an eventual political take-over by the ANC, hence Eskom's way 
forward was clear and the electrification of black households became a major consideration for 
the Corporation. So far as the ANC's continuing interest in electrification was concerned they 
organised in February 1992 a National Meeting on the subject. This meeting and its ramifications 
are discussed in the next section. 
253 Hennan Gillomee, writing in the Cape Times 10th March 1992, suggested, that the CP had made 
a fatal error in agreeing to take part in the Referendum, since due to voters apathy the poll could 
have been as low as 30 per cent of the white electorate who would have voted "yes". If this had 
been the case it would have effectively vindicated the CP's contention that only a minority of 
whites supported the refonn process. 
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2.2 The ANC's National Meeting On Electrification 254 
After their unbanning in 1990 the ANC was able for the first time to articulate and debate 
publicly in South Africa their views on the provision of essential services. So far as the 
electrification of black households was concerned the proceedings of a national meeting on 
electrification organised by the ANC and held at the University of Cape Town in February 1992 
allowed the ANC's position on the electrification process to be publicly known; the meeting also 
had one far-reaching institutional consequence. It is appropriate therefore to consider next the 
most important issues raised at this meeting. 
This meeting, where Trevor Manuel was the keynote speaker and Ketso Gordhan was the 
Chairman, was made possible by funding from the Swedish International Development 
Authority.255 The meeting was attended by representatives of the ANC's Department of Economic 
Planning, Regional Executives of the South African Communist Party, Regional Development 
Forums, Civic Organisations, Trades Union, Local Government, Municipal Electrical Engineers, 
Eskom, The South African Chamber of Business, The Development Bank of Southern Africa, 
Academics from various universities, Electrical Contractors, The Association of Consulting 
Engineers, and certain service organisations such as the Farm Workers Research and Resource 
Project. The government was not represented at the meeting and this prompted Trevor Manuel to 
say in his keynote address: 
"In a letter addressed to me, the Minister of Mineral and Energy 
Affairs, George Bartlett said. As indicated by the Director 
General, Dr P.l Hugo, the Department of Mineral and Energy 
Affairs is currently undertaking an investigation into appropriate v 
structures for electricity distribution in South Africa. These 
investigations initiated by the National Energy Council in 1991, 
are not yet complete. The Director General is therefore not in a 
position to attend"(p.4). 
Manuel was clearly worried that the government was restructuring the electricity supply industry 
without consultation with the ANC and went on to say in this regard: 
254 Details given in this section are taken from the Proceedings of the ANC National Meeting on 
Electrification. Page mnnbers quoted are taken from papers presented at the meeting and reported 
in these proceedings. An interview with Mr. J. Du Plessis on 27th January 1998 also provided 
insights into the mood of the meeting, particularly the ANC's attitude towards Eskom. 
255 Manuel was at the time the Head of the Department of Economic Planning of the ANC, Ketso 
Gordhan was a member of that department. Manual subsequently became the Minister of Finance 
in the ANC government and Gordhan became the city manager for Johannesburg. 
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"The honourable Minister is saying unashamedly we will 
investigate; we will identify the weakness from our own 
perspective; we will serve them up on terms favourable to 
ourselves; then we will inform you; and if the ANC manages to 
get into power, then there will be nothing left to restructure", 
(p.4). 
He also pointed out that resource provision and allocation in South Africa had always been 
controlled and used systematically to the advantage of the white minority at the expense of the 
majority. With respect to electricity supply he said that it served mining and industry and the well 
being of the majority of South Africans had never featured in its planning. 256 He further claimed, 
that electricity had been used to disempower the majority, and that Eskom had sufficient 
generating capacity to supply everyone in South Africa with electricity without having to build 
one further power station257 , but that 70 per cent of the people in South Africa did not have access 
to electricity, which amounted to about 27 million people. 258 Manuel said finally that parastatals 
such as Eskom refused to deliver formal inputs to the national meeting on electrification after 
having initially agreed to do SO.259 Manuel's keynote address summed up the ANC's view of the 
electrification process in South Africa in 1992 and their relations with government and Eskom so 
far as this process was concerned. 260 
256 This of cmITse was true as has been demonstrated in Chapter 3 but with de Klerk's reform 
initiatives this was changing. 
257 Manuel was of course referring to Eskom's excess electricity generating capacity which has 
already been commented upon. 
258 This figure varies depending on the source, generally speaking, however, it seems that it was 
between 27 and 30 million. 
259 . It was reported to the author that Eskom was forbidden by their minister, Dr Dawie de Villiers, 
even to attend the meeting because it "had overt political overtones". McRae, however, dispatched 
two Eskom representatives Mr J. du Plessis and Mr Douwe Van Wyk. They were instructed to act 
as onlookers only and not to become involved in debate: Interviews with Dr McRae, 24th 
September 1996, and Mr J. du Plessis, 27th January 1998. 
260 The ANC's invitation to the government to attend the national meeting was worded in a most 
unfortunate manner, for example, it invited the government "to purge themselves and to 
participate in the restructuring of the provision of electricity", (p.3). It is possible that this 
wording was such that the government could not accept the invitation to attend. If this is the case 
it is historically most regrettable as the government's presence would have allowed public debate 
between the ANC and the government concerning the electrification initiative, a chance which 
was forever lost. Such a debate would have given history a clearer picture of the government's 
stance on electrification in 1992. According to du Plessis so far as Eskom was concerned it was, 
during the meeting, the target of unremitting criticism, which in some respects was undeserved 
given that within Eskom there was a very active pro-electrification faction under the leadership of 
Dr. LC. McRae and that Eskom had already embarked on a progranune to electrify black 
households (see Chapter 8), interview with Mr J. du Plessis, 27th January 1998. 
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2.2.1 Issues debated at The National Meeting on Electrification 
There were three principle issues debated at the ANC's national meeting on electrification, these 
were: 
a) The Restructuring of the Electricity Supply Industry (ESI); 
b) The Capacity to Plan and Implement Electrification Projects; and 
c) The Problems of Financing Electrification Initiatives. 
Each of these issues will be considered seriatim. 
(i) The Restructuring of the ESI 
So far as this issue was concerned the speakers at the meeting clearly identified the fragmentation 
that then existed in the electricity supply industry as a major cause of the failure to make 
electricity available and affordable to all the peoples of South Africa, even taking into account the 
government's reform initiatives. 
Blame for the status quo in 1992 was placed by Paul Theron of the Science and Technology 
Group of the ANC on, "the policies of racial segregation and separate development pursued by 
successive white minority governments in South Africa (and) the formation of a number of quasi 
independent homeland states in the 60' s and the establishment of a parallel system of black local 
authorities in urban areas in the 1980's", (pp.12-13). 
According to Charles Dingley of the University of Cape Town, who dealt with the problem of 
"Institutional Frameworks for the Electricity Supply Industry", (pp.21-31), the highly fragmented 
ESI had three major drawbacks; these being inefficiency, electricity tariff differentials between 
black and white consumers and the inhibition of the flow of resources needed to supply the 30 
million people who, in 1992, did not have access to electricity. Dingley also made the very 
important point that the South African ESI had been designed in the 1920's to meet the needs of 
that time and even when stripped of "its apartheid debris" he questioned whether the ESI in its 
current form possessed the right structure to take South Africa into the future, (p.31). 
These were very telling points indeed and even Eskom, agreed with them in the main as has been 
previously noted. Other speakers at the meeting also identified the fragmented structure of the 
ESI in South Africa as a major problem curtailing the electrification programme and there was 
agreement that some kind of rationalisation was called for. Debate centred on what form this 
\I 
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rationalisation should take and the time frame for undertaking a rationalisation process to avoid 
delays in the electrification programme.261 
In his summing up of this section of the meeting Ketso Gordhan, referring to electrification and 
the restructuring of the ESI, identified two broadly contrasting views that had been expressed. 
The first view was that existing white municipalities had the experience, technology, human and 
financial resources and were best placed to undertake electrification, (p.201). Gordhan suggested 
that they should expand their scope of operations to include township areas. This approach would 
result in electrification taking place within the system of local government. The second view was 
that regionally based, special purpose agencies with broad representation should be created to 
distribute electricity, (p.202). These suggestions clearly left little room for Eskom, irrespective of 
the fact that the Corporation was at this time already electrifying black households in South 
Mrica. 
Notwithstanding these views Gordhan advocated a national strategy to deal with the 
electrification issue. He considered that public intervention was necessary for rapid electrification 
to come about. Existing legislation, which of course included the Electricity Act, would, he 
thought, have to be changed if electrification was to proceed at a local level. Gordhan also 
advocated a national electrification strategy,262 (p.204). 
(ii) Capacity to plan and implement electrification projects 
So far as the ANC's second critical issue was concerned, i.e., the planning and implementation of 
accelerated electrification initiatives the meeting considered that there were adequate technical 
resources and experience available in South Africa to plan and execute an electrification 
programme, see contributions to the meeting by Whitehead, (p.81) and Isaacs, (p.105). 
There was, however, support for the notion that more parties had to be drawn into the planning 
and implementation process; for example it was suggested that the process would have to be more 
representative of all stakeholders such as contractors, trades union and local communities, see 
Petersen (p.120). In line with the general condemnation ofEskom at the meeting it was explained 
by delegates that reliance should not be placed on Eskom to plan and implement electrification 
261 This. as it turned out, was to be a very problematic undertaking as will be shown in the following 
section of this chapter. 
262 This national strategy was a moot point and is still under discussion and will be considered 
further in Chapter 10. 
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projects. Municipalities and the private sector should be the driving force behind the 
electrification process. 263 
An important requirement identified by the delegates for planning and implementing a successful 
electrification programme was the availability of resources, both monetary and equipment. 
Although the majority of the delegates at the meeting agreed that the electrification initiative 
would not be hampered by the lack of resources. Howard Whitehead, the executive Director of 
Durban Electricity, did point out in his paper (pp. 75-83) some important limitations to these 
resources. These obstacles were, according to Whitehead, three in number, technical, financial 
and the lack of human resources. His most telling point was that whilst white municipalities did 
indeed have adequate capacity they were staffed to generally cater for forecasted growth and for 
dealing with current affairs; they had little capacity available to tackle a country-wide 
electrification programme. 264 
There is little doubt that Whitehead's views were prophetic and, as history showed, it was left to 
Eskom to bear the greatest burden in the national electrification programme, which they had 
anyway initiated in 1990. 
Gordhan, in his summary of this topic said that the resources were available to electrify black 
households and that the meeting had shown that the meeting had shown that the key "constraint 
to planning and implementing a national electrification initiative was the lack of political will", 
(p.203). Gordhan's advice to the meeting on how to overcome this shortcoming was ominous; he 
said that if regulation failed then mass-action should be used, (p.203). What this mass-action was 
to be composed of is unclear. If non-payment for services was what Gordhan was referring to 
then this was already in force. 
263 It was claimed by L.H. Nape Maeba of the ANC's Science and Technology Group that the 
electricity distribution structure in South Africa should be changed from top to bottom because the 
system had not worked for the majority of people simply because it was not meant to, (p.73). 
264 Whitehead's views were conditioned by a survey which had been carried out on 17 major 
municipal undertakings (date unknown) which purported to show that in the 17 municipalities 
surveyed 1000 engineers and technicians, together with 3000 electricians and semi-skilled 
workers connected 29407 new consumers per annum. If the electrification programme required 
more connections than that to be made per annum then it would require more staff to be added to 
those already employed. He added that only the fmancially sound larger municipalities, supported 
by a diverse customer base could hope to undertake a major electrification programme. Smaller 
municipalities would require grant funding to undertake such a programme, (pp.82-83). 
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(iii) Financing electrification initiatives 
The third issue considered at the meeting, the financing of electrification initiatives, would, 
according to Theron, cost about R800 million per annum (1992 rands), (p.17) or 1 per cent of the 
government's annual Public Works Budget. Like other members of the ANC present at the 
meeting Theron advocated the involvement of others beside the central government in financing 
the programme to electrify black households in South Africa. He cited Eskom' s positive net 
income from 1981 to 1990 and the capital resources accumulated by Eskom as a source of 
electrification funding. 265 
Patrick Bond of P1anact (an organisation which has been referred to already in connection with 
the SEP) vigorously attacked South Africa's existing financial system and claimed that the 
country had a surplus of "financial funds searching for outlets" within the big insurance 
companies, pension funds, banks and building societies, (p.17 4).266 Like other speakers at the 
meeting Bond also attacked Eskom, accusing the Corporation of over-capacity and criticising the 
decommissioning and mothballing of older power stations and Eskom' s foreign funding 
programme for the building of new power stations, (pp.155-158). He further targeted Eskom as a 
major barrier to change, (p.190). Bond's approach to the financing of the electrification 
programme rested on the argument that new forms of community-controlled financial institutions 
that dispersed democratic control over resources to communities had to be established if the 
electrification initiative was to be successfully carried out (p.163).267 
The new institutions spoken of by Bond were to be community-controlled and composed of 
Community Loan Funds, Credit Unions, Mutual Banks, Rural Finance Centres and a Women's 
265 Like many ANC delegates Theron seemed unaware of the financial problems that Eskom had 
faced in this period, and that in some years during the period he referred to Eskom had in fact a 
negative net income and an inventory of unpaid accounts for the supply of bulk electricity to 
Greater Soweto, see Chapters 4 and 6. 
266 These funds would of course be searching for profitable investment opportunity. Providing 
electricity to underdeveloped areas required development funding which appeared to be in short 
supply as demonstrated by the fact that some state-related institutions such as the Independent 
Development Trust (IDT) and the Development Bank of Southern Africa during this period were 
attempting to raise foreign finance for development projects. For example the IDT director Jan 
Steyn was trying to raise 100 million American Dollars through a J.P. Morgan syndication, and 
claiming that this was necessary because there was not sufficient capital available in South Africa 
"to create the flexibility needed by development initiatives", (The Financial Mail 22 November 
1991 ). 
267 Bond was very critical of the role that Eskom had played in the progranune to electrify black 
households up to that time. He clearly saw electricity as a basic need and its provision a basic 
right. That Bond was politicising the electrification progranune seems clear by Bond making 
claims that the "anti-apartheid tactic of the rent boycott ensured that electricity would remain at 
the centre of mass interest and action", (p.166). This conflicts with Eskom's understanding of the 
non-payment problem, which was that it was poor service delivery by Black Local Authorities that 
was responsible. 
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Bank, (p.178). These institutions were to fill the needs that the existing financial system in South 
Africa in 1992 was unable or unwilling to meet; these institutions would in Bond's words use 
"bulk funding assistance", and the community would control and dispense the funds allocated to 
them (p.186)268. A particularly interesting institution suggested by Bond was the Women's Bank 
which brought the gender issue into prominence. Such a bank would of course reduce the risk of 
alienating from the electrification programme the single largest and most oppressed constituency 
in the country. The institutions that Bond argued for were in 1992 largely non-existent and up to 
the present little or no progress seems to have been made in setting them up, certainly in a form 
that would have been helpful to an electrification programme meeting the objective of "electricity 
for all". 
Ketso Gordhan in his summing up of the debate on the financing initiatives said that the meeting 
had determined that "there was no serious problem of financing a major electrification 
programme provided a creative approach was used", (p.204). He concluded by saying, that, 
"South Africa can certainly afford a major electrification programme, (p.204). Which statement 
seemed optimistic given the report in the Financial Mail of the 22nd November 1991 cited above. 
2.3 Summary 
In his key-note address to the ANC National Meeting on Electrification Trevor Manuel 
emphasised that by holding the meeting the ANC were demonstrating that they had the capacity 
to formulate policy on key areas of social and economic development, (p.206). The key areas 
referred to being the restructuring of the ESI, the capacity to plan and implement electrification 
projects and the financing of electrification initiatives. 
Little policy formulation came out of the meeting, however. The delegates that took part in 
debates mostly spoke in general terms only. This forced the ANC's Department of Economic 
Planning to repeat in their Concluding Press Statement of the meeting with respect to the all 
important financing issues what Ketso Gordhan had said in his sununary of the meeting "that 
electrification would be affordable for the national economy, provided that the necessary political 
will exists to fund such a programme", (p.207). 
This statement said very little by way of an electrification policy pronouncement. It gave the 
impression that the ANC were groping for solutions to a problem that had important political 
undertones, i.e., how to provide electricity to the 27-30 million people in South Africa without it, 
and which was to become a key issue in the ANC's 1994 Reconstruction and Development 
268 A problem that would in all probability arise with these new institutions, was of course the lack of 
financial and management capacity in some communities, particularly the more rural ones. 
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Programme (RDP). At the final plenary session of the meeting an event of the utmost importance 
to the electrification initiative occurred, however. To reduce the meeting's dilemma concerning 
positive action in formulating electrification policy many of the delegates, particularly the civic 
associations, trades union and local government representatives called for a forum to be 
constituted to drive the process of electrifying black households forward into the future. In spite 
of what had been said at the meeting concerning the government it was stated that the 
government would also have to be part of this forum if anything was to be achieved. 
In response to this call for action Mr Johann Kruger made an offer on behalf of the Development 
Bank of Southern Africa (DB SA) to provide professional and practical assistance for convening a 
working committee on electrification within three weeks, see the Concluding Press Statement to 
the ANC's National Meeting on Electrification, quoted on p.207 of the proceedings. This offer 
was accepted by the meeting. 
Mr Kruger immediately convened a meeting between the ANC, the Department of Mineral and 
Energy affairs, the DBSA and Eskom in November 1992. The purpose of this meeting was to 
plan a strategy for establishing and managing a major electrification programme in South Africa 
that would have government support. The fact that government support was mentioned does 
establish that Eskom were acting alone so far as their ongoing electrification programme was 
concerned. 
The meeting resulted in the formation of the National Electrification Forum (NELF) which 
became the catalyst for institutional change within the South African ESI. The following section 
discusses the deliberations of the NELF and the resulting establishment of the National 
Electricity Regulator (NER). It is important to record the deliberations underpinning the 
formation of the NER since the NER would be an institution that would have the power to 
influence how Eskom would be governed and Eskom's electrification programme. 
3.0 INSTITUTIONAL CHANGES AND ELECTRIFICATION 
3.1 The National Electrification Forum and the Establishment 
of the National Electricity Regulator 
The NELF was charged with recommending ways to accelerate the electrification of black 
households in South Africa and was representative of all stakeholders in the South African ESI 
and consisted of members from the ranks of government (national, provincial and local) political 
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parties, businesses, electricity consumers, trades union, civic associations and of course Eskom.269 
Despite the criticisms of Eskom voiced at the ANC's meeting on electrification Dr I.C. McRae 
was appointed Chairman of the NELF. This appointment rather demonstrated the importance of 
Eskom in the electrification process. 
The structure of the NELF was as follows: 
a) A plenary where about 75 stakeholder groups were represented and which was responsible 
for ratifying decisions taken by the NELF and for providing strategic input to working 
groups established to undertake research on particular issues of importance to the 
electrification programme; 
b) A Management Committee which consisted of the key stakeholders which was responsible 
for the overall management of the NELF and served as a decision making body; and 
c) The working groups themselves. These groups were charged with making recommendations 
to the Management Committee, (NELF(a), 1994, p.2). 
The different working groups investigated the following issues: 
a) The Restructuring and Regulation of the ESI; 
b) Financial issues affecting the restructuring of the ESI, including the question of electricity 
charges between Eskom and municipalities; 
c) Human resources issues arising from the restructuring of the ESI; and 
d) The end use of energy and environmental issues. 
The restructuring of the fragmented ESI was an overriding consideration of the NELF since 
unless this issue could be resolved it would become difficult to put in place an efficient co-
ordinated electrification programme. Without a co-ordinated approach to the problem disparate 
attempts at electrification only would result. Furthermore, the fragmentation of the ESI had also 
been the subject of criticism by the ANC and required immediate attention. The findings of the 
Reconstruction and Regulation Group were also the only ones to be submitted to Cabinet. These 
findings, upon their acceptance, resulted in changes to legislation which had an effect on the 
electrification of black households in South Africa. The following discussion therefore 
concentrates on the work and findings of this group. 
269 Interview with Dr I.e. McRae, 24th September 1996. 
207 
As a basis and starting point for their work the Restructuring and Regulation Group studied a 
paper prepared for Eskom by Linegar (1992) dealing with regulatory frameworks in the 
electricity supply industry at large. The paper's usefulness was acknowledged by the NELF, 
(NELF (c), 1994, p.3). This paper attempted to formulate the likely evolution of the ESI and 
identified a number of key issues that would have to be considered in building a regulatory 
framework for the ESI in South Africa. This was then a particularly important document since it 
linked the structure of a future South African ESI to the regulation of that ESI. It therefore 
introduced into the debate the concept of a National Electricity Regulator (NER).270 
The link between the structure of the ESI and regulation was of critical importance since as 
pointed out in Chapter 2 regulation can only really be defined in relation to a particular industrial 
structure. Factors such as the ownership of the entities within the ESI and the economic power 
(e.g., monopoly) that they would posses would be important. Additionally, the question of 
whether competition could be allowed within the ESI and how this would effect the electrification 
programme would have to be answered. Such issues would have an influence on the nature and 
extent of the regulatory framework that it was hoped would be established. Furthermore, any 
regulatory framework that was established would have to be flexible and yet robust if it was to be 
successful in the changing political and economic milieu of South Africa. It would have to be 
capable of change and be able to adapt itself to accommodate any future ESI restructuring that 
may become necessary. 
Linegar's paper made it clear that the ESI in South Africa had been in the past characterised by 
diversity (Chapter 3 also showed this to be the case). For example during different periods in the 
history of electricity supply in South Africa privately owned electric utilities, local government, 
parastatals such as Eskom, provincial government, regional service councils and even railway 
companies had all been involved at different levels of intensity in the electricity supply business. 
As shown in Chapter 3 what the history of electricity supply in South Africa made patently 
evident, however, was that the supply system had failed to deliver an adequate service to black 
consumers and whites in remote areas of the country.271 The result of this was that the working 
group on structure and regulation started its task at the beginning of 1993 when 65 per cent of 
black households, 75 per cent of black schools and 80 per cent of black rural clinics did not have 
a supply of electricity, (Morgan 1994, p.1). 
270 The NER was duly established in October 1994 also Wlder the Chainnanship of Dr I.C. McRae 
who took that p~sition after his retirement from Eskom in that year. 
271 Black in this instance excludes coloured and Indian people who were generally far better served 
so far as electricity supply was concerned. 
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The Restructuring and Regulation working group, as well as attempting to design a structure that 
would be able to cope with the task of overcoming this situation, had also to ensure that the ESI 
would remain well managed, financially sound and technically competent to undertake the task 
ahead. This was of great importance, not only in redressing the injustices of the past, but in 
ensuring that South Africa would continue to have the competitive advantage of low priced 
electricity, which was critical to export industries, with a reliability of supply. 
The results of the deliberations of the Restructuring and Regulation working group which were 
completed in 1994 are discussed below. 
3.2 Recommendations on the Restructuring of the ESI 272 
(i) The ESI should remain under public ownership 
Although it was recommended that the ESI should remain under public ownership it was also 
recommended that the state should not be directly involved in the supply of electricity. This 
meant that the appropriate legal form of supply could be either parastatals (incorporated in terms 
of legislation) or local government electricity departments. This policy decision would of course 
make the electrification initiative easier to manage and it would ensure its continuance vis-a-vis a 
privatised electricity supply industry. 
This decision was made on the following grounds: 
a) Privatising the ESI was not politically acceptable; 
b) Eskom was considered to be now providing an acceptable service; 
c) Private electric utilities would not readily undertake an electrification programme with the 
same enthusiasm as a public utility, i.e., Eskom: 
d) The privatisation of Eskom, or parts of Eskom, would result in increases in the price of 
electricity. There were it was considered many reasons for this, including the duplication of 
assets. A privati sed entity would also be liable for income tax and it would of course have to 
pay dividends to its shareholders. All these issues would mitigate against a national 
electrification programme; and 
e) Privatisation would not necessarily bring the significant gains in efficiency necessary to 
offset the probable increase in the price of electricity, because it was considered that now 
Eskom was well-managed, technically sound and financially healthy.273 
272 This section is based upon an interview with Mr Kevin Morgan, 25 th July 1996. Additional 
infonnation was obtained from NELF (c ), (I 994,pp.5-7) 
209 
(ii) The ESI should remain under stakeholder control 
The view here was that the ESI should be supervised by councils appointed by stakeholders. Such 
councils should include representation from central government, local government, electricity 
consumers and trades union. 
(iii) Competition within the ESI was not possible nor was it 
desirable 
It was considered that there would be minimal economic benefit in allowing competition within 
the ESI (particularly so far as the generation of electricity was concerned) and taking account of 
Eskom's excess generating capacity. Competition, like privatisation would it was decided, act as 
a limiting influence on a national electrification programme. 
(iv) An appropriate governance framework should be put in 
place for the ESI 
This was decided upon because the NELF concluded that the lack of a proper governance 
framework for the ESI in the past had contributed materially to its unsatisfactory perfonnance, 
particularly with regard to the electrification of black households in South Africa. The NELF did 
not finalise its proposals on the governance issue, however. 
(v) There should only be one electricity supplier per local 
government area 
This decision was made because many of the problems concerning electricity supply which had 
beset South Africa, including the problems attached to the electrification of black households, had 
been occasioned by having several different electricity suppliers supplying power within one 
economically-tied area e.g., Johannesburg and Greater Soweto. Where a new local government 
council (fonned by the consolidation of previously separate "white" and "black" towns) applied to 
supply electricity directly, it would henceforth have to supply the new area in total. An applicant 
would no longer be able to elect to continue to supply "white" consumers only and request Eskom 
to provide electricity to "black" areas. Where the new council was not able to effectively supply 
273 This comment provides an interesting contrast in the way the NELF working group members saw 
Eskom vis-a-vis the way delegates to the ANe National Meeting on Electrification two years 
earlier had viewed Eskom. 
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the whole area Eskom would take over the supply of both "white" and "black" areas. This would 
alleviate some of Eskom's problems concerning access of supply to some areas the country. 
(vi) Acknowledgement of the rights of local governments 
Central to the NELF's work was the acknowledgement of the key role that local government 
would in future play in the provision of services particularly the supply of electricity to black 
households. The NELF was also aware of how important the contribution of electricity tariffs was 
to local government finance. In fact without the financial contribution from electricity, most 
local governments would not be able to provide other services. The NELF accordingly confirmed 
the following: 
a) The supply of electricity within the areas of local government should be under its control, 
although this would not mean that local governments would have to provide that electricity; 
b) Local government would be entitled to receive some financial compensation from the supply 
of electricity within its area subject to national norms; and 
c) Local governments would have to approve the electrification programme for bringing power 
to black households within their jurisdiction and ensure that the electrification programme 
was integrated into plans for the provision of other services. 
(vii) Recognition that the ESI needed to be nationally 
controlled and co-ordinated 
This decision revolved around the fact that electricity was vital to economic prosperity and social 
upliftment and therefore the provision of electricity at the lowest possible cost was critical in 
achieving these aims. 
3.3 Recommendations on the Regulation of the ESI 
With respect to the regulation of the ESI the Electricity Control Board established in terms of the 
original Electricity Act (see Chapter 3) was supposed to have acted as a regulator of electricity 
supply in South Africa since 1922. Because of the dominant position of Eskom in the South 
African ESI the Electricity Control Board had, according to the NELF, little influence on the 
ESI, hence as a regulatory body it was ineffective, (NELF (a) 1994,p.26). The purpose of 
regulation was considered by the NELF to have three dimensions, these being Economic 
Regulation, Legal Regulation and Social Regulation. Specifically the purpose of Economic 
Regulation was to: 
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a) Ensure that the regulated entity carried out its business in an efficient and effective manner; 
b) Ensure that the regulated entity did not exercise discrimination among the different classes 
of consumers in its electricity tariffs; and 
c) Ensure that the regulated entity achieved similar financial returns to those that would be 
achieved by a similar entity subject to market forces. 
The purpose of legal regulation was to ensure that the laws governing electricity supply in South 
Africa were not broken, e.g., with regard to such items as safety regulations and land 
expropriation for public purposes such as the building of a power station. With regard to social 
regulation this would ensure that the regulated entity met social objectives principle amongst 
these being the electrification of black households in South Africa, (NELF (b), 1994,p.34). 
These then were the minimum regulatory requirements for the ESI as the NELF saw them. The 
normative rules for regulating a public utility like Eskom and the ESI as a whole that should have 
been observed by the Electricity Council were discussed in Chapter 2 of this study. 
As a consequence of these requirements the NELF recommended placing the "whole ESI under 
the oversight of a national regulator", (NELF (a), 1994, p.26). Legislation could then be prepared 
to either put in place a new regulatory authority i.e., a National Electricity Regulator (NER) or 
amend the Electricity Act to give greater powers to the Electricity Control Board. In the event the 
first option was chosen. 
3.4 Summary 
The National Electricity Forum was a very influential body that gathered together, between 1992 
and 1994, people of diverse skills, many from within the existing South African ESI, and others 
from outside the ESI. 
Because the constitution of the newly elected government of National Unity had not been 
finalised by the end of 1995 it was impossible for a final structure for the ESI to be formulated by 
that date. The NELF's recommendations were, nevertheless, of great import since they were 
formulated by the first group of specialists to address the problems of a coherent framework for a 
new South African electricity supply industry that would have to meet the challenges of future 
developments, challenges like the government's RDP which included a programme for 
electrifying the black households of South Africa. 
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The NELF examined, and gave opinions on, what would probably be the most troublesome issues 
with respect to the restructuring and regulation of the ESI. In these deliberations the question of 
the electrification of black households and Eskom' s role in undertaking this task was subject to 
much consideration. It is clear that the NELF regarded the programme as being of vital 
consequence to the economic, social and political well being of South Africa274. Their approach 
was nonetheless pragmatic and suitable emphasis was given to other, equally pressing problems 
as far as electricity supply was concerned. So far as Eskom was concerned the work of the 
Restructuring and Regulation Working group recognised the central position the Corporation 
occupied in the whole electrification process. This recognition was of course very important, and 
threw into sharp contrast the view of Eskom which emanated from the ANC's National Meeting 
on Electrification. As a consequence of this recognition the electrification of black households in 
South Mrica and Eskom have become synonymous. 
As previously noted the findings of the working group on Restructuring and Regulation were the 
only ones of the various NELF committees to be submitted to Cabinet in the period covered by 
this study. These recommendations were accepted and, in order to implement them, two acts of 
parliament were passed by the House of Assembly and the Senate during November 1994. These 
Acts were: 
a) The Electricity Amendment Act, which provided that all suppliers of electricity (including 
Eskom and local government suppliers) would be required to operate under the authority of a 
license issued by a National Electricity Regulator, (NER); and 
b) The Mineral and Energy Laws Rationalisation Act, which made the South African mineral 
and energy laws applicable to the TBVC states and the SGT's and which would allow Eskom 
to take over the electricity supply to these areas. 275 
On the 1st March 1995 the NER was officially established. Licences to supply electricity were 
issued to Eskom and various municipalities on the 1st September 1995. The NER also set down 
certain criteria that electricity suppliers had to meet if they were to obtain a license, e.g., adequate 
suitably qualified staff, approved tariffing structures, financial integrity etc. Ironically these 
criteria were impossible to enforce. This was because if electricity supply rights were taken away 
from municipalities that did not meet these criteria they would be crippled financially.276 
274 Interview with Mr. K. Morgan, 25th July 1996. 
275 The existing Electricity Act allowed Eskorn to distribute electricity within the Republic of South 
Africa only. 
276 With respect to this issue Dr I.e. McRae and Mr Kevin Morgan of the NER met the Minister of 
Mineral and Energy Mr Pik Botha and also Mr Rolf Meyer. McRae and Morgan were instructed 
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Municipalities invariably funded other services from the revenue earned from selling electricity, 
which they in tum bought in bulk from Eskom.277 
The dichotomy was then that the NER had the legal power to withdraw an electricity supplier's 
license but in many cases it dared not do so. The NER was therefore in 1995 quite incapable of 
undertaking the task of restructuring the South African ESI. As a consequence an Electricity 
Working Group was appointed (which reported jointly to the Minister of Provincial Affairs and 
Constitutional Development and the Minister of Minerals and Energy) to investigate the financial 
relationship between local government and the electricity supply sector as a first step in this 
restructuring process. This working group was made up of personnel from Eskom, the three tiers 
of government (central, provincial and local) and the Treasury. It is suggested that a serious 
omission to the membership of this working group was the labour movement and key electricity 
consumers in industry and commerce. Their presence would surely have added an essential 
element into the debate with respect to acceptable wage levels and the levels of tariffs that 
industry could sensibly afford. The working group was still pondering the problems associated 
with the financial relationship between Local Government and the electricity supply sector at the 
end of 1995.278 
In spite of the problems attached to the NER its establishment was an important institutional 
change that occurred in the period 1990-1995 with respect to the electrification of black 
households in South Africa. It was an institution that allowed Eskom to expand its area of supply 
in its endeavours to carry out a nation-wide electrification programme. The other important 
institutional change that occurred in this period that would influence the electrification of black 
households in South Africa was the restructure of Eskom, this is considered next. 
3.5 Restructuring of Eskom 
In 1991 Eskom was restructured. This restructuring "was designed to support the electrification 
programme and accelerate harmonisation with the country's changed socio-political climate", 
(Eskom Annual Report 1991, p.8, Chief Executive's Report). The mood amongst Eskom's 
not to remove licences to supply electricity held by offending municipalities because of the 
fmancial problems that would ensue, interview with Mr Morgan, 25th July 1996. 
277 This point was subsequently recognised in the White Paper on the Energy Policy of South Africa 
(December, 1998, p.42, section a). 
278 In the White Paper on Energy Policy in the Republic of South Africa of December 1998 mention 
was made of this Electricity Working Group. It would seem that many of the problems attached to 
the restructuring of the South African ESI which existed in 1992, and mentioned in this section, 
are still unresolved, see Postscript in Chapter 10. 
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executive with regard to the electrification of black households at the time of this restructuring 
process can be summed up in a statement made in Eskom in Perspective (1991, P. 16) which said 
"every household has a need for energy. Electricity is the cheapest source of energy, outstripping 
coal, gas, paraffin and candles. Also, the customer has to invest time and money into bringing the 
latter forms of energy into his home. The question is no longer whether the poor can afford to 
have electricity. The question is: can the poor afford not to have electricity". 
Four line functions were created in this restructuring these being Generation, Transmission, Sales 
and Customer Services and, of the utmost importance to Eskom's electrification programme, a 
Marketing and Electrification Group under an Executive Director Mr AJ. Morgan, who was to 
become Eskom's Chief Executive Officer after Dr McRae retired. Within this group a National 
Electrification Planning Division was established. Finance, Human Resources and Technology 
(Engineering) became staff functions. The restructuring exercise was to take place over several 
years and be refined in the process. To make Eskom's task of electrifying black households in 
South Africa easier the Corporation's 12 distribution regions were reduced to 5, these being 
Bloemfontein, Cape Town, Durban, Johannesburg and Pretoria. This reorganisation seemingly 
concentrated on Eskom's public sector role, unlike the reorganisation of 1985 (see Chapter 4) 
when the private sector role was emphasised with the possibility of privati sing Eskom being an 
important consideration in the way the Corporation was restructured at that time. 
4.0 FINANCIAL AND ECONOMIC CHANGES AND 
ELECTRIFICATION 
This section discusses Eskom's own financial and economic performance in the period 1990-
1995. Again, just as for the period 1980-1990 (see Chapter 4), the topics covered are: 1) 
Electricity Sales and Revenue, 2) Electricity tariffs, 3) Capital Expenditure and Borrowings and 
4) Generation Plant. In addition, a very important macro-economic study concerning black 
household electrification that was commissioned by Eskom's Chairman Dr John Maree is 
commented upon. 
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4 . 1 E s k 0 m 's E con 0 m i c Per for man c e: 1 9 9 0 - 1 9 9 5 279 
4.1.1 Electricity sales and revenue 
In 1990 total electricity sales grew by 1,4 per cent, down from the 3,7 per cent growth recorded in 
1989. The highest growth rate in terms of supply category was in bulk electricity sales to 
municipalities, which increased by 8,5 per cent. This high growth rate was partly due to the fact 
that certain municipalities had taken over the supply of electricity to consumers in their area and 
which Eskom had formally serviced directly (which fact accounted for a decline of 11,4 per cent 
in electricity Eskom supplied to the domestic sector in 1990). Eskom did, however, then provide 
increasing amounts of bulk electricity to the municipalities concerned. Negative growth in 
electricity sales took place in all other supply categories except for rural supplies, which increased 
by 5,9 per cent. This increase Eskom attributed to aggressive marketing. Marketing electricity 
became an important pursuit from 1990 onwards and in each of Eskom's distribution regions 
marketing departments had been strengthened by the creation of sales teams. In particular there 
were specialists agricultural and industrial sales staff in 50 districts throughout South Africa.280 
The low growth rate in electricity sales in 1990 reflected a depressed South African economy 
with Eskom forecasting that the low growth rate in electricity sales would continue into 1991, 
(Eskom Annual Report, 1990, p.9). 
Electricity revenue in 1990 amounted to RIO 736 million (R9 271 million in 1989). After net 
interest, finance and abnormal charges had been met Eskom's net income was R845 million (R 
728 million in 1989).281 To counter losses in revenue growth from reduced electricity sales 
Eskom took up initiatives for reducing operational expenditure and estimated that by these means 
R120 million had been saved in 1990. The Corporation's debt/equity ratio stood at 2,7 in 1990 
(1989: 2,8). 
True to Eskom's forecast 1991 was characterised by low economic growth in the national 
economy (GDP showed a negative growth of 0,6 per cent). Electricity sales growth was, however. 
marginally above that of the previous year and amounted to 1,8 per cent. Revenue increased to 
279 The references for the statistics quoted in this section are the same as those used in analysing 
Eskom's Economic Performance for the period 1980 to1990 cited in Chapter 4. 
280 Supporting their specialist sales staff there were two marketing divisions, Agrelek for the 
agricultural market and Industrelek for the commercial, mining and industrial sectors. The idea 
behind the formation of these marketing divisions was the promotion of safe and efficient use of 
electricity and the desire to increase Eskom's share of the energy market. 
281 Abnormal charges were for such things as the non-payment for electricity. As noted Eskom was 
from 1990 not being paid by the TP A for electricity supplied to Greater Soweto. 
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Rll 726 million whilst operating expenditure was R7 173 million. The net income received by 
Eskom was R988 million. Once again Eskom claimed that tight financial controls had resulted in 
the Corporation offsetting some of the inflationary pressures on its operating costs, but still R325 
million was set aside to cover abnormal items of which R291 million related to payment arrears 
being carried by Eskom. These occurring from some municipalities failing to pay, partly or in 
full, for the supply of bulk electricity, (Eskom Annual Report, 1991, p.5). 
In 1992 South Africa's economic growth improved and amounted to a 2 per cent increase in 
GOP. Eskom's turnover was, however, nearly 8 per cent up on 1991 reflecting a further revenue 
increase of R923 million. There was, as a consequence, an improved net income of Rl 489 
million. The improvement in net income, was a direct result of Eskom acquiring ownership of the 
Greater Soweto electricity distribution network. This acquisition reversed "the provision for 
arrear debts previously provided", (Eskom Annual Report, 1992, p.15).282 Eskom's electricity 
sales for 1992 declined, however, by minus 0,4 per cent. This was the first time since 1945 that 
electricity sales volumes had had a negative growth with sales in the industrial, commercial and 
mining sectors down 2,4 per cent on volume. Sales of domestic electricity increased by 40,9 per 
cent, however, due to new connections being made as a consequence of Eskom's programme to 
electrify black households. 
~uring 1993 South Africa's GOP again rose, this time by 1,1 per cent and electricity sales 
rebounded from the decline in 1992 to a level of 4,1 per cent, this being the largest growth in the 
previous five years. Sales revenue rose accordingly to R 13 793 million and again it was reported 
by Eskom, that operating costs were curbed by good management practices. Arrears debts still 
continued to plague the Corporation, however, and R167 million was set aside to cover these. Net 
income, even allowing for arrear debts, amounted to R 1 646 million, an increase of some 10,5 
per cent over the previous year. 
Eskom's Revenue for 1994 increased by 11,8 per cent to R 15 417 million with electricity sales 
showing an increase overall of 3,9 per cent. Net income amounted to R2 268 million a 37,8 per 
cent increase over 1993. The upturn in electricity sales was reported by Eskom to be the result of 
increased activity in the agricultural and metals section of the economy. Arrears for the non-
payment of electricity which still persisted was particularly troublesome to Eskom because its 
financial policy required the Corporation to recover the costs of supplying electricity to each 
consumer group and earning a real return on assets, (a la the recommendations of the de Villiers 
Commission), (Eskom Annual Report, 1994, p.14). The continuing non-payment by certain 
282 The value of this network quoted in Eskom's Financial Statements 1992 was R204 million. 
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municipalities threatened the success of this policy. In spite of non-payment problems Eskom 
pressed on resolutely with its electrification programme. 
In 1995 there was a modest sales growth of 2,8 per cent and revenue increased by 11 per cent to 
R 17 114 million. Operating expenditure also increased, however by 13,6 per cent to R 11 315 
million. Arrear debt increased by R 302 million giving an accumulated debt ofRl 175 million.283 
In 1995 several older less efficient power stations were decommissioned, allowing Eskom to 
replace this expensive electricity by cheaper power from their more modem stations. The cost of 
this decommissioning exercise was R247 million. Eskom's debt/equity ratio continued to 
improve, however, and stood at 1,44 as against 1,73 in 1994. Net income amounted to R2 716 
million, an increase of 19,8 per cent over the previous year. 
4.1.2 Electricity tariffs 
Eskom's rational so far as tariff setting during 1990 was that a low electricity price would help 
South Africa's fight against inflation and encourage export-driven economic growth. Eskom's 
tariff policy was therefore to keep the price increases for electricity year-on-year below the ruling 
rate of inflation as represented by the PPI. The price increase for 1990 had, however, been set 
prior to this policy and amounted to 14 per cent. This new pricing policy, required that over the 
next five years the price of electricity would be reduced by 20 per cent in real terms, (Eskom 
Annual Report, 1990, p.8). The 1991 electricity price increase of8 per cent (effective from the 1st 
January 1991) was therefore below the rate of inflation. 
In 1992 the electricity tariff rose by 8,3 per cent and Eskom was aided in its bid to maintain tariff 
levels below inflation by low increases in the costs of primary energy used at power stations. This 
primary energy included raw water, nuclear fuel, oil and coal. Water, oil and nuclear fuels 
increased in price by 7,9 per cent over 1991 while the cost of coal increased by 8 per cent. 
The electricity tariff increase in 1993 was 8 per cent and flat rate tariffs were introduced for 
domestic consumers in black townships, (Eskom Annual Report, 1993, p.68).284 
283 Eskom found comfort in the fact that large electricity conswners e.g., the Mining and the 
Manufacturing sector contributed about 80 per cent of the Corporation's revenue. Clearly these 
conswners together with paying domestic conswners were cross-subsidising the non-payers in 
spite of the recommendations of the de Villiers Commission. The reform process being 
undertaken by the government made it politically difficult for Eskom to discontinue the supply of 
electricity to non-payers, in fact McRae was wholly opposed to cutting off the supply of electricity 
to non-paying black conswners, interview with Dr McRae 30th October 1996. 
284 The rationale behind the introduction of the flat rate tariffs will be explained in Chapter 8 when 
Eskom's electrification programme for 1990 to 1995 is discussed. 
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In 1994 the electricity tariff rose by 7 per cent, again below the rate of inflation, and this was the 
lowest electricity price increase since 1984. In spite of the introduction of the flat rate tariff for 
black townships in 1993 the problem of non-payment for electricity continued. Eskom did 
mention in their Annual Report (1994, p.lO) that the aspirations of the RDP's electrification 
programme would not be met if the non-payment for services continued to be the norm amongst 
newly connected townships. 
The electricity price increase in 1995 was 4 per cent against an inflation level of 8,7 per cent. 
This being the lowest tariff increase in the years 1990 to 1995. Again the low increases in 
Eskom's primary energy costs helped the Corporation keep its tariffs well below national 
inflation levels, e.g., the cost of coal, which was Eskom's major primary energy requirement, and 
the commodity that they almost exclusively relied upon to generate electricity, rose in price by 
only 6,7 per cent during 1995 below the level of inflation in South Africa, (Eskom Annual 
Report, 1995, p.25). 
4.1.3 Capital expenditure and borrowings 
In the 1990 Annual Report (p.8) Eskom's Chairman Dr John Maree said that "Eskom's long-
term financial position remains strong and will continue and improve as we utilise current excess 
capacity and reduce capital expenditure". This reference to Eskom's excess capacity was an 
important signal that the Corporation was contemplating using this excess capacity for an 
electrification programme and no new power stations would be required to service the 
programme. Because of its excess generating capacity Eskom fully expected to move to a position 
of relatively low capital requirements in the period 1990 -1995. As a result of declining electricity 
sales during 1990 provision had to be made for Eskom to continue with the mothballing of 
several power stations and suspend operations at associated collieries. The capital expenditure 
involved amounted to R 128 million. This mothballing exercise was, as previously noted, 
criticised by the ANC, see of the Proceedings of the ANC's National Electrification Meeting 
(p.156). Mothballing older power stations was, however, a sound economic move under the 
electricity demand conditions prevailing. With this mothballing exercise Eskom removed less 
efficient power stations from the system and produced the required electricity with more efficient 
stations. Capital expenditure for operational purposes was reduced by R 120 million partly due to 
staff reductions, for example Eskom had 51 554 employees in 1989 and 50 000 in 1990, (Eskom 
Annual Report, 1990, p.4). In 1990 Eskom was forced to raise R 1 208 million more than the R 3 
139 budgeted because of higher than assumed loan repayments and, although Eskom was, 
because of its declining expansion programme, reducing its capital requirements, the Corporation 
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still remained vulnerable to increasing interest rates. Eskom's total borrowings stood at R 26 590 
million at the end of 1990 as against R 24630 at the end of 1989. 
In 1991 net capital expenditure amounted to R 3 335 million a reduction of R 327 million over 
1990 which indicated a slowing down of Eskom's capital expansion programme. To reduce 
finance charges on its interest bearing debt Eskom introduced a programme of financial risk 
management in 1991, (Eskom Annual Report, 1991, p.19)?85 Because of higher than budgeted 
sales and lower operating and financing costs together with reduced capital expenditure a greater 
than budgeted inflow of funds occurred in 1991. A reduced borrowing programme was therefore 
reflected in the Corporation's accounts, the variance being R 1 027 million. As a consequence of 
the political reform programme underway in South Africa in 1991 Eskom was, however, able to 
borrow more by way of foreign loans than expected, R 407 million actual as against R 250 
million budgeted. A surplus of capital resulted which was used mainly to redeem money market 
liabilities but also for funding the programme to electrify black households which Eskom had by 
now embarked upon. 
In 1992 Eskom incurred capital expenditure of R 3 611 million. Most of this was financed from 
internal cash flows as Eskom's balance sheet continued to strengthen as did its debt/equity ratio, 
which was 2,21 as against 2,49 in the previous year, (Eskom Annual Report, p.ll). Because 
favourable conditions prevailed in the South African capital market Eskom was able to satisfy its 
loan requirements without difficulty. In 1992 the Corporation also successfully floated its first 
public long-dated bond issues in the international capital market since 1985, the E170 and El71, 
the total issue amounting to R 780 million. Net interest and finance charges amounted to R 2 987 
million (a decrease of 8 per cent over 1991). These charges were covered 1,52 times by net 
operating income. Eskom claimed that because of careful operating and capital expenditure the 
budget for interest and finance charges was curtailed by R 293 million. Whilst the bonds 
mentioned above were well received by investors financial rectitude was important at this time 
because of the rather unstable political situation in South Africa (ANC posturing and the CP and 
government's electoral battles) which could influence Eskom's ability to raise loans on foreign 
capital markets. 
Eskom's planned funding requirement for 1992 (R 2 147 million) had to be raised to R 3 000 
million in 1993 as a result of higher loan repayments from increased capital expenditure on the 
electrification of black households. Because it was foreseen that vast capital expenditure would be 
needed for this project in future years Eskom launched the Electrification Participation Note 
285 The risk management strategy was composed of a variety of instruments including forward 
exchange cover. 
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which was designed to share the financial risk attached to the electrification programme between 
Eskom and various investors, (Eskom Annual Report, 1993, pp.9&19).286 Arrear debts attached 
to the electrification programme continued to rise and a provision of R 248 million was made for 
this contingency in 1993. With respect to foreclosing on their debts Eskom began, during the 
year, taking over certain local authorities electricity reticulation systems with these assets 
bolstering the Corporation's Balance Sheet. Net interest and finance charges in 1993 amounted to 
R 3 147 million giving an increase of 5,4 per cent over 1992. Capital expenditure on fixed assets 
increased from R 3 242 million in 1992 to R 3 591 million in 1993 primarily as a result of the 
resumption in construction activities at Majuba power station and the completion of Kendal 
power station. Capital expenditure on Eskom's electrification programme in 1993 was also 
considerable and amounted to R 584 million, (Eskom Annual Report, 1993, p.4). There was, 
however, high availability in South Mrican capital markets in 1993 due to the lifting of sanctions 
against the country. Major funding was raised on the local capital market and this amounted to R 
2497 million, R 657 million was raised on foreign capital markets. Eskom's net interest bearing 
debt stood at R 28027 million. 
In 1994 Eskom's Chairman Dr John Maree described the non-payment for electricity as one of 
"the most significant financial threats facing Eskom", (Annual Report, 1994, p.9). Eskom 
continued, however, partly financing its capital expenditure from income, which expenditure 
included the cost of the Corporation's programme to electrify black households in South Mrica. 
The result of this internal financing was that borrowings expressed as a percentage of total assets 
was reducing, and the debt/equity ratio fell to 1,7 with net interest and finance charges increasing 
by only 1,2 per cent to R 3 186 million. Net expenditure on capital items such as plant and 
equipment used in the building of Majuba power station, and transmission lines amounted to R4 
192 million. The electrification programme took up R 808 million of that total, (Eskom Annual 
Report, 1994, p.15). Although the South Mrican capital market in 1994 was the severest bear 
market in the previous decade, with interest rates rising by 4 percentage points in a five month 
period, Eskom' s financial planning was largely unaffected by this because of hedging strategies 
which had been put in place in 1993. Eskom did, however, draw up contingency plans to deal 
with possible disruptions in the financial markets as a result of the forthcoming General Election 
in April 1994 which brought the ANC to power, (Eskom Annual Report, 1994, p.15). In 1994 the 
level of non-payment for electricity by certain municipalities continued to plague Eskom with 
arrears reaching over R 900 million by the 31st December 1994.287 
286 Eskom's Electrification Participation Note will be discussed further in Chapter 9. 
287 This topic will be discussed further in Chapter 9 when the fmancial impact of the electrification 
progranune is analysed. Eskom in gentlemanly fashion never identified municipalities that fell 
into arrears with electricity payments in their Annual Reports for the period. 
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Eskom's capital budget for 1995 indicated a requirement of R 4 950 million. Better than 
anticipated electricity sales reduced that requirement to R 3 765 million, however. Foreign 
market loans amounted to R 940 million with Eskom's interest bearing debt rising to R 27 278 
million at the end of 1995. Arrears from the non-payment for electricity continued into 1995 and 
increased by a further R 302 million to R 1 175 million thus adversely effecting Eskom's 
profitability, (Eskom Annual Report, 1995, p.31). Net interest and finance charges on loans 
amounted to R 2 716 million an increase of 19,8 per cent over 1994. In spite of this, however, 
Eskom's debt/equity ratio fell to 1,44 showing a strengthening in the Corporation's asset 
situation. 
4.1.4 Generating plant requirements 
In 1990 Eskom reported having 4 686 MW of excess generating capacity available, (Eskom 
Annual Report, 1990, p.17). In actual terms this amounted to over 9 x 500 MW generating sets or 
1.5 Kriel power stations, Kriel being the first of Eskom' s "new generation" super power stations 
to be completed. This excess generating capacity could be used for supplying electricity to black 
households in South Africa without a new power station being built. The generating plant 
brought into service in 1990 included the final turbine-generator set at Letaba power station, thus 
bringing another major power station in Eskom's massive generation expansion programme 
which the Corporation had embarked upon in the mid 70' s to completion. 
In the years between 1990 and 1995 the generating plant on order by Eskom began to diminish as 
more new power stations were brought forward to completion. By 1993, only the Majuba power 
station was left to be completed. The construction of Majuba was continued in 1994 and 1995. In 
1994 Eskom decommissioned six of their older smaller power stations. Even after this 
decommissioning programme Eskom was left with some 2 720 MW of excess generation 
capacity. 288 
In 1995 the only plant on order by Eskom was for the Majuba Power Station situated at 
Volksrust, (Eskom Annual Report, 1995, p.18). Majuba was the last of the power stations ordered 
by Eskom under the Corporation's massive generation expansion programme of the late 70's, 
80' s and 90' s to serve a demand for electricity that ironically materialised only in part. 
288 This excess generating capacity was greater than the generating capacity of the rest of Sub-
Saharan Africa, Eskom Statistical Year Book (1993), and was quite large enough to service the 
requirements of Eskom' s electrification programme in the period 1990-1995. 
: 
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4.1.5 Summary 
The most important statistics discussed in this section are brought together for convenience in 
Table No 7.1 below . 
. ELECTRIC'ITY REVENUE 
........................... 
···YEAR . . ·SALES:R(MILLIONS) 
PERCENTAGE 
: .......... :. ]:l'i<::REASE •. 
1990 1,4 10 736 14,0 26590 
1991 1,8 11 726 8,0 27266 
1992 -0.4 12 649 8,3 27 616 
1993 4,p89 13 793 8,0 28 027 
1994 3,9 15 417 7,0 27884 
1995 2,8 17 114 4,0 27278 
TABLE NO 7.1 ESKOM OPERATING STATISTICS: 1990 - 1995 
Source: Eskom Annual Reports for various the years. 
4.2 The BEPA Macro-Economic Study on Electrification 
With the change in the government's attitude to political, social and economic reform after Mr 
F. W. de Klerk came to power in 1989, the seeming success of the electrification of Elandskraal 
mentioned already in Chapter 5 and the ANC's statement on the role of parastatal institutions in 
the South African economy, noted above in the discussion on political changes, it seems probable 
that Eskom' s Chairman Dr John Maree thought it expedient to review his policy on the 
electrification issue. What is certain is that Maree commissioned in 1989 the Bureau for 
Economic Policy and Analysis (BEPA) in the University of Pretoria to determine the direct and 
indirect economic consequences of providing the necessary number of transmission and 
reticulation structures needed to electrify 7,5 million black urban homes between 1990 and 2015, 
(De Wet, 1990).290 
In summary the BEP A analysis estimated that 1) the influence of such an electrification 
programme on employment, i.e., the job creating effects of the programme would amount to 
between 1 800000 and 2250000 new jobs by the year 2015 and 2) the impact on South Africa's 
GDP, i.e., the percentage economic growth rate would amount to a minimum cumulative 
289 As Eskom's electrification programme really got under way electricity sales increased 
substantially, non payment was, however, a major problem. 
290 The results of the BEPA study, which in the author's opinion are flawed, are discussed in detail in 
Chapter 8. 
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increases of 24 per cent by the year 2015, BEPA Report, (1990). What the analysis did not 
attempt to do was to calculate the financial impact of this investment on Eskom itself.291 In spite 
of this omission the macro-economic benefits postulated in the report that would arise from a 
large-scale black household electrification programme must have been very encouraging so far as 
Eskom's Chairman was concerned. In any event in 1990, Eskom proceeded with a programme to 
electrifY black households in South Mrica. 
5.0 CONCLUSIONS 
The discussions undertaken in this chapter endeavoured to provide sufficient information for 
answering the following question; why did Eskom undertake a progranune to electrifY black 
households in South Mrica in the period 1990-1995? Using this information the reasons 
suggested for Eskom's decision are as follows: 
5.1 Political Changes and Electrification 
a) The government's reintroduction of its political reform initiatives in the period 1990-1995 
after they had been curtailed in the last half of the preceding decade was a major influence in 
encouraging Eskom to undertake their black household electrification progranune. 
b) The ANC's statement in Harare concerning the role they saw parastatals playing in the 
future infrastructural development process in South Mrica also sent Eskom a clear signal. 
This signal said that if Eskom failed to embrace, and contribute to this development process, 
the Corporation may be nationalised if the ANC came to power. The history of Eskom up to 
the time the Corporation undertook its programme to electrify black households in South 
Mrica suggests that nationalisation was anathema to Eskom's management. For example, 
Eskom's first Chairman, Dr van der Bijl, sought to limit the government's involvement in 
Eskom's decision-making (see Chapter3). That this spirit prevailed into the eighties is 
evidenced by the Financial Mail (3rd November 1993) accusing Eskom of "being a law unto 
itself'. Even after the de Villiers Commission of Inquiry and the government's attempt to 
exert a greater influence on Eskom (for purposes of privatising not nationalising the 
Corporation) it was reported in the NELF's Final Report on the Restructuring and 
Regulation of the South African Electricity Supply Industry in 1994 that Eskom's influence 
was so great that it rendered the Electricity Control Board ineffective. Which was why 
291 An analysis of the fInancial costs ofEskom's electrifIcation programme would only be undertaken 
in 1992. This analysis will be reported upon in detail in Chapter 8. 
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perhaps it was decided that the Control Board should be replaced by a new National 
Electricity Regulator. Nationalisation then went against Eskom's tradition and if undertaking 
a programme to electrifY black households was one way of avoiding this Eskom's 
management would find the means to undertake such a programme. It can be argued then 
that Eskom's decision to undertake a black household electrification programme was aimed 
at placing the Corporation in a favourable light with both the government and the ANC 
thereby avoiding the possibility of nationalisation; thus demonstrating that politics was 
central to that decision. 
5.2 Institutional Changes and Electrification 
With respect to electrification and the institutional changes that occurred in the period 1990-1995 
it is suggested that these were consequences of the political agendas of Eskom, the government 
and the ANC. In the case of the restructuring ofEskom, it inter-alia, offered practical proof to the 
ANC, and the government, that Eskom was paying attention to the changing political milieu of 
South Africa and that the Corporation could be relied upon to undertake development projects 
without government interference. The wisdom of undertaking such projects was demonstrated to 
Eskom by the politicisation of the electrification of black households at the ANC's National 
Meeting on Electrification in Cape Town, in 1992. The replacement of the Electricity Control 
Board by the National Electricity Regulator can be viewed in part as stemming from the desire by 
the ANC for an independent institution that could undertake the task of restructuring a 
fragmented ESI thus ensuring that social objectives, such as the provision of electricity to black 
households, would be met. The NER, because it could issue electricity supply licences, would also 
be important to Eskom as they sought to increase their areas of supply. It would have the effect 
then of also ensuring the sustainability of Eskom's black household electrification programme. 
5.3 Financial and Economic Changes and Electrification 
a) So far as Eskom's financial performance was concerned from 1985 to 1992 it was dominated 
by falling electricity sales. This situation surely encouraged Eskom to initiate a programme 
which would boost such sales and long-term profitability. Hence a nation-wide electrification 
programme which would increase Eskom's customer-base would have been welcomed.292 
292 From interviews with Dr I.C. McRae it is clear that he thought the non-payment issue would be 
solved by sound management of electricity supply to black households. McRae categorically 
refused to accept that a "culture of non-payment" existed amongst black householders. 
Furthermore, at the start of their electrification programme Eskom fmnly believed that the 
average monthly electricity consumption amongst newly connected black households would be 
greater than it eventually turned out to be. On both these issues Eskom was to be proved wrong, 
see Chapter 9. 
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b) By 1990 the rate of increase in Eskom's total borrowings had begun to fall (by 1995 they 
were falling in absolute terms). This situation, taken together with the fact that Eskom's 
massive generation expansion programme was coming to an end and there was excess 
generating capacity available may also have encouraged Eskom to undertake a programme to 
electrify black households and glean the political benefits arising from such a programme. 
The money could be found, the generating capacity was available and so was the manpower; 
evidently the will was as well. 
c) With respect to the very substantial macro-economic benefits that the BEPA analysis 
postulated would arise from the electrification of black households in South Africa it is 
suggested that these, at the very least, provided Eskom's Chairman Dr John Maree with the 
exigency he needed to overcome the constraints the de Villiers Commission of Inquiry had 
placed on such a programme. The BEPA results therefore allowed Maree to get Eskom 
involved in a programme to electrify black households and encouraged him to 
wholeheartedly throw his weight behind the programme. 293 
293 In an interview with Dr Maree, 23rd October 1998 he was at pains to point out the magnitude of 
the benefits to the nation that would arise from Eskom's electrification programme. And after all 
it was Eskom's duty, as a public utility, to maximise the benefits accruing to the nation from 
electricity usage. With this thought in mind a legitimate question that does present itself, 
considering the government's renewed attempts at reform and social upliftment from the time de 
Klerk came to power in 1989, is why didn't the government instruct Eskom to undertake a 
programme to electrify black households as part of their reform initiative? The simple answer is 
probably that they had no need to. Both Maree and McRae had every reason for involving Eskom 
in such a programme on their own volition. This was because, as noted already, Maree, on his 
own admission, was highly political and he doubtless would have wished to be considered 
supportive of the government's reform initiatives as would the Electricity Council which was 
appointed by the government. The threat of nationalisation discussed above would also playa role 
in Eskom undertaking a programme to electrify black households. With respect to McRae he had 
long wanted Eskom to become involved in a programme to electrify black households for altruistic 
reasons. Furthermore, no record could be found by the author of a government directive to Eskom 
to undertake an electrification programme. In interviews with both Maree and McRae they both 
maintain that Eskom's efforts to electrify black households from 1990 was an Eskom initiative. 
Having Eskom undertake this programme on its own volition did of course enable the government 
to limit their confrontation with the CP on the subject of reform and black social upliftment. The 
government could not be accused therefore, as they had been in the previous decade, of using state 
institutions for the benefit of blacks. 
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CHAPTER 8 
DESCRIPTION OF ESKOM'S PROGRAMME TO ELECTRIFY 
BLACK HOUSEHOLDS: 1990-1995 
1.0 INTRODUCTION 
Having determined why Eskom decided to undertake a nation-wide programme to electrify black 
households (commonly called the "Electricity for All" programme) from 1990 this chapter 
concentrates on describing the programme itself and attempting to answer the following questions: 
1) How large was the task facing Eskom? 
2) How did the programme get under way? 
3) Was there a cohesive plan underpinning the programme? 
4) How did Eskom's electrification programme fit into the ANC's Reconstruction and 
Development Programme (RDP)? 
5) How many houses, schools and clinics were supplied with electricity between 1990-1995? 
And 
6) What was the capital cost of the programme? 
In addition issues concerning the non-payment for electricity and the level of electricity sales to 
newly connected consumers will be addressed. 
2.0 THE SITUATION WITH REGARD TO HOUSEHOLD 
ELECTRIFICATION IN 1990 
In 1990 almost all white dwellings in South Africa were electrified. Black dwellings in contrast, 
both in urban and rural areas, had very little access to electricity. To try and see what this 
statement means with regard to the numbers of unelectrified houses in South Africa reference can 
be made to statistics gathered over many years by Eskom. These statistics reveal that in 1990 the 
numbers of electrified and unelectrified dwellings in the Republic, the TBVC states, (the Transkei, 
Bophuthatswana, Venda and the Ciskei), the Self Governing Territories (SGTs) and Development 
Trust Areas (DT As) were as shown in Table No 8.1 below. 
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... . .. _----- .................... . 
ESTIMATED ... . PERCENTAGE OF 
.- .................. . 
.. . . ..... ---- -- ............................ - ....... . 
··TOTALNOOF • DWELLINGS ·.GEOGRAPBlCAL REGION 
. ··········.·DWELLINGS ELEC'l'lUFIED 
RSA METROPOLITAN 
AREAS 
RSA CITIES & TOWNS 
TBVCSTATES 
SGTS 
DTAS 
TOTALS 
2139000 
1288000 
1 129000 
1398000 
85000 
6039000 
80 
51 
5 
11 
38 
. .......... --------_ ........... . 
. -- .. - - _ ... . 
NOO], 
DWELI..lNGS 
.......... -- .. ------ ....... . 
.. ....... --- - . 
..... ELECTRIFIED . 
1 711200 
656880 
56450 
153780 
32300 
2610 610 
TABLE NO 8.1 NUMBER OF URBAN ELECTRIFIED HOUSES IN THE RSA, TBVC 
STATES, SGTS AND DTAS: 1990 
Source: Eskom's National Electrification Planning Division. 
According to Eskom's figures the number of dwellings that had access to electricity (excluding 
white commercial farms which, by 1990 had largely all been electrified) amounted to 
approximately 2,6 million leaving about 3,4 million dwellings unelectrified294. If white-owned 
electrified farms are included in the total of dwellings with access to electricity then the number 
was in excess of 2,7 million. The total number of homes in the RSA metropoles and towns from 
Table No 8.1 amounts to 3 427 000 which does tend to agree with the NELF data base for such 
houses in 1991 which amounted to 3505585. Some confidence in Eskom's figures is engendered 
then both from the NELF fmdings of one year after Eskom estimates and Trollip' s figures for 
1990. 
Furthermore, from the EPRET295 household database Table No 8.2 below is derived which shows 
the total number of unelectrified rural households both in the RSA and "homeland" areas. 
294 Trollip (1993, p.24) estimated that by 1990 about 2,5 million homes in urban areas had access to 
electricity which generally agrees with Eskom's estimate given in Table No 8.1 above. 
295 EPRET (Energy Policy Research and Training) is a major study underway at the Energy 
Development Research Centre (EDRC) in the University of Cape Town. The purpose of the EPRET 
project is to develop policy options for widening access to basic energy services for the urban and 
rural poor in South Africa. 
GEOGRAPBICAtREGION : 
WESTERN CAPE 
NORTHERN CAPE 
ORANGE FREE STATE 
EASTERN CAPE 
NATAL 
EASTERN TRANSVAAL 
NORTHERN TRANSVAAL 
PWV 
WESTERN TRANSVAAL 
TOTALS 
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............ _--------- -- ........... . 
... ."- --- - - --. 
" .. ""." ':'lttJRAl.(· 
Rt.JRA.t·RSA "" <::::.::..::::<: ... 
:·.·.ffOMELAN.DS·: 
95244 0 
42612 53517 
176404 50213 
70544 394810 
127375 823927 
130236 88012 
45872 616780 
95644 168478 
95021 III 120 
878952 2306857 
95244 
96129 
226617 
465354 
951302 
218248 
662652 
264122 
206141 
3 185809 
TABLE NO 8.2 NUMBERS OF UNELECTRIFIED HOUSES IN RURAL RSA AND 
HOMELANDS: 1990 
Source: EPRET household data base (1990), cited in Horvei and Dahl (1994,p.13). 
From Table No 8.1 if the houses in the TBVC states the SGT's and those in the Development 
Trust Areas which were unelectrified are assumed to be in rural areas then this total amounts to 2 
369 470, which generally agrees with the figure of 2 306 857 given in Table No 8.2. These 
comparisons do indicate that the Eskom statistics of house numbers in the rural areas of the 
homelands also largely agree with the EPRET data base and further confidence can be placed 
therefore in Eskom's statistics in this respect. 
With respect to urban areas in the RSA from Table No 8.1 Eskom believed that 1 058 920 homes 
were without access to electricity. EPRET, estimated this figure to be 1,9 million if peri-urban 
areas were included. The characteristics of these homes is given in Table No 8.3 below. 
'})WELLlNG'l'YPE .. NUMBER 
FORMAL LOW INCOME 400000 
PLANNED SHACKS 500000 
UNPLANNED SHACKS 400000 
BACKYARD SHACKS 600000 
TOTAL 1900000 
TABLE NO 8.3 URBAN AND PERI-URBAN UNELECTRIFIED HOUSEHOLDS RSA: 
1990 
Source: EPRET Household Database (1990), cited in Horvei and Dahl (1994, p.12). 
If the figure of 1,9 million is correct this indicates that in 1990 when Eskom was contemplating 
embarking on a major programme to bring electricity to the black households of South Africa and 
the homelands there were at least 5,2 million homes that had been identified as having no access to 
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electricity296. This in itself constituted a fonnidable electrification programme for any government, 
let alone a public utility. 
In reality, the electrification task was even greater than the figures shown above indicated. The 
reason was that the numbers of homes without electricity estimated from Tables No 8.1, 8.2 and 
8.3 above, did not conform to later descriptions of homes that the NER decided needed to be 
electrified and which referred to any structure, room, outbuilding, lean-to shack or construction 
which. regardless of whether it conformed to any building standards, was used as a temporary or 
permanent habitation. The NER used this definition in their calculations of how many houses 
needed to be electrified in South Africa from 1995 onwards. These figures are given in Table No 
8.10 at the end of this chapter. 
3.0 THE ELECTRIFICATION OF BLACK HOUSEHOLDS 
SCHOOLS AND CLINICS 
3.1 General 
In it's 1990 Annual Report (p.3) Eskom announced that it supported a new "democratic outward-
looking South Africa and that "the goals of bringing affordable electricity to all" were closer to 
becoming a reality". The political advantages of this viewpoint were seemingly clear to Eskom 
and they went on to report that the government had decided that it did not regard Eskom as a 
suitable candidate for privatisation (or seemingly for nationalisation, author's addition) in the near 
future, (Eskom Annual Report, 1990, p.9). It will be recalled that the possibilities of privatising 
Eskom had been a consideration from the time that Maree had been appointed Chairman and this 
possibility had formerly influenced the Corporation's approach to becoming involved in a 
programme to electrify black households in South Africa. It is likely that the government now saw 
the benefits of Eskom continuing as a public utility so that it could aid their reform programme by 
providing electricity to black households. Eskom' s announcement then indicated that the 
Corporation was aware of the changing political milieu in South Africa and that it was eager to be 
seen to be supportive of the reforms going on. It is clear that by 1990 Eskom had decided to 
embrace the hair shirt of a costly electrification programme. This indicated that the differences in 
McRae's and Maree' s viewpoints in this regard were at last a thing of the past. Perhaps The South 
African Development Trust report on the post-electrification benefits in Elandskraal mentioned in 
Chapter 5 helped to achieve this. The Viljoen report on Elandskraal was still some two years away 
and it was only after the completion of Viljoen's study that it was realised that the Development 
296 The figure of 5.2 million homes is made up as follows: 3,4 million urban (Table No 8.1) + 0.9 
million une1ectrified houses in rural RSA (Table No 8.2) + 0.9 million peri-urban (Table No 8.3). 
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Trust Report presented an optimistic scenario and had overstated the benefits of electrification; 
just as the BEPA report was to do. By the time this was realised, however, Eskom's electrification 
programme was under way. 
So far as the electrification of black households in general was concerned, in Eskom's supplement 
to their 1991 Annual Report "Eskom in Perspective"(p.16) it was stated that almost "two thirds of 
South Africa's population did not have electricity at home and this approximates to 23 million 
people living in 3 million households country wide". 297 Eskom saw its challenge as making 
electricity available and affordable to these people.298 Eskom estimated that 700 000 of the 3 
million houses without electricity could be electrified by Eskom direct and the Corporation! 
I 
committed itself to electrifying these 700 000 houses by 1996.299 It was estimated that 160 OOO! 
! 
connections could be made each year. The remaining unelectrified houses, the 2,3 million, fell· 
within the jurisdiction of local authorities i.e., they were outside Eskom's area of supply. Eskom 
did, however, pledge itself to co-operate with these authorities and that there was "considerable 
scope for rationalisation of resources which can eliminate duplication and ultimately benefit the 
consumers", (Eskom in Perspective, 1991, p.16). Eskom also claimed that, a la the BEPA report, 
their electrification programme would create about 300 000 jobs by 1995 and improve South 
Africa's GDP growth by 3,4 per cent Eskom also quoted in Eskom in Perspective (1991, p.17) 
another interesting statistic also gathered from the Elandskraal survey that business turnover had 
increased on average by more than 50 per cent after electrification and "if this trend was multiplied 
several thousand times then electrification assumes national urgency". 300 
3.2 Orange Farm 
In 1990 an important electrification project presented itself to Eskom, this was at Orange Farm, a 
squatter community near Vereeniging. Orange farm started as an overflow community from 
Soweto and Sebokeng with squatters living on Wheeler's farm near Evaton, which eventually 
grew too small to accommodate them whereupon they moved to Orange Farm. At Orange Farm 
they could purchase erven of 120 square metres for R500 each. Purchasers could then erect shacks 
and apply for a very favourable loan from the National Housing Council with which to build a 
297 This figure for unelectrified households in South Africa does broadly agree with the figure of 2.8 
million found from the data given in Tables 8.1; 8.2 and 8.3 above. 
298 This mission statement was tempered in 1991 with the caveat that this electricity was for "those who 
want it and are prepared to pay for it", (Eskom Annual Report, 1991, p.6) 
299 Eskom had of course by this time to hand the results of the BEP A report which as mentioned 
already, encouraged the Corporation to undertake an electrification programme. 
300 These statistics were like those from the BEP A report suspect since they were probably based on 
the South African Development Trust and van Biljon surveys at Elandskraal in 1990. The figures 
found in these surveys appear to be unsustainable if the later Viljoen report is taken into account, 
see Chapter 5. 
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permanent dwelling, which would then replace the shack. Services at Orange Fann were very 
rudimentary e.g., there was no water borne sewerage, a shared water supply existed, there were 
dirt roads and of course no electricity.301 
One of the first mentions of Eskom becoming involved in providing electricity to Orange Fann 
can be found in a letter to Eskom's Vereeniging District Manager from Mr S. Boyle of Eskom's 
Electrification Planning Division.302 This letter said that Eskom had "been approached by both the 
community and the authorities at Orange Fann to advise and assist in the electrification of the 
settlement". It also stated that because of the "size of the project (eventually 12 000 erven) a great 
deal of policy-setting and planning will be required before any work can be done on the 
electrification proper". The authorities referred to in the letter were the Transvaal Provincial 
Administration (TP A). 
Certain events concerning Orange Fann prior to the receipt of this letter by Eskom are worth 
recording.303 Dr I. C. McRae had targeted Orange Fann for electrification and together with Mr 1. 
Du Plessis visited the then squatter camp, which was administered by the TP A, to asses the 
situation. A meeting was arranged between the TP A, McRae and du Plessis, a number of Orange 
Fann residents also attended the meeting. At this time Orange Fann had no town council but the 
residents nominated representatives to attend the meeting to speak on their behalf. The TP A 
estimated that people were moving into the area at the rate of WOO/day. McRae asked the TP A 
representatives to outline their plans for the area, particularly with regard to electrification. The 
TP A responded by saying that they could not support the electrification of the area because firstly 
the homes in Orange Fann were informal, secondly the provision of electricity to such homes was 
against the policy of the provincial service and thirdly the residents themselves did not want 
electricity; and in any event they could not pay for it and anyway other services such as the 
provision of water was more important.304 McRae asked the Orange Fann representatives at the 
301 Interview with Mr. J du Plessis 17th December 1997. These facts were confmned in an interview 
with Mr. VC. Milne, 27th October 1998. 
302 Letter dated the 12th March 1990, ref. DAlOllSB: Eskom's Electrification Archive. 
303 These events were explained to the author in separate interviews with Dr I.C. McRae, 30th October 
1996 and Mr 1. du Plessis, 17th December 1997. 
304 The TPA's viewpoint with regard to the electrification of Orange Farm is hard to fathom. 
ElectrifYing the area would make sense since in early 1990 de Klerk's commitment to repealing the 
Group Areas Act did away with the idea that residents of such places as Orange Farm were mere 
sojourners and hence the Orange Farms of South Africa would become facts of life and electrifYing 
them would only serve to show de Klerk's commitment to change. But discussions with Mr VC. 
Milne, does throw some light on the TPA's attitude. He explained that at this time of dramatic 
political change in South Africa there was a lack of clarity concerning the provision of services in 
townships especially informal settlements like Orange Farm and it therefore rather depended on 
who was approached within the TPA as to what viewpoint emerged. Furthermore, the TPA's 
experience in Greater Soweto with respect to the non-payment for services conditioned the thinking 
of some TPA officials. Finally this was the period when the TPA was being replaced by the 
Metropolitan Council and this could have complicated the matter. Interview with Mr VC. Mime 
27th October 1998. 
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meeting if they wanted electricity they all continned that they did. McRae now decided that in 
order to continn this view he would talk to the townspeople themselves. This he proceeded to do 
by driving around the township and questioning residents on a random basis. He found an 
overwhelming desire for electricity. Returning to the TPA offices at Orange Farm McRae told the 
TP A officials of his findings and said that Eskom would be prepared to electrify Orange Farm at 
no risk to the province. Eskom was prepared, he said, to start the project by electrifying 500 to 
1 000 homes, assess the results of this initiative, and proceed from there. The residents would fonn 
a committee to decide which houses should be electrified. The TP A agreed to this plan and as a 
result the letter mentioned above, ref. DNOl/SB was sent. 
In July 1990 Eskom arranged for a survey to be carried out of the more established section of 
Orange Farm by the Consultor Group (Pty) Ltd., to ascertain the resident's ability and willingness 
to pay for electricity so that the Corporation's longer-tenn plans to electrify the entire township 
could be put in place. The key results from this survey are given below. 305 
The average household income was R773/month. 
The breakdown on energy expenditure per household I month was as shown in Table 8.4 below . 
COAL 
PARAFFIN 
BATTERIES 
CANDLES 
FUELWOOD 
GAS 
BATTERY CHARGING 
TOTAL 
.. EXPENDITUU •• · 
. ........... -- ............... . 
········.·(RANJ)sj········ 
29,24 
24,93 
16,77 
9,35 
5,92 
3,15 
2,09 
91,45 
TABLE No 8.4 HOUSEHOLD ENERGY EXPENDITUREIMONm: ORANGE FARM 
(1990 Rand) 
Source: Consultor Group (Ply) Ltd., (1990). 
The community's willingness to pay for electricity was R39,00, this amounted to a usage of about 
200 kWh I month. This was less than what would subsequently be Eskom's break-even rate for 
supplying electricity to black households in South Africa. This topic will be discussed later in this 
chapter. 
305 The results of this survey were very important to Eskom since this was the fIrst large squatter-camp 
that they would electrify, hence it would give them some guidance on how to proceed in other such 
camps. The sample at Orange Farm was 260 households. 
233 
The electrical appliances which potential electricity consumers indicated they would purchase 
immediately after the installation of electricity are as shown in Table No 8.5 below. 
APPLIANCE····· 
STOVE 
FRIDGE 
IRON 
KETTLE 
TELEVISION 
HEATER 
HI-FI 
OTHER (UNSPECIFIED) 
. .............. ."~N$'I'J1..\'I'l()!iIN'.. . ........ . 
.··HOUSEBOLDS(pERCENT)··· 
90,4 
79,6 
76,2 
58,8 
37,3 
23,5 
16,2 
16,5 
TABLE NO 8.5 POTENTIAL SALE OF ELECTRICITY APPLIANCES: ORANGE 
FARM: 1990 
Source: Consultor Group (Pty) Ltd., (1990). 
Residents attitude to high mast lighting in the areas was also tested, this revealed that 98,8 per cent 
were in favour of it. 
The results of the survey were encouraging enough for Eskom to proceed with the electrification 
of Orange Farm and an article in the Engineering News Journal (7th_13 th September 1990) entitled 
"Plans for 3 million houses in the PWV,306 confirmed this when it said with respect to the Orange 
Farm development that "9 000 stands had been completed to date that 70 000-100 000 stands were 
planned that services were rudimentary" and "electricity was to be supplied by Eskom". The 
Citizen (27th December 1990) also reported that "Eskom has for the first time started with the 
'--------------- -
provision of electricity to an informal settlement in the PWV area. This scheme at this time only 
consists of 25 structures in Orange farm near Evaton. Prepaid meters are used to enable 
households to budget and cards in units of RIO can be bought to activate supply". Eskom then, by 
this small initial involvement in the electrification of Orange farm, embarked on their nation-wide 
electrification programme.307 
The issue of the non-payment for electricity was clearly, still a thorn in Eskom's side, however, 
and it was this that made the willingness-to-pay survey at Orange Farm so important. So far as the 
non-payment issue was concerned it was reported (Business Day 27th November 1990) that 
306 The title of the article is, however, erroneous since the plan for Orange Farm was concerned with 3 
million people (not houses) being settled in an area between Soweto, Vanderbijlpark, Vereeniging 
and Alberton. 
307 Orange Farm was eventually completely electrified by Eskom during the period 1990 to 1995. 
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township arrears soared to R96 million in 1990 and legal action was contemplated by Eskom in 
some of the areas affected. Eskom said they were not prepared to write these debts off but would 
"strive to negotiate a solution". 
3.3 National Electrification Programme: Decision to Proceed 
Apart from their work at Orange Farm and the public announcement in the supplement to their 
1991 Annual Report cited above Eskom' s electrification progranune was officially decided upon 
by its Management Board on the 2nd May 1991 the relevant item in the minutes of the Board's 
meeting reads as follows: 
RECORD: 
HEADING 1: 
MEETING: 
ITEM: 
DATE: 
255 
ELECTRIFICATION 
4/1991 
7.1 
2 May 1991 
ELECTRIFICATION PROGRAMME IN DEVELOPINGIREMOTE AREAS 
RESOLVED 
that the following stance be adopted regarding the electrification progranune: 
Eskom will 
a) promote and encourage the electrification of SA; 
b) make its resources available to support electrification for sound business 
reasons; 
c) concentrate it's efforts on providing electricity wherever it is viable to all who 
want it and undertake to pay for it; 
d) focus on viable schemes which have the support of the community, and initially 
focus on the densely-populated communities; 
e) co-operate and work with the authorities and other suppliers of electricity to 
promote electrification on any appropriate basis; 
t) provide appropriate quality products and services; 
g) promote and encourage investment in electrification projects and assist in 
mobilising finance; 
h) actively participate in and facilitate the development, and promote the 
acceptance and implementation of cost-effective technology and standards for 
the ESI; 
i) promote the use of electricity to create or improve business opportunities for 
suppliers and customers; 
j) promote the effective, efficient and safe use of electricity; 
k) support the development, instillation and use of alternative electricity generation 
technology where appropriate. 
A further item taken from Eskom' s Management Board Meetings minutes on the electrification 
progranune and dated the 22nd October 1991 reads as follows: 
RECORD: 
HEADING 1: 
HEADING 2: 
HEADING 3: 
MEETING: 
ITEM: 
DATE: 
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267 
ELECTRIFICATION 
DEVELOPING AREAS 
FINANCIAL PERSPECTIVE 
291(4) 
9 
22 OCTOBER 1991 
ELECTRIFICATION PROGRAMME: A FINANCE GROUP PERSPECTIVE 
A comprehensive discourse on perspectives in the Finance Group on preferred 
fundamentals that should command the Eskom approach to and involvement in 
ventures to accelerate the provision of electricity to underdeveloped households, 
presented under cover of a memo dated 18-10-1991 from the GM (Finance) to the 
Chief Executive was deliberated and Dr. Willem Kok expounded the underlying 
principles validating the opinions and reconunendations.308 
DECIDED 
1. that additional research be conducted to arrive at plausible assumptions to form 
the basis of planning for accelerated electrification of underdeveloped 
households, and that cognisance be taken of issues raised in the preamble; 
2. that all available avenues be pursued by Eskom to fulfil the established 
objectives for accelerated electrification; 
3. that all electrification projects be subjected to sound economic evaluation, 
indicating clearly the risk profile; 
4. that the total electrification programme be co-ordinated on a national tier with a 
pooling of resources and a national prioritising of projects to ensure that, where 
feasible, economical projects be advanced first and ensuring that projects be 
evaluated on a conunon basis; 
5. that a formal progress monitoring and reporting structure be constituted; 
6. that all possible grant funding opportunities for electrification projects be 
pursued, but planning for electrification projects should not be based on this 
funding source; 
7. that, once the salient issues on electrification are clarified, the financial 
implications of electrification on Eskom be outlined to the investment 
conununity.309 
Two conunents need to be made regarding what was decided at Eskom's Management Board 
Meeting, Record 267. So far as decision (4) is concerned it is clear that Eskom was getting 
prepared to undertake non-economic electrification projects as well as those which clearly yielded 
tangible economic benefits, the words "where feasible" offering the basis for this assertion. With 
respect to decision (6) it would appear that Eskom was getting prepared to finance the 
electrification programme itself if funding was not forthcoming from other sources. As already 
noted Eskom's progranune was set at electrifying 700 000 houses between 1990 and 1996. 
308 Dr Kok was (with other members of Eskom's Financial Group) the author of an internal report "A 
Finance Group Perspective" (1991), which was the basis for the deliberations referred to in the 
minutes. 
309 Record No 255 and Record 267 taken from Eskom's Management Board meetings appear here 
exactly as recorded in the minutes of those meetings. 
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3.4 Planning and Managing the National Electrification 
Programme 
According to Mr 1. du Plessis310 whilst Eskom was prepared to undertake this nation-wide 
electrification programme, in spite of decision number (4) in the minutes above and their 
restructuring, neither Eskom, nor the government had a cohesive electrification policy, strategy or 
central plan which would direct this programme. This was probably because at this time the 
Corporation was essentially a supplier of bulk electricity and local authorities looked after the 
distribution of power to the individual end user. The government, likewise, had no policy for 
bringing electrification to consumers in the lesser developed areas of the country simply because \, ) 
up until de Klerk's reform process began to really take effect black people residing in the Republic 
of South Africa were regarded merely as sojourners and their homes were really considered to lie 
in the independent black states created by the South African government. 
Mr Paul Mare,311 who in 1995 took over as manager of Eskom's electrification programme, is also 
clear on the question of policy formulation and planning with respect to Eskom' s electrification 
programme from 1990 onwards. He too confirmed that there was no central co-ordinated planning 
or firm policy on which projects should be undertaken first so far as the electrification programme 
was concerned. According to him Eskom simply allocated certain sums of money to each of its 
five new distribution areas each year and they were then responsible for spending it on appropriate 
electrification projects within their boundaries of supply. According to Mare the modus operandi 
used by Eskom's various distributors as a test of whether or not a particular electrification project 
would go ahead was as follows: 
(a) The number of people in an area that seemed to be ready for electrification was surveyed; 
(b) The distance of the area from the national grid was determined; 
(c) The cost per electrical connection i.e., the reticulation costs were then worked out; 
(d) A survey was then undertaken to determine the resident's desire for electricity and to gauge 
their willingness-to-pay for the power; 
(e) If the answers to items (a) to (d) were encouraging, then engineering plans for the reticulation 
system were prepared, and the actual electrification was then carried out. 
These surveys were, however, only carried out in proclaimed areas and after discussions with the 
authorities had been undertaken to determine suitable areas for electrification.312 These discussions 
310 mterview with the author 17th December 1997. 
311 mterview with the author 6th February 1998. 
312 Proclaimed areas are those where a legal process had been gone through which, amongst other 
things, allowed for the provision of services to commence, e.g., connections to municipal sewers. 
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usually took place at all levels of local government, i.e., municipal councils and even metropolitan 
councils. One of Eskom' s strategies in their electrification progranune was the taking over of 
electricity supply to consumers direct rather than supplying power in bulk to various councils. In 
this way the Corporation hoped to stop the "haemorrhaging of the non-payment for electricity in 
black townships" (Mare's phrase), which was, as already reported, even prior to Eskom initiating 
their nation-wide electrification progranune, of constant concern to the Corporation. 
So far as the electrification of "Related Homeland Areas" (where Eskom still maintained 
electricity supply rights or may be asked to take over the supply of electricity by the "Homeland" 
government) was concerned four of Eskom's Distributors were assigned areas of responsibility, 
these are shown in Table No 8.6 below . 
BLOEMFONTEIN 
CAPETOWN 
DURBAN 
PRETORIA 
. ltttATEDBOMltl..ANlL .•••••.••••.•.•••. 
Part of Bophuthatswana and Qwa Qwa 
The Transkei and Ciskei 
KwaZulu 
Part of Bophuthatswana, Venda, Lebowa, Gazankulu, K wandebele 
and Kangwane 
TABLE NO 8.6 ESKOM'S DISTRIBUTORS AREA OF RESPONSmILITY FOR 
HOMELAND ELECTRIFICATION 
Source: Eskom's National Electrification Planning Division. 
Mare also mentioned that to manage the electrification progranune each distributor had a "Co-
ordinating Division" with planners and specialists in the development of small businesses, 
marketing, sales, engineering design services, maintenance services and customer relations. This 
division was established with the prime purpose of interacting with local communities in areas 
earmarked for electrification. This interaction was considered absolutely essential after Eskom's 
experience in trying to take over the supply of electricity in Greater Soweto.313 
Each distributor worked with a standard Eskom Five Year Business Plan, which was common to 
the whole Corporation. A key statement in this plan for the period 1992 - 1997 reads as follows: 314 
"A volatile environment and nebulous future confronts us. South Africa is in flux of transition. 
The process of democratisation suggests that a new government of the day will take office in the 
not too distant future. To ensure that Eskom can fulfil its destiny our value to the community at 
large has to be evident. This will only be the case if we are acclaimed for successfully embarking 
on a national electrification progranune". 
3J3 Comment made to author in an interview with Mr. I van Gass, 16th January 1996. 
314 A copy of this Business Plan can be found in Eskom's Electrification Archive. 
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The identification of suitable electrification schemes in each distribution area was therefore of 
prime importance and the responsibility of the Electrification Co-ordinating Division at Distributor 
level. Eskom's electrification personnel in Megawatt Park considered that to plan future 
electrification projects successfully every effort had to be made to "get as close to the consumer as 
possible" and so far as the taking over of electricity supply rights were concerned every effort was 
to be made to ensure that such take-overs would yield benefits to both parties concerned i.e., 
Eskom and the supplier that was to be taken over. Priority was to be given to take-overs in urban 
areas.315 Usually in these cases Eskom planned to charge a flat fixed tariff for existing consumers 
until such time as they were connected to pre-payment meters and Ready Boards which operated 
under Eskom's 81 tariff. 316 It was of course in Eskom's commercial interest to limit the time 
period between the imposition of the fixed tariff and the implementation of the 81 tariff so that 
financial losses accruing as a consequence of these take-overs of any electricity supply rights were 
kept to a minimum.317 
Focusing as they were on electrification in black households in urban areas which Eskom hoped 
had the ability to pay for electricity presented Eskom with an equity problem since this decision 
ensured that certain areas would be denied access to electricity. Eskom realised this and as a 
consequence made every effort to alleviate the dissatisfaction with their electrification 
programme's perceived inequity by enlisting the help of community based organisations such as 
Civics and NGOs in planning their choice of areas to be electrified.318 
315 Comment made to the author by Mr. Koos Schoeman, 9th July 1996. 
316 The need to provide an electricity pricing structure specifically for black households was necessary 
to further Eskom's vision of "Electricity for All". The Corporation therefore designed a single rate 
tariff (the Sl tariff) which could be easily understood by every electricity consumer and which was 
applicable to budget or prepayment metering. The aim of the tariff was to make electricity available 
to low-usage consumers at a minimal cost. The important feature of this tariff was that it could be 
kept low by using the excess generating capacity available thus providing Eskom with "the 
opportunity to penetrate the market (i.e., black households, author's addition) while it is fmancially 
viable to do so", (McAdam, 1989, p.7). Hence, as mentioned previously, Eskom's power station 
expansion progranune, which had been severely criticised in the de Villiers Commission of Inquiry, 
was the vehicle used by Eskom to travel forward into their national electrification progranune. 
Using their excess generation capacity Eskom calculated that they could supply consumers with 
electricity at a cost of l6clkWh. The Corporation further decided that a nominal connection fee of 
R30 be charged. This was based on "the psychological reasoning that a commodity too freely 
available often has a low perceived value and is consequently abused", (McAdam, 1989, p.ll). This 
tariff was designed to encourage the electrification of black households. Only later in 1992 did 
Eskom attempt to calculate the true cost of the progranune. Just like the farm electrification 
progranune between 1980-1990, when costs where only considered some eight years after the 
progranunes inception, political, not fmancial considerations seemed to be driving Eskom's 
electrification initiative to electrify black households. 
317 Interview with Mr Paul Mare 19th March 1998. 
318 Interview with Mr Paul Mare 19th March 1998. 
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In addition to the urban, peri urban and rural clusters of houses without access to electricity in 
South Africa there were also in 1990 fann workers dwellings that were similarly without power. 
Hofmeyer (1993, p.20) has estimated that only 32 per cent of farm workers dwellings on fanns 
that had been electrified had access to electricity from these farms. These electrified dwellings 
used electricity mainly for lighting, the use of electricity for cooking and heating purposes was 
low. The EPRET project estimated that in 1994 there were about 600 000 fann workers dwellings 
on farms, which had been electrified and about 450 000 of these did not have access to that supply, 
(Hofmeyer 1993, p.55). These statistics only compounded the daunting task of Eskom's 
"Electricity for All" programme. The electrification of farm workers dwellings was invariably 
accomplished by extending the electricity supply from the farm to these dwellings. The capital 
cost of these connections was shared by the fanner, the State and Eskom. The farmer always 
remained Eskom's customer and was billed by Eskom, the fann workers were the consumers but 
had no independent metering. The government offered fanners a R300 subsidy per connection to 
encourage the electrification of farm workers dwellings, (Hofmeyer, 1993, p.50). Such 
connections were, seemingly, not a priority for Eskom between 1990 and 1995, however.319 
Mare also pointed out that one of the critical problems faced by Eskom in their efforts to electrify 
black households in South Africa was that of supply rights. For example, in black townships 
Eskom did not usually have supply rights, neither could they bring electricity to squatter camps in 
unproclaimed areas. Eskom could, however, electrify peri-urban areas. Eskom therefore had to 
breach certain boundaries to enable their electrification programme to grow in magnitude. To 
finance their expanding electrification programme Mare has estimated that from 1991 onwards at 
least 2-5 per cent of Eskom's tariff to large consumers cross-subsidised the electrification 
programme.320 These cross-subsidies between 1990 and 1994 were not transparent and whilst 
consumers were certainly aware that there must be an element of cross-subsidisation involved in 
Eskom's electrification programme the magnitude of the amount involved was probably unknown 
to them. 
According to both Mare, du Plessis and van Wyk321 Eskom accepted that their electrification 
programme from 1990 onwards would not be financially viable. To try and limit the financial 
losses that could arise, the Corporation put in place the following control mechanisms: 
a) A programme of demand-side management to stimulate the off-peak use of electricity; 
319 Interview with Mr Paul Mare 20th JWle 1998. 
320 The fInancing of the electrifIcation progranune and the subsidies involved between 1990 and 1991 
are discussed in detail in the following chapter. 
321 Interviews with the author respectively on the following dates, 6th February 1998, 27th January 1998 
and 29th November 1996. 
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b) A programme to bring down the capital costs of electricity reticulation to black households by 
innovative construction methods, composed principally of labour intensive construction and 
bundled conductors etc., as already commented upon; and 
c) A programme to minimise administration costs. 
Mr Jan de Beer22 was convinced that various groups supported Eskom's electrification 
programme because it was "political suicide" (de Beer's description) not to. His view was that the 
trades union were encouraged by the possibilities of GDP growth and the (as they erroneously 
thought) extraordinarily large job creating potential of the programme. The environmentalists were 
emotionally captured by the "greening" possibility of reduced air pollution and even the A WB (the 
ultra-rightwing organisation in South Africa led by Eugene Terre'Blanche) apparently supported 
the programme on the grounds that electrification would bring the black birth rate down in South 
Africa. As has been mentioned already the ANC showed their interest in the electrification 
programme from the Harare meeting in 1990 onwards. According to de Beer Eskom did keep in 
contact with the ANC with respect to the progress of the electrification programme prior to them 
becoming the government in 1994, this was done through the Civic Associations in South Africa. 
Also according to de Beer violence in certain areas of the country did disrupt Eskom' s 
electrification programme and this was particularly so in Natal where conflict between the IFF and 
the ANC was rife. In this violence Eskom was at pains to remain non-aligned and in this they were 
successful. This violence was frequently reported in Eskom's Annual Reports, e.g., (1993, p.lO). 
An important restriction to Eskom's electrification programme between 1990 and 1995, which has 
already been mentioned, was that in planning the programme it concentrated on the electrification 
of urban and peri-urban areas. In fact the macro-economic analysis which took place prior to the 
commencement of the programme emphasised this point, see the BEP A report. There was very 
good reason for Eskom deciding to initially concentrate on the urban areas of the country. Firstly, 
rural areas of South Africa were then, and still are, characterised by poverty and unemployment 
(Horvei and Dahl, 1994, p.l). Development in such areas is complex and requires well thought out 
development policies, particularly policies concerning the provision of services including 
electricity. Certainly Eskom had no such policies at the commencement of their electrification 
programme. Secondly, there were obvious difficulties associated with the ability-to-pay for 
services in rural South Africa because of low income levels amongst rural blacks. These 
difficulties would also probably extend to electricity provision. Thirdly, rural electrification can be 
very costly, much more costly than its urban counterpart, hence it was natural that Eskom would 
concentrate on the urban component particularly when it became clear that the Corporation would 
probably end up funding the electrification programme. Eskom estimated that connection costs in 
outlying rural areas, i.e., areas furthest from the national grid would cost about R5 000 each. For 
322 Interview 13th November 1996. 
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connections in truly deep rural areas the cost could double and approach RIO 000 per 
connection323. Fig No 8.1 below gives the average cost per connection in 1995 Rand for urban and 
rural customers. Fourthly, rural electrification would require government involvement with respect 
to development policy formulation. Fifth, other energy carriers would probably have to be brought 
into the rural development equation in addition to electricity usage, e.g., fuelwood, paraffin, 
batteries, gas etc. If energy provision was to be planned for rural development purposes, such 
planning would therefore be outside the scope of Eskom as a lone agent. Sixth the distance of rural 
settlements from the national electricity grid is often considerable, particularly in the deep rural 
areas of South Africa hence the energy development plan for such areas would involve off-grid 
electricity sources and this could bring the private sector into the planning equation. Seventh, farm 
workers habitations are numerous in rural areas and these dwellings would require long cable runs 
from electrified farms for them to be provided with power. Hofmeyer (l993(a» estimated that 
over one third of farm workers households in South Africa would require these long cable runs to 
provide them with electricity. Eighth, rural electrification would ideally have to be part of a broad-
based development programme that would improve per capita income and engender social 
upliftment. Such a programme would require governmental direction, and Eskom could only play 
a supporting role in this process, the Corporation could not sensibly undertake ad-hoc rural 
electrification projects as a consequence. Taking the difficulties mentioned above into account it is 
easy to see why Eskom opted for an urban electrification initiative to start their programme of 
electrifying black households in South Africa. 
323 Interview with Mr D. Van Wyk 13th November 1996. 
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3.5 Eskom's National Electrification Programme Commences 
Thus it was that Eskom's urban electrification programme got under way and at the end of the 
1990/91 period 30 588 household connections had been made with respect to this programme by 
Eskom's five Distributors, the capital expenditure on the programme amounting to RIOO million. 
In 1992 Eskom increased the pace of the electrification programme and the Corporation's Annual 
Report (p.ll) claimed that 640 homes were being connected to the national electricity grid daily. 
The figure for connections by Eskom's Distributors in 1992 amounted to 145522 and this does 
indicate that the 640 claimed connections per day was probably an accurate assessment of the 
average daily activity on the programme. The total capital requirements for the electrification of 
these houses amounted to R 442 million. In their 1992 Annual Report Eskom once again 
highlighted the job creating potential of their electrification programme saying "one of 
electrification's most important spin-offs is job creation". The NELF was also mentioned as being 
important in developing strategies and a new structure for the South African ESI so that the 
electrification of black households could be accelerated. Business Day of the 19111 October 1992 
claimed, however, that the establishment of the NELF was delayed; reporting that the "ANC's 
conference (The ANC's National Meeting on Electrification analysed in Chapter 5 authors 
addition) failed to reach consensus on the forum's membership" . It was also noted in the report 
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that the Housing Fonun had taken 13 months to become established. Fortunately the NELF, under 
the guidance of the DBSA and Eskom, did begin their deliberations in early 1993. 
It was also clear from Eskom' s 1992 Annual Report (p.ll) that obtaining funding for their 
electrification programme was a constraining influence on the programme. To demonstrate the 
financial burden carried by Eskom with regard to the electrification programme, the Daily News 
reported on the 8th October 1992 that in Edendale and Imbali near Pietermaritzburg Eskom was 
electrifying 30 000 houses at a cost of R 200 million and, that "Mr Brian Edwards, Chairman of 
the Natal Midlands Joint Services Board (JSB) said that Eskom would provide most of the finance 
but the JSB would provide R 4 million per year for 4 years" i.e., R 16 million out of R 200 million 
or 8 per cent. During the year Eskom did approach the World Bank with a request for help with 
regard to funding for their electrification programme but the Bank responded by saying that that 
for them to provide such funds a "consensus government would have to be in power in South 
Africa". 324 
In 1992 as more and more black households were being electrified local authorities were 
transferring their electricity reticulation networks to Eskom in increasing numbers (because of 
non-payment of accounts) by ceding their electricity supply rights to the Corporation. As a 
consequence Eskom' s domestic customer base was growing and Eskom' s management claimed 
that progress was being made in overcoming the problem of the non-payment of electricity 
accounts as a consequence of these transfers, (Eskom Annual Report, 1992, p.16). As mentioned 
already, however, in spite of these assurances the contingency sum for arrears shown in Eskom's 
financial statements for the year was above that of the previous year. With respect to electricity 
supply take-overs in the SGTs the Lebowa Cabinet approved in principle that Eskom should take 
over the distribution of electricity in Lebowa in early 1993. Negotiations with the KwaNdebele 
government were also undertaken with a similar outcome in mind. Eskom was then gradually 
breaking down the barriers that curtailed its supply rights and the expansion of its electrification 
programme. The right of supplying electricity to Greater Soweto was also fmal1y concluded in 
1992. As noted already, the acquisition of the electricity reticulation network in that township, 
which was judged to be worth R 204 million, helped amortise Greater Soweto' s arrear debt for 
electricity supply. This debt had been carried by Eskom from 1990 when the TP A was replaced by 
the Metropolitan Council and the bridging fmance for bulk electricity supplied to Greater Soweto 
failed to materialise. 
324 mterview with Mr K. Schoeman, 30th July 1996, and confmned in a statement to that effect in 
Eskom's Annual Report, (1992, p.ll). Mr. Schoeman had been a member of Eskom's team 
negotiating with the World Bank for funding for their programme to bring electricity to lesser 
developed areas of South Africa and had prepared a report on this issue which was presented to the 
World Bank. 
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With respect to this take-over The Sowetan (24th June 1992) reported that "Soweto traders met in 
Jubalani Standard Bank Hall to discuss various issues relating to electricity supply in Greater 
Soweto. The meeting was a joint venture of the Greater Soweto Chamber of Commerce and 
Industries and the Soweto Independent Shopkeepers Association. Chamber Executive Director Mr 
Max Legodi said the Soweto Civic Association would explain the take-over of the administration 
of the electricity supply to Soweto". This was in line with Eskom getting Civic Associations 
involved in their take-overs of supply networks. These take-overs meant that Eskom now had 
electricity supply rights in a greater number of areas than ever before and their domestic consumer 
base had nearly doubled between the beginning of 1991 and the end of 1992. This growth meant 
that Eskom now directly serviced 541 866 consumers up from 278 033 in January 1991. 
In 1993 Eskom created a new management portfolio, that of Electrification and Industry 
Restructuring, (Eskom Annual Report, 1993, p.13). This portfolio was established to ensure 
electrification targets were met, to eliminate the backlog of domestic electrical connections and to 
cope with increasing demands for such connections. This portfolio was an important addition to 
Eskom's Management Board given the limitations of the existing electricity distribution industry 
to cope with the problems of electrifying black households in South Africa. Considering the 
fragmentation of the South Mrican ESI the new portfolio was doubly important since in the 
medium-term it was doubtful that the ESI could have dealt with the backlog of domestic 
connections in the black townships. Mr J de Beer was put in charge of this new Eskom portfolio. 
Eskom's electrification programme was claiming more attention then from Eskom's Management 
Board and Eskom's Chairman Dr John Maree commenting in the 1993 Annual Report (p.ll) said 
that "Electrification should be seen as a national priority". Maree also said that to "reflect the 
change taking place in South Mrica and be more representative of Eskom's stakeholders" the 
Electricity Council had been reshaped and four black members of the ANC were appointed to it. 
These were Dr E. Kuzwayo, Mrs N. Majija, Mr M. D. Mofokeng and Mr G. Mantashe. In addition 
Dr B. L. Fanaroffthe National Secretary of the National Union of Metal Workers of South Mrica, 
representing organised labour, was made a member of the Council. Dr Fanaroff was also a 
member of the NELF and it may be assumed that he, and these four new Electricity Council 
members, would certainly have shown a keen interest in Eskom' s black household electrification 
programme. 
In 1993 the electricity supply to Greater Soweto underwent an upgrade and Eskom began to work 
closely with consumers in the township to overcome the electricity payments problem. 
Community involvement was reported as being "intense" and the community employed so-called 
"electricity representatives" to carry out "first line maintenance and meter reading, the delivery of 
bills and liaison with Eskom", (Eskom Annual Report 1993, p.22). In addition, to managing the 
electricity supply to Greater Soweto, Eskom continued to take over the supply to other townships. 
245 
Business Day (11 th January 1993) reported that Eskom was considering taking over the electricity 
supply to eight more Transvaal Townships. These were believed to include Katlehong, Bekkersdal 
and the Lekoa complex and that Eskom was already supplying Greater Soweto, Alexandra, 
Vosloorus and Tsakane with electricity direct. 
In 1993 the Black Local Authorities Act fell away resulting in municipalities becoming single 
entities, e.g., Greater Soweto became part of the Johannesburg Metropolitan Transitional Council 
(TMC). This change did not help enhance Eskom's electrification progranune, however, since 
after these amalgamations electricity supply rights remained unchanged, i.e., whoever had the right 
to supply electricity to the area prior to the change had the right after the change. Hence Eskom 
still had to cross boundaries to expand their electrification programme, i.e., they had to negotiate 
to, or were asked if they would, take over the supply of electricity prior to providing power to an 
area. To some extent this had the effect of slowing down their electrification programme.325 Black 
townships, however, sometimes preferred Eskom to manage their electricity supply rather than 
entrust it to the adjacent white municipality and tried to get Eskom to do this. Such a case was 
reported in The Star (12th January 1993) when it was said, that "often residents in black townships 
wanted Eskom not the White Municipal Council to electrify their townships. For example in De 
Aar in the Karoo the De Aar Civic Organisation (DACO) opposed the scheme (a scheme by the 
white controlled municipality to electrify the adjacent black township) and wanted Eskom to take 
charge of the installation". 
The demand for electricity in black townships kept growing and because these demands could not 
all be met and remained unassuaged there was considerable theft of electricity. Business Day (19th 
February 1993) reported that "stealing power became a big problem for Eskom to try and deal 
with. For example, Kazin West Rand Township residents drew power illegally from underground 
and overhead cables to electrify their homes. The practice called "Operation Kahanyisa" meaning 
"Switch On" involves residents of the town. Paul Mare, Eskom's National Electrification Manager 
describes this as an "extremely dangerous" practice. Furthennore the practice jeopardised the 
current to those legally connected. Operation Kahanyisa started in 1991 when those who had 
applied for electricity could no longer wait for it. Their campaign will go on as long as necessary 
until they get electricity". This theft of electricity added to Eskom' s financial woes with respect to 
the electrification of black households and clearly complicated their attempts to control the 
financial impact of the programme. Such activities demonstrated the wisdom of Eskom 
establishing the new management portfolio to deal with the problems attached to their 
electrification programme. 
325 Interview with Mr Paul Mare 19th March 1998. 
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Not only was the theft of electricity a problem, the electrification programme in some areas of the 
Witwatersrand and Natal suffered on occasions because of the political violence which occurred in 
these areas and also because of Eskom' s failure to take over certain electricity supply rights. 
Events such as these added to Eskom's electrification planning problems and may have been partly 
responsible for the paucity of data, which exists concerning specific electrification projects. To 
deal with communities needs, especially their expectations concerning the timing of electrification 
projects in specific areas Eskom established local forums involving communities and these were 
considered to be very effective.326 
In spite of problems met in electrifying black households in 1993 Eskom's Chairman Maree 
claimed that Eskom had "changed the lives of another three million people by making electricity 
available to their homes", (Eskom Annual Report, 1993, p.8). During the year Eskom electrified 
208801 houses and in addition 16074 farmworker's dwellings were supplied with electricity, the 
capital expenditure involved amounted to R 584 million. 
Eskom's Annual Report at the end of 1994 was the ftrst under the newly elected ANC Govermnent 
which had come to power in April of that year. The section on the progress of Eskom's 
electrification programme in this Annual Report included information on the requirements of the 
ANC's Reconstruction and Development Progranune (RDP) and how Eskom's black household 
electrification progranune would be influenced by the RDP. In line with the requirements of the 
RDP Eskom was expected to electrify additional houses over and above its own progranune to 
electrify 700 000 houses. This requirement meant extending Eskom's electriftcation programme 
beyond 1996. Eskom was, in addition, required to contribute "R 50 million per year to the 
electrification of schools and clinics and other conununity development activities - particularly in 
rural areas", (Eskom Annual Report, 1994, p.3). 
With the advent of the RDP, in 1994, which was to attempt an alleviation of the dualistic structure 
of the South African economy, society and polity, Eskom formulated new guiding principles 
around which its electrification progranune would be govemed.32i As noted previously Eskom's 
electrification programme was at the time proceeding without strict policy guidelines. The ANC's 
call for an accelerated and sustainable electrification progranune prompted Eskom to examine 
policies that would allow them to meet that challenge. This action can be seen as tacit 
conftrmation that up to this time such a policy was not in place. Much of the motivation for rural 
326 Interview with Mr Paul Mare 19th March 1998. 
327 The RDP aimed at ensuring ... "integrated growth, development, reconstruction and distribution 
into a unified programme. The key to this link is an infrastructural programme that will provide 
access to modern and effective services like electricity, water, telecommunications, transport, 
health, education and training "(p2.) And what was most important "a home must include ... a 
household energy supply (whether linked to grid electricity supply or derived from other sources 
such as solar energy)", (p.8). 
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electrification initiatives in developing countries relates to the potential role of electricity in 
economic and social upliftment. Research indicates, however, that electricity on its own brings 
little by way of such upliftment unless it is ably supported by other developments.328 Hence the 
RDP's emphasis on associated developments, this was an important consideration for Eskom 
because it impacted on the sustainability of its existing electrification programme. If these "other 
developments" could not be undertaken Eskom' s programme would not have its desired economic 
and social effect and this would certainly have a bearing on the sustainability of the ANC's 
programme to bring electricity to black households in South Africa as reflected in the RDP. 
Bearing this in mind Eskom formulated policy proposals for a "National Strategy on 
Electrification to Advance Rural Development" in November 1994. Eskom's electrification 
programme up to this time had concentrated on urban areas, it was clear that now rural areas 
would have to be targeted as well?29 
The principle points in Eskom' s new electrification policy were as follows. 330 
(i) Public policy requirements 
(a) For Eskom to achieve its portion of the electrification objective as identified in the RDP clear 
policy objectives and priorities would be required, e.g., the required spread of connections 
between urban and rural areas in the nine provinces of South Africa; 
(b) Funding guidelines would have to be established involving South Africa's public funding 
agencies which would reflect govermnent policy priorities in a consistent way so that Eskom 
could plan its future electrification programme; 
(c) Guidelines for cross-subsidisation from other domestic consumers and consumer groups 
would have to be worked out. Eskom required govermnent policy-makers, together with 
Eskom's Electricity Council, to balance the benefits of electrification with the implications of 
higher input costs for South Africa's energy intensive economy particularly the mining and 
manufacturing sectors; and 
(d) Eskom considered that infrastructural developing policies, especially those concerned with 
land reform, national housing projects and resulting demographic movements, would have a 
major influence on targeted electrification connections.33! 
328 The introduction of electricity doesn't automatically stimulate economic growth, it's effect depends 
upon the level of development in the area, (this has been shown in the case of Elandskraal) the 
availability of capital and other resources and the other programmes and projects being 
implemented. Foley (1992, p.145) supports this viewpoint he says that "rural electrification does 
not cause development. Electricity is a derived demand occurring only when an area has reached a 
certain economic level". 
329 Interview with Mrs D. Theron 20lh July 1995. 
330 Sununarised from Theron, D. (1994, pp.3-8). 
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(ii) Project selection and financing 
The RDP called for electrification to be "financed from within the ESI as far as possible via cross-
subsidisation from other electricity consumers. Where necessary the government would provide 
concessionary finance for the electrification of poor households in remote and rural areas". Eskom 
considered that this requirement could be implemented as follows: 
(a) Potential electrification projects would be classified into three categories, fmancially viable, 
socio-economically desirable and socio-economically non-viable; and 
(b) Projects within Eskom's right of supply areas which were financially viable in terms of 
Eskom's financial evaluation criteria would be undertaken and :financed by Eskom through 
normal commercial means332. Projects which were socio-economically desirable would be 
considered amongst other energy supply options and evaluated as but one of a number of 
services like education, health, sanitation and water supply; such projects would be submitted 
for concessionary funding from the government333. Projects in rural areas which were not 
financially viable would be the subject of cost -benefit analysis to determine if they were 
socio-economically desirable according to a set of guidelines which would be developed 
within the context of the overall goals of the RDP. Socio-economically non-viable projects 
should not be undertaken by Eskom. 
(iii) Planning 
With the implementation of the RDP and the demise of apartheid Eskom thought that demographic 
patterns of the "Homelands" would probably alter. Furthermore, the job-creation programme in the 
form of public works proposed by the RDP and the housing development programme would also 
affect the movement and final residence of many people. Eskom was acutely aware of the effects 
of these plans on the RDP's electrification programme and considered the following policies to be 
important for dealing with events that may occur as a result: 
331 Eskom's concern here was a very real one and was that there may not be a sufficient number of 
houses to electrifY if the RDP's target of building 1 million houses over the five year period 1995 -
2000 was not achieved. 
332 Eskom' s fmancial evaluation criteria were onerous so far as the electrification of black households 
was concerned and required an 18 per cent return on investment. Separate interviews with Mr Jan 
de Beer and Mr John Bradbury, 13th November 1996. 
333 A wide range of funding sources for rural electrification was potentially available such as the 
DBSA, The Independent Development Trust, the three tiers of government and foreign sources 
comprising of aid packages for service provision from Western European governments. In addition 
the RDP proposed a National Electrification Fund to raise capital fmance from investors in 
electrification projects. This last point will be further commented upon in the following chapter. 
249 
(a) Only people where there was the long-term assurance of residence would be provided with 
electricity; 334 
(b) Cost savings would be achieved by co-ordinating electrification with housing schemes, and 
areas where housing development was taking place would have a higher priority rating than 
other areas so far as the possibilities of being granted access to electricity was concerned. 
Eskom would liase with NationallRegional Housing Boards on this issue; and 
(c) Eskom would keep track of land reform developments and would be prepared to supply black 
farmers with appropriate supplies. 
It was clear that Eskom was concerned about the demands that they thought would be placed upon 
them by the Government of National Unity with respect to the electrification of black households. 
The policies as outlined above was Eskom' s response to those demands. Eskom' s management 
were trying still it seems to approach their programme to electrify black households in South 
Africa with something akin to a business viewpoint, although all the while they were cross-
subsidising their electrification programme. It is evident from the policies discussed above that 
Eskom was concerned about the sheer cost that would be entailed in a rural electrification 
programme and its ability to bear such costs. Eskom was then preparing the way for others to at 
last contribute some of the funding for the electrification programme knowing that in 1995 its 
target for connecting new households to the national grid would be 300 000 as called for by the 
RDP. 
The RDP's overall electrification targets are shown in Fig No 8.2 below. Eskom's target year-on-
year was to be 250 000 connections in 1994 and 300 000 from 1995 onwards. The RDP's 
electrification targets for each of South Africa's provinces were not set by the government but 
were decided by the respective electricity distributors in consultation with communities, (NER 
Progress Report, 1995, p.9). The targets for each province for 1995 are given in Table No 8.7 
below. Only Eskom managed to meet these provincial electrification targets, in fact the 
Corporation exceeded its target. The rest of the EDI did, however, meet the overall provincial 
electrification requirements of the RDP, (see Fig No 8.2 below), which were less than the rest of 
the ED! set themselves. The funding for Eskom's portion of the RDP's electrification programme 
was to come from it's own revenue and Eskom was also required to give R 300 million to local 
authorities in 1997 for them to electrify permanent settlements in designated townships in legally 
authorised development areas set out by local governments for permanent settlements. The 
rationale behind this directive was that it helped "towards levelling the playing field between 
334 Eskom calculated that for every rural electricity consumer who moved to an urban area and who's 
home was not reoccupied, there would be a direct negative cash flow impact on Eskom that varied 
between R 500 and R 2500. Interview with Mrs D Theron, 20th July 1995. 
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Eskom distributors on the one hand and local government distributors on the other hand who did 
not have access to the internal Eskom tariff', (NER Annual Report, 1996, p.12).335 
Eskom's Financial Group analysed the financial impact of the Corporation' s electrification 
programme on Eskom itself (for the first time) in 1992 (see Els 1992). The report on this analysis 
mentions the complicating factor of Eskom having to provide funding for electrification 
programmes by local authorities; several of Eskom's financial managers worst fears had in fact 
now materialised. 336 
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FIG NO 8.2 RDP EL ECTRIFICATIO N TARGETS: 1994 - 1999 
Source: NER Progre ss Report (1995 , p .9) 
EDI : El ectr i cit y Distribution Indu stry. 
335 What this internal Eskom tariff refers to is not clarified in the NER Progress Report. Presumably it 
simply means the greater sources of capital that Eskom had access to for undertaking the 
electrification of black households in South Africa when compared with local government. 
336 This issue is discussed in detail in the following chapter. 
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" 
"'> LOCAL' 
PROVINCE '" ... -.- ......................... OTHER ...... ESKOM ·.·TOl'AL.·· .. '. . ............ .... ....................... ... ............... 
" 
GOVERNMENT, 
EASTERN CAPE 13 877 0 46 000 59 877 
FREE STATE 16 243 0 18 000 34 243 
GAUTENG 27 353 0 44 000 71 353 
KWAZULU/NATAL 27 768 50 53 000 80 818 
MPUMALANGA 6 422 13 492 34 000 53 914 
NORTH WEST 9 194 20 000 24 000 53 194 
NORTHERN CAPE 6 885 0 6 000 12 885 
NORTHERN 6 751 5 000 63 000 74 751 
PROVINCE 
WESTERN 16 449 0 12 000 28 449 
PROVINCE 
TOTAL 130 949 38 542 300 000 469 484 
TABLE NO 8.7 ESI ELECTRIFICATION TARGETS PER PROVINCE: 1995 
Source: NER Progress Report (1995, p,lO), 
Whilst it was all very well for the government to insist that Eskom was to fund a great part of the 
national electrification programme the perennial problem of non-payment for electricity persisted 
in 1994 and presented Eskom with serious policy problems since the Corporation was funding 
their expansion and electrification programmes from internally generated monies. This non-
payment forced Eskom to cross-subsidise newly connected electricity consumers from revenue 
obtained from those who paid for electricity. Eskom suggested to government that if the non-
payment situation continued the electrification objectives of the RDP would not be achieved, 
(Eskom Annual Report, 1994, p.IO). Was this an invitation for the government to become involved 
with the non-payment issue? If it was it had little effect and non-payment and the theft of 
electricity continued337 . 
In 1994 the recently elected ANC Government raised the question of the privatisation of Eskom.338 
Eskom, however, pointed out that it was playing an important role in the delivery ofRDP goalS.339 
The inference here was clear, if Eskom was privati sed then projects that focused on the social 
upliftment of the previously disadvantaged community may be looked at with disfavour by a 
337 Interview with Mr Paul Mare 26th March 1998. 
338 It is curious that the government raised this issue considering their statement concerning parastatals 
at the Harare Conference of 1990, their subsequent comments at their National Electrification 
Meeting in 1992 and their increasing demands upon Eskom to take responsibility for electrifying 
even greater numbers of houses than they had originally envisaged. It is clear from the NELF 
deliberations that that forum did not consider the privatisation of Eskom to have any merit at all if 
the electrification of black households in South Africa was to be undertaken. 
339 Interview with Dr I. C. McRae 6th November 1996. 
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privately-owned electric utility with shareholders to consider. Perhaps Eskom's message was 
heeded since certainly the privatisation issue was not proceeded with.340 
After the ANC came to power foreign countries felt more comfortable about providing aid to 
South Africa and a joint venture, to electrify Khayelitsha in the Cape, between Eskom, Electricity 
de France and East Midlands Electricity (a UK private electric utility) was completed in 1994. 
This project was opened by the late President Mitterand of France. Such joint ventures were, 
however, not the norm and by and large Eskom acted alone in their nation-wide electrification 
programme. During 1994, with the continuation of Eskom's take-overs of various municipal 
domestic electricity supply networks, there was an improvement in the volume of payments for 
electricity services, which interestingly enough was lead by Greater Soweto, (Eskom Annual 
Report, 1994, p.16). It seems that slowly Eskom was demonstrating that service levels for 
electricity delivery in black townships could be improved and consumers were responding 
positively to the Corporation's efforts in this regard. 
Domestic electricity sales to newly electrified consumers continued to be low, however, and 
averaged only 80 kWh Imonth.341 This figure was much lower than the break-even figure of 355 
kWh/month that Eskom needed to keep the electricity price at an affordable level for these 
consumers i.e., the new SI tariff that Eskom had put in place at the commencement of its 
electrification programme. Even with increased levels of payments then Eskom was still facing a 
shortfall in revenue over expenditure so far as its electrification programme was concerned. This 
situation directly paralleled that of the electrification of white-owned commercial farms in the 
period 1980-1990 with farmers using less electricity than Eskom required for a break -even on their 
TariffD. 
As Eskom's electrification programme continued, it was reported in their Annual Report (1994, 
p.20) that many of the houses still to be electrified were situated far from the national grid in deep 
rural areas characterised by low population densities. Only about 12 per cent of the houses in these 
rural areas had access to electricity in 1994. Eskom warned that bringing power to these areas 
would be very costly. This warning was probably for the benefit of the government since Eskom's 
own electrification progranune had been, as mentioned already, concentrating on urban areas. 
With the advent of the RDP, however, it was clear that rural areas were to be targeted as well and 
because Eskom was funding its portion of the RDP's electrification progranune there may also 
have been concern within the Corporation regarding the potential cost of electrifying these rural 
areas. 
340 The privatisation of Eskom and black household electrification are, however, not mutually 
exclusive issues as will be shown in Chapter 10. 
341 The important question of electricity consumption in newly electrified households will be discussed 
in more detail presently. 
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At the end of 1994, Dr I. C. McRae retired from Eskom and became the Chairman of the NER. Mr 
Allen Morgan, also an engineer, replaced him as the CEO of Eskom. This was a propitious 
appointment so far as Eskom' s electrification progranune was concerned, since, as already noted, 
Morgan had been Eskom's Executive Director Sales and Customer Services and Electrification 
prior to becoming CEO and in that capacity had been intimately involved with the Corporation's 
electrification progranune. The progranune did not therefore suffer a change in momentum after 
McRae's departure and in 1994 Eskom connected 254 383 houses and 16 838 farm workers 
dwellings to the electricity grid at a capital cost of R 808 million. 
Again in 1995, it was reported by Eskom that the non-payment for electricity provision continued 
to be "a significant threat", (Eskom Annual Report, 1995, p.31). The payment arrears by the 31st 
December 1995 amounted to R 1175 million (which figure included outstanding interest charges). 
Part of the problem it seems was the accounts inherited from the Transkei Electricity Supply 
Corporation (fESCOR) when Eskom took over the supply of electricity in the Transkei. Eskom 
also admitted publicly for the first time in 1995 that they were cross-subsidising the costs of 
supplying electricity to black households due to these consumers low electricity consumption 
levels and their "low affordability levels", (Eskom Annual Report, 1995, p.32). To counterbalance 
this fact it was also reported that for every 100 houses electrified between 10 and 20 new 
"activities" were started in the informal industrial sector. The number of concomitant jobs that 
were created was estimated to number 14, (Eskom Annual Report, 1995, p.IO). If Eskom's 
informal job creation was accurate then 43 848 jobs were created in the informal sector in 1995 
alone as a consequence of the electrification progranune.342 The number of houses connected to 
the national grid as a result of Eskom's electrification programme in 1995 amounted to 313 179 
thus exceeding the target of 300 000 set by the RDP. 
In 1995 the NER started actively becoming involved in the South African ESI and in addition the 
government introduced a process to investigate the structuring of state-controlled enterprises. This 
process was designed to be carried out by "sectoral task teams and reconstruction and 
transformation committees", (Eskom Annual Report, 1995, p.15). These task teams were in 
addition to the Electricity Working Group (mentioned previously in Chapter 7) created to 
recommend a future structure for the South African ESI. The [mdings of these task teams would 
clearly have an influence on Eskom' s electrification progranune after 1995. 
It is necessary now to briefly discuss one further topic of great importance to the viability of 
Eskom's electrification progranune. This topic concerns electricity consumption by consumers 
connected to the national grid as a consequence of Eskom's electrification progranune. It is upon 
342 This issue will be further commented upon in the next chapter. 
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this statistic, that the viability of Eskom' s electrification programme turned, hence it deserves 
special mention. 
Eskom's return on their electrification capital investment was sensitive to: 
a) The cost of connections; 
b) Operation and maintenance costs; 
c) The electricity tariff levels; and 
d) Revenue losses. 
Eskom had at least partial control over the first three items but item (d), revenue losses, was to a 
considerable extent completely outside their control, especially with respect to the amoWlt of 
electricity used by each household. So far as this was concerned the financial break-even usage for 
Eskom's electrification programme was, as previously mentioned, 355 kWh/month. At the end of 
1995 NER estimates of the average electricity used by each newly connected black household on 
the electrification programme amoWlted to only 83 kWh/month see Fig No 8.3 below. 
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FIG NO 8.3 AVERAGE ELECTRICITY CONSUMPTION PER 
HOUSEHOLD FOR FIVE YEARS AFTER CONNECTION: 
KWH/MONTH 
source : N ER Progre s s Report , (1995 , p . 17) 
The major problem of trying to estimate actual electricity consumption growth in the 
electrification programme is that, although Eskom's Distributor' s monthly reports do give figures 
for sales for each area of supply, these figures are difficult to analyse since some settlements had 
only been electrified in the recent past whilst others had been electrified from the inception of the 
electrification programme in 1990/91. The best that can be done is therefore to examine average 
growth figures. Available averages in sales in kWh/month in Eskom's 5 Distribution Areas for the 
period 1993-1995 are shown in Table No 8.8 below. 
DISTRIBUTOR •• ·· 
.. ............ . 
BLOEMFONTEIN 
CAPE TOWN 
DURBAN 
JOHANNESBURG 
PRETORIA 
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...•. .. 1993 
.................... 
76 
137 
73 
70 
51 
79 78 
123 124 
88 83 
67 83 
55 59 
TABLE NO 8.8 AVERAGE SALES OF ELECTRICITY BY DISTRIBUTOR: 
1993 - 1995 IN kWh/MONTH 
Source: Eskom's National Electrification Planning Division. 
Clearly these figures are very much below the break-even consumption figure of 355 kWh/month 
in each year and for every Distributor. Putting too much reliance on these figures is problematic, 
however, because in many cases electrified households supplied power to "backyard shacks" thus 
inflating the amount of electricity bought by the household itself?43 
The problem with average figures for electricity consumption by black households is that as the 
numbers of electrified dwellings increased in a particular area the average consumption decreased. 
For example, a study by Thorne and Qangule, (1994), showed that between 1993 and 1994 the 
number of electricity consumers in Khayelitsha in the Western Cape increased from 6 000 to 10 
000, the newer consumers using less electricity than the older consumers due to the slower 
acquisition of electrical appliances. This trend brought the average consumption of electricity in 
the townships per household down to about 100 kWh/month. Viljoen and Kidgell (1994) examined 
electricity consumption in 20 settlements in the Northern Province, eight of which had been 
electrified for more than a year. These researchers found that monthly electricity consumption per 
household varied from 20-30 kWh confirming the very low usage of electricity by consumers 
newly connected. Although studies such as these are few in number, so far as Eskom's 
electrification programme in the period 1990-1995 is concerned, they are of prime importance 
since if the consumption figures quoted in them are accurate they bode ill for the viability and 
sustainability of an ongoing nation-wide electrification progranune. The problem of low electricity 
consumption will also be exacerbated when Eskom's electrification programme is mainly 
concerned with the electrification of deep rural areas where the ability-to-pay for electricity will 
no doubt on average be lower that that found in urban areas. 
What is important is that electricity consumption estimates made by Eskom for newly connected 
consumers at the start of their electrification progranune were much higher than were subsequently 
achieved and this shortfall in electricity sales added to revenue losses. The result was that 
considerable cross-subsidisation was required (see the following chapter) to sustain Eskom's 
electrification programme. Clearly larger and larger subsidies would be required as the 
343 Interview with Mr Paul Mare 26th of August 1998. 
256 
electrification progrannne moved from urban to rural to deep rural areas of South Africa. To 
compound the problem of revenue losses further in the period 1990-1995 there was, as mentioned 
already, considerable theft of electricity as well in the newly electrified areas. Mare has estimated 
that the costs to Eskom as a result of such theft for various years were as shown in Table No 8.9 
below. 344 
:.::.: .. , 
199019119921993 
COST OF ELECTRICITY 4,5 19,7 28,4 34,5 43,5 
THEFT (R MILLIONS) 
TABLE NO 8.9 COSTS OF ELECTRICITY THEFT: 1990-1995. 
Source: Me P Mare Eskom's Electrification Manager (1998). 
In Eskom Annual Report parlance the theft of electricity is usually termed "non-technical losses" . 
Each electricity meter had a unique code so in theory it should have been easy to trace electricity 
consumption patterns. In the case of the theft of electricity, however, meters were bridged and 
sales were not recorded. There was also a breakdown in Eskom's record-keeping so far as non-
technical losses were concerned in the years up to 1995 hence there were electricity sales that 
could not be charged against a particular meter and this made the theft of electricity easier to 
accomplish. In addition to non-technical losses there were of course technical losses, these 
resulting from such things as line losses, transformer problems and loading and reticulation design. 
These losses have been variously estimated by Eskom to be anything from 10 to 15 per cent.345 
All in all then revenue losses to Eskom from their electrification progrannne were considerable as 
was the amount of cross-subsidisation demanded by the programme.346 Certain of these losses, for 
example losses as a consequence of low electricity sales to black households, were generally quite 
beyond Eskom's control. These losses do, however, help to explain Eskom's efforts to market 
electricity between 1990 - 1995 thus increasing electricity sales and capturing segments of the 
energy market which were the province of other energy carriers such as gas, fuelwood and coal. 
3.6 Numbers of Connections and Capital Requirements 
To close this section some overall statistics are presented in tabular and graphical form which 
serve to summarise the achievements of Eskom' s programme to bring electricity to black 
344 It must be emphasised that this, by Mr Mare's own admission, was a very crude estimate, it is given 
merely to indicate that the theft of electricity amounted to considemble sums of money in the years 
1990 to 1995 
345 Interview with Mr P Mare 26th August 1998. 
346 These revenue losses and the amount of cross-subsidisation required as a consequence will be 
discussed in detail in the next chapter. 
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households in South Africa in the period 1990 to 1995. To show the magnitude and importance of 
Eskom's electrification programme the numbers of connections made by local government and 
others are also given so that comparisons may be made and the extent of Eskom' s achievement can 
be seen. 
Firstly, Table No 8.10 below shows the population of the different provinces of South Africa, both 
urban and rural, the number of houses in each province and the number of these houses which had 
access to electricity on the 31 st December 1995. 
I 
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; TYPE NOOK NOQF NO OF HOTISES pOPln.ATIQN .. ·.BOUSE8 .... NOT ................... P1l0VlNCE· .......................... HOUSES 
. ·liiti:¢emFIED ELl<t'fiuFmj) •••• .................. 
EASTERN CAPE RURAL 4 475 073 897 436 51 874 845 562 
EASTERN CAPE URBAN 2149715 495 315 33 053 162 262 
EASTERN CAPE TOTAL 6 624 788 1 392 751 384 927 1 007 824 
FREE STATE RURAL 1 300 293 241852 78 633 163219 
FREE STATE URBAN 1 500 167 357 266 241532 115 734 
FREE STATE TOTAL 2 800 460 599 118 320 165 278 953 
GAUTENG RURAL 351213 68 560 37 262 31 298 
GAUTENG URBAN 6827915 1 682 288 1 307 335 374 953 
GAUTENG TOTAL 7 143 128 1 750 848 1 344 597 406 251 
KWAZULUINATAL RURAL 5186023 987 188 138 120 849 068 
KWAZULUINATAL URBAN 3 396 259 808 552 636 551 172 001 
KW AZULUINATAL TOTAL 8 582 282 1795 740 774 671 1 021 069 
MPUMALANGA RURAL 2 080 631 393 279 146 442 246 837 
MPUMALANGA URBAN 887 545 195 637 116 253 79 384 
MPUMALANGA TOTAL 2 968 176 588 916 262 695 326 221 
NORTHWEST RURAL 2 440 829 480919 98 703 382216 
NORTHWEST URBAN 1 081 723 229 120 160 053 69 067 
NORm WEST TOTAL 3 522 552 710 039 258 756 451 283 
NORTIIERN CAPE RURAL 263 247 64 076 30 007 34 069 
NORTIIERN CAPE URBAN 546 799 118 977 90 516 28 461 
NORmERN CAPE TOTAL 810 046 183 053 120 523 62 530 
NORTHERNPROVTINCE RURAL 4 661202 936 598 221931 714 667 
NORTHERN PROVTINCE URBAN 487 023 118 799 84 596 34 203 
NORmERNPROVINCE TOTAL 5 148 225 1 055 397 306 527 748 870 
WESTERN CAPE RURAL 574 270 136 086 64 010 72 076 
WESTERN CAPE URBAN 3 276 825 797 227 702 351 94 876 
WESTERN CAPE TOTAL 3 851 095 933 313 766 361 166 952 
GRAND TOTAL RURAL 21296781 4 205 994 866 982 3 339 012 
GRAND TOTAL URBAN 20153971 4803181 3 672 240 1130941 
GRAND TOTAL TOTAL 41 450 752 9009175 4 539 222 4 469 953 
TABLE NO 8.10 ELECTRIFICATION STATISTICS BY PROVINCE AS AT 31ST DECEMBER 1995 
Source: NER Progress Report (1995, p.12) 
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.O/OllQUSES ~d~OUSES ••••. 
.. ELEC'I'RIJi1ED 
.lJ.,lCTJUFIED 
5,78 94,22 
67,24 32,76 
27,64 72,36 
32,51 67,49 
67,61 32,39 
53,44 46,56 
54,35 45,65 
77,71 22,29 
76,80 23,20 
13,99 86,01 
78,73 21,27 
43,14 56,86 
37,24 62,76 
59,42 40,58 
44,61 55,39 
20,52 79,48 
69,86 30,14 
36,44 63,56 
46,83 53,17 
76,08 23,92 
65,84 34,16 
23,70 76,30 
71,21 28,79 
29,04 70,96 
47,04 52,96 
88,10 11,90 
82,11 17,89 
20,61 79,39 
76,45 23,55 
50,38 49,62 
259 
Secondly, Fig No 8.4 below presents statistics on the numbers of black households electrified in 
the period 1990-1995 by various entities. 
500000.------------,-----------,------------,-----------~--~~----_, 
497869 
450000 
, 
400000 ---: .... ............... __ ._ ...... .i. 
350000 ········t 
318313 
300000 ..... -.. ~. 
250000 .-
200000 .. ...... ~- ........ +_. __ ..... 
150000 ~.-4I ....~-. -i.l-995-- I ·--··i-j· --··-··- -..... ·137f15 -
100000 .. _.j .... _ .......... _ ........ _. _---------- .. -.---" 
50000 
34584 
....... ~- .... -.... 
, 
. ............... _ ...... -_ ....•. _ ..... _-_ .... - ..... _ .... _ .......... _._ ... . 
31181 
0+-----
1990/1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 
-+-- Local Government Other -B- Total 
FIG NO 8.4 YEARLY ELECTRIFICATION CONNECTIONS BY VARIOUS 
ENTITIES: 1990 - 1995 
Source : Eskom ' s National Electrification Planning Division . 
·The number of connections by Eskom include farm worker' s dwellings. 
It is possible to effect a broad reconciliation between the figures for houses that had access to 
electricity in 1995 given in Table No 8.10 i.e., 4 539 222 and the number of electrified houses in 
Fig No 8.4 and Table No 8.1. Adding the total of houses electrified by Eskom, local government 
and others between 1990 and 1995 given in Fig No 8.4 to the total of electrified houses in 1990 
given in Table No 8.1 the total comes to 4 190 722. It seems from this that although Eskom had 
underestimated the number of houses to be electrified at the start of their electrification 
programme by an order of magnitude they had estimated the numbers of electrified houses in 
South Africa and the "homelands" in 1990 fairly accurately. 
Thirdly, the comparison between the numbers of connections made by Local Government, Eskom 
and others in 1995 by province is shown in Fig No 8.5 below. This figure clearly demonstrates the 
magnitude of Eskom' s contribution to the electrification of black households in South Africa in 
1995. It can be observed that it was only in the Western Cape that Local Government made more 
connections than Eskom. 
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FIG NO 8.5 ELECTRICAL CONNECTIONS BY ESKOM, LOCAL GOVERNMENT AND 
OTHERS IN 1995 
Source : Eskom's National Electrification Planning Division . 
Fourthly, Table No 8.11 below shows the number of schools provided with electricity between 
1991 and 1995 in the different provinces of South Africa. 
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PrtQYJN(:E .-- ........ TYPE )991~1993 1994> 
EASTERN CAPE URBAN 3 3 
RURAL 38 64 
TOTAL 41 67 
FREE SATE URBAN 7 7 
RURAL 41 58 
TOTAL 48 65 
GAUTENG URBAN 6 6 
RURAL 14 22 
TOTAL 20 28 
KWAZULU/NATAL URBAN 4 6 
RURAL 49 83 
TOTAL 53 89 
MPUMALANGA URBAN 6 6 
RURAL 27 49 
TOTAL 33 55 
NORTH WEST URBAN 17 17 
RURAL 32 62 
TOTAL 49 79 
NOR THERN CAPE URBAN 6 6 
RURAL 12 40 
TOTAL 18 46 
NORTHERN URBAN 28 8 
PROVINCE 
RURAL 53 128 
TOTAL 81 136 
WESTERN CAPE URBAN 2 2 
RURAL 9 16 
TOTAL 11 18 
GRAND TOTAL URBAN 79 61 
RURAL 275 522 
TOTAL 354 583 
TABLE NO 8.11 NUMBER OF SCHOOLS ELECTRIFIED: 1991-1995 
Source: NER Annual Report (1996). 
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8 
34 
42 
50 
49 
99 
76 
0 
76 
0 
82 
82 
0 
228 
228 
50 
17 
67 
2 
35 
37 
0 
363 
363 
8 
25 
33 
194 
833 
1 027 
According to the NER Annual Report (1996) approximately 19 000 schools were without 
electricity at the end of 1995. From Table No 8.11 it can be seen that only 1 964 schools had been 
electrified from 1991 to 1995. The NER placed great emphasis on the fact that, electrifying 
schools should take precedence in future electrification initiatives, and about 90 per cent of schools 
in South Africa still had to be electrified in 1995, (NER Annual Report 1996). This simple statistic 
and the NER's concern adds emphasis to the comment made by Archer and Moll (1992, p.147) 
that: "After 40 years of apartheid it should occasion no surprise that the educational sector is 
J 
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among the most contested terrains in South African society. Whatever the political order to emerge 
a safe wager is that education will be at the very top of the priority ranking in a new resource 
allocation". 
This new resource allocation would surely be driven by recognition of the skewed distribution of 
income and skills which existed in South Africa in 1995 as a result of Apartheid's policy of 
providing separate educational facilities for black and white scholars which involved large 
differentials in the quality of tuition provided by the State and which inhibited the development of 
human capital in the country. Correcting this situation was clearly of critical importance to the 
ANC if a redistribution of income was to emerge in a naturally sustainable manner. The provision 
of a composite skills base from primary schools upwards would help in this endeavour and aid in 
improving the inventory of human capital in South Africa. Electrifying schools accelerates this 
process by exposing scholars to new technical skills such as computer literacy. A lack of 
electricity impedes this process as pointed out in Business Day (24th December 1991) when it was 
stated that the lack of electricity in 81347 per cent of schools limited their potential "to provide a 
well-rounded education progranune including audio-visual aides or technical education involving 
tools". Electric light also allows tuition to continue after dark thereby lengthening the day and 
enabling workers participating in the acquisition of life-skills such as reading and writing after 
their working day is over. 
The electrification of clinics is likewise of concern. No information could be obtained on the 
numbers of clinics in South Africa, or their location, let alone those that had been electrified prior 
to 1995. What is known, is that in 1995, 37 clinics only were electrified, (NER Annual Report 
1996). The locations of these are given in Table No 8.12 below. 
347 This figure seems low when the statistics presented above are considered. 
EASTERN CAPE 
FREE STATE 
GAUTENG 
263 
NQo( 
Clinics 
1 
4 
KWAZULU/NATAL 0 
MPUMALANGA 0 
NORTH WEST 0 
NORTHERN CAPE 1 
NORTHERN PROVINCE 23 
WESTERN CAPE 7 
TOTAL 37 
TABLE NO 8.12 NUMBER OF CLINICS ELECTRIFIED: 1995 
Source: NER Annual Report (1996). 
It can be seen from this table that 23 of these clinics (i.e., 62 per cent) were located in the Northern 
Province whilst in KwaZululNatal, Mapumalanga and the North West Province no clinics were 
electrified. The electrification of clinics must surely be seen to work hand-in-hand with the 
electrification of schools in developing human capital stock by ensuring that adequate primary 
health care in both urban and rural areas is provided. Electricity also allows the safe storage of 
drugs by refrigeration and opens up the possibilities of health service provision after dark in 
comfortable surroundings. 
Because many black rural schools and clinics, like certain centres of habitation, are far from the 
national grid it is very costly to bring grid electricity to them. This suggests that other forms of 
electricity may be the solution to this problem, e.g., photovoltaics. Given the importance of 
education and health services in promoting the development of human capital it is suggested that 
the electrification of schools and clinics deserve special attention so far as energy policy 
formulation is concerned. In a country groping its way towards the goals of income redistribution 
and efficient services provision for those formally deprived, the decision of which and how many 
schools and clinics to electrify should therefore not be left to Eskom alone to make, but the 
government should become involved in this process as well. 348 
Finally Table No 8.13 gives the number of connections made by Eskom between 1990 and 1991 in 
each of the COIporation's distribution regions and the capital expenditure incurred on their 
electrification programme over this period. 
348 The question of a cohesive electrification policy will be considered in the concluding chapter of this 
study. 
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BLOEMFONTEIN 2 628 26 425 41 711 44 338 37 718 
CAPE TOWN 3 149 14 470 23 381 47 243 56 057 
DURBAN 17 165 41 027 42 703 43 851 53 253 
JOHANNESBURG 2 229 28 508 45 954 45 814 46 973 
PRETORIA 5 417 35 092 55 052 73 137 119 178 
TOTAL 30 588 145 522 208 801 254 383 313 179 
FARM WORKER CONNECTIONS 
BLOEMFONTEIN 4 316 6 436 7 537 6 988 
CAPE TOWN 6 599 7 347 5 496 4 928 
DURBAN 834 1 322 2 334 1 071 
JOHANNESBURG 86 125 76 0 
PRETORIA 863 844 1 395 2 147 
TOTAL 12 698 16074 16 838 15 134 
CAPITAL EXPENDITURE (R MILLIONS) 
BLOEMFONTEIN 7 68 132 121 141 
CAPE TOWN 10 47 65 140 191 
DURBAN 52 123 138 215 270 
JOHANNESBURG 8 78 101 89 100 
PRETORIA 23 126 148 243 354 
TOTAL 100 442 584 808 1 056 
TABLE NO 8.13 NUMBER OF ELECTRIFICATION CONNECTIONS, WITH CAPITAL COSTS MADE BY ESKOM: 1990-
1995 
Source: Eskom's National Electrification Planning Division. 
265 
4.0 CONCLUSIONS 
This chapter has shown that, despite difficulties encountered with the non-payment for electricity, 
and the seeming lack of a cohesive planning regime involving government input embracing the 
incorporation of land reform schemes and urban and rural growth points, Eskom, working alone, 
exceeded their original plan to electrify 700 000 houses in the period 1990-1996 by 252 473 
connections by 1995, the total number of houses electrified being 952473. Furthermore, although 
Eskom's forecasted electrification programme provided for the supply of electricity to urban 
formal low income and informal planned houses only, the Corporation succeeded also in 
electrifying 60 744, farm workers dwellings, between 1990 and 1995. With regard to the 
electrification of schools and clinics this was shown to lag far behind the efforts made to electrify 
households. The emphasis on household electrification can perhaps be understood, however, given 
the poor living conditions of the majority of black South Africans and the unrest caused by poor 
services provision that occurred in Greater Soweto in the period 1985-1990. With the advent of 
the RDP government intervention in Eskom's electrification programme was seen to take place. 
The RDP intervention did not mean, however, that a detailed governmental electrification policy 
for South Africa had been formulated, such a policy was still a thing of the future. The RDP 
simply meant that Eskom's electrification programme was to be expanded to include rural areas 
which, as the average connection costs have shown, would put an increasingly heavy financial 
burden on Eskom in future and tend perhaps to slow down the process of bringing electricity to 
black households. 
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CHAPTER 9 
THE FINANCIAL AND ECONOMIC IMPACTS OF ESKOM'S 
BLACK HOUSEHOLD ELECTRIFICATION PROGRAMME: 1990-
1995 
1.0 INTRODUCTION 
The purpose of this chapter is to quantifY the financial and economic impacts of Eskom' s 
programme to electrifY black households in South Africa in the period 1990-1995. The important 
questions that have to be addressed in this regard are as follows: 
1) Was the financial cost of the programme greater than expected? 
2) What was the magnitude of the cross-subsidisation necessary to sustain the programme? 
3) How large were the economic benefits arising from the programme? And 
4) How did these economic benefits compare with the postulated benefits? 
The financial cost of the programme will be considered first and then the various economic 
benefits will be discussed. The economic benefits will be divided into their socio-economic, 
micro-economic and macro-economic components for ease of exposition. 
2.0 THE FINANCIAL IMPACT 
Prior to presenting a table of historical capital, operating and maintenance costs and revenue 
arising from Eskom' s programme to electrifY black households in South Africa in the period 
1990-1995 some attempts which were made in 1992 to estimate the programme's financial 
impact on Eskom itself will be discussed. These results are important since, as will be shown, 
they allowed Eskom to know in advance the magnitude of the subsidies the Corporation would be 
called upon to provide to sustain the programme to electrifY black households up to 1995. 
Three different reports that estimated the financial impact of Eskom' s electrification programme 
were produced. Early in March 1992 the first report was completed. On the 10th April 1992 a 
second report was produced and quickly thereafter in mid-June 1992 the third report was 
produced (see Els 1992). Each of these reports were based upon the same analytical approach, 
and subsequent analyses simply recorded newer information as it came to hand thus enriching the 
results. Because these reports were important in formulating financial strategies for Eskom in 
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meeting their electrification programme there is value in briefly discussing the third and most up-
to-date ofEskom's reports here. 
The methodology for all three reports was that Eskom' s electrification programme was modelled 
on the basis that it was a stand-alone project taking into account: 
a) Cost savings resulting from the restructuring of Eskom in 1991 described earlier; 
b) Eskom' s projected financial results for 1992 which were known with a degree of certainty; 
c) The 1992-1997 electricity sales projections; 
d) Expected primary energy costs over the period: 
e) Eskom' s capital investment plans for the period; 
f) The targeted connections for the period; and 
g) Energy consumption per dwelling. 
The targeted connections for the period were increased in the third report from 700 000 in the 
previous reports to 912 000 as a result of detailed research undertaken by Eskom' s Marketing and 
Electrification Departments. In arriving at this number of potential connections the following 
factors were taken into account:349 
a) Permanence of occupation, i.e., problems of migration; 
b) Lack of infrastructure i.e., distance from the national grid and access to other services such 
as water; 
c) Affordability criteria; and 
d) Alternative energy sources, i.e., use offuelwood, candles etc. 
The electrification consumer mix was further refined in this third report from the formal urban, 
high-density informal and low density informal households specified in the two earlier reports, to 
Townships, villages, informal squatter camps and rural farm worker dwellings. The breakdown 
was as shown in Table No 9.1 below. 
349 This targeted figure was very close to be actual nwnber of household connections made by Eskom 
in the period 1990 - 1995 which amounted to 952 473, households and 60 744 fannworkers 
dwellings making comparisons between the theoretical and actual fmancial impact of Eskom's 
electrification progrannne very meaningful. 
ESTABLISHED 
GROWING 
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5 
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TABLE NO 9.1 CONSUMER MIX ESKOM'S ELECTRIFICATION 
FINANCIAL REPORT: 1992 
Source: Eskom Financial Planning Department Report (1992, Annexure A, 
p.3). 
The connection costs varied from R 1 000 to R 5 000 each depending on the length of line from 
the grid to the supply point. 350 The energy consumption per dwelling, which has previously been 
targeted as being one of the most critical pieces of information in determining the viability of 
Eskom's electrification programme was based on the location of the consumer. In an 
"established" area the consumption was estimated to grow from 110 to 450 kWh/month. In a 
"growing" area the range would be from 90 to 300 kWh/month and in a "subsistence" area the 
range was estimated to be 60 to 160 kWh/month. Operating Costs presented a problem since little 
information was available on this item at the time. Indications from Eskom's Distributors 
suggested that these costs ranged from R 20 to R 30 per month per household. A figure of R 12 
per household was eventually used in the analysis. The tariff used was Eskom's SI Tariff 
amounting to 18,84 centslkWh in 1992. 
Based upon the information outlined above Income and Cash Flow Statements were produced, 
these are shown below in Table No 9.2 and Table No 9.3 respectively for the years applicable to 
this study. 
350 These were very reasonable assessments if the actual costs shown in Fig No 8.1 in the previous 
chapter are compared with them. 
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,<,::'«:L .... .. ... ItEM" [ [ , 1992 ]993 1994 ... ,19~5/ 
REVENUE 13,8 57,2 128,1 237.0 
PRIMARY ENERGY 1,3 5,4 12,0 22,6 
OPERA TING COSTS 11,5 53,6 96,8 145,4 
DEPRECIATION 16,7 53,5 99,6 151,9 
INCOME (15,7) (53,3) (80,3) (82,9) 
FINANCE CHARGES 40,7 137,7 272,7 440,1 
NET INCOME (56,4) (193,0) (353,0) (523,0) 
TABLE NO 9.2 ABRIDGED INCOME STATEMENT IN MILLIONS OF 
RAND: ESKOM'S ELECTRIFICATION FINANCIAL 
REPORT 1992 
Source: Eskom Financial Planning Department Report (1992, p. 5 a). 
............. - .. - ..... .......... . ......... 
. ::::,::.: : ' ........... --- .- ..... 
' .. •• ..,.,m ... ', .. , i' .. ' ... "J992., 1993:' .". ·1994 
NET OPERATING INCOME (15,7) (55,3) (80,3) 
NON CASH ITEMS 16,7 53,5 99,6 
1,0 (1,8) 19,3 
FINANCE CHARGES 40,7 137,7 272,7 
OPERA TING CASH FLOW (39,7) (139,5) (253,4) 
CAPITAL EXPENDITURE 469,2 563,9 730,2 
J995 
(82,9) 
151,9 
69,0 
440,1 
(371,1) 
738,7 
NET FUNDING REQUIREMENT 508,9 703,4 983,6 1 109,8 
TABLE NO 9.3 CASH FLOW STATEMENT IN MILLIONS OF RAND: 
ESKOM'S ELECTRIFICATION FINANCIAL REPORT 1992 
Source: Eskom Financial Planning Department Report (1992, p.5a) 
The salient features arising from these income and cash flow statements are the following: 
a) Net income was negative in every year peaking at R 523 million in 1995; 
b) There were operating losses in every year peaking at R 82,9 million in 1995; and 
c) Debt, represented by net funding requirements, occurred in each year peaking at Rl 109,8 
million in 1995. 
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In Table No 9.4 below the results of updated (calculated in 1998) historical costs incurred and 
revenues earned in the years 1992 to 1995 from Eskom's electrification programme are 
presented. 
••• 
ITEM ·····1993· 
•••• •••• • •• 
. .. 
1!)9!F 
CAPITAL COSTS 441 871 000 584 414 000 807 992 000 1 055 467 000 
PRODUCTION 53 479 763 131 198 853 227 890 115 348 507 058 
COSTS)5! 
REVENUE 31 650 625 66 982 447 120347 606 190 830 113 
NET FUNDING 463 700 138 648 630 406 915 534 509 1 213 143 945 
REQUIREMENT 
TABLE NO 9.4 ESKOM'S ELECTRIFICATION PROGRAMME 
HISTORICAL COSTS AND REVENUE IN RAND: 1992 -
1995 
Source: Eskom's National Electrification Planning Division. 
Examining the results of Eskom's 1992 financial analysis given above in Table No 9.3 and the 
historical financial figures gathered for Eskom's actual electrification programme given in Table 
No 9.4 reveals an interesting comparison bearing in mind the number of electrical connections 
estimated in the 1992 financial analysis was vel)' close to the actual number of connections 
achieved by Eskom in their electrification programme up to the 31 st December 1995. 
The net funding requirement, i.e., the actual financial shortfall that occurred from Eskom's 
electrification programme in the years 1992 to 1995, and which had to be cross-subsidised by 
other electricity users, was year-on-year, vel)' similar to that postulated in the ex-ante financial 
analysis undertaken by Eskom. These figures are compared for convenience in Table No 9.5 
below. 
351 The Production Costs are the costs of generating the electricity delivered to the electrification 
programme and the operation and maintenance costs involved in the production process. 
1992 
1993 
1994 
1995 
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1992 
ANALYSIS 
509 
703 
984 
1 110 
HISTOR.ICAL 
····AppRAIsAL 
.. ..... .. 
464 
649 
916 
1 213 
TABLE NO 9.5 COMPARISON OF PROJECTED AND ACTUAL 
ELECTRIFICATION FUNDING REQUIREMENT IN 
MILLIONS OF RAND: 1992 - 1995 
It can be seen from Table No 9.5 that it was only in 1995 that the historical costs exceeded the 
projected costs. 
The fact that Eskom's management knew from 1992 that continuing with their black household 
electrification programme would negatively affect their financial position suggests that the 
political imperative for doing so was paramount. The fact that the financial impact of the 
electrification programme on Eskom was only analysed some two and one half years into the 
programme also tends to support the view that politics, not economics, was the deciding factor in 
Eskom's decision to undertake the programme in the first place. Because the programme would 
require large cross-subsidisation it is suggested that the BEP A analysis which postulated that the 
programme would provide the nation with very large macro-economic benefits was therefore all 
important so far as that decision was concerned. 
Before discussing the macro-economic analysis one further point in connection with the ex ante 
study and the historical figures resulting from Eskom' s electrification programme needs to be 
considered. Comparisons between the capital costs of Eskom' s electrification programme shown 
in Table No 9.3 reveal that the programme's projected capital costs in the years 1993, 94 and 95 
were all less than the actual, as shown in Table No 9.4 above. The years 1994 and 95 were 
particularly troublesome in this regard. The actual extra capital expenditure over the budgeted 
expenditure being R 317 million in 1995 alone. The divergent capital costs in the years 1994 and 
1995 can at least be partially explained by Eskom making more peri-urban and rural connections 
at high cost than had been envisaged in the theoretical financial analysis as a consequence of the 
RDP. The establishment of the RDP was the essential departure point between Eskom's 
theoretical financial appraisal of its electrification programme and reality. It was obvious 
therefore that as the electrification programme embraced more peri-urban and rural areas, 
particularly deep rural areas of the country, the capital costs involved would greatly increase. 
This problem was discussed earlier when reasons were given for Eskom electing to concentrate, 
at least initially, on electrifying black households in urban areas. In May 1993 Eskom had issued 
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their Electrification Participation Note 01, to fund the electrification of some of the houses Eskom 
had originally targeted for electrification. Eskom was of course aware that rural electrification 
would be more costly than urban electrification and with more and more rural areas being 
scheduled for electrification after 1994 it is easy to see why in October 1994, and according to 
Eskom, to meet "the changed dynamics of the programme" the Corporation proposed the issue of 
a new Electrification Participation Note i.e., EP No 02.352 
The broad characteristic of the Participation Note was that investors would share the financial 
risks being undertaken by Eskom as a consequence of the Corporation embarking on their 
electrification programme.353 The risks mentioned being that Eskom may not be able to escalate 
electricity tariffs in an economically viable fashion and the possibility of actual electricity 
consumption levels being lower than forecast, which, as has been shown already, was a known 
fact. Several socio-economic inducements were added for potential investor's consumption e.g., 
the purchase of participation notes would "make enormous strides towards bringing electricity to 
the nation as a whole" and they would "seek to provide a meaningful kick start to the economy 
over the next few years" they would in addition "bring immeasurable environmental and health 
benefits to millions of people as well as benefits to the country and it's ecosystem as a whole,,354 
and finally they would "provide the private sector with a direct investment into one of the most 
significant components of the Reconstruction and Development Programme", (participation Note 
prospectus, 1994, p.28). Calling into question "kick starting" the economy Professor Colin 
MaCarthy of Stellenbosch University observed in Business Day (6th September 1991) that 
"economic quick fixes did not exist". Whilst MaCarthy's comments were directed at the Nedcor 
Old Mutual scenarios for South Africa where housing for the poor was postulated as a way of 
"kick starting" the economy, it seems that electrifying black households in South Africa was now 
being viewed in the same light. Eskom's Participation Notes were therefore not without risk and 
building on what McCarthy said in 1991, and as will be shown in the next section, Eskom's 
electrification programme was as equally incapable of "kick starting" the South African economy 
into life as was the scheme to house the poor. 
Three other financial analyses concerned with electrifying South Africa's black households 
deserve mention. These are the Van Horen analyses (1993 and 1994) and an analysis undertaken 
by Mark Davis (1997). These analyses considered a long-term national electrification programme 
352 See Theta Secwities Prospectus 1994. 
353 Investors were assured that "the risk of bad debts has been largely eliminated by making use of 
prepaid meters in all new connections", (Participation Note Prospectus 1994,p.19). From what has 
been said already, concerning some consumer's ability to "bridge" such meters this was an 
optimistic view. 
354 The health benefits of Eskom's electrification programme will be discussed in the next section. 
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spanning 20 years from 1992 to 2011. Future scenarios were developed embracing urban and 
rural electrification. Both analyses report the need for cross-subsidies and the fact that debt 
accumulation would be substantial at the end of the period i.e., 2011. The importance of the 
studies rests on the future economic impact of electrifying black households in South Africa and 
not on their historical content since they are both essentially concerned with future electrification 
financial problems. 
3.0 THE SOCIO-ECONOMIC IMPACT 
Widespread access to electricity impacts the socio-economic condition of a country in many ways. 
Unfortunately historical data on the socio-economic aspects of Eskom's electrification 
programme is rather sparse and apart from recording the numbers of electrical connections made 
in rural clinics and schools, which has already been commented upon, little else has been 
recorded in detail with respect to those developments in the period 1990 -1995. What has 
received some attention, however, is the health impacts of electrifying both urban and rural 
homes, including farm workers dwellings, and the social consequences of fuelwood gathering. 
These two topics will therefore be the theme of this section. 
3.1 Health Hazards 
With regard to health hazards the provision of electricity to homes can reduce respiratory disease 
from the inhalation of coal and fuelwood fumes. Evidence from studies undertaken in China, 
India, Nepal, Nigeria, Papua New-Guinea and South Africa itself all suggest that there is a strong 
relationship between indoor combustion of coal and biofuels with their accompanying high 
concentrations of airborne particulate matter and respiratory infections. The most serious of these 
infections are bronchitis and pneumonia in children, and chronic bronchitis and other pulmonary 
diseases in adults, particularly amongst women, (Smith, 1987). It therefore follows that with the 
elimination of coal and wood-burning stoves that would eventually come about from the complete 
electrification of the black households in South Africa a major contribution to the health of the 
South African public could be achieved. 
The impact of wood and coal burning stoves used for cooking and heating purposes have also 
been the subject of research in the period of this study. Such stoves have generally high emission 
factors of CO2 which is an important green-house related gas. Data for South Africa published by 
the President's Council in 1991 states that with respect to such stoves households contribute 8 
million tons of CO2 annually to air pollution. Because South Africa has a dual economy the 
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situation with regard to air pollution is exacerbated. This is because not only is there air pollution 
from first-world production factors but also from the vast number of coal and wood-burning 
stoves existing in the lesser developed areas of South Africa. 
So far as the geographical distribution of South Africa's coal resources is concerned they are 
confined to two areas of the country, the Eastern Transvaal Highveld (ETH) and the Waterberg 
coalfields. More than 80 per cent of South Africa's coal comes from the ETH, however, and about 
75 per cent of the fossil-fuelled electricity supplied to South Africa is also generated in this area 
by Eskom, (see Chapter 3). Furthermore the greatest concentration of black townships such as 
Greater Soweto and Alexandra are also located in this region. Although Greater Soweto had been 
electrified by 1986 and many of the larger black townships in the ETH were undergoing 
electrification between 1990-1995 coal burning stoves were still widely used for cooking and 
space heating purposes in these townships. Hence the problem of health hazards emanating from 
the use of coal-based energy sources is concentrated in the ETH. 
In the rural areas of South Africa the use of fuelwood is widespread, particularly amongst farm 
labourers dwellings. Terblanche (1993) has monitored the exposure of such households to 
fuelwood emissions. Total volatile organic compounds were measured inside cooking areas and 
outside dwellings. In addition personal monitoring was carried out on 15 children aged 8-12 
years. The results of these studies confirmed the findings of other studies carried out in Africa 
and the conclusion was that "the levels of both gaseous and particulate pollutants measured in 
indoor environments have potentially serious health risks", (Terblanche, 1993, pp.38-42). The 
levels of carbon monoxide recorded inside cooking huts were also a cause for concern and added 
to the risks of biomass fuel usage indoors.355 Terblanche (1993, p.43) also reported that in winter 
in many unelectrified houses in South Africa "the whole family will gather round the fire and 
may even spend the night there in the case of severe winter conditions". The infant mortality rate 
for acute respiratory illness in South African rural areas as a consequence is almost 15 deaths per 
100 000 of the population compared with 2 deaths for North America, WHO (1988). This 
indicates the importance of electricity provision in combating the health hazards of traditional 
fuel usage in homes in South Africa's black townships and rural areas. 
Whilst information on the health effects of domestic coal burning was sparse in the period 1990-
1995 there was a study undertaken in the PWV by Terblanche, Nel and Opperman, (1992). This 
study consisted of personal monitoring of 45 children between the ages 8-12 years in coal-
burning townships; the results indicated extremely unacceptable levels of exposure to air 
355 Peak levels of 900ppm lasting from a few seconds to minutes were recorded. The one hour health 
standard for such a situation in the USA is 35ppm, (Terblanche 1993, p.41). 
275 
pollutants, (Terblanche, Nel and Opperman, 1992, pp.41-44). Another problem connected to 
Eskom's electrification programme between 1990 - 1995 and health hazards in the PWV region 
was that whilst there were many electrified areas, including Greater Soweto, there were also 
many unelectrified houses which emitted air pollution from coal burning stoves which carried 
great distances thereby affecting the health of people actually living in electrified houses. A 
further complication was that in partially electrified houses356 about 45 per cent still used coal-
burning stoves for cooking and about 40 per cent used wood for space heating purposes.357 This 
suggests that partial electrification will not control the health hazards occasioned by fossil and 
biomass fuel usage. Eskom' s "Electricity for All" initiative is then much more relevant than the 
coiners of the phrase thought possible in curbing respiratory illnesses. 
The most common pollutants produced by all domestic fuels are particulates followed by sulphur 
dioxide (mainly from coal), nitrogen oxides from coal, wood, paraffin and gas, and the volatile 
organic compounds produced from the usage of all biomass fuels and coal. The health problems 
which can be caused by exposure to these air pollutants from domestic fuel usage varies from 
acute eye irritations, chronic pulmonary disease and cardio-vascular disease, (Terblanche, 1993, 
p.45). Access to electricity can mitigate against these health hazards particularly those arising 
from the use of coal and wood burning which were the most widespread fuel usage categories in 
black households and the most dangerous. 
Because of its concern with health matters, and to also promote electrification, Eskom funded a 
three year research project to try and quantify the health benefits of its original electrification 
programme; it will be recalled that this programme involved electrifying 700 000 homes in the 
period 1991 to 1996.358 This research project was undertaken by the Medical Research Council's 
Community Health Research Group in conjunction with Eskom; results from this research are 
reported in Yach et al (1994). Part of this research was to determine the impact of Eskom's 
electrification programme on the financial repercussions of changes in the demand for health 
services. 
356 Houses with a plug for lighting and a few basic electrical appliances such as kettles or irons etc. 
357 In fully electrified houses the householders, in 2 per cent of the cases, also used coal for cooking 
purposes, (Terblanche, 1993, p.SO). Van Gass, (1992, p.311) has also stated that 22 per cent of 
newly electrified houses in Greater Soweto continue to use coal stoves. Kgatle, (1988, p.19) also 
confmns that the use of coal stoves in electrified dwellings is because they perfonn multiple 
functions such as cooking and heating. 
358 As has been shown in Chapter 8 this electrification programme was amended to include the 
requirements of the RDP introduced by the Government of National Unity in 1994. 
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The first stage of the investigation was to detennine the extent to which the access to electricity 
lead to its actual utilisation. The focus was directed on lower income groups of the South African 
population comprising blacks, coloured and Asian households. Monthly household energy 
consumption figures by electrified and unelectrified households were used to estimate the 
expected change in air pollution levels. This estimate was then translated into an impact on 
respiratory infection morbidity and mortality rates. 
With respect to paraffin usage the total health impact of paraffin poisoning was represented as 30 
hospitalisations for every million litres of paraffin sold. Using monthly energy consumption 
figures paraffin consumption was calculated both for the energy used prior to and post Eskom' s 
electrification programme. Additionally the impact of the electrification programme on the 
number of burn mortality cases was estimated. This was done by using the bum mortality rate of 
South Africa's white population as a proxy for newly electrified black households. 
The results of the analysis, see Table No 9.6, suggests that as a consequence of electrification for 
the duration of Eskom's programme to electrify 700 000 houses between 1991 and 1996, 
morbidity due to respiratory infections would fall by an average of 76,5 per cent, paraffin 
poisoning was expected to decrease by a total of 4 899 cases and an average reduction of 35 065 
bum cases could be expected. In financial terms the direct savings to South Africa's health 
services as a consequence of Eskom's electrification programme amounted to R 763, 63 million 
(1994 rand), (Delport, cited in Yach et al 1994). In addition to these savings there would of 
course be benefits to the economy from a reduction in man hours lost in the workplace from 
respiratory illness as a direct result of the electrification of black households. No historical studies 
on such benefits could be found, however. 
Reduction in total cost of transport to GP' s 
Reduction in total cost of transport to specialists 
Reduction in total cost of ambulance transport to hospital 
Reduction in total cost of public & private transport to 
hospital 
Reduction in total GP consultation cost 
Reduction in specialist consultation cost 
Reduction in total state hospitalisation cost 
Reduction in total private hospitalisation cost 
Reduction in total drug costs 
Reduction in total direct cost 
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R3 203 664.11 
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R6 444 061.47 
R981971.39 
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N/A 
N/A 
R356 737 445.10 
...................... 
. ... ........ ..... ..... . 
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............................... 
PQISQNINO.A.ND 
BURNS 
............... 
RO.OO R3 203 664.11 
RO.OO R469 694.65 
RO.OO R6 444 061.47 
RO.OO R981 971.39 
RO.OO R49 165 142.17 
RO.OO R29 065 263.00 
R406 893 573.30 R674 301 221.60 
N/A RO.OO 
N/A RO.OO 
R406 893 573.30 I R763 631 018.40) 
TABLE NO 9.6 DIRECT HEALTH COST SAVING DUE TO ELECTRIFICATION, (1994 RAND) 
Source: Delport, 1994, Table 5 cited in Yach et al (1994). 
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Whilst the figures in table No 9.6 are impressive they are of course only estimates since 
historically electricity usage data suggests that low-income households can generally not afford to 
use the amount of electricity (i.e. , equivalent to white household usage) required to dispense with 
coal and fuelwood usage entirely, see the statistics in Table No 8.8 in the previous chapter). The 
health hazards attached to traditional energy usage will therefore remain in South Mrica for 
many years to come. In this respect Terblanche, (1993, p.74) has estimated that the health risk of 
living in partially or unelectrified areas is 130 per cent higher than living in a totally electrified 
area. The striking lack of significantly decreasing health risks from living in a partially electrified 
area re-emphasises the importance of total electrification. Lerer in Yach et al' (1994) supports 
this assertion stating that "it is clear electrification is the key to the reduction of indoor air 
pollution" . Lerer does add a note of caution regarding the juxtaposition of indoor household 
pollution and air pollution from Eskom's power stations supplying electricity to newly electrified 
areas. It is important to note in this respect, however, that emissions of S02 per unit of energy 
generated can be controlled and managed much more efficiently by Eskom in their power 
stations, by for example very high chimneys which disperse the emissions of S02, thus diluting 
the health hazard in a much more effective manner than can be expected from the emissions 
arising from coal and wood-burning stoves in black households.359 It would appear that the 
important negative socio-economic externality concerning the health hazard associated with coal 
and fuelwood usage can be internalised by a total electrification programme. To demonstrate the 
effects of electrification with regard to sulphur dioxide and particulate emissions Figs No 9.1 and 
9.2 are presented below. 
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FIG NO 9.1 ELECTRIFIED AND UNELECTRIFIED HIGHVELD BLACK 
TOWNSHIPS: SULPHUR DIOXIDE CONCENTRATIONS 
Source: Turner (1990 , p .20 Fig No 10). 
359 Chimneys in Eskom's modern power stations are 300 metres high and are built for just this 
purpose. 
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FIG NO 9.2 ELECTRIFIED AND UNELECTRIFIED HIGHVELD BLACK 
TOWNSHIPS: PARTICULATES CONCENTRATIONS 
Source: Turner , (1990 , p .20 Fig No 10). 
It can be seen from these figures that so far as sulphur dioxide emissions are concerned 
electrification can reduce the hazard by about 70 per cent and with respect to particulates the 
reduction amounts to about 67 per cent. 
3.2 Fuelwood Gathering 
The use of fuelwood for cooking and heating has a further socio-economic negative externality in 
addition to the respiratory diseases associated with the combustion process that may be alleviated 
by electricity provision to rural areas. This additional externality concerns the private costs of 
buying fuelwood in South Africa, which is considered to be a cheap energy source but does not 
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take into account the costs of replanting deforested areas of the country.360 With respect to 
fuelwood use and deforestation Gander, (1991, p.14) has estimated that the fuelwood usage per 
capita/per annum used by households in selected areas of South Africa is as shown in Table No 
9.7 below. 
·REC.ION 
EASTERN TRANSVAAL 
WESTERN TRANSVAAL 
NATAL 
'" ... 
792 
818 
934 
TABLE NO 9.7 FUELWOOD USAGE IN SELECTED AREAS OF SOUTH 
AFRICA: 1991 
Source: Gander, (1991, p.14). 
Eberhard, (1986, p.105) estimated that on a national scale the per capita usage of fuelwood per 
annum amounted to 800kg, which figure seems to confirm Gander's later regional findings. The 
total consumption of fuelwood per annum has also been estimated and amounts to 12 million tons 
and the replacement regime is considembly less than this figure, hence fuelwood in South Africa 
is gradually being denuded, (Van Gass and Barnard, 1991, p.lO). One of the problems of tracking 
fuelwood usage is the fact that it is an unregulated fuel source, and this adds to the destruction of 
fuelwood sources by private individuals for either their own use or for selling. Fuelwood 
shortages are a feature of all developing economies as a consequence, (Pearson and Stevens, 
1989, p.132). The cost offuelwood as a percentage of household income varies throughout South 
Africa and costs are higher in urban than in rural areas where often families undertake fuelwood 
gathering rather than buying it. Fuelwood purchases are then informal and not part of the 
economic structure of South Africa, yet they have important consequences on the amount of 
disposable income an urban family is left with after such purchases. In South Africa's metropoles 
the costs of fuelwood as a percentage of household income at the start of Eskom' s electrification 
programme was almost zero in Durban, in Pretoria it amounted to about 7 per cent, in The Vaal 
Triangle the figure was about 13 per cent (Van der Berg, 1990, p.47); this figure represents a 
significant percentage of a households' disposable income. 
Another aspect of fuelwood usage is the shadow price of the fuel as represented by the 
opportunity cost of the time spent gathering it. Gathering fuel wood is usually undertaken by 
women, children or unemployed members of a family. According to Jooste and Nortje (1987, 
360 Fuelwood is in fact not a cheap energy source. Van Gass estimates that on average it is three times 
more expensive than electricity per unit of energy generated, (Van Gass 1992). 
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p.55) the time taken to gather fuelwood amongst farm workers (the group that uses this energy 
carrier the most) is shown in Table No 9.8 below. 
HOURS/WEEK SI'EN'I'(;A'IEuERING···· . "I'ERCENTAGE·OFFARiMWORKERS 
FUF;.L\VoOif . IlPtJSEHOI,DS 
1 - 2 
3 - 4 
5 - 6 
7-8 
GREATER THAN 8 
13 
14 
10 
20 
6 
TABLE NO 9.8 TIME SPENT GATHERING FUELWOOD 
Source: Jooste and Nortje, (1987, p.55) 
These figures show that 20 per cent of farm worker households spend at least 1 day per week 
gathering fuel wood for cooking and heating purposes. In addition to this time there is of course 
the time required to prepare a fire, heat water for cooking or washing and the time taken to cook 
a meal over a fire. These times are all in excess of the time taken to do the same tasks if 
electricity is available to replace fuelwood. Eskom's electrification programme has then the 
potential to increase a household income by people utilising the time spent in gathering fuelwood 
on more productive pursuits such as low-input sustainable agricultural cultivation or making a 
contribution to inward industrialisation in the form of home industry development. ElectrifYing 
rural areas would furthermore, allow families more time together as the time spent in gathering 
fuelwood is reduced and in particular it would relieve women of arduous chores. 
The comment about fuelwood shortages in developing countries made above by Pearson and 
Stevens, (1989) can be translated into a local context for South Africa where fuelwood gathering 
has already caused shortages which began to be felt as early as 1991 at the beginning of Eskom' s 
electrification programme. Table No 9.9 below illustrates the degree of fuelwood shortages 
reported by percentage of farm workers in selected areas of South Africa. 
SLIGHT SHORT AGE 
SERIOUS SHORTAGE 
11 
24 
27 
18 
42 
8 
TABLE NO 9.9 FUELWOOD SHORTAGES IN SELECTED AREAS OF 
SOUTH AFRICA 
Source: Gander, (1991, p.24). 
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It is clear from Table No 9.9 that serious shortages offuelwood do occur in areas of South Mrica 
with 24 and 18 per cent of farm worker households reporting such shortages in Natal. The social 
costs associated with the time spent gathering fuelwood and the economic externalities attached 
to the denudation of the resource suggest that methods aimed at reducing fuelwood usage should 
be part of an educational programme attached to Eskom' s electrification programme so that these 
externalities can be internalised, especially as households become used to using electricity over 
time. There is unfortunately, so far as can be determined, no definitive historical costlbenefit data 
available in South Africa on the opportunity cost of replacing fuelwood by electricity. 
4.0 THE MICRO-ECONOMIC IMPACT 
4.1 The Radio and Television and the Electrical Appliance 
Manufacturing Sectors 
An important aspect of Eskom's electrification programme in the period 1990 -1995 was the 
impact it had on the sales of electrical appliances.361 This section discusses this topic. Electrical 
appliances convert electrical energy into useful services within households and businesses. 
Appliance ownership patterns can therefore be seen as a barometer of the economic benefits, 
which arise from Eskom's electrification programme. Important influences on the sales of 
electrical appliances are climate and the availability and costs of other energy forms and since 
these vary throughout South Africa, appliance sales and energy usage patterns differ in various 
areas of the country. Consequently a multiplicity of energy carriers are used by many households. 
As well as these influences differences in the economic and social conditions of electricity 
consumers newly connected to the national grid from 1990 to 1995 also make it difficult to 
discern national trends in electricity usage and appliance ownership, (Van Gass, 1993, p.2). So 
far as the multiplicity of energy carriers used by households is concerned Data Research Mrica 
(DRA) (1993, p.20) concluded that 95 per cent of electrified houses in South Africa still 
depended on other energy sources besides electricity in the period 1990 to 1995. 
Usually the first use of electricity in a home is for lighting, which for many households is the 
most important benefit of Eskom's electrification programme. Eskom found, however, that newly 
electrified households were still using candles for lighting in rooms which did not have electricity 
plugs, extension cords not being very much used, (Van Gass 1993, p.7). This rather forcibly 
361 In this section the term "electrical appliances" is taken to mean radios, hi-fi equipment and 
television sets as well as the more conventional goods such as kettles, irons etc. 
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demonstrates the multiplicity of energy uses. Research conducted by DRA (1993, p.66) suggested 
that the major reasons for this are as follows: 
a) Lack of confidence in the reliability of electricity supply; 
b) The use of traditional fuels for certain tasks; 
c) Some non-electrical appliances handle a wide range of uses, e.g., coal stoves can be used for 
heating as well as cooking; 
d) Affordability, i.e., the costs associated with electric appliance purchases; 
e) The aim of "saving electricity" was important; and 
1) In low income formal and informal houses access to electricity was not a feature of every 
room in these houses. 
Appliance purchases were usually spread out over time by most households with preference, 
necessity and affordability governing which appliance was purchased first. Minimum electrical 
appliance purchases were, in rank order, Iron, Stove, Fridge and Kettle. The introduction of 
electricity, however, leads to rapidly changing appliance usage patterns as traditionally used non-
electric appliances were replaced by electrical appliances, (Van Rensburg, 1994, p.33). Newly 
connected electricity consumers generally preferred new to second hand appliances and the 
purchase of the latter was a rare event, (Van Rensburg, 1994, p.31). The quality of the appliances 
bought was an important characteristic in buying patterns with instalment buying being generally 
the most popular means of acquiring appliances. 362 
It is suggested that electrical appliance purchases between 1990 and 1995 had four important 
economic effects, these being as follows: 
a) They had a secondary impact on the South African economy, i.e., they stimulated the 
appliance industry from manufacturer through to retailing, creating employment and adding 
to GDP growth in the process; 
b) As appliances were accumulated a more electricity intensive life-style was adopted in 
households; 
c) Because, as mentioned above, appliances were usually bought on credit, the broad money 
supply (M3) in South Africa was increased; and 
d) Because the import content of appliances purchased in South Africa was high the current 
account of the country's Balance-of-Payments was negatively effected. 
362 Access to [mance was a problem only to purchasers that could not provide some sort of security 
e.g., a stable income, (Van Rensburg, 1994, p.32) 
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In the period 1990 to 1994 several surveys were undertaken concerning the purchases of electrical 
appliances by electrified households. Examples of these studies are Englebrecht (1992), Hofmeyer 
(1993), DRA (1993), Van Gass for the NELF (1993) and Van Rensburg for the NELF (1994). 
The most influential of these studies are the DRA and Van Rensburg studies. The DRA study is 
particularly important since it produced a time-series of appliance purchases, which can be used 
to determine the micro and macro-economic impacts of electric appliance sales on the South 
African economy. The study itself was conducted in Kwa ZululNatal and covered 856 peri-urban 
and urban township dwellings, covering the mix of dwellings electrified in Eskom' s national 
electrification programme. Two important conclusions (apart from those relating to the micro and 
macro-economic impacts to be calculated later) can be drawn from this study. 
Firstly the purchase of electrical appliances followed a stepped pattern, i.e., there were periods 
when appliances were bought and periods when they were paid for and no further appliances 
were bought. This regime of purchase, accumulation and further purchase allowed low income 
households to amortise their hire purchase commitments. Appliances were by these means 
accumulated over many years with the more expensive ones such as TV sets and refrigerators 
reaching saturation level of around 80 to 90 per cent over a five year horizon.363 
Secondly an indication of the most desirable appliances purchase could be discerned. The order 
being lamps for lighting purposes, (one of the universally prime images of newly electrified 
homes in South Africa)364, audio systems such as radios and hi fi's, and electric irons with over 
50 per cent of electrified houses buying these items in their first year after electrification. TV sets 
and refrigerators ranked second in importance as being the next most desirable electric appliance 
to own with over 50 per cent of electrified houses buying these items within 18 months of being 
supplied with power. Following on from these appliances, kettles and electric stoves (which 
replace hotplates as households progress in the plateau of appliance purchase and accumulation 
described above continued) were next in order of priority, and these achieved a 50 per cent 
saturation level after 3 years. 
363 With respect to appliance purchases amongst newly connected black households in South Africa 
the situation parallels that of Western Europe in the 1930' s where the transition from a non-
electric way of life to one where electricity was widely used was influenced by social action, 
relationships and disposable income. In Europe the pattern of appliance purchases was also 
stepped reflecting the lack of means of purchases and changes in lifestyle that the acquisition of 
electric appliances brought, (Landes, 1972, pp. 338-339). 
364 Foley (1989, p.33) also mentions that people's desire to have electric lights is one of the strongest 
motivating factors for obtaining an electricity supply. It being virtually unknown for consumers to 
take a supply of electricity and not use it for lighting purposes. 
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The Van Rensburg, (1994) study presents a picture of consumer requirements pertaining to the 
acquisition and utilisation of electrical appliances amongst selected socio-economic groupings. 
These groupings include, like the DRA study, both peri-urban and urban households. This study 
was conducted by both a literature survey and a field study. The data is extensive but it does not 
offer a time-series of appliance purchase and is therefore of less use than the DRA study for 
purposes of determining the micro and macro-economic benefits of Eskom' s electrification 
programme. It does, however, also contain data on the desire households showed for certain 
appliances, (which generally agrees with the DRA's ranking in this respect). Data on future 
purchases of appliances and the preferred retail outlets from which appliances were purchased is 
also provided in this report. The sample of 175 electrified households is considerably smaller 
than the DRA study. There is in addition 175 unelectrified households surveyed to compare 
situation and needs, however. An important observation in the Van Rensburg study is that the 
long-term appliance saturation levels i.e., 5 years plus, do agree with the DRA study results. 
The accumulation of electrical appliances by household for the first and fifth years of the period 
1990 - 1995 i.e., the time period covered in this study, in the areas surveyed by DRA are shown 
in Table No 9.10 below. 
.. : .. ::::::::::.:::::::::::::::::.::::-.::::.::.:::::::::::::: .... 
EUtt'fRltjAI..A:PPLlANCE . 
KETTLE 
IRON 
HOT PLATE 
TELEVISION SET 
STOVE 
REFRIGERATOR 
GEYSER 
HIFISYSTEM/RADIO 
FAN 
HEATER 
FREEZER 
TOASTER 
SEWING MACHINE 
FRYING PAN 
286 
••••. ••. YEARl 
."::::::' .: .. :::::: . ::: 
....... .... . ..... 
••.••... (PERCENT) • 
.. ... .... . ... 
34 
63 
46 
52 
15 
42 
2 
69 
12 
13 
6 
2 
4 
3 
..... _-- .... ------ ....... . 
(PE~CENT) •.. 
75 
80 
88 
75 
82 
9 
76 
34 
41 
19 
11 
6 
8 
TABLE NO 9.10 PERCENTAGE OF ELECTRIFIED BLACK 
HOUSEHOLDS OWNING VARIOUS APPLIANCES 
Source: Condensed from the DRA Survey, (1993). 
A particularly revealing statistic from Table No 9.10 is the percentage of television sets and Hi-
Fi/Radios owned by newly electrified households. These percentage levels suggests that one of the 
main uses of electricity in low income electrified households is for entertainment, provided by 
radios and television sets. The Business Section of the Sunday Times on the 17th October 1993 
observed in this respect that "the local manufacturing of TV tubes which to some extent can be 
linked to increased electrification could generate savings and foreign currency earnings of R 533 
million per year" . 
Using the DRA time-series for the percentage of houses owning various electrical appliances and 
the total number of households electrified by Eskom between 1990 and 1995, the total number of 
electric appliances sold in South Africa as a result of Eskom' s electrification programme can be 
estimated for the period. This estimate is shown in Table No. 9.11 below. 
365 As mentioned above hot plates are replaced by electric stoves as the accumulation of electric 
appliances proceed year-on-year. 
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TO'tAtNooF 
•• APPLIA.:NtmS······ 
• PURCHASED 
1"~,19,i!5 •... · 
467 998 
700 058 
49 513 
652 038 
385 785 
578 110 
47449 
718 631 
201 182 
231 651 
107 184 
53 476 
42724 
50426 
TABLE NO 9.11 ESTIMATED TOTAL NUMBER OF ELECTRICAL 
APPLIANCES SOLD AS A CONSEQUENCE OF 
ESKOM'S ELECTRIFICATION PROGRAMME: 
1990 - 1995 
Table No 9.11 graphically illustrates the impact Eskom's electrification programme made in the 
period 1990 to 1995 on the South African electrical appliance industry. 
It would seem logical to assume that there is a connection between the demand for electrical 
appliances (and therefore electricity) and income levels. It is curious to note, however, that even 
in the inflationary economic climate of 1990 to 1995 there was strong growth in the demand for 
electrical appliances and TV sets and radios and hi-ii's. In this respect Van Gass (1993, p.20) has 
noted that "an unexplainable change took place in retail appliance rates despite the recession". It 
would seem then that the provision of electricity to black households in South Mrica is a catalyst 
for the purchase of electrical appliances and of course as more appliances are bought the circle 
widens and there is a concomitant increase in the demand for electricity. 
In attempting to estimating the impact made by the sales of radios, television sets and electrical 
appliances, (resulting from Eskom's electrification programme) on South Mrica's main macro-
economic variables, i.e., GDP, Balance of Payments (BOP) and employment creation use will be 
made of the historical time-series data on such sales in the period 1990 to 1995 presented in the 
DRA survey. The prices of such appliances (which when multiplied by the numbers of appliances 
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bought equals the change in final demand that sets the multiplier to work) are as given by 
research carried out for the NELF, see Van Gass (1993, Appendix 3). The numbers of houses 
electrified by Eskom are taken from Eskom's own records cf., Table No 8.13 Chapter 8. The 
quantification will be carried out by Input-Output analysis using the 1993 South African National 
Input-Output Tables. A list of the multipliers calculated from these tables is provided in 
Appendix A of this study. The direct, indirect and induced impacts are shown in the tables given 
below. These impacts give a truer estimation of the impacts than do the direct and indirect effects 
only since they include the contribution made by the private consumption expenditure of 
households. Table No 9.12 shows the estimated contribution to GDP and the Balance of Payments 
(BOP) burden and Table No 9.13 shows the contribution to employment creation. 
VEARL ..........•••... 
1990/91 
92 
93 
94 
95 
75,03 
475,95 
892,65 
1 323,82 
1 868,99 
. ........ - -. ---........ ----- .... . 
............. --"- -- ........... ----- ...... . 
•• BOPR(MILLIONS) •• • •• •··· 
(16,58) 
(105,49) 
(199,24) 
(296,24) 
(418,66) 
TABLE NO 9.12 CONTRIBUTION TO GDP AND THE BOP BURDEN: 
ELECTRICAL APPLIANCE PURCHASES: 1990 -1995 
...... --- ...... 
YEAR 1.99Df9i 1992 ••••• ·•·· 1993 •• • •• ·.·.1.994······· 1995 
.. 
S 373 2 072 3 490 4 761 6 157 
SIS 1 137 6 306 10 621 14 492 18 739 
LIS 989 5 482 9 234 12 598 16 292 
TOTAL 2 499 13 860 23 345 31 851 41 188 
TABLE NO 9.13 CUMULATIVE JOB CREATION FROM ELECTRICAL 
APPLIANCE PURCHASES: ESKOM'S 
ELECTRIFICATION PROGRAMME: 1990 - 1995 
NOTES: S: SKILLED LABOUR 
SIS: SEMI-SKILLED LABOUR 
LIS: LOW SKILLED LABOUR 
THE CUMULATIVE EMPLOYMENT FIGURES INDICATE THAT WORKERS 
EMPLOYED IN ANY PARTICULAR YEAR INCLUDE THOSE EMPLOYED IN 
THE PREVIOUS YEAR SO THAT THE ACTUAL NEW JOBS CREATED IN 
ANY ONE YEAR IS THE NUMBER OF EMPLOYED IN THAT YEAR MINUS 
THE NUMBER EMPLOYED IN THE PREVIOUS YEAR. 
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The contribution to GDP from the sales of radios, televisions, hi-fi systems and electrical 
appliances, resulting from Eskom's electrification programme, was about 0,02 per cent in 1991 
rising to about 0,5 per cent in 1995. 
4.2 The Civil Engineering and Building Construction Sectors 
The other two sectors of the South African economy that benefited directly from Eskom' s 
electrification programme were the Civil Engineering and Building Construction sectors.366 The 
work undertaken by these sectors included the building of transmissions networks, cable laying 
and providing the electrical services for houses by means of sub-contracting this work to 
specialists. In the period covered here 1990 to 1995 the work was almost exclusively carried out 
by Eskom approved contractors. These contractors were established firms that had a proven 
record of work with Eskom in the past. This process meant that in the period 1990 to 1995 there 
was essentially little black empowerment or capacity building in the kinds of work undertaken by 
Eskom's electrification programme so far as construction was concerned. This situation was to 
change after 1995 when black managed enterprises were encouraged to tender for such work.367 
In attempting to estimate the impact made by work undertaken by the Civil Engineering and 
Building Construction sectors (as a result of Eskom's electrification programme) on South 
Africa's GDP, BOP and job creation use will be made of the historical capital expenditure on the 
programme given in Table No 9.4 above. This capital expenditure (representing the change in 
final demand which sets the multipliers to work) year-on-year started in 1990/91 as a very small 
percentage of the value of construction being carried out in South Africa being a mere 0,5 per 
cent. By 1995, however, this percentage had risen to 4,6 per cent, (Central Statistics Data 1996). 
Again 1-0 modelling is utilised for estimating the required multipliers and once more the direct, 
indirect and induced impacts are estimated for the reasons already given. The results of the 
analysis are shown in Tables No 9.14 and 9.15 below. Table 9.14 shows the amount of GDP 
generated year-on-year and also the Balance of Payments burden on the country's Current 
Account. In Table No 9.15 an estimate is given of the job creating potential of Eskom's 
electrification programme from economic activity in the building and civil engineering sectors 
over the years 1990 to 1995. 
366 Due to the multiplier effect, see Appendix A, all or most of, the sectors of the South African 
economy benefited indirectly from Eskom's electrification programme. 
367 Telephonic conversation with Mr Paul Mare, 11th December 1998. 
1990/91 
1992 
1993 
1994 
1995 
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163,46 
722,28 
955,28 
1 320,74 
1 725,27 
(24,42) 
(107,90) 
(142,70) 
(197,31) 
(257,75) 
TABLE NO 9.14 CONTRIBUTION TO GDP AND THE BOP BURDEN: 
\:]':,Mi .... 
S 
SIS 
LIS 
TOTAL 
CIVIL ENGINEERING AND BUILDING ACTIVITY: 1990 
- 1995 
19-901:91. 1992' 1993 1994 
'.·· ••••• 1995·· 
656 2 651 3 182 4 065 4 871 
2 695 10 461 10 461 16 039 19 222 
2 381 9 242 11 096 14 170 16 982 
5 732 22 354 26 837 34 274 41 075 
TABLE NO 9.15 CUMULATIVE JOB CREATION FROM CIVIL 
ENGINEERING AND BUILDING ACTIVITY: ESKOM'S 
ELECTRIFICATION PROGRAMME: 1990 - 1995 
NOTES: S SKILLED LABOUR 
SIS: SEMI-SKILLED LABOUR 
LIS: LOW SKILLED LABOUR 
THE CUMULATIVE EMPLOYMENT FIGURES INDICATE THAT WORKERS 
EMPLOYED IN ANY PARTICULAR YEAR INCLUDE THOSE EMPLOYED IN 
THE PREVIOUS YEAR SO THAT THE ACTUAL NEW JOBS CREATED IN 
ANY ONE YEAR IS THE NUMBER OF EMPLOYED IN THAT YEAR MINUS 
THE NUMBER EMPLOYED IN THE PREVIOUS YEAR. 
4.3 The Informal Sector 
In addition to the costs and benefits (as recorded in increased GDP and job creation) of Eskom's 
programme to electrify black households in South Africa in the formal sectors of the South 
African economy discussed above, there were additional such benefits arising from what was 
strictly speaking business development in the micro-economy of the informal manufacturing 
sector. For purposes of continuity, it will be appropriate to discuss these benefits at this juncture. 
Eskom had, certainly from 1993 onwards, concerned itself with this aspect of their electrification 
programme and it will be recalled that each of Eskom's five distributors i.e., Bloemfontein, Cape 
368 By 1995 Eskom's electrification programme was responsible for 13 per cent of the construction 
industry's contribution to South Africa's GDP, or about 0,4 per cent of the country's GDP, as 
measured from Central Statistics Data (1996). 
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Town, Durban, Johannesburg and Pretoria had a Co-ordinating Division with specialists in small 
business development. Additionally part of the R50 million annual contribution that Eskom made 
for the electrification of schools and clinics by others was earmarked for community development 
by means of small business development. 369 
Very little historical evidence is available, however, on the numbers of jobs created in the 
informal sector of the South African economy as a direct result of Eskom' s electrification 
programme. What is available is reviewed here. In the Supplement to Eskom Annual Report 
(1991, p.17) it was stated that for every 100 houses electrified, 14 new jobs would be created in 
the informal sector. If this estimate was accurate it meant that in the period 1993 to 1995, based 
upon the number of households electrified by Eskom, 108 691 jobs would have been created. As 
will be shown presently this number is greater than the estimated job creating capacity of 
Eskom's electrification programme in the formal sector for this period. Eskom's initial estimate 
of informal sector job creation as a consequence of their electrification programme is therefore 
suspect and, like its macro-economic counterpart (the BEPA analysis), it was overstated by an 
order of magnitude. As a result of the efforts of Eskom's small business development consultants 
in the period 1993 to 1995 the total number of businesses established in the informal sector and 
the resulting job creation are shown in Table No 9.16 below. 
. .......... _-.--- . ...... _-- - ........ 
199"3 
....... -- - . .. . .... 
1994 1995· TOTAL 
JOBS CREATED 760 1 600 2 023 4 383 
INFORMAL SECTOR ACTIVITY 
SMALL BUSINESSES EST ABLISHED 233 534 502 1 269 
INFRASTRUCTURAL DEVELOPMENT 10 10 
AGRO BASED BUSINESS 16 16 
ENTREPRENEURIAL TRAINING 150 150 
TABLE NO 9. 16 SMALL BUSINESS DEVELOPMENT FROM ESKOM'S 
ELECTRIFICATION PROGRAMME: 1993 -1995 
Source: Eskom's National Electrification Planning Division. 
The small businesses developed ranged from such things as Spaza stores, sewing and knitting 
businesses, welding and small mechanical repair facilities, to shebeens and bakeries. 
Infrastructural development included providing employment to people for maintaining simple 
aspects of the electrification programme's reticulation system. Agro-based businesses included 
369 Interview with Paul Mare, 29th October 1998. 
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such activities as the maintenance of electrically-driven implements used on small fanns whilst 
entrepreneurial training included training people in the use of electronic computers etc. 
From the results shown in Table No 9.16, even if these represent a gross understatement of the 
informal jobs created, the reality of the situation was that the informal job creating potential of 
Eskom's electrification programme was limited. Some confirmation of the low figures for 
informal business creation can be found in the results of a survey carried out for Eskom by 
Integrated Market Research in three electrified informal settlements in 1993 and 1994. The 
number of businesses created in these settlements are shown in Table No 9.17 below . 
.. --.-- - ................ . 
............................ 
SETTLEMENT 
IVORY PARK 
ORANGE FARM 
STRETFORD 
TOTAL 
. ----.-- .---- ................ .. .............. .- ............ _------- ............... - ..... . 
NUMBEROFLBU$lNESSESCREAtEDBEtwEEN19?j~j995····· 
............... -- - .. . . ...... . ..... -. 
(18)370 
22 
18 
22 
TABLE NO 9.17 INFORMAL BUSINESS CREATION IN SELECTED 
SETTLEMENTS: 1992 - 1994 
Source: Integrated Marketing Research, (1994, p.5) 
The types of businesses created were butcheries, shebeens, medical services, welding and dry 
cleaning. It can be seen from Table No 9.17 that the actual numbers of businesses created was 
small and in fact in Ivory Park in the period 1993 - 1994, 18 informal businesses closed down. 
With respect to the creation of small informal businesses it was seemingly assumed by Eskom 
that in their original estimate of the job creating potential of their electrification programme 
access to electricity alone encouraged the development of a diversified informal business sector. 
The figures quoted in the tables above suggest that this assumption was incorrect. The 
Elandskraal electrification project confirms this. In this township Viljoen, (1993) showed that the 
development of small businesses was not primarily a function of the availability of electricity but 
that other supportive measures such as finance and managerial skills were equally important, see 
Chapter 8. 
The limited existing historical evidence on small business development does not give a clear 
indication of electricity's role in such informal sector development, but it is suggested that 
Eskom's hopes in this regard were optimistic and the process is very much more complicated than 
the Corporation at first envisaged. Viljoen, (1993, p.54) maintains that electricity provision was 
370 Indicates that 18 businesses closed down. 
293 
not an essential item in the small businesses he surveyed in Elandskraal and that "most will 
survive without it if forced to do so." A study by Theron (1991) also found that only 10 per cent 
of households operating informal sector businesses in Khayelitsha were dependent on electricity. 
In that study respondents were asked if they had been able to start an informal business as a result 
of being supplied with electricity, only about 7 per cent answered in the affirmative. The results 
presented above tend to confirm that electricity is not necessarily a sufficient condition for 
founding an informal type of business, and other inputs are required as well, particularly artisan 
skills and establishing businesses requires some capital for the purchase of essential equipment. 
Theron and van Horen (1992) have confirmed this and they too indicated that the development of 
small businesses is not primarily a function of the availability of electricity but that other support 
measures such as finance and managerial ability are equally important. 
Inward industrialisation is nevertheless important as a development strategy and electrification is 
clearly useful in encouraging this. The rapid growth in urbanisation in South Africa, already 
commented upon, will create a demand for low-cost, low-quality goods that can be manufactured 
in the informal sector, particularly with the aid of electricity, e.g., simple welding tasks. Such 
activity will go some way towards generating economic growth. The historical evidence suggests, 
however, that this growth was lower than expected by Eskom. Inward industrialisation is, 
therefore, constrained by capital and skills needs. A low income elasticity of demand for products 
which are typical of this type of manufacturing process also tends to work against success in 
engendering economic growth in informal sector manufacturing. The historical evidence 
discussed in this section does suggest, however, that inward industrialisation does, offer a means 
of employment, and even skills acquisition, if sufficient capital can be mobilised to complement 
the supply of electricity to lesser developed areas of South Africa. 
5.0 THE MACRO-ECONOMIC IMPACT 
5.1 The BEPA Study 
As mentioned in Chapter 8, on behalf of Eskom's Chairman Dr John Maree, The Bureau of 
Economic and Policy Analysis in the University of Pretoria undertook an analysis to calculate the 
macro-economic impact of electrifying 7,5 million black urban households between 1991 and 
2015, i.e., 300000 connections would be made annually. The results of this analysis were widely 
reported e.g., Business Day of the 24th December 1991 said" According to a study by Prof. Geert 
de Wet of Pretoria University, the electrification of 1 million households over three years could 
create 270 000 jobs and add 5 % to SA's GDP". Eskom itself made much of the results of the 
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BEPA study, see the supplement to Eskom's Annual Report, (1991, p.17), Eskom in Perspective. 
The economic benefits of Eskom' s electrification programme as given in the BEPA study were 
also enthusiastically acclaimed in other research reports on electrification, for example 
Terblanche (1993, p.35) and Van Gass (1990). The results were clearly an important factor in 
Eskom's decision to undertake their electrification programme. The results of this analysis were, 
it is suggested, over optimistic and because of this and it's importance in Eskom' s electrification 
programme decision making in 1990 it is considered appropriate to briefly comment on this 
report at this juncture. 
The methodology used in the BEPA analysis was to determine the changes in black consumer 
patterns and investment arising from the electrification programme and then determine the direct 
and indirect economic consequences of these changes by means of macro-economic modelling 
using a Keynesian type multiplier. The investment figures in reticulation and transmission 
structures required for the programme were calculated in conjunction with Eskom in 1991 rand, 
as were the expected maintenance costs. These figures were then adjusted for inflation from 1991 
to 2015 and then converted to 1985 rand. Known 1985 GDP and employment multipliers were 
then used to estimate the cumulative increase in GDP over the period of the study and the actual 
number of new jobs created by the electrification programme year-on-year. 
With respect to black consumption patterns the BEPA analysis postulated that potential changes 
in these would be induced by the wholesale electrification of urban areas causing a shift in the 
consumption pattern of black households towards electrical and related goods and away from 
alternative more traditional sources of energy. It was assumed that this shift, would lead, inter 
alia, to the establishment of a whole range of new small manufacturing and maintenance 
industries in the black urban areas electrified. Comparing the results discussed in the last section 
with this statement it is suggested that this expectation was also optimistic. It was also posited 
that the impact of electrifying black urban areas would change the demand for the supply of 
technically superior goods and services which would have a dramatic effect on productivity and 
socio-economic improvements such as education. With respect to the maximum cumulative 
number of new jobs that would be created as a result of Eskom' s electrification programme, the 
BEPA analysis estimates are shown in Table No 9.18 below. 
1995 
2000 
2015 
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300 000 - 600 000 
700 000 - 900 000 
1 800 000 - 2 250 000 
TABLE NO 9.18 JOB CREATING POTENTIAL OF ESKOM'S ELECTRIFICATION 
PROGRAMME: BEPA ANALYSIS 
Source: BEPA Report (1990). 
And the influence on GDP was estimated to be as follows; 
1995 
2000 
2015 
MtNCUMULA TIVEEFFECTON.CDP 
.......................... (INCRE.ASE)% ............... . 
6 
11 
24 
TABLE NO 9.19 CUMULATIVE EFFECT ON GDP FROM ESKOM'S 
ELECTRIFICATION PROGRAMME: BEPA ANALYSIS 
Source: BEPA Report (1990). 
The detailed macro-economic benefits that the South African economy would enjoy from 
electrifying black urban households in the period 1991-1995 in terms of increased GDP and job 
creation according to the BEPA analysis are shown in Table No 9.20 below. 
1991 
1992 
1993 
1994 
1995 
GROSSl)OM"E$'rtC 
. FIXE)) INVES'rMENT 
R(MlLLIONS) 
276 
290 
304 
318 
332 
62 
106 
150 
194 
238 
296 
CQN$umnQ~ 
"EXPENDI'fIFlm •••••. 
R(M~LIONS)·· 
SOCIAL.·I.ntIRABLE· 
616 
647 
678 
709 
740 
743 
991 
1239 
1487 
1735 
237 
316 
396 
475 
554 
1934 
2350 
2767 
3183 
3599 
nIltEC'rt\.NlJ 
INlJIUC'r .. 
EFFECl' •• ON GDP •. 
R( MILLIONS) 
5802 
7050 
8301 
9549 
10797 
. - .................. . 
DlRECT.AND 
.............. 
..IND.IltECf. 
EF'F'"EC'rON JOIl 
. .......................... . 
CREATION, I.E~,··· 
. NO OF JOBS 
... ' .... 
CltEATEJ) . 
185664 
225600 
265632 
305568 
345504 
TABLE NO 9.20 MACRO-ECONOMIC IMPACT OF ESKOM'S ELECTRIFICATION PROGRAMME: 1991 - 1995, BEPA 
ANALYSIS (1985 Rand) 
Source: BEPA Report (1990). 
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In Table No 9.20 the multiplier used to arrive at the direct and indirect GDP (the Keynesian 
multiplier) was 3 and the employment multiplier was 32 (Appendix 6 of the BEPA Report), i.e. it 
required 32 workers to produce R 1 million of GDP in 1985. From an examination of Table No 
9.20 it appears that a major error has occurred in calculating the GOP and employment creation 
arising from this electrification programme. The error is this. If the investment in the 
transmission and reticulation infrastructure is considered as the initial autonomous change that 
stimulates the income multiplier to work the related changes in black consumption and social 
investment cannot also be regarded as the stimulus. The figures under Consumption Expenditure 
in Table No 9.20 above should therefore be ignored when estimating the macro-economic impact 
of the electrification programme by means of a Keynesian type multiplier. Correcting Table No 
9.20 results in a final growth in GOP and job-creating potential of the electrification programme 
being much smaller than that postulated in the BEPA Report. The corrected impacts are shown in 
Table No 9.21 below. 
I·· .. 
. .............................................. . 
YEAR· GROSSDQi\tI&STIC ...•. IHRECT&niDIRECl' .·DIRECT&'l'NDIRECT 
.. •••••. ... .. INVEStMENt ....EFFE(:TOFGDI"E:FJ:iEt;TQN ..•• 
...... ···.(~~j~~~l~~II~~f . ·{R MJt't19NS) .. EMPLOYMENT 
1991 
1992 
1993 
1994 
1995 
·········(~·MI:J.;J.;J:()!·{S) 
338 
396 
454 
512 
570 
1 014 
1 188 
1 362 
1 536 
1 710 
32 448 
38016 
43 583 
49 152 
54720 
TABLE NO 9.21 MACRO-ECONOMIC IMPACT OF CORRECTED BEPA 
ANALYSIS (1985 Rand) 
It must be remembered that the employment figure given in Tables No 9.20 and 9.21 are 
cumulative since, as was the case of the 1-0 analysis undertaken for the electrical appliance sector 
and the building and civil engineering sectors, the numbers of workers employed each year 
included those that were employed in the previous year. Comparing the results of Table No 9.21 
with the results from Table No 9.20 it is seen that by 1995 instead of the electrification 
programme requiring 345 504 employees, Table No 9.20, it actually required only 54 720 i.e., 
about 16 per cent of the original estimate. So far as the effect on South Africa's GOP was 
concerned. This would similarly have to be adjusted downwards. The minimum cumulative effect 
on GOP by 1995 would now be one per cent rather than the six per cent postulated in the BEP A 
report. (see Table No 9.19 above). 
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5.2 Other Macro-Economic Electrification Stndies 
As a prelude to analysing the macro-economic impacts of Eskom's programme to electrifY black 
households in South Africa between 1990 and 1995 using historical cost data it will be instructive 
to examine the main characteristics of three hypothetical economic studies of electrification 
programmes undertaken by other research organisations. These studies will be compared with the 
Eskom initiated BEPA study and later they will all be compared with the macro-economic 
impacts derived from historical data. In this way the degree of confidence engendered by the 
historically inspired calculations can be assessed. 
The three studies referred to above are the Dingley Study (1990(a» The EDRC study (1993) and 
the Human Sciences Research Council Study (HSRC) (1995), undertaken by Conningarth 
Consultants. Table No 9.22 below compares the main characteristics of each of these studies as 
well as the BEPA study already discussed. 
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. .. ,. ... ... ... ..... .. 
DINGLEY ••••• EDRC HSRC ••. , .CHi\Ri\C'rERISTICSOF HEPA" 
.....• , ...... , .. STUDY (1993) ..... , ":,. (1990) (1995) ....... .. (1990)· 
PERIODISA TION OF STUDY 1990 - 2010 1993 - 2007 1994 - 2010 1991 - 2015 
RURAL AND RURAL AND RURAL AND GEOGRAPHICAL FOCUS URBAN URBAN URBAN URBAN 
SOCIAL 
NO FORMAL NO FORMAL ACCOUNTING ANALYTICAL TECHNIQUE MODEL MODEL MATRIX MACRO-ECONOMIC 
(SAMS) 
NUMBER OF CONNECTIONS/ 344000 VARIES (AVE 350000 388000) YEAR 300000 
AVERAGE COST PER R2000 R3000 R 1465 CONNECTION i R2480 
AVERAGE ANNUAL CAPITAL R 700 MILLION R1032 MILLION R 604 MILLION EXPENDITURE37l R 744 MILLION 
JOB CREATION CUMULATIVE 556500 126000-210 000 212 170 TOTAL 1 800000-2250000 
CUMULATIVE INCREASE IN NOT GIVEN NOT GIVEN NOT GIVEN GDP (%) 24 
TABLE NO 9. 22 COMPARISONS OF DATA FOR VARIOUS ELECTRIFICATION STUDIES 
Source: Condensed from the Dingley, EDRC, HRSC and BEPA studies. 
371 Capital expenditure is made up of house wiring, electricity reticulation and building and civil engineering costs. 
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From Table No 9.22 it can be readily seen that all the studies have certain important similarities 
(and differences). Firstly the size of each study's electrification programme is of the same order of 
magnitude, i.e., 7,35 million, 5,16 million, 6,6 million and 7,5 million houses respectively. The 
number of household connections/year in the Dingley, EDRC and BEPA studies, are comparable. 
The HRSC study has a varying number of connections per year from 450 000 in the period 1994-
2004 to 50 000 in the years 2005-2010.372 The BEPA assumption of 300000 connection/year was 
just below the peak actually realised in Eskom' s electrification programme in 1995 when 313 179 
houses were connected to the grid. With regard to the costs of each connection with the exception 
of the costs given in the BEPA report they seem low, cf., the costs of rural connections given in 
Fig No 8.1 of Chapter 8 which increase dramatically over urban connections and would tend to 
increase the average connection costs shown in Table No 9.22 for the Dingley, EDRC and HSRC 
studies. So far as the BEPA study is concerned only urban formally planned dwellings are 
considered and the cost per connection also assumed (R 2480) is conservative when the average 
cost for urban connections, also as given in Fig No 8.1, is considered. Furthermore the HRSC and 
BEPA studies are based on formal models whilst the Dingley and EDRC studies are not. 
Meaningful comparisons between the four studies cited in Table No 9.22 are, therefore, made 
with difficulty. 
What is perhaps of importance, however, is the order of magnitude of the job creating potential of 
the different electrification programmes for an equal number of black houses electrified. Such a 
comparison between the BEPA electrification programme and Eskom's actual electrification 
programme is particularly important. This is because, and as was suggested already, the BEPA 
analysis played a role in Eskom's decision to proceed with a programme to electrify black 
households in South Africa in the period 1990-1995. Considering the EDRC study first the 
analysts postulate that between 9 000 and 15 000 jobs per year are created on average from their 
electrification programme. The Dingley study asserts that there would be 26 500 jobs being 
created each year as increases in domestic demand took effect which, explains the large 
difference in job creating potential between the two studies. The BEPA report presents job 
creation figures which, for the reasons already given, are incorrect by orders of magnitude. So far 
as cumulative totals are concerned the HRSC and the EDRC studies are comparable, however, 
particularly when the upper bound of the EDRC projections are considered. 
What remains to be done now is to take the historical data that has been gathered by Eskom 
concerning the Corporation's electrification programme over the period 1990 - 1995 and 
372 COlUlecting 450 000 households per year to the national grid is seen by Eskom as probably not 
feasible. Interview with Mr P Mare, 29th October 1998, (300 000 connections/year seemed to be 
the figure that Eskom was comfortable with). 
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estimate what this data suggests the historical macro-economic impact of this electrification 
programme over this period really was. The numbers of jobs created by Eskom's electrification 
programme can then be compared with the results obtained from the hypothetical electrification 
programmes described above. This is the subject of the following section. 
5.3 Macro Economic Impact of Eskom's Electrification 
Programme Using Historical Data 
In attempting to estimate the macro-economic impact of Eskom' s electrification programme in 
the period 1990 to 1995 the effects of the micro-economic impacts discussed thus far will be 
summated and added to the effects of the programme on Eskom itself i.e., the micro effects will 
be drawn together to enable an estimation of the historical macro-economic effects to be made. 
For this purpose the following historical data for purposes of calculating changes in final demand 
that make the multipliers work has to be processed. Firstly, the times-series data on radio, 
television and electrical appliance sales resulting from research carried out by Data Research 
Africa (see Table No 9.10). Secondly the costs of such appliances arrived at from research carried 
out for the NELF by Van Gass (1998, Appendix 3). Thirdly, data gathered by Eskom itself 
concerning the capital costs associated with their own electrification programme (see Table No 
9.4). Fourthly, data gathered by the NER on the average household electricity consumption 
pattern over five years (see Fig No 8.3 in the previous chapter), and finally data, again gathered 
by Eskom, on the number of households and farm workers dwellings electrified by the 
Corporation between 1990 and 1995 (see Table No 8.13 also in the previous chapter). The 
quantification of the macro-economic impact will, once again, be carried out using input-output 
analysis using multipliers derived from the 1993 national input-output tables for South Africa. In 
this analysis, however, both the direct and indirect, and the direct, indirect and induced effects 
will be estimated so far as the job creating potential of Eskom's electrification programme is 
concerned. As previously noted the direct, indirect and induced figures probably give a truer 
estimate of the programmes macro-economic benefits because they include the effects of the 
private consumption expenditure of households i.e., the input-output model is closed in this case. 
The direct and indirect employment effects are given because these are required for comparison 
purposes with the results of the employment potential of the four other studies on electrification 
programmes in South Africa given in Table No 9.22 above. The macro-economic impact of 
Eskom's electrification programme in the period 1990-1995 estimated by submitting the 
historical data cited above to input-output analysis is given in Table No 9.23 below. 
I 
.VEAR " GDP" 
R(l\tiltI.>JPiSSY 
. .... ..... ..... . 
1990/91 250,99 
1992 1 248,66 
1993 1 964,05 
1994 2 846,85 
1995 3,909,03 
CLOSED MODEL 
BOP 
;R;{I\tiJl;l,;loN$) 
. ............ . 
(41,69) 
(217,72) 
(351,94) 
(510,95) 
(703,51) 
302 
J)lltEcr.INDIRECT 
AND INDUCED •.. 
EFFECTON ... 
. ...................... - .. . 
•• • Ir.Mj>)::'o)!'I\ti:tl'!t .•••. 
S 1 074 
SIS 3 889 
LIS 3 426 
S 4 823 
SIS 17 091 
LIS 15 037 
S 6 883 
SIS 23 856 
LIS 20985 
S 9 164 
SIS 31 618 
LIS 27823 
S 11511 
SIS 39 514 
LIS 34 782 
OPEN MODEL 
CUMULATIVE 
. .......... - ......... . 
PlI\tiJ.>tO):'I\tiIr.NT IN~i~~CTTE;~~~T . It~;t~\~\~~~~ QNEMrLOYMENT . 
8389 S 608 5072 
SIS 2 421 
LIS 2 043 
36 951 S 2 781 22 414 
SIS 10 654 
LIS 8 979 
51 724 S 4 151 31 523 
SIS 14 856 
LIS 12 516 
68 605 S 5 368 41 595 
SIS 19 658 
LIS 16 569 
85 807 S 6 758 51 986 
SIS 24 539 
LIS 20689 
TABLE NO 9.23 MACRO-ECONOMIC IMPACT OF ESKOM'S ELECTRIFICATION PROGRAMME: 1990 -1995 USING 
HISTORICAL DATA. 
NOTES: S SKILLED LABOUR 
SIS SEMI SKILLED LABOUR 
LIS LOW SKILLED LABOUR 
THE CUMULATIVE EMPLOYMENT FIGURES INDICATE THAT WORKERS EMPLOYED IN ANY PARTICULAR YEAR INCLUDE THOSE 
EMPLOYED IN THE PREVIOUS YEAR SO THAT THE ACTUAL NEW JOBS CREATED IN ANY ONE YEAR IS THE NUMBER OF 
EMPLOYED IN THAT YEAR MINUS THE NUMBER EMPLOYED IN THE PREVIOUS YEAR. 
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5.4 Job Creating Comparisons 
Comparing the direct and indirect job creation figures for electrifying 952 473 black households 
and 60 744 farm workers dwellings by Eskom between 1990 and 1995, i.e., 1 012 917 
connections, and shown in Table No 9.23, with the job creation figures in the studies shown on 
Table No 9.22 for making the same number of connections the following comments can be made. 
a) The BEPA study presents employment figures which are an order of magnitude greater than 
those found by analysing the historical data relevant to Eskom's electrification programme. 
Table No 9.24 below offers comparisons between the BEPA and the Eskom studies. 
DIRECT & 
INDIRECT 
EFFECT ON 
EMPLOYMENT 
CREATION 
(I) 
275 616 
(2) 
44 975 
(3) (4) 
51 986 530 
TABLE NO 9.24 COMPARISONS BETWEEN THE BEPA ANALYSIS AND 
AN ANALYSIS USING HISTORICAL DATA FOR JOB 
CREATION: (1 012 917 ELECTRICAL CONNECTIONS) 
b) So far as the EDRC study is concerned after the same number of connections had been made 
as that contained in the historical analysis presented above, i.e., 1 012 917 the number of 
new jobs created varied between about 27 000 and 45000. These figures are then of the same 
order of magnitude as those projected in the historical analysis and the corrected BEPA 
study. 
c) The HRSC study postulates that an annual number of 388 235 connections are made per 
annum over a 17 year period. The programme is, however, divided into two phases. The first 
phase, where 3 728 235 connections are made, has an accumulative job creating potential of 
124 763. This infers that for each connection in the programme 0,0335 jobs are created, 
therefore for 1 012 917 connections the number of jobs created is 33897. This figure is also 
clearly of the same order of magnitude as the one derived from the historical analysis and the 
corrected BEPA study. 
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d) The Dingley study suggests that 77 000 new jobs would be created after 1012 917 electrical 
connections are made. Whilst this figure is about 1,5 times that estimated with historical data 
for the direct and indirect job creativity potential of Eskom's electrification programme it 
does approach the figure of 85 807 jobs created by that programme when private 
consumption expenditure is included in the analysis, i.e., when the 1.0. model is closed. 
e) Because of the comparisons that can be drawn between the order of magnitude of the job 
creating potential of the EDRC the HSRC the Dingley and the corrected BEPA studies and 
the analysis presented here using historical data and 1-0 analysis, some confidence can be 
placed in the historical analysis. On the other hand the BEPA study gives rise to some 
disquiet because of the shear magnitude of its job creating potential. On a practical note it is 
hardly likely that the employment creation postulated in the BEP A study could have 
occurred. For example, the BEPA study claimed that by merely electrifying 300000 black 
households in 1991 the total number of those employed in South Africa would increase by 
185664 (Table No 9.20). Using the 1996 census this would account for a 2 per cent increase 
in the work force; a very large growth for such a small investment. 
6.0 NEGATIVE EXTERNALITIES ASSOCIATED WITH THE 
GENERATION OF ELECTIRICITY 
This chapter has emphasised the economic benefits arising from the use of electricity in Eskom' s 
programme to bring power to black households in South Africa; for example health benefits and 
increased GDP from the purchase of electrical appliances by newly electrified households. There 
are, however, negative economic externalities attached to the generation of the electricity used by 
these households. These negative externalities reduce the positive economic returns of Eskom' s 
black household electrification programme. 
Two fairly recent studies which attempt to place a value on the negative externalities arising from 
electricity generation in South Africa are the Dutkiewicz and de Villiers (1993) study and the 
1996 study van Horen. Both studies used the damage function373 approach in attempting to 
quantifY the costs of the externalities from each stage of the fuel cycle in the generation of 
electricity, starting, in the case of coal-based generation, with the impacts arising from the 
373 A damage ftmction requires data to be gathered from the main impacts of electricity generation, 
e.g., the emission of pollutants and their deposition; an economic value is then attached to these 
impacts. 
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extraction process itself. The researchers in both studies noted that their efforts to quantifY the 
cost of these negative externalities were hampered by serious data gaps. 
The Dutkiewicz and de Villiers (1993) study covered four electricity generation options (coal, 
nuclear, wind and solar). This study concluded that most of the negative externality costs were 
small (pp. 14 and 40) and would not make any difference to the competitiveness of adopting the 
softer renewable generation options which are generally thought to be less polluting than 
conventional electricity generation processes, i.e., wind and solar, to those of fossil and nuclear 
fuels. 
The van Horen Study (1996), which is the more detailed of the two studies, concentrated upon the 
most important steps in the input pathway of the coal and nuclear fuel cycle in terms of their 
scale and frequency in South Africa. Van Horen attempted to put values to the following issues: 
a) Morbidity and mortality in coal mines; 
b) Water consumption in power stations; 
c) Health effects of power station air pollution emissions; 
d) Damage from greenhouse gas emissions; and 
e) Subsidies to the nuclear fuel industry. 
The problems arising in attempting this task as emphasised by van Horen himself (p. 87) were as 
follows: 
a) Morbidity and mortality rates in coal mined encompassed the mining industry as a whole. 
Data for the amounts of coal used by Eskom alone was not available. 
b) No epidemiological studies for dose-response functions were available for South Africa. The 
ones used by van Horen were derived from North America and these were applied to the 
South African situation. 
c) Uncertainty was expressed with regard to the atmospheric modelling approach used by van 
Horen for estimating the health impacts of air pollution. 
d) Uncertainty was also expressed with regard to the impact of anthropogenic greenhouse gas 
emissions in the economic social and environmental sphere. 
e) Very little reliable data was available on the environmental and human health issues so far as 
water consumption in power stations was concerned. 
In short some very important data were not available to draw specific conclusions regarding the 
actual social costs of electricity generation by Eskom. As a consequence, while the presence of 
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negative economic externalities which accompany the electrification of black households in South 
Africa is acknowledged, it is considered appropriate for purposes of this study, not to make any 
attempt to adjust the economic benefits associated with the electrification of black households, 
and qualified here, downwards, but simply to suggest that they are an upper bound value. 
It is important to note also that because of Eskom's excess generating capacity no new power 
stations needed to be built to meet the power requirements of the corporation's black household 
electrification programme. From the electricity generation viewpoint then this programme did 
not necessarily increase the value of the extant negative economic externalities arising from 
power generation in South Africa. 
7.0 CONCLUSIONS 
Because of the low electricity consumption patterns, the theft of and the non-payment for 
electricity, Eskom's electrification programme required the South African taxpayer to cross-
subsidise the programme in the sum of R 4486 million, (1995 randi74 • With the advent of the 
RDP Eskom was required after 1995 to also include the electrification of rural areas in their 
programme. This of course would put an even greater burden on South African taxpayers because 
of the lessened ability-to-pay for electricity by rural dwellers. Although the RDP stated that 
"concessionary finance" would be available for the electrification of poor households in remote 
rural areas if the incidence of non-payment and theft persisted and increasing levels of cross-
subsidisation became necessary the sustainability of Eskom's electrification programme could 
still come under threat. 
The employment creation potential of Eskom's electrification programme as postulated in the 
BEP A report was shown to be incorrect by an order of magnitude. Likewise the informal job 
creation potential of the programme according to Eskom's own estimates were optimistic when 
these estimates were compared to historical reality. The expected cumulative growth in GDP as a 
result of Eskom's electrification programme i.e., 6 per cent in 1995 also seemed to be over 
optimistic and it is suggested that in reality this growth was of the order of one per cent based on 
known historical capital investment in the South African economy arising from Eskom' s 
electrification programme. 
374 Net funding requirement (Table No 9.4) in 1995 rand. 
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Showing that the BEP A study grossly overstated the benefits of Eskom' s electrification 
programme is significant since the potential macro-economic benefits of this programme coupled 
with the political imperative was, it is suggested, the raison d'etre for Eskom undertaking the 
programme in the first place. If the true potential of the programme had been known a more 
carefully planned approach to the programme with greater government involvement would have 
been advisable and possibly sought. 
Whilst Eskom' s electrification programme stimulated the electrical appliance market such 
appliances have a large imported content in the order of 30c in the rand (1995 prices). This 
means that as a direct result of the provision of electricity to black households there would be a 
negative impact on the Current Account of the South African Balance-of-Payments. 
Despite Eskom's programme to electrifY black households in South Africa (their "Electricity for 
All" programme) performing in a more economically subdued way than originally expected, 
South Africa's GDP was positively impacted by the programme as was demonstrated in Table No 
9.23. In addition there was a positive increase in employment levels as a consequence of the 
programme. What was of particular significance, so far as employment creation was concerned, 
was that 87 per cent of all jobs created by Eskom's electrification programme, i.e., 74 296 jobs, 
were created amongst semi- and low-skilled workers the categories of labour most in need of jobs 
in the period 1990 - 1995. 
It is suggested that the results for GDP growth, the balance of payments burden and employment 
creation as a result of Eskom' s programme to electrifY black households in South Africa between 
1990 and 1995, shown in Table No 9.23 above realistically represent the macro-economic impact 
that that programme had on the South African economy. In particular, the results of the closed 1-
o model, which includes the effect of private consumption expenditure, are considered to be the 
most likely historical impact. It is further suggested nevertheless that the figures quoted in Table 
No 9.23 are conservative since they do not take into account slack in the productive capacity of 
the South African economy in this period nor do they take into account the negative economic 
externalities associated with the generation and use of electricity. It is important to mention 
therefore that the historical micro- and macro-economic benefits and disbenefits calculated in this 
chapter must be regarded as estimates only, and rather conservative estimates at that. 
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CHAPTER 10 
CONCLUSIONS 
1.0 INTRODUCTION 
The foregoing six chapters have traced the contemporary history of Eskom' s programmes to 
electrifY white-owned commercial farms and black households in South Africa in the period 
1980-1995. The theme running through these six chapters is encapsulated in the four hypotheses 
postulated in Chapter 1, these being that: 
1) Politics played a crucial role In Eskom's decision to undertake its electrification 
programmes; 
2) The benefits arising from the programme to electrifY black households were in reality much 
smaller than expected; 
3) Large cross-subsidisation was required to sustain both the farm and black household 
electrification programmes; and 
4) Eskom lacked adequate regulatory oversight. 
This concluding chapter considers the following fundamental question: Are the hypotheses 
postulated above correct or not? 
If the first three are proved to be correct then the following questions present themselves for 
consideration: 
1. What are the important issues that will have to be addressed in future energy policy 
formulation in South Africa? And 
2. What actions can be suggested to help ensure that the electrification of black households in 
South Africa is sustainable in the long-term? 
With respect to the fourth hypothesis the following questions have to be addressed: 
1. How was Eskom regulated with respect to the hypotheses underpinning the normative theory 
of public utility regulation discussed in Chapter 2 of this study? And 
2. What suggestions can be made for the future regulation of Eskom and the South African ESI 
with respect to the whole energy sector of the South African economy? 
The first three hypotheses will be considered first, leaving the fourth hypothesis to be treated 
separately thereafter. 
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2.0 THE FIRST THREE HYPOTHESES 
With reference to the first hypothesis this study has shown that statements were made by Eskom's 
managers and commissioners and certain decisions were recorded in Eskom's Management 
Board meetings and expansion plans that showed that politics had a major influence on Eskom's 
decisions to undertake both the electrification of white-owned commercial farms and black 
households in South Africa in the period 1980 - 1995. With regard to Eskom's programme to 
electrify black households it is clear then that the programme was not undertaken with social 
upliftment and social justice in mind. Furthermore, the ANC's actions and statements from 1990 
onwards emphasised the politicisation of the electrification of black households. 
A major telling factor so far as the farm electrification programme was concerned was that even 
in the years when Eskom ran a deficit on the electricity supply account (see Chapter 5) the 
finances for that programme went unchecked. It was eight years into the programme before a 
detailed analysis of its financial impact on Eskom took place. With respect to the black household 
electrification programme, even when it was clear that it required large amounts of cross-
subsidisation, no analysis of its financial impact on Eskom took place; such an investigation only 
took place two years into the programme. Likewise Eskom's 1991 restructuring programme, 
which was initiated to make the task of electrifying black households an easier matter was 
undertaken prior to the programme's financial impact on Eskom being assessed. These actions 
tend to confirm that financial considerations were secondary and subservient to the political 
imperative so far as Eskom's decision to electrify white-owned commercial farms and black 
households in the period 1980 - 1995 was concerned. 
With respect to the second hypothesis the macro-economic benefits arising from Eskom's 
programme to electrify black households between 1990-1995 were shown to be much smaller 
than those confidently assumed by Eskom. In the case of additions to GDP this proved to be 
overstated by over 600 per cent and so far as job creation was concerned this was overstated by 
over 500 per cent, i.e., both variables were overstated by orders of magnitude. Eskom's 
programme to electrify black households also negatively impacted South Africa's balance of 
payments, a fact which had seemingly never been even considered at the inception of the 
programme. 
Turning to the question of the cross-subsidisation necessary to sustain both the electrification of 
white-owned farms and black households i.e., the third hypothesis, it was shown that subsidies 
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were required for both initiatives year-on-year. In the case of the electrification of black 
households these subsidies amounted to the startlingly large sum in 1995 terms of R 4 486 
million in the five years from 1990-1995. 
From the study it is clear then that the three hypotheses have been proved. Prior to addressing the 
questions which arise as a consequence of this proof and which are enumerated in the 
introduction to this chapter, i.e., how these findings could impact future energy policy 
formulation in South Africa it is necessary first to discuss the economic characteristics of 
electricity itself because energy policy formulation should ideally be conditioned by such 
characteristics. 
2.1 The Economic Characteristics of Electricity 
Considering electricity as an economic good it is clear that from the tum of this century 
electricity has become an essential factor of production in almost every country in the world. In 
addition, because of it's importance in the home as an energy source for cooking, heating and 
lighting, electricity has become a significant force in providing social welfare on an individual 
and household level. 375 
Electricity is, however, not a public good in the way that national roads and national defence are. 
This is because people benefit from roads and defence collectively whilst the amount of electricity 
used by each consumer can be measured and charged for on an individual or household level. 
Hence each consumer must pay for the amount of electricity used and failure to do so renders the 
consumer liable to having his supply of electricity cut off. Under these circumstances the 
excludability criterion applies and electricity is clearly a private good. 
Considering the non-rival aspects of electricity supply it is also clear that if one consumer uses 
more electricity than he needs e.g., leaving lights burning during daylight, this has theoretically, 
the effect of reducing the amount of electricity left for others. As a consequence the individual 
who uses the most electricity presumably obtains the greatest satisfaction from the good. Under 
these circumstances electricity must once again be classified as a private good. 
An electricity consumer is of course also a price-taker and a quantity adjuster, hence each 
individual consumer decides what is affordable. Under this criterion electricity is shown once 
more to be a private, rather than a public good. Electricity can then never be a good where the 
375 And more recently for use in providing entertainment via television, radio and hi-fi equipment. 
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consumer becomes a quantity-taker and adjusts price, i.e., his willingness-to-pay. Goods 
exhibiting this characteristic belong to the public variety. 
From what has been said about electricity it can, without doubt, be classed as a private good, 
hence the findings of the de Villiers Commission, which contended that it must be treated as 
such, were founded on sound economic principles. There are nevertheless, elements of what may 
be termed "public goodness" attached to electricity supply. "Public goodness" here means the 
overall socio-economic benefits that accrue to a community from the increasing use of electricity. 
These benefits come about because each person in a community will benefit from the general 
provision of electricity, i.e., access to the good. Even if some members of a community do not use 
one unit of electricity personally they will still benefit from the community's general access to 
electricity. Electricity has then an element of "public goodness" attached to it, which is quite 
different from the benefits derived by individuals from using electricity. Some of the communal 
or collective benefits that accrue from access to electricity, and which have been discussed in this 
study, are as follows: 
a) Street lighting which helps to prevent accidents and crime; 
b) Job creation from small businesses (some in the informal sector) which depend on electricity, 
e.g., welding shops; 
c) Increased educational levels as electronic equipment is introduced into school curriculae, 
furthermore the days are lengthened for study purposes by means of electric lighting; 
d) Health benefits from the ability to refrigerate food and, as described, in the reduction of 
morbidity and mortality rates from chest ailments and burns; and 
e) Preservation of natural resources from the reduced use offuelwood. 
As more and more electricity is used these benefits allow, indeed force, each individual to acquire 
more of the material and social comforts which electricity is able to provide. Increased energy 
use, up to certain limits then, makes living easier, safer and more comfortable. Beyond certain 
limits the depletion of natural resources can be problematic and waste accumulation and pollution 
become detractors from electricity's "public goodness'. 376 Acknowledging the "public goodness" 
of electricity does not of course take away it's private good characteristics. The governing 
considerations in managing its supply should therefore include both its private good 
characteristics and it's "public goodness". This is part of the dilemma presented in the way that 
376 In South Africa electricity generation is almost exclusively reliant on coal and coal is, at least 
within the short to mediwn-tenn, a non-renewable natural resource Furthennore there are 
negative economic externalities attached to electricity generation which may, with increasing 
electricity generation, counter the benefits derived by society from this available energy, see 
Chapter 9. 
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electricity supply was managed in the period covered by this study i.e., 1980 to 1995. From the 
private good viewpoint the supply of electricity should have been governed by sound business 
practices and the market mechanisms. This is precisely what Eskom attempted to do in the 
period, particularly after Dr John Maree took over as chairman of Eskom in 1984. Because of the 
"public goodness" nature of electricity, however, it can be argued that those who could not afford 
to pay for it should have been subsidised, not by Eskom, as they were, but by the government. 
Relying on the facts discussed above it is suggested that decisions concerning national energy 
policy with respect to electrification should never be the prerogative of Eskom but are the 
prerogative of government. 
2.2 Energy Policy 
Turning now to questions on energy policy these are for convenience considered under three 
headings, these being finance, economic efficiency and equity. Each of these issues are of course 
interconnected as will be shown in the discussion below and require sound regulatory practices to 
be put in place with respect to public utility decision-making and management. 
2.2.1 Financial issues 
The first consideration, if Eskom's black household electrification programme is to be sustainable 
in the long-term, is the source of funding required to cross-subsidise the programme, this is of 
prime importance. Taking the arguments developed in the section on the economic characteristics 
of electricity into account, in theory the amount of money required to cross-subsidise Eskom' s 
electrification programme should be provided by the government. If this is not done at least two 
major complicating factors can arise. Firstly rural electrification may be jeopardised, and this is a 
prime requirement of the RDP. Rural electrification would be jeopardised because the costs of 
electrifYing such areas would require even greater amounts of cross-subsidisation than have been 
provided in the past. The costs of connecting rural areas to the national grid are on average at 
least twice the cost of urban connections and also because there would, in all probability, be low 
levels of electricity usage in rural areas. Whether Eskom could continue to cross-subsidise the 
supply of electricity to such areas without ever-increasing tariff levels is then a moot point which 
leads to the second problem. Eskom claim that, South Africa has for many years had a 
competitive advantage in the quality and low cost of its electricity compared with some of its 
competitors in the markets for export goods. This fact is time and again mentioned in Eskom's 
Annual Reports. If the tariff levels to industrial enterprises. were increased to cross-subsidise a 
rural electrification programme then these enterprises may lose their competitive advantage of 
cheap electricity. It is suggested therefore. that because the subsidies required to sustain Eskom's 
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electrification programme embrace social equity and national development they should be a 
prerogative of government. A difficulty does present itself with this, however. If the subsidies 
required to keep an electrification programme going were obtained from the fiscus then the 
programme would, in all probability be curtailed in magnitude because it would have to compete 
for funding with other development needs. In spite of this it can be argued that whilst Eskom 
should indeed be a player in national economic and social development, it cannot be responsible 
alone for the electrification portion of such development, and this seems to have been the case in 
the period 1990 to 1995. 
The second consideration also concerns the cross-subsidisation of Eskom' s electrification 
programme. This issue raises questions on how these cross-subsidies should be distributed if the 
government is to take responsibility for them. This is an extremely complicated issue because of 
the fragmentation of the electricity supply industry in South Africa. As described already this 
topic was the subject of much debate in the period from 1993 onwards. It will be recalled that 
there were some 400 separate electricity supply entities in South Africa in 1995. It was also 
pointed out that, because of the inability of many of these supply entities to electrify black 
households Eskom gradually began to augment its consumer base by taking over their electricity 
supply rights. There remain, however, many individual electricity suppliers. Parcelling out funds 
to each of the remaining electricity supply entities for electrifying black households on an 
equitable basis would be a monumental task. The fragmentation of the South African ESI is 
therefore a critical problem that could jeopardise an efficient electrification programme and this 
fact alone presents a strong case for the establishment of only a limited number of large electricity 
supply entities in South Africa which are adequately regulated. Such a situation would make it 
easier for cross-subsidisation funds to be distributed by government. 
A third consideration, concerns the question of electricity tariffs themselves. It was shown that 
electricity tariffs varied between newly electrified black townships and adjacent white townships. 
From a business viewpoint such tariff differentials made good economic and financial sense and 
can readily be understood. These different tariffs did, however, exist because of Apartheid 
policies. They came about because of the propensity of Eskom to electrify white areas of South 
Africa that could afford to pay for the service whilst ignoring black townships and rural areas that 
could not, and which were anyway inhabited, according to the tenets of Grand Apartheid, by 
"sojourners" who were soon to return to their homelands. Furthermore, in the more afiluent white 
areas the electricity load factors were better than those in black townships, that were electrified in 
the period 1990 to 1995. The costs of the reticulation systems in white areas had also usually 
been long paid for which would bring the marginal cost of electricity supply to these areas well 
below the cost of supplying electricity to more recently electrified black townships. Financing 
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electricity supply to black townships was also a more difficult proposition than financing 
electricity supply to white townships since connections to white townships were invariably paid 
for by householders themselves, whereas in black townships connections were financed by the 
supply entity and costs were recovered by way of the electricity tariff. This situation made the 
tariffs in black townships higher than those in adjacent white townships and presented equity 
problems (this topic will be discussed in more detail presently). This was the situation that 
obtained with Eskom's "Electricity for All" programme, and which also contributed, to unrest in 
Greater Soweto and to the problem of non-payment. Selecting tariff levels then that could ensure 
good service provision and payment for services is related to the cross-subsidisation issue. 
Formulating tariff structures, particularly for newly connected black households it can be argued, 
is therefore the prerogative of government's energy policy, and not the prerogative of Eskom. 
The structuring of such tariffs, if they are to produce the benefits mentioned above, should ideally 
be done in conjunction with a competent regulatory agency. 
A fourth consideration is the raising of funding by municipalities for electrification purposes. 
Historically the limited financial capacity of many municipalities curtailed Eskom's ability to 
help them gain access to electricity prior to the "Electricity for All" initiative and cross-
subsidisation was introduced by Eskom. The introduction of the Electrification Participation 
Note, which was intended to be an annual issue by Eskom, was to enable the burden of financing 
a programme to electrify black households to be shared by contributors. Eskom was the only 
entity in the ESI, however, which could possibly issue such a note and which had access to 
considerable amounts of local and international finance. Municipalities, that needed money to 
upgrade and maintain electricity distribution networks, were, between 1990 and 1995, almost in 
every case operating on small margins near bankruptcy, (Morgan, 1993). This means that if 
South Africa is to be electrified on a grand scale government will have to become involved in the 
raising of finance attendant on the electrification programme particularly with respect to 
municipalities. 
A fifth consideration concerns the positive economic externalities attached to an electrification 
programme. These being, inter-alia, reduced mortality and morbidity rates as a consequence of 
widespread access to electricity, the control of natural resource depletion, particularly with regard 
to fuelwood usage, and the accompanying environmentally sustainable benefits. The issue of 
externalities therefore presents a case for government funding for a nation-wide electrification 
programme that Eskom is funding at present by means of cross-subsidisation. 
A sixth consideration involves the ability of consumers to pay for electricity provision. With 
respect to this issue the magnitude of the socio-economic benefits arising from an electrification 
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programme depends to a great measure not only on the consumer's ability-to-pay for an 
electricity supply per se but the purchase of electrical appliances as well. A key piece of energy 
policy research that is required then in South Africa for the formulation of a sound electrification 
policy is the affordability criterion of different strata of society with respect to the purchase of 
electricity and electrical appliances. 377 
A seventh consideration concerns the multiplicity of energy use by newly connected electricity 
users in South Mrica. In this case, and as was shown in this study, many different energy carriers 
are in use, for example coal, fuelwood and paraffin. An energy policy should therefore ideally 
examine all energy carriers and determine how the extended use of one, for example electricity, 
would impact the financial viability of providing others in common domestic use. This situation 
impacts on how Eskom and the South African ESI should be regulated; this question will be 
discussed again presently. 
An eighth consideration concerns electricity supply rights in areas under the jurisdiction of 
municipal authorities. This is a particularly controversial issue in South Mrica that will have to 
take cognisance of the role played by revenue from electricity sales in municipal budgets in 
supplying other essential services. This issue is likewise important with respect to the regulation 
of Eskom and the South African ESI. 
2.2.2 Economic efficiency 
A controversial issue is that of the efficient use of scarce economic resources, by Eskom's 
electrification programmes from 1980 onwards. It will be recalled (see Chapter 2) that ensuring 
the efficient use of scarce resources is one of the prime tasks of public utility regulation. There are 
insufficient historical data to comment definitively on the cost -benefit ratios of the different 
aspects of the programmes, however. Nevertheless, some comments can be offered concerning 
economic efficiency and the results obtained from the study in general terms. This section 
377 South Africa's income distribution was, during the period of this study, one of the most unequal in 
the world. ill the 1970's a Gini coefficient of 0,66 obtained, (Wilson and Ramaphele 1987). What 
was particularly ominous, however, was the fact that in 1990/91, at the start of Eskom's 
programme to electrify black households on a national scale the Gini coefficient was in fact higher 
at 0,68, (Whiteford in the Weekly Mail and Guardian, 18-24 May, 1994). It is suggested that 
energy policy should therefore make provision for people who simply cannot afford a basic supply 
of electricity just as water policy in South Africa is addressing the needs of people who cannot 
afford to pay for a subsistence supply of potable water. The reason for making such a provision is 
based upon the fact that both the positive and negative externalities attached to the provision of 
services like water and electricity affect the nation as a whole. 
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concentrates on Eskom's electrification programme in the period 1990 to 1995 only because this 
is the ongoing electrification initiative in South Africa. 
Firstly, it was seen that the expected macro- and socio-economic results ofEskom's electrification 
programme, so far as job creation and growth in South Africa's GDP, fell short of Eskom's 
expectations, in fact by orders of magnitude. The question of employment creation is a 
particularly important issue in South Africa. Secondly, the effect of the electrification programme 
on micro-industry development was also very disappointing so far as the historical evidence is 
concerned; Eskom's forecasted growth in micro-industries was optimistic and this too fell short 
of the Corporation's expectations. The magnitude of the subsidies spent on Eskom' s 
electrification programme therefore raises two important questions 1) whether such sums of 
money can be justified in the national context so far as the economic efficiency of scarce 
resources usage is concerned? and 2) whether that investment placed in other economic sectors of 
the South Africa economy would yield higher returns than money invested in electrification 
projects? This second question is especially relevant when all kinds of services provision are 
required in South Africa, e.g., health, education, the provision of water and housing.378 Because 
of the lack of historical data the question cannot be answered. It does, however, highlight an 
omission in the planning of the programme to electrifY black households in South Africa. Ideally, 
the costs and benefits of electrification projects should be compared, not only with each other, but 
with the provision of other services as well prior to the decision to proceed if the efficient 
allocation of South Africa's scarce resources such as capital and labour is to be assured. From the 
research carried out for this study seemingly this was never done. Whilst it can be argued that it 
was not Eskom' s prerogative to carry out such analyses, it can also be argued that, as a parastatal 
using public money, Eskom should have. These counter arguments aside what is clear is that for 
the efficient use of scarce capital in all its forms an electrification programme should be part of a 
strategy for efficient services provision which should form part of a national energy policy 
embodying sound regulation principles as discussed in Chapter 2. 
The history of the electricity supply industry covered in this study throws up another problem of 
scarce resource usage and economic efficiency that deserves mention, although it is only 
indirectly connected with Eskom electrification programme. During the 1980' s Eskom was 
responsible for the largest portion of South Africa's foreign debt, this amounting to some 15 per 
cent of the total. This debt was the result of Eskom's massive generation expansion plan already 
described in Chapter 3 and which contributed to making the Corporation's electrification 
programme financially viable to poor consumers. The repayment of this debt clearly had the 
378 It can be argued that the provision of fresh clean water is of the greatest priority for without it life 
ceases to exist, which is not the case with respect to electricity provision. 
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effect of curtailing socio-economic growth in South Africa. It can be argued therefore that in a 
sense this expansion programme was an inefficient usage of scarce capital resources. This was 
because in the event not all the electricity generated in the power stations built with the money 
borrowed was needed in the forecasted period. The results were the mothballing of older stations 
and excess generation capacity. These illustrations also emphasise that the electricity supply 
industry cannot act as an isolated entity if the efficient use of scarce resources is to be 
contemplated but must form part of a national energy policy, again embodying sound regulation. 
2.2.3 Equity 
In the section on Financial Issues above certain questions on Eskom's electricity tariffs for black 
households and cross-subsidisation were discussed. This section enlarges on the debate by 
considering the equity implications of these tariffs and the cross-subsidisation of small electricity 
consumers. Again, these are important issues with respect to the regulation of public utilities. 
The tariff level for consumers in Eskom' s electrification programme was set to break even at an 
electricity usage of 355 kWh/month and there was only a nominal connection fee of R30 charged, 
(McAdam, 1989, p.3). The tariff was the result of Eskom's "Vision for the Future, electricity 
being made available to all people in South Africa at a price they could afford", (McAdam, 1989, 
p.4). In reality, as was shown, the monthly consumption of electricity by black households did not 
reach 355 kWh/month but varied between 83 kWh/month and 138 kWh/month over a five year 
period, see Chapter 8. The original tariff was the result of limited information, uncertainty with 
respect to consumption and risk taking on Eskom' s part. In effect the tariff was a manipulated 
tariff to make Eskom's electrification programme financially viable to the poorer sections of the 
community and depended on Eskom's excess generating capacity which in any event would only 
be available for a certain period of time, i.e., until there was sufficient demand made upon it, 
whereupon the tariff would be thrown into jeopardy. This tariff gave rise to an equity problem 
because of its redistribution implications. The redistribution of income via the manipulation of 
electricity tariffs as was the case in Eskom' s electrification programme involved the use of a set 
of hidden indirect taxes on larger electricity consumers who provided the revenue to allow the 
cross-subsidisation to take place. 379 These taxes were clearly not under the same scrutiny or 
assessed against the same criteria as other taxes, and it can be argued that they represented an 
inequitable situation for large consumers. It is suggested that a system of income transfers and 
taxes which are explicit and which are subject to economic debate would have been a more 
equitable way to proceed with funding the shortfall in the returns from the electricity tariffs for 
black households. 
379 This of course was really no different from the situation with respect to the electrification of 
white-owned commercial fanns between 1980 and 1990, see Chapter 4. 
318 
Compared with policies which treat poverty at its root cause by providing such income transfers, 
income redistribution policies based upon manipulated electricity tariffs suffer from the 
disadvantage that they are non-selective and therefore it is difficult to increase the real income of 
the target group since consumers who are wealthier than others will also benefit. The real 
problem with manipulating electricity tariffs for black household is that the underlying cause of 
poverty will remain unattended. It is therefore suggested that the problem would be better dealt 
with via social security policies and by equating electricity tariffs to levels where economic 
efficiency is achieved so that scarce resources can be efficiently allocated. Tariffs structured along 
efficiency criteria would require marginal cost pricing structures as per those governing the 
theory of public utility regulation (as discussed in Chapter 2), and not manipulated tariffs. 
Apart from the inequity associated with manipulated electricity tariffs for the poor such tariffs are 
still contentious. According to Turvey and Anderson, (1977, p.19) there seems to be nothing 
unfair in tariffs that do not cover a utilities accounting costs so far as the poor is concerned. It is 
suggested, however, that such tariffs can only be defended where the more appealing methods of 
redistribution through fiscal policy approaches are not administratively possible. This does not 
seem to be an impediment in South Africa. What does seem to be the case with Eskom's tariffs 
for electricity supplied to black households is their political acceptability rather than their 
inequitable nature with respect to large electricity consumers. 
The electrification of black households in South Africa was intended to serve both economic and 
social aims. This ideal also presents an equity problem, however, with respect to who benefited 
from the provision of power. In Eskom's 1990 - 1995 black household electrification programme 
the Corporation had to make difficult choices regarding which area to electrify. Eskom's 
programme took the most sensible course considering the financial burden of the programme. 
Households in urban and peri-urban areas were chosen to be electrified first. The perceived 
ability-to-pay was also an important criterion in the decision making process.380 The decision to 
electrify urban households mitigated against rural dwellers, however, and they were not provided 
for and equity was not well served so far as they were concerned. This raises the important 
question of whether or not Eskom has the right to make decisions concerning who should, and 
who should not, be provided with power. The question is particularly relevant so far as the 
electrification of schools and clinics is concerned. The pragmatic answer to this question is that it 
is better for government to make such decisions since they are, or should be, the custodians of any 
national energy policy especially one that has to address the problems associated with social 
380 Seemingly both the willingness-to-pay and the ability-to-pay was, however, badly overestimated. 
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upliftment and that these decisions should ideally be overseen by an efficient public utility 
regulator. 
3.0 THE FOURTH HYPOTHESIS 
Chapter 2 of this study discussed the fundamentals of public utility regulation and the rules 
underpinning such regulation which take into account, inter alia, the efficient use of scarce 
resources, equity considerations and pricing policies which allow the goals of regulation to be 
achieved. Eskom' s governance should ideally have ensured that these goals played an important 
role in the Corporation's decision-making process. The remaining chapters of this study have 
shown, however, that Eskom's decision making was predicated on political imperatives and the 
rules of public utility regulation were largely subservient to these requirements. This conclusion 
alone suggests that the fourth hypothesis postulated in Chapter 1 of this study that Eskom lacked 
adequate regulatory oversight is proved. To add weight to this conclusion it is appropriate to now 
examine the mechanisms which were in place to regulate Eskom since its establishment to see if 
they constituted a sufficient platform for the adequate regulation of the Corporation. 
It was established in Chapter 2 that certain types of industry have historically been the subject of 
regulation. Electric utilities are one such industry. The history of electricity supply regulation in 
South Africa goes back to the Victoria Falls Power Company which operated as a monopoly 
under the Transvaal Power Act of 1910381 , see Chapter 3. 
With the establishment of Eskom the Transvaal Power Act was superseded by the Electricity Act 
of 1922. This act regulated Eskom and was concerned with the provision of the supply of 
abundant reliable cheap electricity for the mining industry, the railways and white-controlled 
municipalities. 
Under this act Eskom was to operate at neither a profit nor a loss; this rule was to remain in force 
until 1985 when a new operating philosophy was established for Eskom as a result of the de 
Villiers Commission of Inquiry into Electricity Supply in South Africa. Clearly under such a 
firm financial constraint, with no mention of marginal costing being made in the act, tariffs 
which reflected the normative preferred pricing regime for public utilities, i.e., marginal cost 
381 lbis act regulated the prices that the Victoria Falls Power Company could charge for electricity 
and depended on a controlled rebate system the size of which depended on the company's annual 
surplus profits, these profits being the balance of the revenue remaining after all expenses and 
certain agreed capital charges had been met. 
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pricing, would occur rather by accident than by design. Under this pricing rule it is doubtful then 
that the most efficient allocation of resources resulted. Furthermore the pricing of electricity was 
left entirely to Eskom' s managers as opposed to some independent agency that could have 
protected consumers from price abuses that could have arisen. Price regulation was therefore 
lacking under the Electricity Act of 1922. 
Eskom did, however, live up to its mandate to provide abundant power for South Africa. This 
service was in practice, however, limited to the delivery of power to white power blocs under the 
prevailing apartheid socio-economic system. Hence one of the most important characteristics of a 
pubic utility, and one always borne in mind in setting up regulatory norms (i.e., service provision 
to the entire community, social justice and equity) was also lacking under the regulatory measures 
provided by the Electricity Act of 1922 
Effectively then the state had created an enterprise in Eskom without central regulation in two 
key aspects of the service an economy could expect from an electric utility. What was a large 
problem, however, was the fact that this situation applied to the South African ESI in its entirety. 
The Electricity Act of 1922 did, however, leave the door open for private enterprise to supply 
electricity in South Africa. With Eskom's take-over of the Victoria Falls Power Company (see 
Chapter 3), however, Eskom became to all intents and purposes the monopoly supplier of 
electricity in South Africa, a situation under which diligent regulation is required. The 
Electricity Act of 1922 was not amended to allow more strict regulation of Eskom than that in 
force when the Victoria Falls Power Company also supplied power to South Africa and the act 
was, as shown, already weak in two key areas of public utility regulation. 
The Electricity Act of 1922 then created what can only be described as a rudimentary regulation 
system for Eskom and the South African ESI. The normative rules of public utility regulation are 
clear: where a monopolist supplier exists diligent and detailed regulatory oversight is necessary 
to protect consumers from monopolistic abuses and to ensure that the public accrues benefits that 
may arise from monopolistic supply such as decreasing costs (see Chapter 2). These rules do not 
seem to have been in force so far as Eskom was concerned under the electricity Act of 1922. 
The separate Electricity Control board that was established to resolve disputes between electricity 
suppliers and consumers was also rendered ineffectual by the Electricity Act of 1922 itself. This 
was because the act exempted many entities e.g., white municipalities from requiring a licence to 
supply electricity. As has been shown the ESI in South Africa became highly fragmented as a 
consequence, making the task of regulating it very difficult indeed, and effectively diluting the 
regulatory force that may have been brought to bear on Eskom and the ESI by the Electricity 
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Control Board. Furthermore, the Electricity Control Board had almost no power to regulate the 
tariffs charged for electricity by the various entities in the supply market. Both the Electricity 
Control Board and the 1922 Electricity Act were ineffective then with respect to regulating 
electricity pricing in South Africa; (Armstrong, Cowan and Vickers 1994, p. 13) and (Laffont 
and Tirole, 1992,p.19) emphasise the importance of controlling prices set for the provision of 
monopoly services in regulation theory. 
The prevailing regulatory system applicable Eskom and the South African ESI up to the de 
Villiers Commission of Inquiry in 1984 rather negated certain normative theories of public utility 
regulation, such as the Equity-Stability Theory and the Public Interest Theory, that have been 
developed to protect electricity consumers, see Chapter 2. Public outcry after 1980 against 
Eskom's tariffing policy and accusations that Eskom was a law unto itself, as reported in the 
press, seems to bear this out. 
The other regulatory presence governing Eskom's activities was the Minister in charge of the 
Corporation. His power to control Eskom was also very limited, however. Eskom was, for 
example, only required to report to him annually: he was, moreover, only empowered to react to 
Eskom's generation expansion plans and tariff structures, he had no power to set these tariffs or 
to influence Eskom's planning. 
A further complicating factor in regulating Eskom was that each of the Corporation's 
undertakings set their own tariffs and were responsible for their own financial wellbeing. 
Electricity tariffs were therefore different in various parts of South Africa making the Electricity 
Control Board's task and the Minister's ability to regulate Eskom very difficult, particularly with 
respect to commenting on how efficient and equitable such tariffs really were from the point of 
view of allocating scarce resources and improving social welfare, key ingredients in the 
regulation of a public utility (see Chapter 2). 
As described in Chapter 4 of this study, in the 1980's the state took a keener interest in the 
regulation of Eskom following the recommendations put forward by the de Villiers Commission. 
The ensuing rules under which Eskom was to be governed were, however, not geared to regulate 
Eskom along lines established to control the actions of a public utility, but rather to make the 
Corporation a more attractive target for privatisation. It is arguable whether the interests of 
individual electricity consumers were given due consideration in the formulation of Eskom's new 
operating procedure. 
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With respect to tariffing policies during this period, i.e., post the de Villiers Commission, 
operating under a more "business-like" approach to its consumers Eskom introduced a social 
compact into its pricing process. This essentially amounted to no more than a voluntary price cap 
which mayor may not have been based on marginal cost principles. The regulation of Eskom 
after the de Villiers Commission was also still concerned with the apartheid status quo and 
Eskom's social compact did little to alleviate the plight of the sixty per cent of the South African 
population that did not have electricity, again demonstrating a violation of the normative 
regulatory rules with respect to public utilities and the provision of services to the community as a 
whole. 
Eskom's behaviour in the period covered by this study can to some extent be explained by a 
poorly regulated control of the Corporation's budget maximisation policy, hence Eskom's 
massive generation expansion plan from the early 1970s and their subsequent excess generation 
capacity due to this overbuilding. The Averch-Iohnson effect (see Chapter 2) is in evidence here 
where growth would constitute a measure of success as seen in the eyes of the Corporation's 
managemene82, and serves to show how powerful and autonomous they really were. 
In conclusion it has been shown that since Eskom's establishment the Corporation's managers 
endeavoured to hold those charged with governing them at arm's length. Van der Bijl himself 
started this trend, and it continued. In Eskom's 1943 Annual Report for example the Corporation 
describes itself as operating outside political controe83. The fragmentation of the ESI also made 
the task of regulating Eskom more difficult and the Electricity Control Board and the Electricity 
Council which came after (following the restructuring of Eskom after the de Villiers 
Commission) had in effect limited powers to regulate Eskom. A particularly important situation 
that curtailed the ability of these bodies in regulating Eskom was that their members were drawn 
from diverse backgrounds and many of them had little detailed knowledge of governance as 
applied to an electric utility. They were furthermore usually political appointments. As a 
consequence their knowledge of power generation was, with few exceptions, inferior to that 
possessed by Eskom's managers, a situation that the literature on public utility regulation terms 
adverse selection (see Chapter 2). In addition these bodies met only once a month; they were 
then under a distinct disadvantage when it came to regulating Eskom and Eskom' s managers 
were the real force in Eskom's decision-making process. 
382 Although he does not identifY the Averch-Johnson effect by name, Christie, in his history of 
Eskom, alludes to this phenomenon. 
383 Although this has been shown to be a false statement in itself, the sentiment expressed is 
important with respect to how Eskom's managers viewed regulation and their own autonomy. 
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It is suggested therefore that the hypothesis that Eskom lacked adequate regulatory oversight has 
been proven. Weight is added to this assertion by the fact that Eskom has been described as a law 
unto itself in the press and even members of the NELF Working Group on the Restructuring and 
Regulation of the South African ESI arrived at a similar conclusion. It was this lack of 
regulatory oversight that allowed Eskom to become so autonomous and enabled the Corporation 
to always consider its own wellbeing in its decision-making process, when dealing with political 
imperatives such as the electrification of white-owned commercial farms and black households in 
South Africa as described in this study. 
4.0 THE WAY FORWARD 
One of the realities of Eskom's electrification programme and a basic element of this study was 
the qualitative and quantitative assessment of the changing form of newly connected electricity 
consumers' common life-styles and the macro-economic impact electrification had on the South 
African economy. Such changes force government and electricity suppliers alike to re-examine 
how electricity supply in South Africa should be managed and regulated in future. This re-
examination results not in a single conclusion but in several. In addition to the suggestions made 
above for dealing with the different aspects of energy policy four all-embracing suggestions for 
the way forward with respect to the electrification of black households and the regulation of 
Eskom are made below. These suggestions could equally be considered by any developing country 
about to embark on an electrification programme. The suggestions are as follows: 
1. A cohesive energy policy should be formulated for the future electrification of black 
households in South Africa. That the government should initiate such a policy is inherent 
from the "public goodness" characteristics of electricity presented in section 2.1 above and 
the arguments presented in section 2.2 above on energy policy. A cohesive energy policy 
would have to deal, inter alia with 1) Cross-subsidisation, 2) Electricity tariffs, 3) Funding 
for municipalities, 4) The fragmentation of the South African ESI, 5) Economic externalities. 
6) Affordability criteria, 7) Multiplicity of energy carriers, 8) Electricity supply rights and 9) 
The regulation of the energy sector of the South African economy. With respect to cross-
subsidisation it is important to note that whilst the government has made the electrification 
of black households a priority in its RDP programme up to the present time the electrification 
portion of the RDP has been successful only because of Eskom's ability to cross-subsidise it. 
2. The writing off of outstanding service debts, including those for electricity should be 
considered; this may help overcome two constraints to economic advancement in South 
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Africa; i.e., low economic growth and the skewed income distribution which limits 
opportunities for the poor sections of the community. With respect to the redistribution of 
wealth the benefits of writing off outstanding service debts are twofold. Firstly, debtors 
immediately accrue increased disposable income. Secondly, fiscal savings will also accrue as 
a consequence of the removal of the administrative burden of dealing with such debts. 
3. The question of the privatisation of Eskom, which was actively pursued in the period 1980 to 
1990, could also be re-examined. After all electricity has been shown to be a private good 
and Eskom may well operate in a more efficient manner as a private utility. Redistributing 
these industrial assets could be achieved by share issues to the public or by way of funds from 
the actual sale itself being used to enhance the programme to electrify black households. A 
problem that presents itself with privatisation is that a private utility may not willingly 
undertake non-profitable initiatives like the electrification of black households. It is 
important therefore that the money from a sale of the utility be used for this purpose. 
Subsidies for the continuation of the electrification programme would have to come from the 
fiscus. Government funding does, however, have distinct advantages so far as electrification 
is concerned. It can for example help the development plans of a utility to expand their 
services into unprofitable areas. This is the situation in India under the administration of the 
Rural Electrification Corporation. Furthermore, the system has the advantage that it 
encourages co-operation and co-ordination in policy formulation including the exchange of 
experience from one area to another and dialogue between government and service providers. 
4. With respect to the regulation of Eskom and the way ahead it is suggested that a single 
authority be set up to regulate public utilities in South Africa i.e., water, transport and 
telecommunications and, of course, Eskom. The advantages of this would be many, perhaps 
the most important being that the problem attached to "industry capture" (as outlined in 
Chapter 2) may be obviated. A single regulatory authority would also allow the sharing of 
expertise across boundaries thus enabling an experienced core of regulators to be developed 
in South Africa. Such an entity would make the efficient allocation of scarce resources via 
appropriate tariff structure design and addressing questions of equity with respect to services 
delivery an easier task to manage and aid in the delivery of a superior service to the general 
public and South African industry. 
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5.0 CONCLUDING NOTE 
In spite of the fact that the economic benefits initially estimated for Eskom's electrification 
programme were, as shown in this study, to be grossly inflated the electrification of black urban 
and rural areas of South Africa do lead to significant macro, micro and socio-economic benefits. 
These have to some extent been quantified in this study at least as far as the available historical 
data allows. These benefits will, however, be lagged. They will grow in magnitude as more 
electricity and appliances are bought over time and as black incomes increase to levels 
approaching those of whites in this country. The lagged time period has been shown to take at 
least five years before a reasonable level of electricity usage and electricity appliance ownership is 
achieved by black households. This means that each "electrification" consumer will, in all 
probability, require financial help for many years after the initial electricity connection has been 
made. 
Despite this an important connection can be discerned between the electrification of black 
households and the manufacturing and building sectors of the economy. Economic activity in 
these sectors is enhanced by the increased sales of electric appliances and the construction work 
required for infrastructural development that accompanies an electrification programme. 
Furthermore, growth in the national economy results from the indirect and induced effects of this 
activity within many, if not all, sectors of the economy via the multiplier effects which were 
estimated in Chapter 9. Eskom's electrification programme between 1990 and 1995 not only 
contributed to the social upliftment of the poorer elements of South African society then, but 
made a contribution to the country's GDP growth and much needed job creation as well. Just as 
electricity enabled the mining and manufacturing sectors to expand from the tum of the 20th 
Century, the programme to electrifY black households in South Africa today is contributing to 
growth in the manufacturing, building, civil engineering and other sectors of the economy. 
6.0 POSTSCRIPT 
In December 1998 a White Paper on the Energy Policy of the Republic of South Africa, prepared 
by the Department of Mineral and Energy Affairs was published. Part 3, (pp. 39-56) dealt with 
Electricity Supply. What can be discerned from the White Paper is that solutions are still required 
for the following critically important problem areas: 1) The Restructuring of the ESI, 2) The 
development of an electrification funding policy, 3) The development of a national electrification 
planning strategy within a cohesive energy policy framework, 4) Investigations into competition 
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within the ESI and, 5) The provision of a clearer legislative mandate and policy framework for 
the NER. 
What is of concern here is that this study has shown that these issues had been largely identified 
as early as 1993 with the founding ofthe NELF. It can therefore be concluded that slow progress 
is being made in dealing with the problems of electricity supply in South Africa and this could 
jeopardise the sustainability of the electrification of black households throughout the country. 
With respect to the crucial restructuring of the ESI the White Paper states that "the distribution 
sector of the industry is highly fragmented with more than 400 distributors, resulting in low 
efficiencies, high costs, wide disparities in tariffs, and financial viability problems in many 
distributors", (p.3a). This was precisely the position identified by the NELF in 1994. If any way 
out of this impasse is to be found it has to entail a transformation of the South Mrican ESI from 
fragmentation to integration. It is suggested that such a transformation is required in any event if 
the ESI is to be adequately regulated with the public good in mind. 
With respect to the formulation of a cohesive energy policy for the electrification of black 
households, the nearest the White Paper got was the statement that "government intends to 
address these problems by developing a detailed strategy", (p.46). The strategy cited concerning 
the provision of off-grid technologies such as photovoltaics and others, with respect to costly rural 
electrification as opposed to urban electrification. It is suggested that this approach may fall short 
of the mark. This is because of the diverse policy issues arising from problems attached to 
electrification progranunes, some of which have been raised in this study, and commented upon 
in this chapter. A cohesive energy policy involving all these issues should therefore be developed 
if the efficient use of South Mrica' s scarce resources is to be achieved and social upliftment 
amongst previously disadvantaged groups by means of an electrification programme is to occur. 
That government initiates such a policy is crucial since any attempt to redistribute economic 
opportunity in South Africa by means of an electrification programme cannot be left to Eskom 
alone, no matter how well-intentioned their efforts are, or have been, in the past. 
This problem has now been recognised however. From late 1999 future electrification 
programmes are going to be jointly planned and managed by Eskom, the NER and the 
Department of Mineral and Energy Affairs, by means of a National Electrification Co-ordinating 
Committee, reported in Business Day (lOth October 1999) and Eskom News (an internal Eskom 
newsletter) (November 1999). This being the major change that has occurred in the management 
of the electrification of black households in South Mrica since 1995. Eskom will, however, still 
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have to contribute R 300 million/year towards electrification so the question of cross-
subsidisation of the programme remains. 384 
Not withstanding this latest development from the issues raised in the December 1998 White 
Paper on energy policy in South Africa and the problems attached to the regulation of Eskom and 
the ESI it is suggested that the financial, economic efficiency and equity problems associated with 
the electrification of black households in South Africa identified in this chapter still obtain and 
have to be solved and the way forward for the electrification of black households and the 
regulation of Eskom proposed here still has currency as the new millennium commences. 
384 Telephonic interview with Mr 1. van Gass 5th December 1999. With respect to the fmancial 
viability problems attached to the electrification of black households mentioned in the 1998 
energy White Paper Mr van Gass stated that these arose from costs of connecting rural consumers 
to the national grid and the low electricity demand of these newly connected consumers. This does 
explain the reference to off-grid technologies in the White Paper and confirms statements 
regarding the high costs of rural connections and low electricity demand made in this study. 
APPENDIX A 
INPUT-OUTPUT ANALYSIS: AN OVERVIEW 
Al 
1.0 HISTORICAL BACKGROUND 
Input-output (1-0) analysis was developed by the late Professor Wassily Leontiefin the 1930s. In 
1973 he received the Nobel Prize in Economic Science for this work. The fundamental purpose of 
1-0 analysis is to capture the interdependence of industries in an economy; economic 
interdependence then lies at the heart of 1-0 modelling. This concept will be expanded upon 
below. 
The first attempt at formulating an inter-industry model was undertaken much earlier, however, by 
Francois Quesnay in France in 1758. As a result of this work Quesnay published his "Tableau 
Economic". This table describes how expenditures can be traced through an economy in an 
orderly fashion. Quesnay used as an example the expenditure pathway of a sum of money 
received as rent by a landowner; the landowner spending half the sum on different agricultural 
products and half on the products of artisans. Farmers in turn bought industrial products and 
artisans bought food and raw materials. 
Although Quesnay's work was not well received in his lifetime, in fact it was suggested that "it be 
reduced to an embarrassed footnote" (Gray, 1931),1-0 analysis is today "one of the most widely 
applied methods in economics" (Miller and Blair, 1985, p. 1). 
2.0 ECONOMIC INTERDEPENDENCE 
A change in the final demand for the output of a particular sector of an economy affects the entire 
economy because of the interdependence of the sectors that make up that economy; Such a change 
not only has a direct influence on the output of the relevant sector then, but it impacts most (if not 
all) other sectors of the economy as well. This change in final demand therefore causes a ripple 
effect throughout the entire economy. One of the main objectives of 1-0 analysis is to study this 
ripple effect by determining the direct as well as the indirect and induced effects of a change in the 
final demand for a sector's output on the whole economy. 
The direct effect can be defined as the value of the inputs purchased by the relevant industry from 
all the other industries (including itself) in order to produce an output of Rl and can be represented 
by the so-called technical coefficients of an 1-0 table. Unfortunately these technical coefficients 
cannot be directly applied to represent higher order effects (the ripple effect) arising from the 
change in final demand because they only explain the direct or first-order effects. Other 
coefficients, referred to as the interdependent coefficients, have to be calculated to study second-
or higher- order effects (or the so-called indirect and induced effects). 
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3.0 MULTIPLIER ANALYSIS 
Economists have long been interested in measuring the total impact of changes in final demand 
(the ripple effect) on, for example, income and production. One of the more practical technical 
analytic techniques for doing this is by multiplier analysis, an approach developed by JM Keynes 
from the initial research done by RS Kahn. The Keynesian income and employment multipliers 
are, however, highly aggregated. Consequently the possibilities of applying these multipliers for 
analytic and policy purposes are limited. The 1-0 system, however, offers a method that can be 
used to disaggregate these global multipliers and improve the identification of the causal factors, 
which underpin the increased economic activity resulting from any autonomous change in final 
demand. The principal factors that determine the 1-0 multipliers are the industrial structure 
(technical coefficients) and the final demand structure of an economy. 
4.0 MULTIPLIERS 
1-0 multipliers can measure the ripple effect of an exogenous variable on an economy. This 
measurement can be refined if the indirect and the induced impacts as well as the direct effects are 
taken into account. Measurement of the multiplier effect can be done in terms of GDP, 
employment creation, and many other macro-economic variables. 
5.0 INPUT-OUTPUT MODELS 
There are two basic 1-0 models, these being the open model and the closed model. 
5.1 The Open Model 
An open model is defined as an 1-0 model that includes only the producing sectors of an economy. 
This means that only the interindustry ratios are used in the computation of the interdependent 
coefficients. In an open model a change in the income of households, for example, will have no 
effect on expenditure on private consumer goods and services. An open model multiplier cannot 
then give a complete picture of the economic impact (the ripple effect) occasioned by a change in 
final demand. 
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5.2 The Closed Model 
A closed model includes the effect of the indirect behaviour of households. The output row in an 
1-0 table defining households in the closed model shows the income derived by households from 
each sector in the form of wages, salaries and investment income. The input column representing 
households shows the purchases made by households from other sectors. Where the household 
column and the household row meet this figure shows the sales by households to each other (for 
example the services of domestic servants). Simply put the closed 1-0 model includes households 
in the intersectoral flow matrix for the whole economy giving a more complete picture of the 
ripple effect than does an open model. 
6.0 INPUT-OUTPUT MODELLING 
6.1 The Rationale 
The rationale behind 1-0 modelling is that many economic problems cannot be solved by the mere 
manipulation of macro-economic aggregates. Such problems require the quantitative detail of the 
interdependence of the various sectors of the economy to be exposed and submitted to the 
economic problems under consideration. 1-0 modelling allows this to be done. 
6.2 Characteristics of Input-Output Modelling 
The distinctive characteristics of the 1-0 approach are the following: 
a) Specific relationships between economic sectors are empirically determined given the existing 
technology; 
b) The characteristics of the economy are not concealed by variables such as total industrial 
production, total industrial employment, average price levels, and total gross domestic 
product, instead specific measurements are given for each sector of the economy. This means 
that more detailed answers can be obtained from 1-0 analysis than from using aggregated 
multipliers like the Keynesian multiplier; 
c) The detailed nature of the basic 1-0 approach provides a highly flexible framework for the 
solution of economic problems. The amount of detail can be adapted to the requirements of a 
particular analysis; and finally 
d) The approach can be applied to a broad spectrum of problems, including quantitative 
problems associated with changes in the structure of an economy such as, for example, the 
electrification of black households in South Africa. 
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6.3 General Assumptions for Input-Output Modelling 
It is assumed that every product or group of products is supplied by a single industry; that a unique 
method is used for the manufacture of the products; and that every industry manufactures only one 
primary product. This means that the inputs of every individual industry are considered to be a 
linear function of the production of that industry. It is also assumed that the total effect of 
production by different industries equals the sum of the effects of the production of individual 
industries. 
7.0 LIMITATIONS OF INPUT-OUTPUT ANALYSIS 
One of the most serious concerns in 1-0 modelling for applied purposes, such as undertaken in this 
study, is that technical coefficients in 1-0 tables may reflect data from an earlier period. For 
example the United States 1-0 table based upon 1977 transactions between and among sectors of 
the economy was not available to analysts until 1984 (Miller and Blair, 1985). 
Time lags such as this reflect the fact that when enterprises are surveyed for information 
concerning purchases for their production processes and sales of their output it takes a great deal 
of time and money to obtain the data, organise it and produce an 1-0 table. 
Clearly production processes can, and do, change over time because of such things as 
technological advances, increasing demand for products and new product development. Relative 
prices can also change causing substitution among inputs into production processes. For such 
reasons the technical coefficient matrix of an 1-0 table will in reality change over time. 
In using an 1-0 system for forecasting it is assumed that the technical coefficients remain constant 
for the forecast period. This implies of course that neither input substitution, owing to price 
changes, nor technological change takes place. 1-0 models therefore are "static" models. 
The empirical question of concern is therefore how quickly does the coefficient matrix change? 
and perhaps more importantly, how much difference does this change make to the results obtained 
from 1-0 modelling? 
Carter (quoted in Miller and Blair, 1985. pp. 267-269) addressed these problems with regard to the 
US economy, it appeared that in most sectors structural change was very gradual. His findings 
support the contention that 1-0 tables may remain useful for a number of years, even though the 
year in which they were formulated may make them seem out of date and not useful for 
undertaking economic analysis. 
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1-0 tables are, moreover, updated on a regular basis to take into account structural change in an 
economy. The limitations discussed above should therefore not deter economic analysts using 1-0 
tables which may seem at first glance outdated. The tables used in this study were published in 
1993 and therefore fall midway in the 1990-1995 period over which the historical macro-economic 
impact of Eskom's programme to electrify black households was estimated, they are therefore 
eminently suitable for use in this study. 
8.0 MATHEMATICAL EXPOSITION OF THE INPUT-OUTPUT 
SYSTEM l 
8.1 The Input-Output Table 
The basic table of the 1-0 system, which is known as the transactions table, provides values 
reflecting the different economic flows characterising the economy in a particular year. It shows 
how the output from an industry is divided between the different industries and the final demand. 
At the same time it also shows each industry's inputs from other industries and primary inputs. A 
concise schematic representation of the South African 1-0 table is supplied in Table Al below. 
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8.2 Schematic Exposition of an Input-Output Table 
Quadrant I shows the flows of goods and services produced and consumed in the current 
production process, the interindustry flows. 
Quadrant II shows the final demand components for the output of each industry. Final demand is 
made up of private consumption expenditure (C), government expenditure (G), gross domestic 
fixed investment (K), inventory change (V), exports (E), and imports (Q) which are subtracted. 
Quadrant III shows the primary inputs of manufacturing industries. 
Quadrant IV shows the primary inputs that are directly integrated with final demand. 
The interpretation of the table can be summarised as follows: 
1) To read off the value of the purchases of one industry or sector from another, fmd the column 
under the name of the industry or sector doing the buying and then find the place in the 
column where it meets the row assigned to the industry or sector doing the selling. The value 
given at this intersection is the one sought. 
2) To read off the value of sales of one industry or sector to another, first find the selling industry 
or sector on the left of the table and then find the place in the relevant row where it meets the 
column under the name of the industry or sector doing the purchasing. The value given at this 
intersection is the one sought. 
8.3 Mathematics of the Input-Output System 
Quadrant I: Intermediate demand/output 
Xij the sales of intermediate goods manufactured in industry i and consumed by industry j 
Quadrant II: Final demand/output 
GDP F C + G + K + V + E Q (at market prices) 
=> f 1 Ci + gi + ki + Vi + ei qi 
sales of industry i to final demand. 
where Ci final sales/output of industry i to households 
gi current purchases/inputs of government from industry i 
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ki value of the proportion of gross fixed investment manufactured by 
industry i 
Vi change in inventories of output of industry i 
ei exports of industry i 
qi imported proportion of intermediate and final sales/output of industry i 
Quadrants I and ll: Intermediate demand/output plus final demand/output 
Xi ~Xij + fi 
) 
intermediate demand/output plus fmal demand/output of industry i, for j = 1, ... , n 
total production/output of industry i, for j = 1, ... , n. 
Quadrant ill: Primary inputs 
GDP 
where: 
y 
=> Yj 
w· J 
w + P + T 
w· J + pj + 1-J 
s (at market prices) 
Sj 
purchases of primary inputs by industry j, 
remuneration of employees in industry j; 
pj gross operating surplus in industry j (i.e., the net operating surplus 
before provision for depreciation); 
tj indirect tax paid by industry j; and 
Sj subsidies received by industry j from government. 
Quadrants ill and IV: Primary inputs plus final demand/output 
Xj ~Xij + Yj 
1 
pnmary inputs plus final demand/output of industry j, for i = 1, ... , n 
total production/inputs of industry j, for i = 1, ... , n. 
Total gross input and output (equilibrium condition): 
X J 
=> ~Xij + fi 
) 
for all i = j 
~Xij + Yj 
1 
for all i = j 
=> Gross production/output of industry i = gross production/input of industry j, 
for all i = j. 
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8.4 Input Coefficients or the Technical Coefficient Matrix 
A table of technical coefficients can be derived from an 1-0 table that has been compiled for a 
particular year. A technical coefficient represents the value of the input(s) purchased by one 
industry from another (or from itself) in order to produce an output ofRI. Technical coefficients 
are only calculated for quadrants I and III,. which represent the manufacturing industries and 
primary inputs, the coefficients being usually expressed in monetary units as the direct 
requirements per Rl gross output of an industry. 
To calculate the technical coefficients, every column entry for a particular industry in Quadrants I 
and III is simply divided by the gross output of that industry. The formula for the calculation of 
the technical coefficients can therefore be derived as follows from Table AI. 
aij xijIXj for all i = I, ... , n; j = I, ... , n 
input coefficients per RI gross output (direct requirements per RI gross output). 
8.5 Interdependence or Inverse Coefficients 
As explained already, a change in the final demand for the output of an industry affects the entire 
economy because of the interdependence of the industries and sectors that make up that economy. 
Also as previously mentioned, interdependence coefficients have to be calculated to study second-
or higher- order effects. 
For example, manufacturing will buy inputs directly from the other industries if there is an 
increase in the final demand for manufacturing output. These purchases, however, will induce 
other industries to purchase inputs from each other in order that they may manufacture the inputs 
which they supply to manufacturing. Thus the initial increase in the final demand for 
manufacturing output causes a ripple effect throughout the entire economy. The technical 
coefficients can be used as follows to derive the inverse coefficients from the ratios given in Table 
AI. The total final demand for the outputs of the industries in an economy can be defined as a 
column vector F such that: 
F C+G+K+V+E-Q 
The matrix of technical coefficients can be defined as follows: 
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r all alj aln 
A ail aij ain 
The column vector of industry production or output is: 
x 
The production achieved by each individual industry after the first -order effect has spent itself can 
be obtained by multiplying the technical-coefficients matrix by the final demand column vector as 
follows: 
x(l) AF, 
where X<l) = the first-order changes in output/production. 
The second-order effect is: 
X<2) Ax<l), and so on. 
Comparison of the first-order effect with the second and higher-order effects will reveal that the 
higher the order of the effect, the smaller its value becomes until it eventually tends towards zero. 
The effect at any level is obtained by multiplying the effect at the immediately previous lower 
level by the technical-coefficients matrix. The total effect can be obtained by summing the effects 
at all the levels. 
This means that 
F (initial change in final demand) 
AF 
AJrI) 
AJr2) 
The total of the different effects is: 
AlO 
x<0) + X<I) + X<2) + X<3) + ... + x<nl, and is denoted Xn. 
It follows that 
X n F + AF + A2F + A3F + ..... + AnF 
[I + A + A2 + A3 + ..... + An] F, 
Where 1 = the identity matrix, which is a matrix having zero values for all its elements except 
those on the main diagonal which have a value of 1. 
Where the order (n) of the vector of production Xn obtained above is relatively large, that vector is 
for all practical purposes the same as the value obtained where the vector of final demand is 
multiplied by the inverse coefficients. By approximation the inverse-coefficients matrix equals: 
(1- A).I 1 + A + A2 + A3 + ..... + An 
rij rin R 
rnl rnj 
The A and R matrices are used for calculating the direct, direct and indirect, and direct, indirect 
and induced (1-0 table closed) multipliers used to determine the impact (the ripple effect) on the 
entire economy from a change in [mal demand in anyone sector of that economy. How these 
multipliers are calculated is shown below. 
All 
8.6 Calculation of Multipliers used in the Study 
Industry income multipliers, reflect the change in value added (GOP) that is directly, indirectly 
and derivatively attributable to an autonomous change in the demand for the fmal output of an 
industry. Industry income multipliers are calculated by multiplying the matrices of the input and 
inverse coefficients, element -wise across the columns, by the total primary input coefficients of 
the relevant industry (representing the column), i.e., Y/Xi, where Yi = Wi + Pi + ti - Si. 
Three types of income multipliers can be distinguished: 
(i) y.D J Laij Yi / Xi Direct impact 
(ii) y.I J Lrij Yi / Xi Direct and indirect impact 
(iii) y.A J Lrij Yi / Xi Direct indirect and induced impact, where rij and Yi 
are closed for households. 
Industry import multipliers are calculated by substituting the imports for industry i for Yi in the 
equations for income multipliers given above. In performing the calculations an 1-0 table with 
import leakages shown as a separate row is required. The South African 1993 1-0 Table is 
structured in this fashion. 
Industry employment multipliers show the number of workers required from an autonomous 
change in fmal demand for the output of an industry. The assumption that full employment in the 
economy prevails. Industry employment multipliers can also be calculated by substituting the 
employment for industry i for Yi in the equations for income multipliers above. 
These three types of multiplier were calculated for use in the analysis undertaken in Chapter 9 of 
this study. These multipliers estimate the value of the appropriate economic indicator when 
multiplied by the relevant change in final demand. For example, the GOP multiplier when 
multiplied by the change in final demand for household appliances, i.e., the purchase of household 
appliances, provides the income (GOP) earned by that industry from the purchases of such 
appliances in any particular year. The multipliers calculated are shown in the tables below, 
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9.0 MULTIPLIERS USED FOR DETERMINING THE MACRO-
ECONOMIC IMPACT OF ESKOM'S ELECTRIFICATION 
PROGRAMME: 1990 - 1995 
ECONOMIC SECTOR DIRECT & DIRECT. INDIRECT INDIRECT & INDUCED 
Electricity 0.9411 1.3905 
Radio & television 0.7854 1.4500 
Electrical appliances 1.0020 1.7969 
Building construction 0.8516 1.6423 
Civil engineerUng 0.8768 1.6269 
GDP MULTIPLIERS2 
ECONOMIC SECTOR DIRECT & DIRECT, INDIRECT INDIRECT & INDUCED 
Electricity 0.0601 0.1196 
Radio & television 0.2091 0.2971 
Electrical appliances 0.3190 0.4243 
Building construction 0.1539 0.2586 
Civil engineerUng 0.1305 0.2586 
IMPORT MULTIPLIERS3 
Multipliers derived from the 1993 South African National Input-Output Tables 
Multipliers derived from the 1993 South African National Input-Output Tables 
4 
ECONOMIC SECTOR 
Electricity 
Radio, television & 
electrical appliances 
Building construction & 
civil engineering 
s skilled worker 
sis semi-skilled worker 
lis low-skilled worker 
s 
sis 
lis 
s 
sis 
lis 
s 
sis 
lis 
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DIRECT & DIRECT, 
INDIRECT INDIRECT & INDUCED 
0.8570 2.1130 
2.8361 6.8553 
2.8732 6.6554 
3.5265 5.4170 
10.5310 16.4860 
8.7287 14.3324 
2.4060 4.6150 
11.2908 18.2117 
9.5841 16.0894 
EMPLOYMENT MULTIPLIERS4 
Multipliers are derived from data given in South African Competitiveness Monitor VoL II, WEF A 
Group, Pretoria: 1996. The table shows multipliers in jobs per million rand of [mal demand in 1995 
rands. Adjustments to these multipliers for the relative value of the rand in different years have 
been made in calculating the job creation potential of Eskom's programme to electrify black 
households in South Africa in the period 1990 - 1995. 
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Bl 
A TOWNSHIP_ IS ELECTRIFIED: 
B2 
STREET LIGHTING: 
A POLE MOUNTED TRANSFORMER: 
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